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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis explores the ways in which those who have experienced psychosis engage with and 
respond to film texts which feature psychosis; it draws upon screen theory and cultural theory to 
combine analysis of film content with reception analysis. Adopting a Foucauldian critical 
discourse analysis approach, (Jäger and Maier 2009) I employ textual analysis to examine the 
construction of psychosis in three key areas.  Firstly, the naming of clinical psychosis is explored 
through an examination of policy documents. Secondly, a broad range of texts from the inception 
of film to the present day are analysed to investigate film images and narratives of both named 
and inferred ‘psychosis’. Ethical guidelines were observed in recruiting and carrying out twenty-
four semi-structured interviews with respondents who have experienced psychosis (Koivisto et al 
2001, Davies 2005, Horsfall et al 2007, Keogh & Daly 2009). The transcripts of these interviews 
provide the basis for my third area of discourse analysis; they are explored to determine 
respondents’ attitudes towards psychosis and films that feature it. In this study I argue that 
different hierarchies of discourse and procedures of power operate in the three distinct areas 
through mechanisms of nomination and exclusion (Fairclough 2009). Audience analysis reveals 
that respondents use film texts in order to make sense of and associatively re-create their 
experiences of psychosis. Making an original contribution to the field, I have identified the ways 
in which respondents appropriate specific texts as ‘evocative’ readings. Here, films which do not 
denotatively feature images/narratives of psychosis are read as highly relevant to respondents’ 
experiences of psychosis. My thesis makes a valuable contribution to audience studies by 
bringing together three areas of study in a way that has not been done before. It explores the 
interaction between audience and text and gives voice to a respondent cohort which has 
historically been marginalised. The concept of ‘evocative’ reading also enables me to challenge 
prior emphases on the ‘accurate’ representation of psychosis in popular film (Ritterfeld & Jin 
2006, Pirkis et al 2006). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Before introducing the content of my thesis I would like to begin by considering the use of 
language within its pages. I am mindful that the language I have used in relation to psychosis is 
the subject of much debate and many differing opinions. Lourdes Rodriguez del Barrio argues 
that “the terms developed to describe this experience, and the practices designed to help 
psychosis sufferers face it, have many pitfalls” (2007:139). She emphasises that language use 
reflects theories and practices which derive from a wider socio-historical context and 
acknowledges that whilst terminology is the result of “attempts to understand, make sense of, 
cope with, and master…suffering, the unknown and the strange” it can also be “a source of pain, 
exclusion, reclusion [and] incomprehension” (2007:139). David Oaks, co-founder and former 
director of Mindfreedom, a social change movement which campaigns for human rights in the 
mental health system, admits that the group “has wrestled with language for decades, and there is 
no consensus. There may never be”.  He argues that it is impossible to find language that is 
‘correct’ or ‘perfect’ but considers the “fascinating, frustrating, ongoing discussion” about 
language to be a solution, of sorts, acting as “a wonderful antidote to the falsehood of certainty” 
(2012 online). Oaks campaigns against the use of the term “mental illness”, however, 
considering it to be emblematic of a medical model which views normality as a construct. This 
closely mirrors Michel Foucault’s view:  
 
The very notion of “mental illness” is the expression of an attempt doomed from the outset.  
What is called “mental illness” is simply alienated madness, alienated in the psychology 
that it has itself made possible (1976:76).   
 
Oaks provides a whole series of alternative terms which he considers to be more inclusive and 
creative.  My preferred terminology from this list is “user of mental health services”; I also refer 
to “person who has experienced psychosis” throughout my thesis.  
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Perhaps controversially, I have used the terms ‘mad’ and ‘madness’. ‘Madness’ is a word which 
has been re-claimed by psychiatric service users to challenge a medical model and is embodied 
by the organisation Mad Pride, a user led, independent network for those who have experienced 
mental distress (Beresford et al 2010:21). Simon Cross argues that the term ‘madness’ side-steps 
“the reductionist tendencies of clinical psychiatric language” and problematises “the 
pathologising implications of phrases such as ‘mental illness”’ (2010:3).  He challenges the 
widely supported medical view that ‘tabloid’ terminology for psychiatric patients is derogatory 
(Wahl, 2003, Byrne 2009a), considering it to be useful as an expression of “popular 
consciousness that contradicts what science tells us about ‘mental illness’” (2010: 11).  Both 
Cross and Davi Johnson concur with Roy Porter that the term ‘mad’ is irreplaceable. Johnson 
feels that the term is useful in suggesting “an agnosticism with regards to the ontology of mental 
illness” (2008:45).  Porter acknowledges that the term ‘mad’ is unsatisfactory but believes that 
this usefully draws attention to its shortcomings (2002:6). He considers the value of the term to 
be its resonance and applicability to the everyday; he concludes that “it is widely applied to 
many people besides the clinically certifiable and includes all manner of abnormalities and 
extremes of thought and emotion…No synonym or euphemism is half so evocative” (1991:xi).  
It is in this spirit that I employ it in my thesis.  
 
The introduction to my thesis will delineate its aims.  It will contextualise it alongside the work 
of others in closely related fields and will explain how it makes a contribution to existing studies.  
It will include a summary of the thematic structures of my chapters and will distil key debates 
and theoretical arguments contained within them.  
 
THE FASCINATION OF PSYCHOSIS 
 
My thesis sets out to investigate clinical discourses that construct psychosis.  The findings will 
be used as a point of comparison when analysing dominant filmic discourse surrounding 
psychosis. My thesis will build upon this knowledge to examine how those who have 
experienced psychosis respond to and interpret both discourse areas; in doing so it will provide 
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insight in to how power and discourse operate in three separate cultural sites. Patrick Fuery 
argues that “in some ways psychosis is the least penetrable of the psychical disturbances.  The 
level of resistance to understanding and interpretation make it difficult, sometimes impossible to 
explicate. To a certain extent this is all the more reason to engage in it” (2003:73). It is, perhaps, 
a degree of challenge that draws me towards an exploration of psychosis. Michael Fleming and 
Roger Manvell describe ‘madness’ as:  
 
A condition that stands in opposition to reason and sanity.  It provokes fundamental 
questions about our place in, and understanding of, the world…The very occurrence of 
madness seems to generate questions about the nature of the human being (1985:17).  
 
The elemental nature of psychosis makes it a fascinating object of study. Fuery argues that this 
fascination has been exerted over centuries (2003:8) and that cinema reflects multiple historical 
and cultural discourses of madness, sometimes in anomalous or anachronistic ways (2003:32). 
Shorter considers that  “before the end of the 18th century there was no such thing as psychiatry” 
but “psychiatric illness is as old as the human condition” (1997:1); an exploration of the dynamic 
nature of psychiatric discourse is an important aspect of my work. By incorporating a historical 
dimension I hope to challenge presentism and avoid a tendency to interpret past events in terms 
of modern values and concepts. John Wing considers that madness:  
 
Can stand for every variety of unreason from foolery to psychosis and for any set of ideas 
or actions that is unacceptable or incomprehensible in terms of traditional social norms.  
Consequently ‘madness’ has a shifting connotation.  It carries different meanings 
according to the epoch, the society and the social group involved, and according to the 
interests and preconceptions of the person who is using it (2010:2). 
 
I acknowledge that representations of psychosis may have a cultural legacy; Cross argues that 
“we…are historical subjects and this means that our own twenty-first century engagement with 
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past images of madness brings our own historical consciousness to bear on their reading” 
(2010:69). The acknowledgement that contemporary representation is inflected by what has gone 
before also guards against reflectionism, or the assumption that the ‘reality’ of psychosis pre-
exists its screen representation.  
 
I have chosen to base my study upon film because, as Roy Stafford argues, the film text is an 
important site in the “struggle over questions of identity” (2007:81).  I also consider film to have 
an affinity with psychosis. Stephanie Brown Clark links the historical development of film with 
medicine, arguing that cinema emerged partially as a result of technology designed to appraise 
the human body (2004:134).  She considers both to have a “fascination with life”, particularly 
the “visible” (2004: 129). I have included texts from early in film history to the present day in 
my study; the earliest is The Cabinet of Doctor Caligari, (1920), the most recent is Silver Linings 
Playbook, (2012). Fleming and Manvell argue that, from its early inception, film has proved to 
be “peculiarly suitable” for handling the “intimate psychological” aspects of madness (1985:18). 
Their argument is key in view of Brown Clark’s assertion that the cinematic focus is pre-
occupied with “the explicitly and floridly abnormal or monstrous” (2004:131). She extends the 
concept of the ‘monstrous’ to the psyche, arguing that the cinematic monster “reflects the public 
and scientific desire to visualize not only the body but the soul” (2004:134). The ongoing 
struggle to challenge filmic representation that links psychosis with ‘monstrosity’ or ‘deviance’ 
is central to my thesis. The next sections of the chapter will justify why my research is necessary 
and of interest and will contextualise it in relation to the work of others in closely related fields.  
 
WHY CONSIDERING THE VIEWS OF THOSE WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED 
PSYCHOSIS IS IMPORTANT 
 
Anthony Clare refers to the “constant” and “insatiable” interest shown by the media in 
“psychological” matters; he believes that this reflects public interest and offers up both problems 
and opportunities for those whose lives are influenced by mental health issues (1992:2). Whether 
this continuous and “insatiable” media interest is real or perceived is subject to debate; Claire 
Bithell points out that psychiatry receives less media coverage than general medicine (2010:4), 
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an indication, from the outset, that the field of psychiatric media representation is characterised 
by contradictory statements which may, or may not, have validity. A seeming constant, however, 
is that media coverage “is often negative in tone” (Bithell 2010:4). Bithell quantifies media 
coverage of psychiatry as being “four times as negatively framed” as general medicine (2010:4). 
There is wide acceptance that mental health coverage in the media focuses on criminal or violent 
acts (Bithell 2010:4) and the relationship between mental health and violence has been the 
subject of extensive study. Ann Rogers and David Pilgrim argue that a “complicated inter-
relationship between clinical factors, personality factors and contextual factors” has revealed 
conflicting evidence which both supports and contests a link (2005:204). They summarise the 
results as follows:  
 
Taken as a whole population, people with mental health problems, even those who have 
had inpatient stays, are actually less dangerous than their non-mentally ill neighbours.  
However, within this total population some patients are predictably violent.  Risk factors 
which raise the probability of violence include the following: The use of illicit drugs and/or 
alcohol…those patients with command hallucinations [and]…those with a diagnosis of 
anti-social personality disorder (2001:197).  
 
They emphasise, however, that:  
 
The conflation of violence with mental illness and its expression in language, its 
importance as a cultural construct and its impact on the everyday lives of people with 
psychiatric diagnoses are…worthy of our attention.  There is evidence, for example, that 
psychiatric patients internalize the stigma of dangerousness in a way which comes to 
impact negatively on their self-image (2005:209). 
 
Addressing potential stigma, including and beyond the media staple of linking violence and 
mental distress, is necessary in relation to a group that Pilgrim and Rogers describe as “devalued 
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individuals with precarious rights of citizenship” (2001:195). To this end I adopt a cultural 
studies approach, which Natalie Fenton argues is prompted by “a concern with a critique of the 
configuration of culture and society” and the aim of achieving “social transformation” (2007:16).  
The experience of psychosis is central to debates about disability, normality and power (Davis, 
2013:1) and activism within the disability movement (Lewis 2013: 115). Alison Wilde argues 
that disability studies scholars largely concur that disability representation is problematic and 
“that there is little cultural recognition of disabled lives” (2010:34). Dan Goodley and David Bolt 
also note that “hitherto, the relationship between disability studies and literary and cultural 
studies has, at least in the UK, been a weak one” (2010:2).  For this reason they argue that it is 
“more necessary than ever” to analyse disability as “a social and cultural phenomenon” (2010:2). 
Briant et al’s study, which concludes that there are “fewer articles in which disabled people are 
presented in a sympathetic manner”, confirms the need for work in this area (2013: 874).  
 
My study is concerned with representation but also with an analysis of the stylistic and structural 
features of the film text (see Chapter 4), areas that are considered under-developed in relation to 
disability studies work (Hoeksema and Smit 2001:36). Fenton argues that “both pleasure and 
ideology are constantly at work when we consume culture and the dilemma of how to understand 
the tension between them is at the centre of progressive cultural theory” (2007: 24). Film as 
entertainment and the aesthetic and textual pleasures it offers are considered in both chapter 5 
(p150) and in relation specifically to audience response in Chapter 6 (see interviews with Tina 
and Tom p232, p234) Whilst Byrne acknowledges the “highly filmic” nature of psychosis, 
therefore, (2009a:293), Bithell argues that the “mental health community” do “not always have 
realistic expectations of the way the media works” (2010:12). My thesis is underpinned by a 
desire to explore the interface between the politics of mental health representation and the 
specific characteristics of the film text.  
 
This thesis supports the on-going process of looking at the representation of mental health issues 
in the media. Significant bodies of research include that of Greg Philo on local Scottish and 
national media output (1999:136) and Otto Wahl on children’s media and journalism (2003, 
2004). The thesis supplements work on mental health representation which uses a Foucauldian 
7	  
	  
framework; this is not common but is exemplified by Davi Johnson’s Foucauldian analysis of the 
TV series Monk (2008). Johnson’s reliance upon Foucauldian theory proves illuminating, 
revealing a shift in representation to celebrate the neurodiversity of mental illness as enriching 
which Johnson argues is conflated with Neo-liberalist discourses of capitalism and control 
(2008:44). My thesis develops knowledge specifically in the area of cinematic representation.  It 
adds to the work of Fleming and Manvell (1985) and Gabbard and Gabbard (1999) which 
considers psychiatry in film from its inception. Both of these pairings fuse the work of a mental 
health specialist and a film specialist; Peter Byrne, a psychiatrist who has also taught film 
studies, continues this combined approach, in the present (2009a). Whilst I stay with film, 
however, my focus shifts to consider the perspective of the service user, an area that is under-
developed in current research. Existing and on-going work on the representation of psychiatric 
discourse in film tends to consider it from the perspective of the mental health professional, 
particularly in terms of how useful it might be as a teaching tool (Bhugra 2003, Byrne 2000, 
2003, 2009, Subodh and Tandon 2011, Darbyshire and Baker 2012). Research concentrates on 
textual features and their relation to medical ‘truth’, leaving both production and audience 
perspectives relatively unexplored. Greg Philo emphasises that in avoiding both text based 
studies can offer only limited conclusions (2007a:175). There is a tendency to foreground the 
possibility of negative media effect in the absence of an analysis of audience response (Wahl 
2003, Sieff, 2003, Clarke, 2004). Bithell, for example, asserts that “audiences tend to take 
messages about mental illness from the media they favour more or less at face value” (2010:4)· 
There is also a tendency to underestimate audience response. Simon Wessely asserts that “it 
would be naïve to think that just knowing more means the public would have a better image of 
mental health- things are more complicated than that and mental health disorders are often 
unpleasant, complicated and unpredictable” (2010:8).  Audience research, which looks closely at 
what individuals make of media representations of mental health is clearly necessary. Philo 
points out that: 
 
Without the analysis of production and reception processes, discourse analysis is limited in 
the conclusions that it can draw…There is a need to develop methods which can trace the 
communication of messages from their inception in contested perspectives, through the 
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structures by which they are supplied to and processed by the media, then to their eventual 
appearance as text and finally to their reception by audiences” (2007b:125).   
 
There is undoubtedly a specific gap in the literature for more comprehensive research that 
foregrounds the views of the service user and this is a gap that my research addresses. Philo’s 
own 1993 study did include follow up with thirty-two mental health service users but they were 
not participants in initial focus groups (1999:143). Briant et al addressed attitudes towards 
disability in seven focus groups; only two of these were with people who self-identified as 
disabled, although some disabled people took part in interviews (2013:878). It is important to 
prioritise research with service users who may be excluded because researchers are discouraged 
at the prospect of asking vulnerable populations to discuss sensitive issues (Murray 2003,Davies 
2005, Koivisto et al 2001). This is particularly important in view of the argument that qualitative 
interviews are shown to benefit not only the researcher but also participants (Murray 2003, 
Davies 2003, Koivisto et al 2001). In reference specifically to mental health research Vanessa 
Pinfold and Graham Thornicroft argue that “evidence that has high salience with the public is 
information delivered by people with direct experience of what they are talking about – the 
human element who are… credible sources” (2006:149); this description sums up the position of 
those who have experienced psychosis in relation to my own study. There is growing recognition 
that it is essential to air the voices of service-users in order to “give the public a better 
understanding of mental health problems” (Bithell 2010:18). Byrne recommends learning from 
the interesting and “complex” experiences of people with mental health problems as the first step 
in potentially enriching “wafer-thin mental illness stereotypes” in film (2009b:6). This research 
project cannot claim the status of survivor/user controlled research, arguably the most 
empowering form of service user research to attempt to effect “change, for the individual, the 
group and in society” (Beresford 2006:226). It shares the same aim, however, of observing 
voices that are often silenced.  
 
The final section of this Introduction will incorporate a summary of the content of the individual 
chapters of my thesis and a discussion of my theoretical and methodological approaches, thus 
clarifying how I have set about achieving my aim of establishing how film representations of 
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madness correspond with service users’ lived experiences, or not.  It will conclude by 
highlighting the key findings from my research.   
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
 
In Chapter 1 I set out the theoretical framework that addresses how psychosis is represented in 
film and how those who have experienced psychosis respond to this. This chapter positions the 
thesis in relation to the work of Michel Foucault, which is then contextualised within the field of 
film theory. Chapter 2 contextualises the cohort of those who have experienced psychosis in the 
wider field of disability studies and critically evaluates key audience debates; taken together, 
Chapters 1 and 2 constitute my literature review, positioning my work in relation to key theories 
and discussions in discourse analysis, film studies, disability studies and audience studies.  
Chapter 3, the methodology, explains, in detail, the processes I will employ to explore filmic 
constructions of psychosis, the lived experience of psychosis, and the way in which those who 
have experienced it interpret film texts. The three substantial chapters of my thesis then embody 
its main thematic discussion and focus upon the following discursive formations: Chapter 4 
looks at the naming of clinical psychosis; Chapter 5 considers film discourse surrounding 
psychosis and Chapter 6 explores interviewee discourse in relation to psychosis in film. In my 
conclusion, Chapter 7, I include a summary of what has been divined from these core chapters in 
addition to a discussion of the strengths, weaknesses and limitations of my research and the 
implications that this has for further research.  
 
My study employs Fairclough’s tri-partite theoretical model to address how texts have 
historically represented psychosis and how they continue to do so. Fairclough’s framework for 
Critical Discourse Analysis considers “overlapping dimensions of text, discourse practice and 
sociocultural practice” (Smith and Bell 2007:86), paying attention to the role played by power in 
discourse (Smith and Bell 2007:80). Textual analysis includes consideration of structure, 
vocabulary and representation; discourse practice is concerned with text production and 
consumption which Fairclough further sub-divides to include the examination of media 
institutions; and sociocultural practice focuses on outside practices that affect the production of a 
text – for example politics and social attitudes (Smith and Bell 2007: 86). These areas are highly 
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relevant to my study. I also use Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital to enrich the analysis of 
material generated by my interview cohort. It is Foucault’s work, however, which provides the 
most frequent reference point throughout my thesis; his observations on power and discourse are 
particularly apt in attempting to understand how the identities of those who experience psychosis 
have been, and continue to be, constituted by social forces.  Foucauldian discourse analysis 
enables an examination of what makes knowledge possible in respect of the naming of clinical 
psychosis and in the film text (Fox 1997:35); it lends itself to an examination of how identities 
are constructed and how cultural hegemony operates.  At the same time Foucault’s theory of 
power illustrates how hegemony can be contested by emancipatory social change (Olssen et al 
2004: 36).  Alessandro Fontana and Mauro Bertani explain that:  
 
Foucault never devoted a book to power.  He outlined a general theory of power on a 
number of occasions; he tirelessly explained himself; and he was not stinting when it came 
to corrections and clarifications.  He tended, rather, to study the workings, the effects and 
the “how” of power in the many historical analyses he made of asylums, madness, 
medicine, prisons, sexuality and “policing” (2003: 274).  
 
The synchronic and diachronic aspects of Foucault’s work are directly applicable to an 
examination of how psychosis is represented across a diverse range of film texts and how these 
representations are received by a specific audience cohort who have experienced psychosis.  His 
work on governmentality, the efficacy of governing the self (Cotoi 2011:111) and resistance to 
domination are all highly relevant and characterised by nuance:  
 
By domination I do not mean the brute fact of the domination of the one over the many, or 
of one group over another, but the multiple forms of domination that can be exercised in 
society; so, not the king in his central position, but subjects in their reciprocal relations; not 
sovereignty in its one edifice, but the multiple subjugations that take place and function 
within the social body” (Foucault 2003:27).  
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Discourse analysis problematises and provides an alternative to the “strictly experimental, 
quantitative and decontextualised research tradition” which has dominated mental health 
research (Harper 2006:47); it offers, instead, a social constructionist examination of the resources 
available to determine the experience of psychosis. My chosen qualitative methods of discourse 
theory and interviews can be adapted to many other kinds of study. I consider them to be the best 
methodological tools to answer the questions of how psychosis is represented in film and how 
those who have experienced psychosis respond to this.  
 
In summary, therefore, I consider that my thesis makes a valuable contribution to an existing 
body of work by engaging with the study of film, focusing upon service users’ biographical 
experiences and hence producing audience-focused work. Key findings include the recognition 
that there are different priorities and emphases amongst stakeholders in terms of hierarchies of 
discourse. My study shows that whilst discourse surrounding the naming of psychosis displays 
an ever-increasing plurality, a deconstructive approach which reconstitutes ideas and redefines 
legitimacy, acts as a democratic force in recognising multiple ways of acting and speaking 
(Rosanvallon 2011:8) It reveals true heterogeneity amongst film texts and shows that whilst film 
provides detailed and sensitive expositions of psychosis, at times, it has a tendency to suggest 
links between psychosis, violence and problematic sexuality. An examination of interviewee 
response shows that whilst common features of psychosis are identified the experience is also 
notable for its varied presentation. Discourse amongst this group is characterised by both 
reiteration of dominant discourse and resistance to it. Through carrying out interviews with those 
who have experienced psychosis I have explored and theorised an interaction between an 
audience group and a media text which has not been described in existing literature. Service 
users read filmic representations of psychosis in a way that is proximate to ‘textual poaching’ (de 
Certeau 1982, Jenkins 1992) and Sandvoss’s description of neutrosemic readings (2005:126) but 
is ultimately more contingent and unpredictable and is best summed up as an ‘evocative’ reading 
which does not subvert or resist the preferred meaning of the text so much as appropriate it for 
unique personal use. Respondents notably interpreted texts that do not feature denotative 
psychosis as most accurately evoking their experiences of psychosis, testifying to individuality 
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of response and supporting Nightingale’s argument that mass communications are characterised 
by variability of interpretation (1996:35).  
 
In the following chapter I delineate the theoretical framework that addresses how those who 
experience psychosis respond to its representation in film.  Chapter 1 positions my study in 
relation to Foucault before proceeding to contextualise Foucault in the wider field of film theory.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW SECTION ONE: FOUCAULT AND FILM 
THEORY 
 
This thesis is concerned with the way in which psychosis is represented in film and how those 
who have experienced psychosis respond to and engage with film representation. The purpose of 
the literature review is to set out a theoretical framework that is effective in addressing these 
issues in depth.  To this end it is organized into two sections.  The first section will position the 
thesis in relation to the work of Michel Foucault, as overarching principles which form the basis 
of his writing are applicable to my own study.  The chapter will then move on to consider how 
Foucault is positioned in relation to influential aspects of film theory.   
 
The chapter begins by foregrounding major Foucauldian principles which are relevant to an 
exploration of psychosis. It then moves on to focus upon science as a powerful and contestable 
discourse before narrowing, in two stages, to consider medicine as a sub-division of science and 
psychiatry as a sub-division of medicine. This section ends with a consideration of Foucault’s 
work on normalisation and how this applies to the naming of psychosis. The second half of the 
chapter examines how Foucault is positioned in relation to Marxism, structuralism and 
psychoanalysis.  It considers the relevance of Foucault’s work to an examination of cinematic 
discourse before moving on to a discussion of Foucault as a post-structuralist.  The chapter 
concludes with a consideration of counter arguments to Foucault’s work.  
 
KEY FOUCAULDIAN CONCEPTS  
 
Perhaps the most crucial aspect of Foucault’s work in relation to my thesis is a questioning of 
what Colin Jones and Roy Porter refer to as “the liberal vision of the autonomous individual past 
or present able by personal choice to make his or her own way in the world” (1995:1).  The 
debate about agency is central to a focus on the nature of psychosis and how it is named and 
represented.  Foucault’s work is concerned with processes of marginalisation; he directs his 
attention to social institutions such as psychiatry but is also concerned with dynamics at a micro 
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level, for example within the family (Jones & Porter 1995:9). His wide-ranging analysis of 
control and resistance is highly applicable to my work.  
 
Foucault’s key focus on discourse is intrinsic to his concept of archaeological analysis which 
goes beyond structural analysis to establish connections between discourse and the non-
discursive practices which characterise disciplines such as psychiatry. Foucault considers that the 
medical profession is particularly concerned with mapping out an archaeology of knowledge 
because it fears disorder in the form of disease (2000:xxiv).  In The Order of Things (2000) 
Foucault analyses why certain objects, statements and people have priority; he is particularly 
interested in what lies between the governing discourses of a culture and the scientific or 
philosophical theory that explains why the order exists: 
 
Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law, the 
hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that which has 
no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language: and it is 
only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as though already 
there waiting in silence for the moment of its expression (2000:xx). 
 
Jones and Porter consider that Foucault aims to “defamiliarize, to expose seemingly natural 
categories as constructs, articulated by words and discourse and thus to underline the radical 
contingency of what superficially seems normal” (1995:5). This is pertinent to a discussion of 
the naming of psychosis where the relevance of language is noteworthy. Foucault emphasises the 
link between language and discourse when he refers to words containing “concealed 
propositions” which make them more influential than mere “cries or noises” (2000:92). He 
speaks of the tyranny of speech and of a quest to “destroy syntax” in order to reveal what is 
concealed within (2000:298). Notably Foucault’s theory of discourse is not restricted to its 
potentially negative or limiting aspects. Jean Carabine points out that for Foucault discourses are 
variable and are continually mediated by other discourses; they can be contradictory and also 
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productive.  Discourses are dynamic and are capable of producing powerful new ways of 
conceptualising issues (2001:268-273).  
 
Foucault is interested in discourse because it reveals power/knowledge networks.  He adopts a 
genealogical approach in order to explore the links between ‘truth’, knowledge and power 
(Carabine 2001:275, Danaher et al 2000:Xi).  Foucault links the concept of truth closely to 
knowledge and takes issue with two important principles: –that the notion of truth is disinterested 
(Danaher et al 2000:24) and that knowledge is independent of power (Foucault 1991:72). 
Foucault considers that knowledge (i.e. the truth) has the power to set people free; power, 
however, has the ability to dominate and repress.  The possession of knowledge is also used to 
legitimise the use of power. Foucault suggests that ‘truth’ is characterised by five important 
traits: it is based on scientific discourse and the institution; it is susceptible to both economic and 
political influence; truth is circulated widely and consumed by many; it is controlled by great 
political and economic apparatuses; it is subject to political and social confrontation and debate 
(Foucault 1991: 73). All of these traits are applicable to an examination of psychosis and how it 
is named.  The first two are embodied in psychiatry as an institution; the third is embodied by the 
interest shown in psychiatric issues, particularly in the Western World; the fourth relates directly 
to Chapter 5 which considers how discourses surrounding psychosis are circulated in the media, 
and the fifth trait is illustrated by the current controversy that surrounds the publication of DSM-
5 (see Chapter 4).  Foucault considers the media’s role in generating discourse to be vital; this is 
a key focus in my thesis which examines how the film text disseminates psychiatric discourse 
(see Chapter 5). Danaher et al consider that Foucault sees the media as “an institution whose own 
claims are based on effectively evaluating the games of truth played out in government, business, 
education and so on” but also point out that “while the media’s role has conventionally been to 
make public institutional practices known to readers and viewers within the private sphere of 
family and home, the media in western societies have increasingly turned their attention to 
private sphere concerns” (2000:42). Foucault’s overarching appraisal of both the institutional and 
the domestic and his recognition of the media as dynamic are key factors in an in-depth analysis 
of discourse that relates to psychosis.   
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Crucially, in exploring the links between truth, power and knowledge Foucault makes the point 
that power is not devoid of truth:  
 
Truth isn’t outside power, or lacking power: contrary to a myth whose history and 
functions would repay further study, truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the child of 
protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves 
(1991:72). 
 
Whilst Foucault views truth as a site for ideological struggle and considers how truth is produced 
to be key he does not see power as purely repressive (Danaher et al 2000:Xix). Foucault 
emphasises that the exercise of power is not intrinsically wrong but can be dangerous (1994:xix). 
He argues that power is extremely effective when it is hidden (Danaher et al 2000:59) and that 
whilst power acts on some more than on others, everyone is subject to power (Danaher et al 
2000:74).  Foucault advocates an open-minded approach to a consideration of power and feels it 
is simplistic to analyse power in terms of intentionality (McNay 1994:91). He talks of “the twin 
seductions of paranoia and universal suspicion” coupled with a “compulsive quest for 
foundationalist certainties and guarantees” as distracting from a productive appraisal of power 
(1994: Xix) Foucault stresses the importance of desisting from a consideration of power as 
purely negative.  He cautions against overuse of the verbs “excludes, represses, censors, 
abstracts, masks, conceals” in relation to power and emphasises that power has a great capacity 
for production in relation to reality and the individual (1991:204). Foucault’s believes that whilst 
power circulates in different institutions and amongst different individuals nobody actually owns 
it (Danaher et al 2000:73). Power, according to Foucault, is both complex and dynamic; it is also 
highly productive, employing language and discourse to create subjects with varied 
characteristics and social identities. Another important aspect of power is that it prompts 
resistance. Foucault indicates that it is important to neither celebrate nor fear resistance but to see 
it as an intrinsic part of power.  He talks of resistance as a ‘counterstroke’ which serves to 
unsettle power (Kendall and Wickham 1999:51) and seeks to illustrate that power is capable of 
coming from below rather than through a strict hierarchical structure (Foucault 1994: Xxiv).  
This principle is illustrated throughout chapter six.  
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The Foucauldian concept of governmentality is crucial in distinguishing between power as 
dominance and power relations which are more consensual (McNay 1994:85). Bryan Turner 
defines governmentality as a system of power which articulates “the triangular relationship 
between sovereignty, discipline and government” (1997:xiii). The term links principles of 
governance and modes of thought and outlines the close relationship between power and the 
subjectification of the individual (Lemke 2000:2). It explores both the relationship between the 
self and aspects of domination and the self and the state and offers a perspective on power which 
is not restricted to consensus or violence (Lemke 2000:3). As a concept it is crucial to a 
consideration of psychiatric discourse which is concerned with subjectivity and how the 
individual is positioned in relation to institutional power (Rose 1990).  
 
Foucault’s work on power/knowledge and his concept of discipline are connected.  Foucault 
describes discipline as “a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of 
instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets” (1991:206) but emphasises 
that “power is not discipline; discipline is a possible procedure of power” (1991:38). Discipline 
can be viewed as both punishment or coercion and as a a body of knowledge which must be 
acquired in order to achieve success (Danaher et al 2000:x).  The first definition is a verb and is 
negative, the second a noun which sees discipline as a positive force.  Foucault concedes that not 
all discipline exerts dominance and recognises the presence of “consensual disciplines” 
(1991:38) The concept of discipline is multi-faceted and is nuanced in the same way as the 
concepts of power and governmentality; this makes it a valuable tool in the examination of 
psychiatry where disciplinary techniques are developed in order to control through “the power of 
the norm” (McNay 1994:94).   
 
Criticism (including self-criticism) has been levelled at Foucault’s work on power. McNay 
expresses concern with Foucault’s “inability to sustain the central insight of power as a positive 
force and consequent slippage into a more conventional notion of power as a negative or 
dominatory force” (1994:100). She also argues that Foucault’s work on power lacks 
differentiation (1994:63). This is echoed by Nancy Fraser who considers that Foucault’s work is 
weakened by a refusal to use normative criteria in order to distinguish between “acceptable and 
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unacceptable forms of power” (1981:286). Giddens perceives the same in Foucault’s work on the 
institution, arguing that he fails to distinguish between those wielding great power (including 
psychiatry) and more open systems (1984). Dieter Freundlich argues that Foucault attempts to 
disassociate agency from the individual and attribute it to the institution with the result that “for 
Foucault the direction of causality always seems to operate from the system to the subject, never 
the other way round” (1995:174/5).  Freundlich argues that Foucault’s over-emphasis on the 
institution means that he fails to acknowledge the power that can be exerted by one individual 
over another.  He considers Foucault to be “very reluctant to grant the subject any real self 
determination” (1995:176), thereby failing to attribute the subject with sufficient agency 
(1995:152). This criticism is echoed by Madan Sarup who considers Foucault to be “rather weak 
and inadequate on the question of agency and the subject” finding it “impossible to deal with 
identity as experienced” (1996:74). Myra Macdonald’s criticism of Foucault shifts the focus 
from power itself to its aftermath.  She argues that whilst Foucault “may be astute in describing 
the mechanisms of power, he leaves us strangely adrift in reaching any conclusions about its 
political consequences”, thereby making it difficult to evaluate its potential harms or benefits 
(2003:36). Foucault’s circumvention of conclusions has prompted frustration at what is 
perceived as a refusal to declare a stance (for example on Nazism, Boyne 2001:168). Fraser 
suggests that Foucault adopts a position whereby he “suspects everything and therefore must 
condemn nothing” (1981:286).  This has led to demands that Foucault articulate a position. 
Foucault’s response is that he is not comfortable in doing so; he sees his role as foregrounding 
problems in all of their complexity, thereby “restoring the right to speak” of marginalized groups 
(1994:288).  
 
The first section of the chapter has considered key Foucauldian principles that are relevant to an 
examination of discourses surrounding the naming of psychosis.  It is clear that Foucauldian 
principles of power and agency are highly relevant to my own study. The next section of the 
chapter will explore Foucault’s relationship with science before narrowing down to consider 
medicine as a subdivision of science and psychiatry as a sub-division of medicine; in doing so it 
will apply Foucauldian principles more specifically to my chosen subject. 
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FOUCAULT’S FOCUS UPON SCIENCE, MEDICINE AND PSYCHIATRY. 
 
Alan Megill argues, “In Foucault’s perspective every “science” is in fact an “ideology”” because 
“it is irremediably caught up with relations of power” (1987:249). Foucault considers scientific 
discourse to be particularly worthy of scrutiny:  
 
Discourse in general, and scientific discourse in particular, is so complex a reality that we 
not only can, but should, approach it at different levels and with different methods 
(2000:xiv). 
 
Foucault questions the apparent naturalness of science, arguing that “chance encounters, 
institutional politics and practices of patronage and favouritism” are responsible for scientific 
discovery rather than “a disinterested quest for the absolute truth about the world” (Danaher et al 
2000: 38).  He suggests that science has an ideological function which is connected with power 
and the way in which it is used to regulate and normalise the individual (Danaher et al 2000:26).   
 
Foucault distinguishes between the human sciences (including medicine), and the physical 
sciences.  He employs the word ‘savoir’, to define knowledge which cannot be completely 
ignored but “falls short of rigorous scientificity” and applies it to medicine (1991:51/1994: 
Xviii).  Foucault argues that the acceptance of medicine into the corpus of science was not 
inevitable but was brought about by external factors such as urbanization and the economy 
(1994:150). He does acknowledge the importance of medicine in appraising man as an “object of 
positive knowledge” and dealing with the most important thing to man – his mortality (2003: 
197-8). He also considers that the purpose of medicine is to communicate knowledge rather than 
to politically coerce (2003:46). Despite this Foucault’s work is notable for its implacable 
questioning of the medical profession. 
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In The Birth of the Clinic (2003) Foucault turns his focus specifically upon the doctor; he 
distinguishes between ‘quack’ and ‘doctor’, indicating that he sees a spectrum of integrity 
amongst the medical profession (2003:66). He questions the scientific and economic status of the 
doctor, focusing upon the “very meaning of the medical profession and the privileged character 
of the experience that it defines” (2003:78). His scrutiny is clearly connected with issues of 
power. This is illustrated by the latter question replacing the former: “What is the matter with 
you?  Where does it hurt?” (2003:xxi).  The second question reduces the agency of the patient 
and increases the power of the doctor. Notably Foucault also treats the physical buildings used 
for medical purposes as manifestations of power. This is seen in his attitude towards the hospital, 
the clinic and the asylum respectively. Foucault’s attitude towards the hospital is notably 
negative. He describes it as: 
 
A place of internment of men and diseases, its ceremonious but inept architecture 
multiplying the ills in its interior without preventing their outward diffusion… more a seat 
of death for the cities where it is sited than a therapeutic agent for the population as a 
whole (1991:284).  
 
Foucault expresses the view that the hospital should be viewed as an edifice that is designed to 
protect the healthy classes from contagion (2003:49). He suggests that hospital practice “kills the 
capacity for observation and stifles the talents of the observer by the sheer number of things to 
observe” (2003:16). He also objects to the hospital’s ordering function of grouping diseases; he 
sees the hospital examination as measuring the individual against a corpus of knowledge rather 
than focusing on specific features of illness; Foucault’s questioning of the ontological status of 
disease stands in opposition to the process of classification seen in Chapter 4 which focuses upon 
the naming of clinical psychosis.  
 
Foucault’s work distinguishes between the function of the hospital and the clinic; he considers 
the latter more repressive, even, than the hospital. His hostility towards the clinic is linked to 
issues of power and the invasive nature of ‘the gaze’. Foucault speaks of the clinical gaze which 
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operates “in sovereign fashion” uncontested (2003:35). In the clinic the notion of the gaze 
intensifies – it is no longer content merely to document but becomes actuarial, incorporating 
statistics and calculating risk (2003:35). Comparatively, Foucault acknowledges the hospital to 
be subject-centred and for the benefit of the patient whilst the clinic subjects the body of the 
patient (often impoverished) to medical scrutiny for the benefit of others:  
 
But to look in order to know, to show in order to teach, is not this a tacit form of violence, 
all the more abusive for its silence, upon a sick body that demands to be comforted, not 
displayed? (2003:83). 
  
Foucault’s interest in medical buildings extends to an examination of the asylum.  He focuses 
specifically upon the imposing architecture of the buildings used to contain the mentally ill and 
refers to “the irresistible attraction” exerted by these “fortresses of confinement” (2007:197) – 
something that is still notably present in filmic representation (see p186). Foucault takes an 
oppositional stance to the accepted view that the asylum was more humane than the houses of 
confinement that pre-dated it (Boyne 2001:31). He considers that the social institution of the 
asylum creates a “them and us” situation between inmates and overseers thereby affording 
‘madness’ a minority status (2007:239). Foucault questions whether the creation of asylums, 
generally viewed as an advance in medical practice, should be celebrated “in triumphalist terms” 
by the psychiatric profession considering them “part of the armature of power” (Boyne 2001:14). 
He admits that the asylum addressed some of the stigma of depravity but considers that it 
“deployed a judgemental and moralizing ethos”, to become a new form of repression (McNay 
1994:23). He regards the asylum as an institution that:   
 
Substituted for the free terror of madness the stifling anguish of responsibility: fear no 
longer reigned on the other side of the prison gates, it now reigned under the seals of 
conscience.  The asylum no longer punished the madman’s guilt, it is true; but it did more, 
it organized that guilt (2007:234). 
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Foucault sees the purpose of the asylum as one of attachment or correction: it is linked, like the 
hospital, to economic productivity.  
 
In addition to his negative appraisal of the asylum it is incontrovertible that Foucault is 
particularly questioning of psychiatry as a medical speciality; he refers to it as “dubious” 
(1991:51). In Truth and Knowledge he states that “the epistemological profile of psychiatry is a 
low one” (1991:51) As well as questioning the scientific basis of psychiatry Foucault is also 
concerned with the power wielded by the psychiatrist– for example to forbid sexual activity 
(1994:82).  Foucault comments on the way in which psychiatric influence extends to the legal 
system, another prominent seat of power, suggesting that the link between crime and psychiatry 
is not so much to do with knowledge as “a modality of power to be secured and justified” (1994: 
186). Notably Foucault also charges the psychiatrist with a capacity for invention:  
 
19th century psychiatry invented an entirely fictitious entity, a crime that is insanity, a 
crime that is nothing but insanity, an insanity that is nothing but a crime for more than half 
a century, this entity was called “homicidal monomania” (1994:182).   
 
The term “monomania” was finally discredited in 1870, by which time Foucault considered that 
psychiatric influence was firmly established over the legal system (1994:188).  The relevance of 
Foucault’s focus upon the naming of disease has direct relevance to the contemporary focus upon 
classification, power and language (see Chapter 4).  
 
Foucault’s historical work is often interpreted as being uniformly hostile towards psychiatry 
(1994:243). This interpretation provides the basis for David Cooper’s introduction to Madness 
and Civilization where he speaks in emotive terms about psychiatry: 
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There are many available forms of crucifixion in our age; apart from the cross there are the 
shock box and the operation of leucotomy as well as the mass of tranquilizing drugs that 
flood the ready market of well-trained but gullible psychiatrists (2007:vii) 
 
Cooper goes on to talk of the “devastation…wrought by a pseudo-medical perspective” and 
intimates that psychiatric intervention is responsible for nullifying “the wildly charismatic or 
inspirational” (2007:viii-ix).  Cooper’s position is extreme and, I would argue, does not 
accurately reflect Foucault’s own, more complex attitude towards psychiatry. Whilst 
acknowledging coercion over the mentally ill, for example, Foucault, unlike Cooper, does not 
attribute this solely to psychiatric personnel, nor does he consider the family to offer an anodyne 
alternative to the asylum; conversely the asylum is felt to appropriate the family role of 
subjecting the patient to moral scrutiny and consequent shame (McNay 1994:23).  It is this wider 
reflection which makes Foucault’s work valuable when appraising psychiatric discourse.   
 
Whilst it cannot be denied that Foucault is critical of psychiatry, particularly in his early work, it 
is also important to note that in revisiting Madness and Civilisation (2007) and The Birth of the 
Clinic (2003) he concedes that the domain of medicine and the repressive institutions associated 
with it (including psychiatry) were not as straightforward as he had initially believed (McNay 
1994:63).  Despite Foucault’s questioning of psychiatry he is at pains to state that he is not 
against it (1994:243). It is notable that he refers to Madness and Civilisation as having been 
received both favourably and with hostility by psychiatric personnel; Foucault takes this as 
evidence that his work cannot be considered to be part of the anti-psychiatry movement 
(1994:243).  He considers that his stance in relation to psychiatry “in no way impugns the 
scientific validity or the therapeutic effectiveness of psychiatry: it does not endorse psychiatry 
but neither does it invalidate it” (1994: xviii). Foucault acknowledges the complexity of the 
psychiatric domain and makes it apparent that he sees his approach to it as flagging up 
problematic areas for which there may be no panacea:  
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I don’t think that in regard to madness and mental illness there is any “politics” that can 
contain the just and definitive solution.  But I think that in madness, in derangement, in 
behaviour problems, there are reasons for questioning politics: and politics must answer 
these questions but it never answers them completely (1991:384). 
 
In concluding this section of the chapter it is important to consider why Foucault focuses his 
attention on science, medicine and specifically psychiatry. McNay points out that Foucault sets 
out to “examine how power relations of inequality and oppression are created and maintained 
in…. subtle and diffuse ways” in the “ostensibly humane and freely adopted social practices” 
offered in disciplines such as medicine and psychiatry (1994:1).  In questioning whether a 
practice is humane one area of recurrent interest for Foucault (and of extreme importance for any 
work which centres on psychiatry) is the link between discipline and reasonable behaviour. The 
next section of the chapter will examine the concept of reasonable behavior (or normality) before 
applying it specifically to the concept of ‘madness’ and the psychiatric world.  
 
REASONABLE BEHAVIOUR /NORMALISATION  
 
Foucault considers that the “power of the norm” is used as a dividing practice to qualify or 
disqualify people as fit and proper members of society (McNay 1994:9). Consequently 
Foucault’s work often centres on areas of perceived deviation. Foucault argues that power has 
not always been used as a force for normalisation (1991:196).  In The Birth of the Clinic he 
asserts that medicine’s initial focus on health was subsumed by its normalising function 
(2003:40) and, referring specifically to madness, argues that “it was only with the arrival of the 
calm, objective, scientific gaze of modern medicine that what had previously been regarded as 
supernatural perversion was seen as a deterioration of nature” (1976:64).  Foucault believes that 
normalisation works to establish a standard by which all are measured; individuals may be 
considered to conform or not. Discipline is administered by figures of authority (including 
psychiatrists) that make up part of the framework of what Foucault calls ‘the carceral network of 
power-knowledge’ (McNay 1994:94). Notably Foucault’s theory on normalising judgements is 
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consistent with his theories concerning power and discourse in that he considers the way in 
which normalisation works to be complex and subtle.  Foucault acknowledges that the power of 
the norm can be difficult to detect and that repression may not be overt.  At the same time he 
stresses that the administration of discipline is not necessarily left uncontested.  Additionally 
those who administer it may be beneficent and possess scientific integrity; in this respect 
disciplinary power incorporates positive aspects (McNay 1994:94).  
 
Foucault clearly perceives that society sees difference from the norm as a threat. Often the 
response is to deny difference, neutralize and re-incorporate it; alternatively difference is 
excluded (Boyne 2001:124). Whilst Foucault acknowledges that forced assimilation is one aspect 
of reason he also sees the desire to coerce others in to conforming as a form of violence which 
provides justification for trying to push beyond reason to include difference (Boyne 2001:33). 
Boyne refers to Foucault’s desire for “a form of thought that promises affirmation and invitation, 
instead of neutralization and incorporation as a framework for accommodating difference” 
(2001:124). Foucault’s focus upon madness reveals how normalisation operates in the 
psychiatric domain. He argues that mental illness is perceived as negative “since illness is 
defined in relation to an average, a norm, a “pattern”” and “since the whole essence of the 
pathological resides within this departure” (1976:62). The figure of the madman is of particular 
importance to Foucault because of his difference from the norm and his capacity to challenge 
order: 
 
The madman…is the disordered player of the Same and the Other.  He takes things for 
what they are not…He inverts all values and all proportions, because he is constantly under 
the impression that he is deciphering signs… for him all signs resemble one another, and 
all resemblances have the value of signs (2000:49). 
 
Foucault’s belief in the madman as ‘Other’ led to his interchange with Derrida which will be 
discussed on page 29. Foucault considers that he has “a complex personal relationship with 
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madness and the psychiatric institution” (1994:244). He refers to the intrinsic fascination of 
madness in Madness and Civilisation: 
 
On all sides madness fascinates man.  The fantastic images it generates are not fleeting 
appearances that quickly disappear from the surface of things (2007:20). 
 
This fascination is multi-factorial; Foucault responds to the incoherence of madness, its variety 
and the way in which it can be endlessly interpreted.  He refers to “measureless madness which 
has as many faces as the world has characters, ambitions and necessary illusions” (2007:26). At 
the same time Foucault acknowledges that madness also incorporates a sense of loss or a “void” 
(McNay 1994:15).  He concedes that a “positive plenitude of the activities of replacement” fill 
the void but indicates that whilst madness initially fascinates it cannot sustain the interest of the 
onlooker or the voyeur (2007:22). Foucault suggests that it is the unknowable nature of madness 
that makes it a difficult object of study (Boyne 2001:28).  Part of this difficulty is that madness 
characteristically involves self-attachment (2007:26) and is often predicated upon silence; this 
invites fascination but ultimately leads to frustration (McNay 1994:4). Foucault’s appraisal of 
madness is relevant to a consideration of screen representation. Whilst the variety and fascination 
of madness offer creative opportunities to the filmmaker, its incoherence and inability to sustain 
interest raise questions about the potential possibility of representing it with accuracy; similarly 
issues of silence are important in relation to representation (see Chapter 5).    
 
Foucault’s interest in madness led to a genealogical appraisal of psychiatry which was motivated 
by critique.  Foucault questions the interpretation of history as development and seeks to 
emphasise that social attitudes towards madness have not always been negative or uniform 
(1991:7). He recognises epistemes that have operated over the last 400 years (2000:xxii) but 
points out that they do not necessarily show progressive development. Instead, it cannot be 
assumed that they evolve to become imbued with higher levels of reason they are arbitrary, 
appearing and disappearing suddenly (Danaher et al: 2000: Xi,16). In addition to questioning 
history and disturbing teleology, Foucault’s genealogical approach also seeks to highlight salient 
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moments in the formation of modern attitudes towards madness. Foucault foregrounds, for 
example, the ancient link between madness and leprosy houses which he considers to have 
conferred mental illness with the stigma of disease long after becoming redundant (2007:195). 
He also links the practice in Europe of housing the mentally ill in boats which were set loose to 
drift along canals and rivers with the exclusion of the mentally ill, arguing that this, in turn, led 
to other forms of exclusion, including incarceration (Danaher et al 2000:126).  
 
Foucault’s historical work on madness has been interpreted as romantic and unreliable.  He tends 
to make sweeping statements and work in binaries.  He argues in Mental Illness and Psychology, 
for example, that in the Renaissance “madness was allowed free reign…it circulated throughout 
society, it formed part of the background and language of everyday life” (1976:67).  Similarly he 
claims that “before the nineteenth century, the experience of madness in the Western world was 
very polymorphic; and its confiscation in our own period…must not deceive us as to its original 
exuberance” (1976:65).  He stands accused of imprecision in both his use of dates and attitude. 
Roy Porter describes his work as simplistic and generalised (2002:93) and his description of a 
former world which was “strangely hospitable” to madness (2007:33) is countered by Danaher et 
al who argue that “madness was classified as a vice rather than a condition or a category and 
insane people were imprisoned or beaten, sometimes left to their own resources, or even expelled 
from their communities” (2000:126). Most criticism of Foucault’s historical work centres around 
Madness and Civilisation which Foucault admits to having written in a “state of happy semi-
consciousness, with a great deal of naivete and a little innocence” (McNay 1994:32). He is 
accused of being unduly critical of the asylum and failing to acknowledge potentially positive 
aspects of confinement. His assertion that the treatment of the mad is governed by issues of 
morality rather than medical advance is also contested (McNay 1994:25). Foucault later refutes 
his original view of madness as a constant objective phenomenon (McNay 1994:66).  He admits 
that his conception of power in Madness and Civilisation is undeveloped and dominated by 
aspects of subordination and domination (McNay 1994:31). He perceives his early work as 
reductionist and lacking attention to variation.  Foucault concedes that his focus on repressive 
medical institutions exaggerated their influence on discourse; he later modified his stance 
conceding, “I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power.  I am more and 
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more interested in the interaction between oneself and others and in the technologies of 
individual domination, the history of how an individual acts upon himself (1988:19).  
 
Whilst specific criticisms are levelled at Foucault’s work on madness what cannot be contested is 
that he has played a key role in problematising the field of psychiatry and has forcibly 
demonstrated the influence exerted upon the contemporary understanding of mental illness by 
complex historical, cultural, political and economic factors. David Armstrong considers that 
whilst medical historians may find ‘Madness’ bemusing and exasperating no historical account 
of psychiatry can ignore Foucault’s major point that “not all might be progress in 
‘improvements’ in the management of mental illness”(1997:19) and David McCallum that: 
 
While for some the jury may still be out on ‘Foucault the historian’, there ought to be less 
reluctance to acknowledge that contribution which Foucault…made to the method of 
enquiry he described as ‘histories of the present’ – the use of historical investigation for the 
purposes of diagnosing problems in the here and now (1997:53).   
 
Foucault considers that his genealogical approach is able to “separate out, from the contingency 
that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, 
do or think” (1991:45); this resistance to normalisation invites comparison with the work of 
Derrida. Both Foucault and Derrida are interested in the concept of transgression and with the 
possibilities for difference. Nicholas Royle characterises Derrida’s work as committed to 
destabilising all contexts in a search for what Derrida (1992) calls the “democracy to come” 
(2004:44). He considers Derrida’s work to be driven by “a desire for momentous revolutionary 
change; even for ‘unimaginable revolution’” in order to rethink identity and subjectivity and 
achieve “freedom for everyone” (2004:22). Like Foucault, Derrida is concerned to “celebrate the 
secondary, derivative, low side: the supplement” and to challenge the process of labelling, 
categorization and stereotyping which constructs groups such as psychiatric service users and 
serves to deny difference (Boyne 2001:127).  
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There is a divergence in the work of the two, however, which centres upon the concept of 
madness as ‘The Other’. It was, perhaps, Foucault’s belief that contemporary thinking had 
abandoned its interest in ‘Otherness’ which led to his dispute with Derrida (Boyne 2001:15). In 
The Order of Things Foucault asserts “the history of madness would be the history of the Other – 
of that which, for a given culture, is at once interior and foreign, therefore to be excluded” (2000: 
Xxiv). Foucault was preoccupied with the delineation between The Other and The Same and 
looked to the work of classical artists as evidence that The Other could exist and had the capacity 
to “overthrow the edifice of Western reason” (McNay 1994:14).  Derrida argued that the quest 
for Otherness was impossible. The interchange between Foucault and Derrida was arguably not 
solely about madness but also about the nature of Western thought. In an analysis of Descartes’ 
Meditations Foucault reproaches Descartes for not truly confronting madness; he feels that 
Descartes avoids its consideration and consequently excludes it from the domain of reason. 
Foucault interprets Descartes as determining that madness has no relevance for the rational mind 
and therefore rejecting it as The Other:   
 
Instead of finding something in the thought of the mad that could not be false Descartes 
effectively declares that ‘I who think cannot be mad’ (2007:57) 
 
Derrida, however, on reading Madness and Civilisation, set out to demonstrate that Descartes 
does not actually exclude madness. His interpretation of Descartes is that madness is never 
entirely other to thought; there is no special domain or higher form of reason outside of reason 
itself.  He warns Foucault “to think of escape is impossible” (Boyne 2001:67). Derrida views 
madness as linked with silence and considers that any attempt to articulate it is to betray it with 
reason. He argues that: 
 
Whatever his claims to be resurrecting the silent language of an oppressed madness, 
Foucault continues to speak the language of the very reason that carried out the oppression 
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in the first place.  In short he is caught within the all-powerful order that he is seeking to 
evade (Megill 1987:223).  
 
He feels that Foucault’s work is in error in implying that “there is something present behind the 
concept, and that whatever does lie behind the concept (or beyond the sign or the word) can be 
reached” (Boyne 2001:68). Ultimately Derrida’s critique emphasised Foucault’s utopianism in 
searching for an opposition to reason and finding it in madness.  Foucault’s counter-response 
was that Derrida was unable to think on the Outside of philosophy. He was to concede to the 
force of Derrida’s arguments, however, and abandoned the quest to find a higher form of reason. 
Foucault’s views on the ‘Other’ have been criticised as romantic but Boyne’s interpretation of 
his interchange with Derrida is ultimately optimistic:  
 
The ultimate lesson of the Foucault/Derrida debate is that there is no pure other, that 
ontological difference is a chimera.  This means that there is no bright promise on the other 
side of reason.  It also means if all is on our side, that there is no reason, outside of our 
reach, why we cannot generate our own bright hope for a different future” (2001:170). 
 
The focus of the chapter will now shift from a consideration of Foucault’s work and its specific 
application to the field of psychiatry to contextualise Foucault in the wider field of Film Studies 
theory. This section of the chapter begins with an overall appraisal of film theory, including the 
dialectical approaches which underpin it. The chapter then positions Foucault in relation to 
Grand Theory, specifically Marxism, structuralism and psychoanalysis. The next section 
considers the relevance of Foucault’s work on discourse to film as a cultural site. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of Foucault’s theoretical stance as a post-structuralist and includes 
critiques of his work. This section of the literature review relates directly to Chapter 5 which 
looks specifically at film texts that feature psychosis.  
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CONTEXTUALISING FILM THEORY 
 
Approaches to film analysis are varied and multiple. Dudley Andrew considers that because 
films are the site of “myriad problematics, involving multiple aspects of culture” the world of 
film theory has turned to tangential disciplines such as philosophy, psychoanalysis, linguistics, 
logic and ideological theory (1984:189). The multi-disciplinary nature of film analysis is also 
recognised by Robert Stam who refers to it as being oriented by diverse goals and being open to 
diverse influences.  He categorises the influences upon film analysis into “grids” 
(psychoanalysis, Marxism and feminism) and “schemata”, (excess, reflexivity, carnival) as well 
as film form and representation (2000b:194). David Bordwell and Noel Carroll supplement 
Stam’s categories with Lacanian psychoanalysis, structuralist semiotics, post-structuralist literary 
theory and variants of Althusserian Marxism which together make up the body of what they 
designate as “Grand Theory” (1996:xiii). Christine Gledhill and Linda Williams delineate the 
ambitious scope of Grand Theory: 
 
      These theories tended towards totalising philosophical or scientific quests 
      for big truths, whether truths of history and revolution (Marx, Althusser), 
      self and identity (Freud and Lacan) or language (Saussure and semiotics). 
      (2000:5). 
 
Grand Theory, which dominated in the 1970s, was subsequently subject to criticism by active 
audience and cultural theory approaches for what Gill Branston refers to as having “relied on the 
narrowest kinds of textual analysis for the grandest most sweeping conclusions about the 
ideological effects of cinema” (2000:132). Bordwell and Carroll have similarly questioned Grand 
Theory’s status as “the indispensable frame of reference for understanding all filmic phenomena” 
(1996:xiii). Bordwell’s response has been characterized by a fundamental suspicion of applying 
theory to film. He expresses the view that there is a tendency to over-simplify established theory 
and illustrates this by noting the birth of the catchphrase a “----------ian reading of X”.  In his 
view this approach ultimately meant that “theory became streamlined; its complexities and 
nuances were often ignored” (1989:83). Bordwell comments specifically on the work of 
32	  
	  
Foucault, claiming that despite Foucault’s contestatory stance his own work is appropriated and 
can serve the function of stultifying true enquiry. He refers to Making Meaning (1989):  
 
This book’s analysis might be more persuasive to certain readers if whenever I mention 
critical “practice” or “discourse” I were to attach a quotation or two from Foucault…the 
taken for granted power of the theory can appear to validate the interpretation; in turn the 
interpretation can seem to illustrate the theory, confirm it, or extend its range of application 
(1989:212). 
 
Whilst I have used Foucauldian quotations throughout my research I do not feel that I have 
simultaneously attempted to simplify his theoretical approach; indeed it is the “complexities and 
nuances” to which Bordwell refers that characterise Foucault’s work and make it such a valuable 
resource.  
 
As well as recommending an avoidance of theory Bordwell, together with Carroll, advocates 
cognitivsim, a “middle range methodology” which “privileges the normal, the commonsensical 
and the most ordinary (Smith 1998 online).  Carroll proposes “cognitivism” as a substitute for 
psychoanalytic approaches:  
 
Cognitivism is not a unified theory.  Its name derives from its tendency to look for 
alternative answers to many of the questions addressed by or raised by psychoanalytic film 
theories, especially with respect to film reception, in terms of cognitive and rational 
processes rather than irrational or unconscious ones (1996:62). 
 
Bordwell argues for a cognitivist approach that begins with the filmic event and then extrapolates 
to wider arguments (Smith 1998) whilst Carroll advocates a pluralistic approach to the study of 
film and proposes “fallibilism” as an advance: 
33	  
	  
 
The fallibilist agrees that he or she may have to review his or her theories in light of future 
evidence or in response to the implications of later theoretical developments, because the 
fallibilist realizes that theories are at best well-justified and that a well-justified theory may 
turn out to be false (1996:481). 
 
This is useful in cautioning against the unquestioning adoption of film theory but what remains 
unclear is whether Carroll subjects his own preferred approach to similar scrutiny. Along with 
Bordwell it seems possible that in pursuing “common sense” Carroll assumes his own work is 
objective and not underpinned by theory. It is notable that when Stam emphasises the desirability 
of greater mutual awareness of theory in traditionally divided fields he chooses psychoanalytic 
and cognitive theory as examples, thereby subjecting both to scrutiny.  Stam believes that “it is 
not a question of completely embracing the other theoretical perspective, but rather of 
acknowledging it, taking it into account, being ready to be challenged by it” (2000b:330). 
Cognitivism has been critiqued, notably by Slavoj Zizek (2001 online). Zizek considers that “the 
Post Theory trend is deliberately dialectical and “often sustained by a stance of profound 
political resignation, by a will to obliterate the traces and disappointments of political 
engagement” (Zizek 2001:13). He argues that Post Theory behaves “as if we can magically 
return to some kind of naivete before things like the unconscious, the over determination of our 
lives by the decentred symbolic processes, and so forth became part of our theoretical 
awareness (Zizek 2001:14). Bordwell refutes this emphasising that Post Theory is against 
“Theory” but supportive of theories and theorizing” (2005).  He argues that the purpose of Post 
Theory is not, as Zizek claims, an “elimination of theoretical work” but a plea for “better 
theories” (2005).  Bordwell emphasises that the unifying principle in Post Theory is the 
promotion of research that is not reliant upon the psychoanalytic framework that dominates film 
theory; in this sense he considers it to be a widening out and not a closing down of theoretical 
possibility (2005).  
An appraisal of contemporary film theory suggests that it is characterised by greater diversity 
than Grand Theory and less ambition in questing for ‘big truths’.  Toby Miller and Robert Stam 
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consider that theories have become less authoritarian and more epistemologically modest 
(2000a:xvi); they prefer to consider more recent film theory as a “polyvocal conversation” 
(2000:xv). Despite this it is apparent that the field of film studies is characterised by dialectical 
and often contradictory approaches.  One area of historical divergence is between screen theory 
and a cultural studies approach. Robert Lapsley and Michael Westlake differentiate between 
theory which is concerned with establishing the status of cinema as art and theory which is 
concerned with how it functions socially (1988:106). Stam highlights the tension between the 
two, considering that a cultural studies approach is not interested in “media specificity” and 
“film language” so much as “an interest in the processes of interaction between texts, spectators, 
institutions and the ambient culture” (2000b:225). He details the hostility of the Cultural Studies 
group at the Birmingham Centre towards the Screen group, describing them as “elitist and 
apolitical, as overly concerned with the productivity of signifying systems and not concerned 
enough with social productions in general” (2000:227). Andrew considers the cultural shift in 
film theory in the 1980s to be key, characterising cultural theorists as having “a view of 
theorizing which is communal” and “part of cultural thought in a given historical moment” 
(1984:11). Foucault’s work is influential in the area of cultural criticism and my thesis draws 
upon both a cultural studies approach and a Foucauldian discourse analysis approach in its 
examination of how those who experience psychosis interact with the film text. It is important to 
remember, however, that Foucault developed his theory of discourse in opposition to established 
theoretical work. The next section of the chapter will contextualise Foucault in relation to 
specific areas of film theory. Foucault professed a mistrust of central, totalizing theories as early 
as the 1970s; he considered that by virtue of making claims about understanding a monopolising 
truth such theory was engaging in a power struggle (Stam 2000b:180). Before considering 
Foucault’s influence in the field of film theory his stance towards specific aspects of Grand 
Theory will be considered beginning with Marxism before moving on to a consideration of 
structuralism and psychoanalysis.  
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FOUCAULT’S STANCE IN RELATION TO MARXISM 
 
It is important to consider Foucault’s stance in relation to Marxism, a dominant strand of Grand 
Theory. Marxism was an undoubted influence upon Foucault who was in the French Communist 
party for a time (Danaher et al 2000:4). He responded to Marxism because it offered a new 
perspective on existing theoretical systems and established an “endless possibility of discourse” 
(Burke 1995:240). Foucault also welcomed the contestatory nature of Marxism which he felt was 
capable of exposing certain power relations within society (Danaher et al 2000:5).  Foucault does 
resist Marxism, however; his objections are summarized by Olssen et al:  
 
Essentially (Foucault) criticized the holistic and deductivist approach within which it 
located Marxism in general.  His position not only rejected the primacy of the economy but 
also the approach which seeks to explain parts of culture as explicable and decodable parts 
of a whole totality or system (2004:18) 
 
Foucault contests the Marxist assumption that individuals are inevitably oppressed by social 
structures by presenting the possibility that they are “essential and willing supports of these very 
structures” (Boyne 2001:129). He resists a Marxist explanation of how power operates, 
preferring to work at a micro level where a focus upon “a microphysics of power” reveals that 
power may come from below as well as above (McNay 1994: 91). Foucault considers Marxist 
approaches to be reductionist; he does not believe that subjects are duped about reality because 
reality is impossible to fix. He argues that “the forms of totalization offered by politics are 
always, in fact, very limited” (1991: 386).  Foucault critiques the Marxist concept of ideology as 
unnecessarily rigid and used unimaginatively to refer to broad categories such as patriarchy and 
capitalism (Matheson 2005:10).  He expresses difficulty with the term: “like it or not it always 
stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth” (1991:60). 
Myra Macdonald considers that Foucault offers a challenge to the binary nature of Marxism: 
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Foucault is helpful in insisting that models that assume a binary opposition between 
‘dominant’ and ‘alternative’ discourses simplify the unpredictability of ongoing contests 
for power and influence.  Foucault’s dislike of binary oppositions also usefully reminds us 
that it is facile to assume, as media academics sometimes do, that all ‘alternative’ 
discourses have right on their side, and that all ‘dominant discourses’ are necessarily 
suspect. (2003:37). 
 
Whilst Foucault critiques and supplements Marxism he does not reject it. This is exemplified by 
his partial acceptance of the Marxist principle that the cinema fulfills a function in conferring 
identity.  Foucault does not consider that the subject is an “anthropological given” so much as a 
social construction which is inflected by institutions such as the cinema (Lapsley & Westlake 
1988:20). In focusing upon the influences which determine identity Foucault’s work can be 
linked with that of Althusser and in addressing the way in which film constructs the subject with 
Lacan; in this respect his work approximates a Marxist approach.  Where Foucault differs is in 
the Marxist assumption that cinematic representation is necessarily a part of capitalist ideology. 
Stam points out that a Marxist theoretical approach emphasises that cinema is responsible for 
constructing acquiescent subjects who are motivated to maintain the oppressive social order of 
the Capitalist system (2000b:138). According to this approach the cinematic spectator is sutured 
in to a position of misrecognition by filmic devices (2000b:136). Stam appraises a Marxist 
approach as “somewhat hyperbolic, even hysterical” in the way it considers cinema to be a 
dominant ideological state apparatus.  Foucault’s stance places much more emphasis upon 
cinema as part of a larger discursive whole that is characterised by contradiction and 
ambivalence (2000:138). 
 
Whilst there are commonalities between Foucault’s work and Marxist approaches there are also 
divisions which are referenced by Foucault’s conclusion that Marxists were not interested in his 
work despite its focus on vulnerable members of society (Foucault 1994:259). Foucault’s interest 
in and questioning of Marxism is mirrored by his stance towards structuralism which will be 
considered next.  
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FOUCAULT IN RELATION TO STRUCTURALISM 
 
The major links which exist between Marxist and structuralist approaches mean that Foucault’s 
attitude towards structuralism can be anticipated. Lapsley and Westlake consider that 
structuralism went on to develop the work of the Marxist theorists by providing it with a “theory 
of language” (1988:11). Foucault responded positively to certain aspects of structuralism; this is 
not surprising given that his own “archaeological” work has been interpreted as structuralist 
(Danaher et al 2000:7).  What Foucault responded to in structuralism was its precise and 
systematic nature; he felt that in this respect it was an advance on Marxism. He was interested in 
the driving force of structuralism which suggested that meaning should be considered as 
relational and not intrinsic (Danaher et al 2000:7). Foucault’s work is akin to that of both the 
Marxists and the structuralists in its sceptical attitude towards the concept of the free subject 
(Danaher et al 2000:8). He welcomed the way in which structuralism broadened perspectives but 
ultimately felt that a structuralist approach stopped short of thorough investigation and, in 
parallel with Marxism, was under-developed.  This is seen in his assertion that structuralism 
cannot account for meaning simply by looking at relations. He rejects the principle that “a 
system of universal rules or laws or elementary structures” underpins history or explains “its 
surface appearances” (Olssen et al 2004:49), arguing that structuralism fails “to theorize 
adequately the historicity of structures” (Olssen et al 2004:50). Foucault argues that structuralism 
is unable to account for change; “it could explain all of the rules but not why people used the 
rules in a certain kind of way” (Danaher et al 2000:8). Donald Matheson considers that the key 
theoretical point of difference between a Foucauldian approach and that of a structuralist is that 
the structuralist analyses utterances as if they are languages, rather than considering symbolic 
actions in specific social situations (2005:43). He acknowledges that a structuralist approach 
examines structures, such as texts which have the capacity to obscure other structures, in an 
attempt to trace invisible structures below the surface. A Foucauldian approach is concerned, in 
addition, to look at patterns and links between texts. In Matheson’s view the two approaches are 
quite different in method: the first presumes that prejudiced ideology exists and the second that 
discourse acts in prejudicial ways (2005:10). For Foucault, therefore, structures are of less 
importance than context and specificity. Foucault considers that structuralism does not attempt to 
look at the non-discursive and does not investigate areas of repression. His work in relation to 
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structuralism is notable for its attempt to examine the connections between discursive and non-
discursive domains which are charaterised by restricted discourse; this leads to a focus on 
hierarchies of power (Danaher et al 2000:8).  
 
The limitations of a structuralist approach which are highlighted by Foucault are perceived by 
Andrew when applied directly to film.  Andrew concludes that structuralism does not recognize 
cinematic discourse and is able to provide only a limited explanation for the way in which film 
makes meaning (1984:170). This perception of limitation justifies my decision to use 
Foucauldian discourse analysis in relation to the film text in Chapter 5.  
 
The third aspect of Grand Theory which will be considered in relation to Foucault’s theoretical 
approach is psychoanalysis.  By the mid 1970s structuralism had been replaced by what 
Bordwell and Carroll call “film theory tout court”.  This was concerned with determining the 
“social and psychic functions of cinema” and included psychoanalytical approaches (1996:6). 
Once again it is possible to perceive a pattern of acceptance and rejection in Foucault’s attitude 
towards psychoanalysis.   
 
FOUCAULT IN RELATION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS 
 
There has always been a kinship between psychoanalysis, psychology and film. Michael Chanan 
links the relationship between spectator and cinema screen to that of dreamer and dream 
(1980:34) and George Orwell underlines the link between cinema and psychology: 
 
Properly used, the film is the one possible medium for conveying mental processes. A 
dream, for instance...is totally indescribable in words, but it can quite well be represented 
on the screen (2000:10). 
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Psychoanalysis can be seen to be influential in fantastical film narratives, the nature of film form, 
and the unconscious of both the spectator and the film maker (Andrew 1984:135). Freud’s 
influence on film between the late 1930s and 1940s has been interpreted as modish but film has 
also appropriated psychoanalysis more permanently as a discipline that deals in signification 
(Branston 2000:141). 
 
A psychoanalytic approach explores how subjectivity is formed in the psyches of those watching 
via screen representations. Lapsley and Westlake delineate two separate phases in the use of 
psychoanalysis in the cinema.  The first, which they call the structuralist phase, is concerned with 
the mirror stage; the second places emphasis upon fantasy and desire and is denoted as the post-
structuralist phase (1988:78). Andrew considers a psychoanalytic approach to be a theoretical 
advance on structuralism because it shifts the emphasis from how objects are reproduced in 
cinema to the production of subjects:  
 
Only by shifting the discourse to another plane and invoking another system could modern 
theory develop…Questions about the connections cinema maintains with reality and 
art…were subsumed under the consideration of cinema’s rapport with the spectator. A 
new faculty, the unconscious, instantly became a necessary part of any overarching film 
theory, and a new discourse, psychoanalysis, was called upon to explain what before had 
been of little consequence, the fact and the force of desire” (1984:134). 
 
Foucault’s work shares an affinity with a psychoanalytic approach because of his interest in 
spectatorship. Foucault was interested in the power of the dominatory gaze (2003); he “took the 
panopticon as a metaphor for that continual process of proliferating local tactics and techniques 
which operated in society on a micro-level, seeking to procure the maximum effect from the 
minimum effort and manufacturing docile and utilisable bodies” (Tagg 1980:45). John Tagg 
points out that the concept of the panopticon was made redundant by photography which 
continued to feature in areas of specific interest for Foucault: 
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If we examine any of the…institutions whose genealogy Foucault traces, we find 
photography seated calmly within them.  From the mid nineteenth century on, photography 
had its role to play in the workings of the factory, the hospital, the asylum, the reformatory 
and the school (1988: 77). 
 
Tagg makes the point that the status of photography as a technology “varies with the power 
relations which invest it” (1988: 80). Foucault’s work on the gaze, which Tagg considers to be 
comprised of “intimate observation…subtle control…refined institutional order…passive 
subjection and an ever more dominant benevolent gaze” (1988:81) is considered by Bordwell to 
have “mapped new semantic fields onto the act of looking” and to have been influential in 
exacerbating film theory’s interest in the look (1989: 155).  The gaze is a dominant motif in film 
theory as it is the point at which identification is felt to take place (Copjec 2000:442). Copjec 
sees it as “that point at which sense and being coincide; the subject comes into being by 
identifying with the image’s signified” (2000:442). Foucault’s interest in the gaze is illustrated 
by his examination of the Velasquez painting Las Meninas.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Velasquez: Las Meninas 
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Miller and Stam refer to the complexity of Velasquez’ painting considering that it “implicates 
painter, image and spectator, both inside the text and as part of it” (2000a:86). The power of the 
painting, for Foucault, is in its questioning of spectatorship and its focus upon self-reflexivity 
(Chanan 1980:34). The painting raises questions about the identity of the spectator and the 
individual’s negotiation of subjectivity in relation to both the text and the wider world. Las 
Meninas is illustrative of how fascination can be exerted by a single text but the principles 
embodied in it can, perhaps, be extrapolated out to include a wider appraisal of film.  
 
In addition to a shared interest in spectatorship Foucault responded to psychoanalysis as a 
discipline because of its capacity to critique: 
 
Psychoanalysis and ethnology occupy a privileged position in our knowledge…because 
they form an undoubted and inexhaustible treasure-hoard of experiences and concepts and 
above all a perpetual principle of dissatisfaction, of calling into question, of criticism and 
contestation of what may seem in other respects, to be established (2000:373). 
 
Foucault appreciated the transgressive ability of psychoanalysis to “unmake that very man who 
is creating his positivity in the human sciences” and the way in which it offered an alternative to 
the established medical gaze (2000:379). He welcomed the capacity of psychoanalysis to counter 
the non-symmetrical observation typical of medicine by offering a “new structure of language 
without response” (2007: 238). Patrick Hutton points out that “Foucault never discussed the 
significance of Freud’s work in any depth.  His remarks consist of scattered and usually oblique 
references” (1988:121). It is notable, however, that Foucault considered Freud’s work to be key 
in initiating discursive practice (Burke 1995:241) and in exploring areas which had been 
suppressed by common-sense notions of reason (Andrew 1984:159). He considered 
psychoanalysis to be a “counter science” which was no less valid than the human sciences but 
had the capacity to “flow in the opposite direction”, thereby contesting the epistemological basis 
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of science (2000:373).  In addition psychoanalysis provided “a perpetual principle of 
dissatisfaction” as it pointed “not toward that which must be rendered gradually more explicit by 
the progressive illumination of the implicit but towards what is there and yet is hidden” 
(2000:373). Crucially Foucault’s fascination with psychoanalysis was because it was “a theory 
whose object is the irrational…. which cannot be accounted for in terms of rational cognitive or 
organic explanations” (Carroll 1996:64). Foucault turned to psychoanalysis in his dispute with 
Derrida about the “otherness” of madness considering that it might be a way of challenging 
Derrida’s assertion of the “unsurpassability of reason” (Boyne 2001: 90). He responded to the 
radical interpretation of the sign offered by the madman and considered that psychoanalysis had 
the power to sever the relation between the signifier and the signified (Andrew 1984:159); in this 
way he saw psychoanalysis as an advance on structuralism. Foucault perceived a link between 
madness and self- reflexivity; this is emphasised by Patrick Fuery who links the worlds of 
madness, the mirror and the dream: 
 
The symbol of madness will henceforth be that mirror which, without reflecting anything 
real, will secretly offer the man who observes himself in it the dream of his own 
presumption (2004:30). 
 
Fuery links the radical interpretation of the signifier and the signified with the mirror, a defining 
feature of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Foucault’s work can be allied with that of Lacan through its 
focus on subjectivity. Foucault invested in psychoanalytic theory because, like Marxism and 
structuralism, it critiqued the notion of the free subject (Danaher et al 2000:8). Marxism and 
psychoanalysis can be linked through the influence of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory on 
Althusser’s ideological work (Pearson and Simpson 2001:346). Althusser’s Marxist approach 
theorised that ideology functioned because of the individual’s negotiation of subjectivity in 
relation to the world.  He did not consider ideology to be “a circumscribed set of political 
doctrines” so much as “a complex interaction between the social subject and the myriad 
institutional discourses… that gave this subject the imaginary illusion of his/her seamless 
connection to the social world” (Pearson & Simpson 2001:346). Foucault’s work can be allied 
with that of Althusser because he similarly considered the subject to be a construct which comes 
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about as the result of repressing desire in order to become a part of society (Danaher et al 
2000:8). The work of Lacan and Althusser meets in respect of the mirror phase:  
 
The process of viewing is likened to the illusion of a solid-state ego given by the mirror 
phase.  Taken together these qualities of ideology, lens, and subjectivity blind spectators to 
the fact that they, like the films they watch, are thick with discourse, unknowable by 
themselves or others without this encrustation of meaning and interpretation as are all 
social phenomena in a world of ideology (Miller 2000a:406). 
 
The positioning of the subject is specifically relevant to the cinema in terms of apparatus theory 
which looks closely at the impact of the technical apparatus and physical conditions of watching 
film upon members of the audience (Miller 2000a:406). Psychoanalysis can be considered as a 
useful political tool in making apparent the lure of cinema and through it the dominant ideology 
of society. Stam points out, however, that this impact can be overstated: 
 
Apparatus theory at times imbued the cinematic machine with an abstract and malevolent 
intentionality, falling into a kind of neo-Platonic condemnation of emotional manipulation.  
But real life spectators were never the pathetically deluded, shackled captives of a high-
tech version of Plato’s cave decreed by apparatus theorists (2000b:139) 
 
Scepticism has also been directed towards the power of the apparatus because there is no way of 
examining whether, or not, its effects are as stated; it is not contested and there are no means of 
falsifying its claims (Miller 2000a:406). Foucault subjected psychoanalysis to similar scrutiny. 
He critiqued the acceptance that psychoanalysis could understand the “truth” of the subject 
whilst simultaneously denying the existence of a “knowing subject” and considered that 
psychoanalysis was often used in isolation when appraising a text when its best use would be to 
employ it as part of a wide variety of analytical tools.  He was sceptical of psychoanalysis’ claim 
to uncover secrets and explain them, believing that it was simplistic to satisfy the analyst’s 
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desires so readily (Westlake 1988:102). Hutton argues that Foucault was not interested in the 
workings of the mind so much as “the emerging array of asylums that have fostered scrutiny of 
the mind over the past three centuries” (1988:125). Ultimately Foucault viewed psychoanalysis 
as a socially constructed category the purpose of which was to “provide a means of rendering the 
subject visible, governable, trackable” (Copjec 2000:440). Liz Eckermann argues that Foucault 
“saw the development of psychoanalysis as a further repression of the self” (1997:160) likening 
it to the confessional used by the Catholic Church and a tool for normalisation (1997:167).  
Foucault concluded that whilst psychoanalysis had set out to achieve greater knowledge it had 
ended by imposing limits on what could be known largely because it had done nothing to 
question systems of power or attempt to redefine them (Lapsley &Westlake 1988:218). He 
considered a psychoanalytic approach to power to be simplistic, questioning, for example, 
Freud’s assumption that power is “a lawgiver that forbids and represses” (Foucault 1994:xix). 
Bill Nichols argues that Foucault’s more developed work on power moved the theoretical 
limitations of psychoanalysis forward and also emphasized the phallocentric nature of 
psychoanalysis, revealing it to be incompatible with a politics of multiculturalism and social 
difference (2000:42).  In addition Nichols considers that psychoanalysis, in foregrounding the 
voice of the analysand, clings to assumptions of abstract rationality and democratic equality that 
lead to a politics of consensus but represses a true politics of identity (2000:42). Stam similarly 
refers to psychoanalysis’ claim to “identify psychic processes common to humanity as a whole” 
but ultimately to universalise “a particular guilt-ridden and time-bound culture: Christian, 
patriarchal, occidental and based on the nuclear family” (2000b:329). Lapsley and Westlake 
offer a corrective to the problems inherent in psychoanalysis:  
 
What was needed was a mode of theorising that would retain the radical implications of Lacan’s 
notion of the complex constitution of both the subject and object through discourse but would 
avoid the phallocentrism implicit in Lacan’s thinking.  Just such an ideologically acceptable 
dephallicised recasting of the relation of subjectivity and discourse was to be found in the work 
of Foucault (1988:101). 
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Joan Copjec is more questioning of Foucault’s work, however. She agrees with the limitations 
that Foucault saw in psychoanalysis, highlighting the difference between a view which maintains 
that the conscious and the unconscious are “processes of apprehension”, and Foucault’s belief 
that they are “categories through which the modern subject is apprehended and apprehends 
itself”  (2000:440).  At the same time she also considers Foucault’s concept of the panopticon to 
be less flexible than Lacan’s own work on reflexivity which views the mirror as a screen. Copjec 
suggests that Foucault’s work on the panopticon lacks complexity because it does not recognise 
that non-knowledge or invisibility might be a possibility for the subject.  For Copjec, Lacan’s 
argument is more layered because he considers that “that which is produced by a signifying 
system can never be determinate” (2000: 439). She critiques Foucault’s work on power and 
surveillance via the panopticon by pointing out that for Foucault difference is not a way of 
countering panoptic power – it actually feeds it and leads to greater helplessness (2000:437). 
Copjec questions what she sees as a limited argument which is ultimately “resistant to resistance, 
unable to conceive of a discourse that would refuse rather than refuel power” (2000:439).  
 
Whilst Foucault responded to certain aspects of Grand Theory in the form of Marxism, 
structuralism and psychoanalysis, therefore, his work is also characterized by departures.  These 
departures define the Foucauldian approach to discourse which influences my work. The chapter 
will now move on to consider how Foucault’s work can be applied to the cinematic domain. 
 
FOUCAULT AND THE CINEMA 
 
Foucault rarely makes direct reference to the cinema. He does, however, include cinema in a 
discussion of heterotopias; Foucault considers cinema, along with beaches, cafes and trains, to be  
“absolutely different from all the sites that they reflect and speak about” (Hansen 2002:401). He 
also appraises the cinema as “a very odd rectangular room, at the end of which, on a two 
dimensional screen, one sees the projection of a three-dimensional space” (1984:6), thereby 
emphasising the alien nature of cinema and its capacity for transformation.  Whilst such 
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specificity is rare, Foucault’s work is, nevertheless, relevant to an examination of cinema as an 
important site for the creation and circulation of discourse.  
 
Tessa Perkins considers that the turn to discourse embodied in Foucault’s work acts as a 
corrective to the fundamental criticism of Grand Theory as ahistorical and “provided a way out 
of…various Marxist, structuralist and psychoanalytic strait jackets” (2000:86).  His historical 
approach, which brings “to light the discursive formations and events that have created the fields 
of knowledge and games of truth by which…society has governed itself” (Danaher et al. 
2000:36) is relevant because it is ultimately  “concerned with modernity – what is happening 
here and now” (Perkins 2000:126). It is not so much specific aspects of Foucault’s work, (such 
as his focus upon madness, the prison or sexuality) that are relevant to the field of cinema as his 
appraisal of film as an area of discursive practice. Despite this, areas of specificity have been 
linked to film, for example, Foucault’s work on sexuality, as cinema proves to be endlessly 
interested in the revelations and concealments it offers (Lapsley & Westlake 1988:20). It is the 
cultural positioning of film that makes a Foucauldian approach rewarding. Tim Bywater and 
Thomas Sobchack stress that: 
 
Film, no less than any other cultural artefact, can be “read” in a variety of different ways – 
as historical document, psychological casebook, philosophical repository, or political 
example (1989:xiv). 
 
Film is a key site for the play of cultural discourse and a key mechanism for encapsulating and 
proliferating cultural messages. A Foucauldian approach to film texts considers: “Whose interest 
do they serve? What relations of domination do they help maintain?” (Lapsley & Westlake 1988 
:20). In this respect Foucault brings “disciplinary paradigms of knowledge to film” (Stam 
2000b:247). Carl Plantinga suggests that if film can be considered to disseminate knowledge 
then, in Foucauldian terms, it can also be considered as part of a strategic enterprise that attempts 
to attain or maintain power (1996:309) and Matheson points out that “while on one level the 
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meanings that are found in the media are shared, the power to make those shared meanings is not 
shared” (2005:2). MacCabe argues that: 
 
Rather than thinking in terms of inside (cinema) and outside (ideology) the concept of 
discourse enabled one to think the operations by which cinema is constantly transforming 
the outside inside, and that inside a further element in the outside (1978:35). 
 
Foucault’s work on power is also relevant to a consideration of textual representation (Lapsley & 
Westlake 1988:21). Foucault delineates the importance of representation in The Order of Things, 
expressing the view that it “governs the mode of being of language, individuals, nature, and need 
itself” (2000:209). Stereotyping, as a key filmic concept and an important facet of representation, 
“assigns identities through norms” and has the potential to proliferate discourse in the social 
sphere (Lapsley & Westlake 1988:20). Commenting specifically upon madness Fuery points out 
that cinema assimilates many different types of representation: 
 
Cinema has become a repository for the discourses and images of madness that have 
developed over thousands of years.  In its relatively short history, cinema has effectively 
absorbed, conventionalised and established the representations of madness for itself as a 
textual practice and for the wider social domain (2004:31). 
 
Fuery considers that cinematic representations of madness draw freely on “the full historical and 
cultural range of discourse of the mad” (2004:31). Adopting a Foucauldian approach to the 
filmic representation of madness involves an incorporation of his work on plurality and 
historicity and a questioning of texts as important social documents which have become 
culturally acceptable over time (Lapsley & Westlake 1988:20).  Foucault considers that in 
adopting a discourse analytic approach:  
 
48	  
	  
What we are concerned with here is not to neutralize discourse, to make it the sign of 
something else, and to pierce through its density in order to reach what remains silently 
anterior to it, but on the contrary to maintain it in its consistency, to make it emerge in its 
own complexity (Foucault 1972:52). 
 
Macdonald considers that a strength of discourse analysis is that it “starts its enquiry with an ear 
to the texts themselves, and in a spirit of openness to the patterns that may emerge” thereby 
making it a suitable tool for the examination of film (2003:2).  A consideration of Foucault in 
relation to the text inevitably leads to a discussion of his positioning as a poststructuralist.  
Foucault observes the poststructuralist shift from text to spectator and dominant motifs of post-
structuralism, such as the destabilization of textual meaning, characterise his work (Stam 
2000a:148). Foucault moves towards an analysis of discourse, however, rather than focusing 
upon what he considered to be an endless process of interpretation.  He was more interested in 
the impact of the text upon audiences than the text itself and regarded deconstruction as 
responsible for closing off rather than opening up enquiry by placing too much emphasis upon 
the interaction between the text and the reader (Stam 2000a:4).  
 
Notably Derrida placed more emphasis than Foucault on “what the author means or is trying to 
say” (Royle 2004:7). Derrida considered that it was crucial to take authorial intention into 
account when reading a text but conceded that neither reader nor writer could achieve complete 
mastery over the text. Foucault’s seminal essay “What is an Author?” (1977) highlights the 
importance of addressing the issue of authorial voice. He considers the view of the author as sole 
originator of the text to be both simplistic and trivial, preferring to view the author as only one 
source of signification (1977:115). This clearly has great relevance for issues of cinematic 
discourse and authorship.  Andrew Bennett points out that “the question of the author…has been 
central to the development of film studies since the 1950s and the ascription of a single, unified 
and identifiable author for a film or for a body of films is bound up with the question of the 
status of film itself as a medium” (2005:106). Foucault considers that the role of the author is 
bound up with juridical and institutional systems and that authorial name is used to pin down a 
“proliferation” of meaning (Bennet: 2005:23/28).  He links the concept of the author with the rise 
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of Capitalism, regarding auteurism as an aspect of film theory which is driven by an “aesthetic of 
consumption” (Stam 2000a:4). At the same time as he expresses concern with the individual 
status of the author, Foucault contests “the Barthesian notion of the ‘death of the author’” 
arguing that any challenge mounted against the privileged position of the author will work 
conversely to preserve that privilege, thereby ultimately missing the true significance of the 
author’s disappearance (Bennett 2005:21). Foucault’s work on the author transcends Barthes’ 
focus upon a negative space or absence where the identity of the author is lost to consider “the 
social and historical construction of a ‘writing subject’ and…writing as a space in which this 
disappearing is endlessly enacted” (Bennett 2005:20). Foucault therefore argues: 
 
We should re-examine the empty space left by the author’s disappearance; we should 
attentively observe, along its gaps and fault lines, its new demarcations, and the 
reapportionment of this void; we should await the fluid functions released by this 
disappearance (1977:121). 
 
His approach is to monitor patterns of breaks and gaps in order to see what is revealed by the 
disappearance of the author” (1977:121). Sean Burke argues that Foucault’s work transcends the 
question of ‘Who is the author?’ to examine the origin and control of discourse, and “the diverse 
functions of the subject” (1995:245).  Foucault asserts that the subject cannot be the source of 
meaning because it is constituted by social discourse.  This stance led to his pronunciation that 
the subject was dead (Hamscha 2010:153). Norman Fairclough outlines the complexity of the 
position: 
 
Discourse is not the majestically unfolding, manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking 
subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his 
discontinuity with himself may be determined (1989:104). 
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Foucault’s post-structuralist stance has certainly not been universally accepted; Macdonald 
summarises criticisms of his discourse approach: 
 
Because of its fuzzy edges, the concept of ‘discourse’ is often accused of replacing familiar 
concepts such as ‘language’ or ‘representation’ with unhelpful academic jargon.  Where 
‘language’ and, more especially, ‘representation’ urge us to examine communicative 
strategies, discourse can appear to be an abstract concept, ill-suited to the analysis of media 
texts (2003:1) 
 
Foucault’s views upon the indefinite nature of agency have also invited negative commentary. 
John Corner argues against a poststructuralist approach which denies that texts have fixed 
meanings, stating that an insistence upon polysemy might dismiss or fail to recognise that the 
text does have determinate meaning (1991:105).  Kay Richardson reinforces this by 
acknowledging that whilst textual determinacy does have its limits it is not unreasonable to 
assume a ‘low level’ can exist (1998: 223). Paisley Livingston points out that Foucault’s 
assertion that it is impossible to know an author’s intent is not logically traced through to 
questioning the interpretation of that same text: 
 
Foucault...lays…down in “What is an Author?” that it is impossible to know an author’s 
mind but he then makes any number of sweeping assertions about what goes on in other 
readers’ minds when they interpret texts, and no justification of this asymmetry is provided 
(1996:169).  
 
Terry Eagleton highlights a similar illogicality in Foucault’s appraisal of the subject as 
positioned by discourse but the critic as objective:  
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If regimes of power constitute us to our very roots, producing just those forms of 
subjectivity on which they can most efficiently go to work…what is there “left over” so to 
speak, to find this situation so appalling?” (1991:47). 
 
This inconsistency is also recognised by Bordwell who wonders “how can the intellectual argue 
that the activities of others are culturally constructed while arrogating to him or herself a position 
that purportedly escapes this?” (1996:13).   
 
Criticisms of Foucault’s work as a form of cultural construct and also of his determination to 
remain fiercely committed to “a necessary non-correspondence condition” are important in an 
overall appraisal of his theoretical approach (Mercer 1980:9).  Nevertheless, his work, 
particularly in the field of mental health, remains appropriate and valid for an exploration of 
discourse in the naming of clinical psychosis, the film text and amongst those who have 
experienced psychosis and will, therefore, act as a point of reference in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
which examine these issues in greater detail. For me the value of a Foucauldian discourse 
approach is that it moves beyond the text to emphasise power, how this is embodied in language 
and how it operates in the wider social world. 
 
The second section of the literature review will review key work in audience studies and will 
discuss its application to a group of respondents who have experience of psychosis and their 
interpretations of its filmic representation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52	  
	  
LITERATURE REVIEW SECTION TWO: AUDIENCE APPROACHES 
 
Audience studies seek to answer the questions: “What kinds of meanings does a text have? For 
whom?  In what circumstances?  They also assess the possible effect of media texts in social, 
political, emotional and cognitive domains (Staiger 2005:2).  The intention of my research is to 
examine the relationship which exists between film representations of psychosis and an audience 
group made up of those who have experienced it.  Michael Tracey states:    
 
One of the few questions really worth asking about the media and society is what the 
relationship is between the things they purvey and the meanings and understandings that 
we carry around with us as worldviews, mental pictures, ideologies, belief systems 
(1998:74). 
 
I wish to examine this relationship via a series of interviews which will focus upon the film text 
and will consider the outcomes, if any, of the selection and presentation of material relating to 
psychosis. I wish to elicit the responses of those who have experienced psychosis as I consider 
representations of psychosis to have greater and more specific relevance to this cohort than 
anyone else.  
 
The chapter begins by contextualising those who have experienced psychosis in the wider field 
of disability studies.  It then moves on to consider theoretical audience approaches in relation to 
this study.  
 
A FOCUS UPON THOSE WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED PSYCHOSIS 
The Equality Act 2010 states “a person has a disability for the purposes of the Act if he or she 
has a physical or mental impairment and the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse 
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effect on his or her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities” (2010). Writing a decade 
ago Karen Ross points out that: 
 
Disability has…been almost totally ignored as a thematic of contemporary interest to mass 
media researchers, and what studies do exist are either content driven...or else focused on 
the views of non-disabled people…What most of these studies show is that there is a dearth 
of images of disability in mainstream broadcasting and those that do exist are largely 
peripheral and stereotypical (2003:132). 
 
Writing specifically in relation to the portrayal of mental illness Philo notes that:  
 
Those studies which have attempted to relate media content to attitudes have been limited 
to examining the short term influence of particular films and television series, or of press 
coverage of specific events.  In addition the reliance of these studies on quantitative 
research designs and techniques means they have been unable to address the complex 
processes involved in belief formation and in the interpretation of media messages 
(1996:xi) 
 
My study aims to specifically target areas of belief formation and interpretation. Since Philo’s 
(1996) publication the body of research on mental health representation remains limited.  My 
intention is to supplement this work by focusing on the relatively unexplored domain of film as 
previous studies have prioritised television, newspapers and the link between psychiatric illness 
and crime (Signorelli 1989, Wahl & Lefkowits 1989, Philo 1994). Notably, service users are not 
always consulted in relation to research on mental health issues.  Whilst Philo’s 1996 study did 
elicit the opinions of twenty three service users this was as an addendum to the main study which 
used six focus groups containing ten members, none of whom were service users (1996:83).  The 
views of psychiatrists and related mental health professionals are sought, (Gabbard & Gabbard 
1999) but this is an interesting complement to interviewing those who have experienced 
54	  
	  
psychosis and not a substitute.  Ross considers that without consultation with disabled people 
representations of disability can become “fantasy portraits.” These result from the assumption 
that accurate portrayals can be made without lived experience and also as a result of the concerns 
of programme makers about the limits of acceptability to audiences (2003:135). Alison Faulkner 
and Phil Thomas observe a tendency to by-pass user-led understanding in psychiatric research. 
They question whether researchers are “asking questions relevant to service users – the people 
for whom the issue is most crucial” (2002:2). Faulkner and Thomas argue that “research should 
be based in the subjective, lived experience of emotional distress” but this goes against the 
“dominant paradigm” in mental health research which “renders the views of people with mental 
illness invalid and negates the person as an individual” (2002:2). Lesley Henderson emphasises 
the productive nature of consultation with psychiatric service users. In her opinion inpatient 
settings offer important access to, and improved consultation with, mental health users compared 
to other “distressed groups” (1996:26).  She considers that further improved access is crucial in 
“making the invisible visible” (1996:35).  
 
Whilst my audience cohort is made cohesive by the experience of psychosis it differs in respect 
of ideological determinants including familial situation, gender and class (Silverstone 1996:282) 
and political belief, income and age (McQuail 1997:2). These “cross-cutting variables” (Ross: 
2003:136) must be taken in to account along with other potential factors such as degrees of 
activity and passivity and the context in which texts are consumed when assessing response 
(McQuail 1997:150). As Alan McKee points out, it is possible that an audience member might 
never have thought or known about a specific representation before involvement in a study, let 
alone formulated an opinion (2003:84).  
 
Before delineating the audience approaches which are most appropriate for my study it is 
important to contextualise them. Approaches to audiences are diverse and have evolved to 
become more complex. This chapter will consider the historical evolution of audience research 
before summarising its relevance.  Effects theory will be examined first, followed by active 
audience and cultural studies approaches and finally post-structuralist/postmodernist approaches.  
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EFFECTS THEORY 
 
Dickinson et al suggest that, “in a sense, of course, all media research contains or draws from, 
explicitly or not, some theory of media influence” (1998:x).  It is logical, therefore, that early 
audience work is preoccupied with potential influence. Jostein Gripsrud refers to the era between 
1920 and 1940 as being dominated by passive audience models and calls it “The Almighty 
Media” (2002:42). The term “mass” audience was also coined at this time by Herbert Blumer 
(1939) and was rich in associations, evoking apprehension centring on manipulation, moral and 
cultural decline and depersonalisation (McQuail1997:7).  Early television theory emphasised “its 
addictive pull, its ubiquitous invasion of social and cultural space, and its seeming passivity and 
emptiness as a leisure time activity” (McQuail1997:5). Research in the 1960s and 1970s assumed 
an ideological slant; “the media, as bearers of ideology, were seen… as having an enormous 
impact on the way that people think and act” (Dahlgren 1998:299). An assumption of ideological 
effect was later incorporated into further evolved models such as Gerbner’s work on cultivation 
theory (Gripsrud 2002:43).  
 
Contemporary attitudes towards effects theory offer a spectrum of opinion on its validity. David 
Gauntlett does not consider that its lengthy history legitimises it:  
It has become something of a cliché to observe that despite many decades of research and 
hundreds of studies, the connections between people’s consumption of the mass media and 
their subsequent behaviour have remained persistently elusive…why are there no clear 
answers on media effects? (1998:120). 
 
Gauntlett suggests that media effect cannot be determined because it does not exist; Birgitte 
Hoijer argues that because no two individuals are the same then it is impossible to determine 
media effect with any precision (1998:170).  
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Not all contemporary approaches are dismissive. Stuart Hall considers the media to be an 
ideological apparatus; he places emphasis on “the systematic ‘over accessing’ of selective elite 
personnel” and over-reliance upon their viewpoint as a source of influence (2003:61). Graham 
Murdock takes a political economy approach; he considers that research becomes distorted if 
questions are not asked about agency and the political and economic institutions that shape the 
media. Murdock argues that certain media institutions occupy positions of power and privilege 
and, in consequence, control influential discourses. He suggests that we cannot avoid recognition 
of the power that the media wield in shaping aspects of semiotics and subjectivity 
(Dahlgren1998: 301). Herbert Schiller’s focus on film highlights the potentially harmful effect of 
product from media conglomerates and considers that “indigenous creative forces are swamped 
and inevitably crippled by the relatively cheap cultural products offered by the big producers” 
(1998:11). Schiller suggests “the net effect of such total cultural packages on the human senses is 
impossible to assess but it would be folly to ignore” (1998:4). Tracey considers that we are 
dependent on the media for information about the world; it is logical and inevitable, therefore, 
that there should be some form of media influence:   
It is obvious that if the audience is being provided with ‘information’ and ‘understandings’ 
by the media and that there are what we might call ‘errors’ within those messages that 
there will necessarily be errors within the public mind (1998:78). 
 
Thomas Austin is questioning of ‘the unevenly available resources for, and limits on” audience 
agency (2002:16). Roy Stafford also argues that the concept of a “discerning and discriminating 
public” who seek out films to gratify their own needs is attractive but far removed from the 
reality of the market place; he suggests that there is a tendency to underestimate “the will of 
large corporations to persuade audiences” (2007:129).  
It is important to consider contextual factors when considering media effect. Murdock 
acknowledges that the power of media organisations is, itself, limited by the general economic 
and political framework in which it functions and is, therefore, subject to boundaries (1998:206). 
In addition Cecilia Von Feilitzen points out that media power must be considered in relation to 
content and cultural influence (1998:9). Austin considers effect to be contextual: 
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I want to hold on to the notion that media consumption, including watching films (on 
television and video as well as at the cinema) informs and impacts upon our daily lives – 
but in complex and contextually shaped ways.  It does this in part by offering explanatory 
frameworks that may be applied to the social world…Such ‘effects’ are always constituted 
according to the particularity of the social settings in which texts are encountered, and so 
exceed, for example, the simplistic logics of  ‘glamorising violence’ which circulated in 
some common sense knowledges and indictments of popular screen media (2002:95). 
Unlike Schiller, who refers exclusively to major corporations and considers their interests to be 
incompatible with the needs of the public, Austin suggests that, “just as a film’s audience should 
not be conceived as an undifferentiated totality, so industrial and critical sectors should be 
recognised as relatively heterogeneous rather than monolithic” (2002:6). Schiller links the 
product of transnational companies with the erosion of responsible representation; he suggests 
that “the heaviest cost of transnational corporate produced culture… is that it erodes the priceless 
idea of the public good and the vital community” (1998:11). In contrast Austin recognises the 
creative capacity of Hollywood cinema and its function of “inviting (rather than simply 
determining) the production of multiple meanings and genuine pleasures by varied and 
heterogeneous audiences” (2002:77). Like Richard Maltby (1995:27), Austin sees popular film 
as far too “opportunistic” for a set agenda.  He acknowledges the importance of exploiting 
difference, not eroding it, in order to reach a wider audience base and argues that mainstream 
film might promote minority discourse in order to exploit new markets (2002:58). Douglas 
Kellner also argues that whilst media texts are assumed to be conservative they are capable of 
leading to social reform and change in a sense that can be characterised as liberal (1998:40). This 
is reflected in Chapter 5, which concludes that film texts come from a wide range of production 
companies, cover a wide range of genres and contain various and sometimes contradictory 
messages.  
 
The chapter will now move on to consider the historical roots of and contemporary approaches to 
active audience theory.  
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ACTIVE AUDIENCE THEORY 
The most notable move away from Gripsrud’s “Almighty Media” and effects theory was the shift 
in focus from ideology and its effects to the audience itself (Hartley 1996:225). Gripsrud uses the 
term “Powerless Media” to refer to active models of audience research (2002:42); his choice of 
terminology highlights the divergence in approach. Dickinson et al argue that the “Powerless 
Media” model was part of the same tradition as effects theory in that it was still about effect, or 
lack of it (1998:x). Similarly Staiger does not see an absolute distinction between the two 
approaches: she cites uses and gratifications theory as marking the beginning of active audience 
theory but points out that “throughout the first half century of mass media theory various authors 
have considered individuals as coming to texts with characteristics that determined or at least 
influenced their relations to those texts” (2005:52). Martin Barker, however, recognises the 
tendency of audience theory to gravitate towards either an effects or an active audience model: 
“at present media theory recognises children or gratified users” (1998:190). Robert Kubey sees 
the two approaches as unnecessarily divorced from each other, a result, perhaps, of their 
historical development: 
Was the much criticized “magic bullet/hypodermic needle” direct effects model cited so 
often by uses and gratifications exponents deliberately to set up a straw man in order to 
validate the importance of uses and gratifications? (1996:196). 
 
Polemical arguments characterise the active/ passive debate: McQuail considers that an emphasis 
upon the active audience “was itself largely an ideological move designed to deflect the attack on 
monopolistic capitalist media” (1997:13); John Hartley notes that audiences are often depicted as 
“sub and superhuman…in the classic Levi-Straussian manner” (1996:232); Dahlgren considers 
uses and gratifications, as a key aspect of active audience theory, to be an imbalanced 
‘corrective’ to passive audience theory  (1998:299) and Austin recognises “two totalising 
stereotypes of the film spectator; a controlling, voyeuristic male gendered subject and a passive 
dupe interpellated or positioned ideologically by the cinematic apparatus and the film text” 
(2002:11). This dichotomy inevitably means that active audience theory, like passive audience 
theory, is subject to criticism. Sonia Livingstone argues that: 
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Research on the active viewer tends to be overly constructivist, neglecting the role of the 
text, to be overly cognitive, neglecting the role of emotions and actions, to be overly 
individualistic, reducing the social act of viewing to the individual act of cognising 
(1998:37) 
 
Kubey specifically critiques uses and gratifications theory as deliberately structured to avoid any 
evidence of effect. He suggests that evidence shows that the mass media bring about uniform 
responses in a large percentage of audiences but this is routinely ignored leading to distortion 
(1996:198). Kubey argues that gratification itself is never considered to be an effect and 
considers that, “ironically the only sort of media effect they (uses and gratifications theorists) are 
prepared to recognise is one that they believe misleads audience members to conclude that there 
are media effects” (1996:201). A frequent criticism of the uses and gratifications model is that it 
is often unable to explain why audiences make the choices that they do. McQuail suggests that 
because uses and gratifications theory is not underpinned with rigorous methodology then there 
is a tendency to reify responses to verbal statements so that they become “new constructs” which 
are meant to represent “the gratifications offered by media content” (1998:155). He also 
considers that researchers substitute the statements of a limited group of individuals for a true 
examination of culture and that uses and gratifications theory fails to recognise the importance of 
aesthetics (1998:155). Barker argues that the notion of ‘activity’ in active audience theory is 
extraordinarily imprecise and that a theory of “disgratification” would provide an additional 
useful dimension (1998:190).  
Despite criticism of the uses and gratifications model McQuail acknowledges the importance of 
the approach in foregrounding a focus on the audience: 
One of the innovations in the search for better concepts and methods of inquiry in relation 
to media effect was to take more account of the kind and strength of the motivation of the 
general public (1998:153). 
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Virginia Nightingale similarly highlights the importance of early active audience research as 
emphasising that “viewers have voices and critical perspectives…which deserve attention” 
(1996:64). Active audience theory was also key in focusing on the pleasures offered to the 
audience by the text (Katz 1996:10). Both of these considerations remain relevant to an analysis 
of the responses of those who have experienced psychosis to film representation.  
 
The work of John Fiske is central to the active audience tradition. It can be understood as a 
reaction to previous work addressing media influence. Fiske’s work foregrounds audience 
empowerment, creativity, rebellion and opposition to dominant readings and emphasises 
“processes of sense-making” (Dahlgren 1998:299). Fiske argues that the film audience “may 
well be relatively more powerless than the television audience”, thereby validating an 
examination of it (1987:74). He focuses on subcultures and the way in which they apply their 
own interpretive frames to the deconstruction of media texts. As my research is concerned with a 
group that might be considered to be a ‘subculture’ his work is particularly relevant. It is 
important to consider how those who have experienced psychosis might be considered a 
subculture; they conform to Richard Kahn and Douglas Kellner’s definition by being a subset of 
the dominant culture and by instituting new grammars and meanings in order to interpret the 
world (2003: 299). In certain respects, however, they do not conform to standard definitions.  
Kahn and Kellner define subcultures as youth cultures which concern themselves with “the 
cultural novelties of the day” (2003: 299). Martina Bose emphasises the historical emphasis 
placed on subcultural style “as a symbolic response to social exclusion” (2003:169); neither of 
these subcultural aspects are relevant to my respondents. It is also arguable whether those who 
have experienced psychosis consistently challenge the social order by being politically resistant 
or activist, although, as David Muggleton and Oliver Marchant point out, this aspect of 
subculture is generally “reified” to become “heroic” or “romantic” (2000:23, 2003: 85). Those 
who have experienced mental illness do not notably strive for media attention and are not 
appropriated by the culture they attempt to subvert (Kahn and Kellner 2003:299).  
 
The relevance of considering those who have experienced psychosis as a subculture is important 
in respect of power. Baldwin et al argue that the concept of subculture is concerned with “the 
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division of culture” (1999:317) and that “subcultures are intimately connected to issues of power 
and struggle” (1999:316). Dick Hebdige similarly considers that what subcultures express is “a 
fundamental tension between those in power and those condemned to subordinate positions and 
second class lives” (1995:130). Mental illness can, therefore, be considered to be a subculture 
formed as a consequence of the effect of culture upon individual lives and of social inequality on 
the individual (During1999:1). Baldwin et al refer to “the idea of culture as a ‘way of life’” 
(1999:112) and point out that “those living at the extremes of society…are perhaps very different 
in their ways of life from the broad mass in the middle” (1999:327).    
 
It is also important to consider associations between deviance and subculture in respect of those 
who have experienced psychosis. Baldwin et al stress that “the assumption that subcultural 
adherents are in some sense ‘deviants’ from the mainstream culture or different from the ‘rest of 
us’” has been historically present in work on subcultures (1998: 317). Diana Sweeney and David 
Pollard link deviance with a medical model pointing out that mental illness can be culturally 
categorised as a health issue and a subset within culture (2002:2); they do acknowledge, 
however, that this tends to ignore the “broad scale of diversity” encompassed by mental illness 
(2002:3). Muggleton emphasises that subcultural identity is characterised by similarity, not 
difference and that members often come from different backgrounds but “hold similar values that 
find their expression in shared membership of a particular subculture” (2000:31). Sweeney and 
Pollard, however, point out that the ephemeral nature of mental illness means that sufferers do 
not form a cohesive subcultural group (2002:5).  They argue that this a further reason why those 
who experience mental illness are not a typical subculture:  
 
The suggestion that subcultures construct identities relative to the dominant culture 
assumes that, at some level, there exists an element of choice.  This all but ignores the 
plight of the mentally ill, whose world is possibly at odds with their ability to choose 
(2002:3).  
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They argue that being a member of this particular subculture is not always desirable and that the 
mentally ill tend to “seek freedom from their isolation and find a supportive culture” (2002:6). 
Sweeney and Pollard consider that, for the mentally ill, “affiliation with their subculture is 
difficult to muster because the markers that define their specific grouping are either impossible 
or too uncomfortable to interpret”. This means that the desire to fit in “may well vanquish 
conscious link (sic) to their own cultural subgroup” (2002:5). 
Fiske’s work is notably positive about the ability of subcultures to counteract dominant 
discourse; my study examines whether this is the case with those who have experienced 
psychosis:   
Despite generations of life under the hegemony of capitalism there is still a wide range of 
social groups and subcultures with different senses of their own identity, of their relations 
to each other and to the centres of power.  Divergent and resistant subcultures are alive, 
well and kicking, and exerting various forms of pressure and criticism upon the dominant 
ideology of Western capitalist society (1998:194).  
 
Fiske’s work on subcultures references Foucault’s work on individuation (1990); he considers 
that subcultures display “bottom up individuality” which opposes individuation or “top down 
power at work”.  This “bottom up sense of identity” is “the product of a person’s history, of 
family ties and continuities, of relationships with friends or community groups, or choices in 
leisure time activities” (1993:68). Fiske equates subcultural pleasure with the popular; this is an 
association that will be questioned in Chapter 6 (p225):   
 
Popular pleasures must always be those of the oppressed; they must contain elements of 
the oppositional, the evasive, the scandalous, the offensive, the vulgar, the resistant. 
Pleasures offered by ideological conformity are muted and hegemonic; they are not 
popular pleasures and work in opposition to them (1989: 127). 
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Fiske considers that texts are popular because they invite large audiences from diverse 
subcultures who seek to “resolve textual contradictions” (1998:194). This view is shared by 
Austin who argues that “films succeed commercially primarily because they are pleasurable and 
meaningful for viewers”; the pleasures they offer cannot be reduced to a simple formula 
(2002:3). Tamar Liebes and James Curran believe that “media images consumed by majority 
audiences” bear the imprint of minority group members “as long as tell-tale labels are safely 
removed or hidden from sight” (1998:93). According to Fiske pleasure is achieved via “evasion, 
or at least a negotiation, of dominant ideological practice, the ability to shake oneself free from 
its constraint”.  He sums this up as the pleasure/power to be different (1987:234) and argues that 
“counterknowledges can never be repressed entirely” (1994:217). Fiske utilises de Certeau’s 
(1984) analogy between power as an occupying army and the “subjected peasant” as a “guerrilla 
fighter” to illustrate how subcultures operate:    
The weak can and do attack the powerful as guerrilla bands attack the occupying force.  
These attacks are fleeting, opportunistic; they are mounted when weaknesses are spotted, 
when gaps in the army’s deployment of force can be exploited.  Armies move by strategy, 
guerrillas by tactics; power bloc control is strategic and is challenged by the tactical raids 
of the people (1993:68).  
 
Fiske emphasises that media texts can never be successfully controlled– if this were the case 
social change would not occur (1998:201). He uses the term ‘excorporation’ to define “that 
process by which the powerless steal elements of the dominant culture and use them in their 
own, often oppositional or subversive interests” (2009:568). He also draws upon Eco’s theory 
of aberrant decoding (1972) to argue that because mass communications are decoded by a 
spectrum of varied groups then aberrant decodings should be considered the norm (1987:65). 
Chapter 6 shows that textual decodings are characterised by evasion and counter-knowledge.  
Respondents employ ‘excorporation’ to construct readings which are characterised by their 
private and resistant nature but which do not necessarily reflect Fiske’s view that the 
oppositional is scandalous, offensive or vulgar.  
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Matt Hills points out that Fiske’s work is subject to criticism for “romancing the subordinate” 
(2005:65).  He argues that the concept of subcultures is vague, questioning their ontology and 
status (2005:134) and the artificial distinction between mainstream and subcultural: 
The general public or the mainstream are assumed to be monolithic, degraded and 
inauthentic exemplars of commercial conformity or ‘straightness’.  By contrast subcultures 
are represented as ‘resistant’ artful and ‘authentic’ to the very extent that they are set apart 
from their imagined others (2005:127). 
This dichotomy is a reminder that a measured approach is important in audience work and 
perhaps explains why Fiske’s work has been subject to criticism and counter argument. Gripsrud 
considers that Fiske takes the notion of audience resistance to “the point of caricature” (2002:58) 
and Barker refers to his “less guarded moments” where the creativity and resourcefulness of the 
audience are celebrated, to an unrealistic level, in relation to simplistic media texts (1998:221). 
Jenkins’ view that “readers are not always resistant; all resistant readings are not necessarily 
progressive readings; the “people” do not always recognize their conditions of alienation and 
subordination” acts as a corrective (1992:34). Cornel Sandvoss considers that whilst Fiske “pays 
close attention to those on the receiving end of cultural hegemony” he fails to pay sufficient 
attention to “the origins of hegemonic power” and ‘the interplay of society, culture and 
economy” (2005: 14). David Miller and Greg Philo also take issue with Fiske as “the best known 
advocate of popular culture” (2001:7).  They dispute his central belief that popular culture offers 
resistance to dominant ideology and are critical of his emphasis on audience pleasure, believing 
that this distracts from “the text, the real world and key issues on the power and impact of media 
messages” (1996: xiv). They challenge the view that popular culture is empowering, arguing that 
there is “a fateful confusion in the work of the populists, which is that they confuse the culture of 
the people with the products provided by capitalist corporations” (2001:8). They consider that 
there is ample evidence in their own work (including the representation of psychiatric illness 
(1996)) to show that beliefs can be influenced by media messages (2001:2). This is later re-
iterated by Philo who argues that the active audience model “underestimates the power of the 
media in shaping “taken for granted beliefs”” (2008:541).  Philo and Miller also express concern 
that types of resistance, ranging from student uprising to the casual consumption of popular 
media are bracketed together indiscriminately (2001:8). They conclude that when much work on 
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audience pleasure is analysed it has little to say about popular culture beyond the assertion that 
people like it (2001:10).  
Notably Fiske later reconsidered his early work to conclude that what the media produce is not 
without social significance (Gripsrud 2002:58). He acknowledges power inequalities and 
questions a Foucauldian theory of power as sometimes allowing “us to ignore the fact that some 
interests benefit more than others from its operations” (1993: 254). Fiske considers that whilst 
opposition might be regularly articulated in response to media texts, powerful discourses still 
influence preferred readings. He considers textual analysis that affords subordinate groups 
opportunities to “generate their own cultural experiences and position, meanings that serve their 
interests, and not those of cultural domination” to be a way of addressing power imbalances 
(1998:202).  This has great relevance to my own study which testifies to the way in which 
individuals who have experienced psychosis negotiate their own meanings and use film texts for 
their own specific ends (see Chapter 6).  
 
Jenny Kitzinger’s work is characterised by its recognition of both the significance of media texts 
and audience resistance. She acknowledges the active interpretation of media forms and that 
media consumption is, ultimately, for personal pleasure or purpose; her emphasis on the active 
audience reflects its centrality within the audience tradition. At the same time Kitzinger stresses 
the paradox of the media’s enduring power in shaping the audience. The purpose of her research 
is to “attend to potential influence” and to focus on how the mass media defines and may even 
possibly transform social issues and exert influence upon audience members (2004:28). She 
considers that “at its boldest, active audience research can sometimes suggest that questions of 
media influence are irrelevant or, at best, impossible to research” but that meaning production is 
so obviously inflected   by the life experiences that individuals bring to the text that attempts to 
make generalisations are “misguided or at least doomed to failure” (2004:24).  Livingstone 
argues that theorising about media influence has been condemned as a “messy pot pourri with 
inconsistent or inconclusive conclusions” (1999:66); Kitzinger considers that this is why 
researchers have tended to avoid it (2004:24). She concludes that it is possible to track “how 
specific media coverage can tap into pre-existing cultural images, experiences and expectations 
in ways that provoke powerful responses” (2004:31). Kitzinger emphasises that “in spite of and 
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sometimes even because of…audience engagement, the media can have a very powerful role in 
defining, maintaining and even transforming the way we see the world” (2004:31). 
 
In addition to a consideration of both media influence and audience activity my study is 
concerned with the cultural positioning of those who have experienced psychosis. The next 
section of the chapter will consider the reaction of cultural studies to textually focused audience 
work and audience theory which has emphasised the individual.  
 
CULTURAL STUDIES 
There is no single definition of cultural studies; Hall considers it has never been wholly unified 
in its approach: 
Cultural studies has multiple discourses; it has a number of different histories.  It is a whole 
set of formations; it has its own different conjunctures and moments in the past.  It 
included many different kinds of work.  I want to insist on that!  It always was a set of 
unstable formations (1996: 263) 
Oliver Marchant argues that cultural studies “shifted the focus of social research towards what is 
sometimes called the ‘micro-politics’ of everyday life” (2003:83) and During that it provides 
“space for, and knowledge of, the multiple audiences and communities who, in various 
combinations, vote, buy records, watch television and films, etc. without ever fitting the 
“popular”, “ordinary” or “normal” (1999:20). It is Hills’ definition of cultural theory as 
“typically an act of engagement with the here and now, or at least with what matters to people” 
which informs my research focus (2005:176). Barker argues that “one of the big gains of the 
cultural studies tradition was its recognition that what the media…produce are complex symbolic 
objects” whose social significance cannot be understood without focusing upon reception 
(2000:177). The value of “the cultural turn”, according to Ross and Nightingale, is that it 
questions “the assumptions of cultural uniformity adopted by mass media” and “documents the 
media practices, activities and passions of people who make up only small sections of the mass 
audience and whose interests are overlooked in the search for commercially viable audience 
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segments and niches” (2003:108). In this respect it has the potential to produce knowledge which 
contests dominant discourse and is relevant to my own study.  Ross sees the cultural studies 
model of audience theory as a reconfigured version of uses and gratifications; reaction against 
uses and gratifications was partly responsible for what she calls the “powerful anti-individualist 
argument which positioned media research within a theory of popular culture and proposed that 
audiences are culturally constructed and their interpretations of media texts informed by 
sociocultural experiences rather than by individual whim” (2003:13). Cultural studies moved 
away from political economy, emphasising instead “textual pleasure, the personal and politically 
dispersed resistances to popular culture and the insistence on the polysemic nature of texts” 
(Livingstone 1996:52). It remained concerned with the interface between text and audience, 
provoking debate about their relative influence. James Hay argues that although cultural studies 
questioned the Marxist conception of production and transmission it still relied upon a textual 
explanation of meaning (1996:368). Lothar Mikos considers that it marked “a shift from an 
understanding of text rooted in literature and/or film studies towards an understanding rooted in 
media and cultural studies”.  The pertinent question was no longer “What is a text as the work of 
an artist?” but rather, “What is a text, when considered as a social object?” (2008:210). Hartley 
recognises a change in emphasis from text to audience so that “the proof is sought in the eating, 
not in the pudding” (1996:225).  He considers that the shift in critical attention from ideological 
effect to audience is key “since it is at this point that meanings generated in and by media 
discourses actually go live socially, where textual and social power intersects, and where the 
distinction between them is meaningless” (1996:225).  
Fiske cites Hall’s `Encoding/Decoding' paper as an early theoretical attempt to account for both 
culture and textual positioning (1987:64). Nightingale considers that “Hall set the challenge for 
researchers to address both textual production/structure and audience response when 
interrogating the hegemonic power of the media (1996:57). Barker sees Hall’s model as 
“surpassing” effects theory because it takes account of the text and improving upon uses and 
gratifications because it stresses “the ideological role that text could have” (1998:92). Hall’s 
model was not unidirectional as these two models had been.  It embraced aspects of ideological 
theory, assuming that the media was “a regulatory regime for maintaining social control” whilst 
also recognising the audience’s ability to contest dominant ideas. Discursive spaces were created 
in the interaction between audience and text where “contested ideas could be explored” (Ross 
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2003:13). Hall did not see culture as “something imposed upon a helpless populace, but as a site 
of struggle” where contest “over meaning was not just a reflection of the social struggle but a 
part of it” (Fiske and Dawson 1996:310, Austin 2002:15). Hall cautions, however, that: 
We must recognize that the discursive form of the message has a privileged position in the 
communicative exchange (from the viewpoint of circulation) and that the moments of 
‘encoding’ and ‘decoding’ though only ‘relatively autonomous’ in relation to the 
communicative process as a whole, are determinate moments (2003:52). 
He acknowledges the possibility of oppositional readings but is wary of according them status 
emphasising, instead, the privileged position of dominant discourse and warning against the 
danger of overstating reciprocal power: “Of course there will always be private, individual, 
variant readings.  But selective perception is almost never as selective, random or privatized as 
the concept suggests” (2003:60).  
Hall’s emphasis upon the centrality and ideological potential of the text is subject to criticism. 
Barker questions whether all texts can be assumed to be ideological in intent (1998:94) and 
Austin considers Hall to lack discrimination in his uniform treatment of texts (2002:17).  Barker 
also considers that Hall’s overemphasis on the ideological ignores other factors that might 
influence reception, such as the pleasures texts offer (1998:94). Jenkins argues that Hall “tends to 
imply that each reader has a stable position from which to make sense of a text rather than 
having access to multiple sets of discursive competencies by virtue of a more complex and 
contradictory place within the social formation” (1992:33).  Notably Hall also criticises his own 
early work for assuming “too close a fit between encoding and an unproblematic message” 
(Austin 2002:17).  
Umberto Eco’s work, like Hall’s, considers the interface between audience and text. Eco defends 
the central importance of the text, arguing that audience power is easily overstated. Whilst 
encouraging close scrutiny of both the text and responses to it Eco argues against treating all 
readings as ground breaking. Eco accepts that certain texts, (which tend to be literary), invite 
multiple readings but considers that only initiated readers achieve this. He refers to two 
categories of readers, “naïve” and “smart”: only the second group is able to respond on a 
sophisticated level (1985). Eco does not accept the claim that popular texts invite multiple 
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readings, believing that they allow only a standard response. He also questions the ability of 
audience members to articulate an accurate response, arguing that there is a difference between 
what is reported and what is actually understood (1974). Nightingale considers that “Eco’s 
warning about the short-sightedness of inferring that what is said by the audience is in any direct 
way an indication of what is understood remains unheeded” (1996:99).  
Work on the relative importance of both text and audience was supplemented, in turn, by an 
ethnographic approach which foregrounds “the things people say about media texts, the reasons 
they give for the opinions they hold; the discourses the texts generate and the rationales they 
develop to explain the importance (or not) of particular media materials in their lives” (Ross and 
Livingstone 2003:107). This culturalist strand “involves a view of media use as in itself a 
significant aspect of everyday life” and is a key aspect of my own study (McQuail 1007:19). 
Historically the turn to ethnography was important in validating textual meaning in respect of 
popularity and pleasure. The concept of pleasure became an important focus for cultural theorists 
(see Hobson 1982, Ang 1985) who picked up on Raymond Williams’ term “the structure of 
feeling”.  Nightingale argues that “‘structure of feeling’ became a means to an end of explaining 
consumption- why the texts were considered pleasurable – rather than a way of understanding 
culture” (1996:48). Williams describes “structure of feeling” as a “very deep and wide 
possession in all actual communities” upon which “communication depends” (2009:37). It is not 
formally learnt or uniform amongst individuals but is: 
A particular sense of life, a particular community of experience hardly needing expression, 
through which the characteristics of our way of life that an external analysis could describe 
are in some way passed, giving them a particular and characteristic colour (2009:36).   
Williams considers that “almost any formal description would be too crude to express this 
nevertheless quite distinct sense of a particular and native style” (2009:36). He emphasises that 
“structure of feeling is the culture of a period”; it is made apparent by contrasts between 
generations, who never talk “quite the same language” and in “accounts of our lives from outside 
the community” (2009:36). The variation in “feeling”, which results from historical context, 
inevitably influences both the encoding and decoding of the text. It is apparent that “structure of 
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feeling” is an important aspect of textual pleasure for those who have experienced psychosis, 
both in respect of film texts that do not feature psychosis and those that do (see Chapter 6).  
Another important aspect of the ethnographic “turn” was “the focus away from the moment of 
textual interpretation…toward the contextualisation of that moment” (Livingstone 1998:239).  
David Morley considers context to be as important as the object of viewing; it incorporates the 
reach of texts, including cinema and home viewing (1991:5). Morley focuses on power in 
“sense-making units”, which range from households and friendship groups to transnational 
communities (McKee 2003:101). He also foregrounds the influence of physical spaces such as 
“the sitting room” considering them to be “the site of some very important political conflicts –
one of the principal sites of the politics of gender and age” and “exactly where we need to start 
from if we finally want to understand the constitutive dynamics of abstractions such as ‘the 
community’ or ‘the nation’” (1991:12). The relative importance of sense making units and 
physical spaces will be considered in Chapter 6 in relation to those who have experienced 
psychosis (p235). 
Nightingale considers that Morley’s ethnographic research revealed the interaction between 
audience and text “to be of a more complex nature than had previously been imagined – an 
extremely significant finding” (Nightingale 1996:67). Despite growing sophistication and the 
incorporation of increasingly complex parameters, however, ethnographic research remains 
subject to criticism on the grounds of validity (Nightingale 1996:87). Ien Ang appraises its 
strengths and weaknesses, acknowledging its importance in providing greater insight in to both 
our own and the lives of others but also its lack of systematicity and generalisability (1996:251).  
She focuses on a need to dispense with seeing ethnography as “realist knowledge” and to accept 
that it is, of itself, a discourse which must be considered as a form of storytelling or narrative 
(1996:255). Ang sees danger in over-privileging audience interpretation which must be offset by 
an acceptance that ethnographic interaction creates a new text. Jane Feuer similarly argues that 
ethnographic research cannot escape interpretation; the ethnographer replaces the text with 
another textual construct, this time of the audience (1996:28). Austin emphasises that “producing 
identities in audience research should be acknowledged and interrogated rather than be quietly 
ignored.” He considers that attaining “transparent unmediated access to respondents’ states of 
mind or emotion” is to ignore context (2007:134). Hartley argues that the concept of the 
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audience can be romanticised in ethnographic research.  He considers that the audience should 
not “be imagined in terms of individuals with identities, experiences, motivations or 
personalities” as by doing this the researcher runs the risk of “deifying” the audience or turning 
them in to the “other” (1996: 226). These warnings about treating ethnographic work as an 
unmediated text are clearly relevant to my own study and have been assimilated.  At the same 
time it is notable that whilst acknowledging the pitfalls of ethnographic research dominant 
figures within the tradition defend it as a methodology. Barker argues that its strength is that it 
can test rather than simply make deductions (1998:131) and Morley considers that “techniques of 
empirical research remain a fundamentally more appropriate way to attempt to understand what 
audiences do …than for the analyst to simply stay home and imagine the possible implications of 
how other people might” consume texts (1996:319). I consider that my close interaction with 
those who have experienced psychosis gives me greater insight in to how they interact with film 
texts which feature psychosis at the same time as acknowledging the artificial constraints of the 
research context.   
Ethnographic research developed in tandem with the postmodernist and post-structuralist 
approaches which will provide the focus for the next section of the chapter. 
 
POSTMODERN/POST-STRUCTURALIST APPROACHES 
 
Postmodernism and post-structuralism will be considered as closely related disciplines. Due to 
the scope of this thesis I have restricted my discussion of the distinctions between them. Ben 
Aggar argues that, “a brief discussion of the main ideas of poststructuralism assumes that we can 
cleanly separate poststructuralism from postmodernism. Unfortunately we cannot” (1991:111). 
He considers “the lack of clear definition reflects the purposeful elusiveness of work that can be 
variously classified as post-structural/and or postmodern” (1991:112).  Aggar distinguishes 
between post-structuralism as a theory of language and postmodernism as “a theory of society, 
culture and history” (1991:112). Of key importance is that both reject “the possibilities of 
presuppositionless representation, instead arguing that every knowledge is contextualized by its 
historical and cultural nature” (1991:117).    
 
72	  
	  
Post-structuralism is associated with both literary and cultural texts and “celebrates 
fragmentation, difference, the dissociation of sign from reference, text from readership” (Hartley 
1996:221). It argues that texts do not contain intrinsic messages; there can be no single 
interpretation of meaning or guarantee that a textual message will reach its intended audience. 
Hall’s definition of post-structuralism moves beyond the text to incorporate social power:   
 
In the post-structuralist position structural unity and identity are always deconstructed, 
leaving in their place the complexity, contradictions and fragmentation implied in 
difference.  There are no necessary relations, no correspondences…What something is…is 
only its relation to what it is not, its existence in a nominalist field of particular others.  
Any structure or organization is to be dismantled; one can build neither theory nor struggle 
upon it.  With any unitary nature denied, society can only be seen as a network of 
differences within which power operates ‘microphysically’ (ie absolutely non-
hierarchically)…This is a theory of necessary non-correspondence in which the lack of 
identity and structure is guaranteed, in which there can be no organisation of power 
(1996:155). 
 
As one of the central tenets of postmodernism is the questioning of structures or patterns it is 
easy to see how the terms post-structuralism and postmodernism conflate (Aggar 1991:116). 
This is, perhaps, why Foucault, whose work is key in relation to my study, is often claimed by 
both “camps” (Aggar 1991:111). Foucault might be considered postmodern because he moves 
away from a linguistic definition of discourse to a model that is concerned with cultural practice 
and “the sociology of social control” and post-structuralist as he rejects “clean positivist 
definitions and categories (Aggar 1991:112). Foucault, however, rejects postmodern and 
poststructuralist labels to offer discourse analysis as a way of perceiving the sociocultural world. 
The ongoing relevance of his pluralist approach to my own area of research is evidenced by 
Faulkner and Thomas who criticise Evidence Based Medicine as “a modernist backlash against 
post-modernism” and assert that “medicine is now practised in a post-modern context” (2002:1). 
Their desire to address issues of power and promote multiple discourses, including those of 
service users, can be interpreted as Foucauldian.  
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Hartley, however, expresses reservations with postmodern and specifically Foucauldian theory 
which he feels questions links between textual and social power but falls short of offering 
explanations. He is frustrated by what he considers to be “contending and incommensurable 
theoretical approaches” which face “real difficulties in isolating a coherent object of study” 
(1996:223). Hall, despite his assertion that his preferred term ‘ideology’ and Foucault’s term 
‘truth’ are interchangeable, expresses the same reservations about Foucault’s propensity to 
‘resolutely suspend judgement’ expressed on page 18 (1996:36). He questions the concept of 
discourse which can be endlessly interpreted: 
Potentially discourse is endless; the infinite semiosis of meaning.  But to say anything at all 
in particular, you do have to stop talking…The politics of infinite dispersal is the politics 
of no action at all.” (Hall 1987: 45). 
 
McKee, however, defends a post-structuralist approach, refuting the charge that “anything 
goes…or that any representation is as acceptable as any other.” He argues that, conversely, post-
structuralism determines “what were and what are the reasonable sense-making practices of 
cultures” (2003:19). Similarly Sandvoss refers to the possibility of endless meaning and 
introduces the term ‘neutrosemy’ to “describe the semiotic condition in which a text allows for 
so many divergent readings that, intersubjectively, it does not have any meaning at all ” 
(2005:126). Like McKee he does not consider that this leads to dissolution of meaning but that 
“the notion of neutrosemy provides us with a useful analytical tool in conceptualizing profound 
cultural changes.  It equips us to explore whether in the practice of fan consumption, texts are 
emptied of meaning and take on a mirror like function” (2005:127).  The value of a postmodern/ 
post-structuralist approach to my study is that it enables a multi-perspectival examination of key 
issues. It is also valuable in bringing to bear a critical focus upon other methodologies I might 
otherwise have employed less reflectively. Paula Saukko considers that a tension exists between 
ethnographic and post-structuralist research approaches:  
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The new ethnographic quest to be truthful to the lived realities of other people runs into a 
contradiction with the post-structuralist aim to critically analyse discourses that form the 
very stuff out of which our experiences are made (2003:15). 
 
Similarly Aggar argues that “the poststructural critique of language casts doubts on 
ethnographies which rely on subjects’ accounts of their own experiences as if these accounts, 
like the accounts of experts are not already encoded with undecidable meaning” (1991:126).  
This tension must be observed in relation to my research by accepting that the accounts of those 
who have experienced psychosis are situated within wider fields of discourse including the 
interview process itself.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The increasing complexity of audience work is apparent when undertaking a study in this field.  
Nicholas Abercrombie and Brian Longhurst argue that a growing body of research indicates 
“audience responses are becoming more differentiated and “may also be increasingly labile – 
moving rapidly between different positions over time and between different reception settings” 
(1998:34). For Mikos audience studies become increasingly important “as both texts and society 
become more differentiated” (2008: 212).  
 
The interface between text and audience remains central to audience research. Livingstone 
argues,  “if we see the media or life events as all-powerful creators of meaning, we neglect the 
role of audiences; if we see people as all powerful creators of meaning we neglect the structure 
of that which people interpret” (1998:26).  In her opinion, the importance of audience research is 
“the interrelation of the two”.  Livingstone is concerned with both how “people actively make 
sense of structured texts and events” and how “texts guide and restrict interpretation”(1998:26). 
Similarly Corner argues, “the researching together of interpretive action and textual signification 
is still the most important thing for audience research to focus upon” (2000:19). Barker, is 
pessimistic in his summation that “we determinedly carry on with textual analyses or we study 
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audiences – but the chances of finding any real link between the two are minimal” (2000:188). 
His negative stance acts as an incentive to focus upon the moment of interpretation. Livingstone 
considers “a thorough analysis of the moment of engagement between text and reader, while 
recognising that this moment itself must be understood within a more ethnographic framework” 
to be a fundamental aspect of audience work (1998:8).  
 
I intend to examine belief formation and assess interpretation by observing the interaction 
between those who have experienced psychosis and the film texts that depict it. In order to do so 
I will draw upon audience theory that considers subcultures, media influence, audience activity 
and the cultural positioning of respondents. I am aware that my study must reconcile certain 
theoretical approaches. It is concerned with the text in that it investigates where, when and how 
film texts featuring psychosis came to be produced and for whom (see Chapter 5); it 
acknowledges their complexity and recognises what Barker calls their “politically salient” and 
“culturally sensitive” nature (1998:12). My study is governed by the awareness that “people do 
still encounter texts and the world and parts of these encounters make differences in lives” 
(Staiger 2005:20) but moves beyond the text to consider the meanings produced or reproduced 
by specific audiences (Livingstone 1998:36).  It heeds the advice of Staiger that, “to discount 
radically the experiences of media would be obstinate” (2005: 2) but does not assume media 
effect aiming, instead, to discover how texts featuring psychosis might enter into the culture of 
those who have experienced it. I draw heavily upon Foucault’s discourse approach and his work 
on individuation in the awareness that a post-structuralist approach which looks at multi-strand 
discourses must be reconciled with an ethnographic study that examines lived experience.  
 
The following chapter will set out a discussion of the methodological framework that will be 
employed in this study. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The research questions that underlie this thesis relate to three key areas; in the first instance I ask 
what factors influence the naming of clinical psychosis; in the second I ask what factors 
influence the nature of the filmic representation of psychosis and in the third I ask what those 
who have experienced psychosis make of its filmic representation.  This chapter will set out the 
methods I have chosen to explore these questions. The purpose of the study is to relate the 
responses of those who have experienced psychosis to the representation of psychosis in film 
texts. I wish to explore the experience of psychosis and its interface with screen representation 
and in doing so pay attention to voices which I consider to be presently silenced. Deacon et al 
argue that it is particularly difficult to retrieve certain voices (2007:31) and the absence of user 
groups in research is well documented (Barnes et al 1999:67, Clough and Nutbrown 2002:45). 
By using the qualitative techniques of interviews and the analysis of recorded speech I hope to 
explore “people’s subjective understanding of their everyday lives” (Pope and Mays 2006:6). I 
also hope to contribute to the body of knowledge about people that live with mental illness, 
supporting Steiner Kvale’s assertion that a central research aim is “to contribute knowledge to 
ameliorate the human condition and enhance human dignity” (1996:109).  
 
My choice to work with people who have experienced and continue to experience psychosis 
means that I have had to ensure that specific ethical concerns are addressed. The Economic and 
Social Research Council Research Ethics Framework states that, in the first instance, “research 
involving primary data collection will always raise ethical issues that must be addressed” 
(2005:2). In addition research involving “vulnerable groups” and “sensitive topics- for example... 
mental health” is considered to involve more than minimal risk (2005:8). The Cardiff University 
Safeguarding Children and Vulnerable Adults Policy document (2010) defines a vulnerable adult 
according to Section 115(4) of the Police Act 1997; this considers a vulnerable person to be 
someone who has an impaired ability to communicate, is susceptible to physical abuse or is in 
danger of having their “will or moral well-being…subverted or overpowered” (2010:6). Risk is 
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defined in the Ethics Framework as referring to “the potential physical or psychological harm, 
discomfort or stress to human participants that a research project might generate” (2005:21).  It is 
considered to be “especially pertinent in the context of health related research” where it could 
potentially affect “a subject’s personal social standing, privacy, personal values and beliefs, their 
links to family and the wider community, and their position within occupational settings” 
(2005:21). A major consideration in carrying out the research, therefore, was to minimise any 
personal harm to this potentially vulnerable group. To this end I ensured that “the ethical 
principles of integrity, honesty, confidentiality, voluntary participation and impartiality” 
informed my study (2005:26).  One of my inclusion criteria was that respondents gave a signed 
record of informed consent (see Appendix p342). I also ensured that I had a Criminal Records 
Bureau certificate in place at the time of the interviews. As “responsibility for ensuring that 
research is subject to appropriate ethical review, approval and monitoring” from “the institution 
seeking or holding an award with the ESRC” I ensured that my application to work with 
vulnerable adults was subject to full ethical review from the relevant bodies at Cardiff 
University. Explicit authorisation was obtained from the JOMEC School Research Ethics 
Committee and a further University external committee who ensured that research procedures 
complied with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.   
 
My study incorporates both an audience and a textual focus. Justin Lewis argues that “if we are 
concerned with the meaning and significance of popular culture in contemporary society, with 
how cultural forms work ideologically or politically then we need to understand cultural products 
(or texts) as they are understood by audiences” (1991:47). By coupling the analysis of film 
discourse with its reception I hope to supplement work in the field of media reception. 
Richardson emphasises that very little work of this kind has been carried out.  She sees its value 
as “analysing more clearly how ‘comprehension’ is produced and how it is put to use within the 
informational and evaluative frameworks which viewers possess” (1998:247). 
 
By focusing upon film I pay attention to a key media form that might have a mediating potential 
and aim to add to work on the representation of psychosis that has been concentrated in broader 
media areas, namely newspapers and, to a lesser extent, television, (see Clarke 2004, Bithell, 
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2010). The study incorporates textual analysis of films that feature psychosis but also reflects 
upon the institutional framework in which they are made. It is not limited to representation and 
response but is positioned in a wider framework that considers the discourses that underpin 
society’s understanding of psychosis and how these shift between cultural sites. In order to 
examine cultural perception my study incorporates a discourse analysis of the policy documents 
that surround the naming of clinical psychosis, including the classificatory principles behind 
DSM IV (1994), ICD10 (1992) and The Wales Mental Health Measure (2010).  
 
My research is positioned in the field of cultural studies.  Paula Saukko argues that three 
different strands govern a cultural studies approach: an interest in lived experience, an analysis 
of discourse and an awareness of social context. She considers that methodological tension exists 
between these strands (2003:19). The chapter will examine my chosen methods and any potential 
tensions between them. It will begin with an examination of textual analysis before moving on to 
consider discourse analysis and post-structuralism.  The chapter will conclude by addressing the 
ethical considerations involved in interviewing a population who have experienced psychosis.  
 
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
A focus upon “the purposes and positions of texts and practices” is central to my work (Clough 
and Nutbrown 2002:25). I employ textual analysis in three distinct areas: an analysis of policy 
documents that focus on the naming of psychosis; an analysis of film texts which feature 
psychosis and an analysis of the transcripts recording the observations on film made by those 
who have experienced psychosis.  
 
McKee considers texts to be crucially important as objects of study as their material reality 
“allows for the recovery and critical interrogation of discursive politics in an “empirical” form” 
(2003:15). He views textual analysis as a way for researchers to “understand the ways in which 
members of various cultures and subcultures make sense of who they are and of how they fit into 
the world in which they live” (2003:1). Fairclough also argues that texts are important sites for 
79	  
	  
negotiating forms of the self, particularly in areas of “doubt or contestation” (1995:7). By 
analysing both text and response I hope to provide insight into how those who experience 
psychosis construct their identity. 
 
Fiske sees textual analysis as a crucial part of a cultural studies approach, arguing that “the 
textual struggle for meaning is the precise equivalent of the social struggle for power” 
(1986:392). Saukko also acknowledges the centrality of the text in cultural studies, to the extent 
that she questions whether the text has become a reductive paradigm (2003:99). She emphasises 
that a cultural studies approach is not concerned with a text’s formal or aesthetic features so 
much as “the way in which cultural texts emerge from and play a role in the changing historical, 
political, and social context” (2003:99). Fairclough also emphasises context, considering the text 
to be “a major source of evidence for grounding claims about social structures, relations and 
processes” (1995b:209). He recognises an on-going fluidity of identity definition and redefinition 
between key power players such as professionals and the public which manifests in the text 
(1995:209) and acknowledges the potential of “causal ‘powers’” including “social structures 
and…practices” and “social agents, the people who are involved in social events” to shape the 
text (2003:22). Fairclough places more emphasis than Foucault on the potential ideological 
function of a text, viewing it as a political document. He argues that texts occasion causal effects 
and that although cause-effect patterns may not be regular this does not mean that they do not 
exist. He considers that texts have the capacity to “bring about changes in our knowledge…our 
beliefs, our attitudes (and) values” (2003:8). Fairclough considers that the nature of effect is 
contingent upon:  
 
Which strategies in a field of strategic struggle are selected and retained, become 
hegemonic, whether and to what extent they are recontextualized in new social fields and 
across different social scales, and whether and to what extent and in what forms they are 
operationalized – enacted in new ways of (inter) acting inculcated in new ways of being 
and identities, and materialized in the physical world (2007:12).   
 
Foucault’s work emphasises context; he sees the text as an aspect of discourse and, therefore, 
diagnostic of issues of power and identity. Foucault moves away from ‘ideology hunting’ in the 
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text to focus upon “patterns, series, hierarchies in language that position people within certain 
roles and ways of thinking” (Matheson 2005:10). His concern lies with discerning the rules 
which ‘govern’ bodies of texts and utterances’ (Fairclough 2003:123). I intend to adopt a 
Foucauldian stance in relation to text and context throughout my thesis. 
 
The first key textual aspect is the analysis of policy documents. Fairclough argues that it is not 
only through media “that social control and social domination are exercised and indeed 
negotiated and resisted (1995b: 209) and Macdonald that discourse acknowledges more readily 
than other analytical concepts that the media are now at best partial originators of ideas and 
value” (2003:2). I have focused upon the introductions to the classificatory manuals DSM IV 
(1994) and ICD10 (1992) as they are key in the naming of psychosis.  In addition I have  
examined The Wales Mental Health Measure 2010 in order to consider the implementation of 
current practice in a local setting.  
 
The second area of textual analysis is of film texts featuring psychosis. My decision to focus on 
film is influenced, in part, by an awareness that compared to other media forms it has not been as 
extensively researched. Pirkis et al argue that “many studies” from different countries have 
covered television portrayal whilst “fewer studies” have chosen film as a focus (2006:528). I also 
recognise film to be a specific aspect of the media and prefer to approach it as such. Haran et al 
note that there is a tendency, when people talk about ‘the media’ to elide difference between 
specific media forms such as newspaper, film and TV (2008:4/5). Kitzinger et al emphasise that 
“it is important not to generalise about ‘the media’ as if it were a single homogenous entity” and 
that it is vital to recognise “differences between diverse outlets” (2008:85). By engaging 
critically with film representation and addressing the challenges and opportunities specific to it 
as a media form I have attempted to challenge it. The inclusion of additional media forms, such 
as television, would necessitate an acknowledgment of additional and specific influences on 
representation. It is important to acknowledge the difference between the two media forms. Film, 
for example, tends to operate as a ‘star vehicle’ by focusing upon an individualised hero, whilst 
TV acts as an ‘ensemble’ vehicle; in this respect television might be considered to offer more 
opportunities for multiple representation. The ‘one off’ nature of film also suggests that it offers 
less opportunity for character development or ‘nuanced’ storylines. An article on the portrayal of 
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mental health in TV Soaps by Time to Change, an anti-stigma campaign run by the leading 
mental health charities Mind and Rethink Mental Illness, acknowledges that the narrative form of 
soap opera is particularly useful for the exposition of mental health representation because 
“mental health problems will manifest over a period of time and build in intensity, rather than 
develop and explode in the space of one episode” (http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/media-
centre/media-advisory-service/soaps-dramas). 
 
Whilst I have focused specifically on film I have not narrowed my focus within the filmic 
domain. I have incorporated a wide series of variables in to the study; these include genre, the 
political economy of production and debates surrounding ‘fact and fiction’. The corpus of film 
texts includes any example that features psychosis, either stated, or implied. The rationale for 
inclusion is texts that further the exploration of the representation of psychosis; variety and 
relevance are two important inclusion criteria. I have not placed restrictions on the range of 
content about which I wish to make inferences, for example the nationality or era of film. The 
sheer number of films featuring psychosis means, however, that “selectivity is inevitable” 
(Deacon et al 2007:206); samples should be seen as illustrative rather than strictly representative 
(Deacon et al 2007:46). This is a small, qualitative study; my aim is to provide an insight in to 
what is revealed by filmic representations of psychosis via a series of samples which have been 
“generated…informally and organically” (Deacon et al 2007:45). In adopting a cultural studies 
approach to the textual analysis of film I prioritise the intensive analysis of specific texts which 
are treated as individual instances of “more universal social experiences and social processes” 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000:370).  
  
Key searches informed by two different perspectives were carried out in order to identify 
relevant material.  The first perspective was based upon film reference material, including the 
Time Out Film Guide General Subject Index (2007) which categorises material according to 
subject and contains cross referenced sections including: mental illness; mental hospitals and 
asylums; psychiatry/psychiatrists; psychopaths and serial killers; therapy and therapists. Internet 
searches were also conducted using the IMDB General Film Database. Key words used in 
searches included ‘psychosis’ and ‘madness’. Inputting ‘psychosis’ identified four hundred and 
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sixty eight potential films and also generated partial matches. These sub-divided psychosis in to 
categories including: paranoid psychosis; brief reactive psychosis; combat stress psychosis; fear 
psychosis; organic psychosis and religious psychosis and were revelatory of trends in film 
discourse. Partial matches were also useful in identifying how psychosis is employed in film – 
for example the use of ‘psychokinesis’ in the Star Wars franchise. The second perspective used 
to identify relevant material was to search databases compiled by medical personnel for teaching 
purposes.  This approach links with Chapter 4, which examines discourse surrounding the 
naming of clinical psychosis. Internet searches were carried out using general sites such as 
www.disabilityfilms.co.uk in addition to specific mental health sites such as 
www.dartmouth.edu/~admsep/resources/cinema.html - (the acronym ADMSEP stands for the 
Association of Directors of Medical Student Education in Psychiatry). Psychosis is listed as a 
discrete category but may also be referenced as a subdivision of another category such as bipolar 
disorder or substance misuse. Classification proves to be inconsistent– Mr Jones (1993), for 
example, appears under multiple headings including “Boundary Violations” and “Bipolar 
Disorder”; such variation mirrors contestation in the naming of clinical psychosis in Chapter 4.  
 
Once I had established an accurate picture of potentially relevant titles I began the process of 
obtaining and viewing texts which I felt might reveal something new about how the world works 
in respect of psychosis (Clough & Nutbrown 2002:9). I aimed for balance in my choice of texts 
(Stake 2000:447). Samples were generated purposively to “illustrate maximum variety”; I 
included examples that illustrated typicality but also examples that were extreme and deviant 
(Ryan & Bernard 2000:780). My choice of texts was also governed by issues of availability.  I 
was hoping, throughout, for example, to obtain a copy of Sybil (1976) but was unfortunately 
unable to do so.  
 
I then commenced an in-depth qualitative analysis of the textual material selected.  This involved 
viewing, sometimes repeatedly and largely on DVD, although occasionally theatrically. Notes 
were taken throughout screenings and were then analysed and organised, using standard MS 
Office packages according to a series of headings which targeted what each individual film had 
to say about psychosis and the way it works in society. There was some standardisation in the 
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film analyses; each began, for example, with a plot synopsis and contained a detailed section on 
the filmic representation of psychosis. Close readings of the films identified themes and 
discursive strategies. I noted discursive regularities in addition to subversions and 
transformations; these were all documented under appropriate headings. I worked with the fluid 
nature of representation to produce an account of the most salient features of each film in respect 
of psychosis. Each analysis was different and was influenced by the film’s historical context and 
inter-textual positioning. I was mindful, throughout, of “absence or silence” in respect of 
psychosis (Carabine 2001:281).    
	  
In undertaking textual analysis my aim was to go beyond underlying conceptions or propositions 
to consider generalised themes (Deacon et al 2007:120/183). Matheson recommends 
approaching the text in two ways: interpretively, looking for traces of “individual structures” in 
the surface of the text and also by tracking “patterns and links between texts” (2005: 10). I have 
noted relations in both synchronic and diachronic dimensions (Deacon et al 2007:182/191), 
observing Fairclough’s argument that “texts…set up dialogical or polemical relations between 
their ‘own’ discourses and the discourses of others” (2003:128). Fairclough emphasises that 
whilst intertextuality results in an amalgam of discourse the rich nature of the text often means it 
contains mixed or hybrid discourses even before its relation to other texts is taken in to account. 
He recommends the inter-discursive analysis of texts in order to determine both the existence of 
discourse and how discourses are articulated together (2002:128). Fairclough draws upon the 
work of Bakhtin to illustrate how texts contain both conventional and original elements:    
 
Any text is part repetition, part creation, and texts are sites of tension between centripetal 
and centrifugal pressures (Bakhtin 1981, 1986)...Centripetal pressures follow from the 
need in producing a text to draw upon given conventions, of two main classes; a language, 
and an order of discourse – that is a historically particular structuring of discursive text 
producing practice...Centrifugal pressures come from the specificity of particular situations 
of text production, the fact that situations do not endlessly repeat one another but are, on 
the contrary, endlessly novel and problematic in new ways (1995:7). 
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By including key historical texts in my analysis I have been able to assess patterns of 
representation over time, examine repeated themes and motifs and question links between 
representation and social attitude. Alan McKee sees the value of historical textual analysis as 
discovering “what were and what are the reasonable sense-making practices of cultures” 
(2003:19); Branston also recognises its importance in aiding insight in to hierarchy and the 
uneven distribution of power (2000:136).  
 
There is debate about the influence of isolated texts.  Fairclough argues that “a single text on its 
own is quite insignificant” and that “the effects of media power are cumulative” via “the 
repetition of particular ways of handling causality and agency” and “particular ways of 
positioning the reader” (1989:54). McKee, however, argues that specific texts can influence 
cultural change (2003:50); he acknowledges that the pace of change will not be rapid, as textual 
consumption is voluntary and the interpretive practices of a culture cannot be predicted (2003:5). 
Films such as One Flew Over The Cuckoos Nest (1975) might be considered to impact upon 
“sense-making practices in a culture” (McKee 2003:50); it is frequently cited in relation to the 
subject of mental illness (Hyler et al 1988) and is considered by Domino (1983) to directly affect 
attitudes towards it.  
 
The basic unit of analysis in terms of filmic representation is whole texts as I feel it is important 
to consider films in their entirety in order to map narrative development and to	  note 
“conspicuous impressions” and patterns before comparison with other texts (Denzin 
1989:231/2). I have, however, concluded the interviews with two film clips. Marcus Banks 
argues that “a study that incorporates images in the creation or collection of data might be able to 
reveal some sociological insight that is not accessible by any other means” (2007:4) and Clough 
and Nutbrown that exposure to a common text helps to establish a sense of the responses 
available (2002:4). Using the clips allowed me to employ aspects of Staiger’s framework for 
audience studies which asks, “What kinds of meanings does a text have? For whom? In what 
circumstances? With what changes over time? And do these meanings have any effects?” 
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(2005:2). 	  Despite issues with portability, technology and time I consider the use of moving 
image to be worthwhile in a study of film. I have selected the opening sequence of Spider (2002) 
and Mr Jones (1993) from a wide range of potential films not because I consider them to be 
“accurate” or “empathetic” (Ritterfeld and Jin: 2006:247) but because	  I feel that they provide 
optimum contrast between ‘mainstream’ and ‘arthouse’ styles. The clips lend themselves to 
comparison of genre and national context of production. Mr Jones is a mainstream Hollywood 
romance directed by Mike Figgis and is a star vehicle for Richard Gere. Spider is a described as 
a ‘thriller mystery’ on IMDB; it is a Canada/UK co-production with Ralph Fiennes in the lead 
role. The clips	   are also depictions of two different disorders that can feature psychosis, namely 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, providing variable relevance for my interviewees. I have 
prioritised opening sequences because they do not necessitate contextualisation and I consider 
that time pressures are an important consideration in extended interviews. Opening sequences 
establish location, genre, style and characterisation whilst key sequences featuring the main 
protagonist ensure that the audience understands who they are, that they are important and why 
(Parker 1999:127.) The opening sequences fulfill both of these functions. In both the central 
protagonist dominates and is in crisis, allowing important insights in to their “modes of knowing 
and feeling” and the nature of psychosis (Kitzinger et al 2008:14). I have not formulated specific 
questions in relation to the clips as I consider them to be rich enough to stimulate discussion 
without intervention, thereby necessitating less mediation.  
 
My final area of textual analysis is concerned with the interviews generated by respondents in 
relation to filmic representations of psychosis. Matheson emphasises the importance of locating a 
text culturally. He considers textual representation to be part of a circle which includes: the 
moment of production; cultural identity; the regulation of identity by social institutions and 
textual consumption (2005:43). McKee also introduces the notion of a circle when he suggests 
that media texts draw on existing ways of making sense of the world; these are then interpreted 
by an audience and fed back into the texts that they produce (speech, writing, dress codes) to be 
fed back, once more, into mediated texts (2003:46). This final area of textual analysis 
foregrounds audience interpretation by exploring the views of those who have experienced 
psychosis in relation to films that feature psychosis.  
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Finally Fairclough points out that whilst “textual analysis can often give excellent insights about 
what is ‘in’ a text…what is absent…is often just as significant” (1995:5).  My study is also 
concerned with “what is ‘unsaid’ but taken as given” (Fairclough 2003:40). This, in common 
with the other theoretical approaches included in this section, will be applied when considering 
all three aspects of textual analysis. Text is one aspect of a wider discourse framework which 
will be considered next.  
 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS  
 
In defining discourse analysis as the “attempt to show systematic links between texts, discourse 
practices and socio-cultural practices” Fairclough contextualises textual and discourse analysis as 
important and inter-related areas of methodology (1995a:16); he places particular emphasis on 
discourse practice which he defines as “the production, distribution and consumption of a text” 
(1995b:135). Fairclough argues that “two causal ‘powers’… shape texts: on the one hand, social 
structures and social practices; on the other hand, social agents, the people involved in social 
events” (2003:22). Fairclough draws attention to “hidden relations of power” which may 
potentially influence film content (1989:49). His work is associated specifically with Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA), which anchors “its analytical claims about discourses in close 
analysis of texts” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999:152). Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer 
define CDA as problem orientated, aiming to “demystify ideology and power through the 
systematic…investigation of semiotic data” (2009:3) whilst Allan Bell and Peter Garrett consider 
that CDA has “an explicit socio-political agenda” which reveals “the role of discourse in 
reproducing or challenging socio-political dominance” (1998:6). Clough and Nutbrown argue 
that “as all social research takes place in policy contexts of one form or another research itself 
must…be seen as inevitably political” (2002:12); my own study can certainly be perceived in 
this way. 
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Carabine links discourse with language, asserting that discourses are “variable ways of speaking 
of issues which cohere or come together to produce the object of which they speak” (2001: 
269/273): my thesis is concerned with language, in respect of both extended examples of talk and 
text (Deacon et al 2007:313/14). Dave Harper defines discourse analysis as, “a reactive, 
recursive and interactive endeavour…a process of reading from a position of curiosity, 
formulating questions about what one is reading, and then crafting a coherent written analysis 
(2006:48). Harper works specifically in the psychiatric field; he points out that discourse analysis 
and the world of psychiatry do not have an extensive history but that discourse analysis is 
“extremely useful when studying phenomena like psychiatric categories which are produced 
almost entirely within language” (1995:348). Harper also emphasises the advantages of a 
discursive approach that avoids “falling into dualist traps” and thrives on inconsistency or 
variability, characteristics which have already been indicated by the inconsistent categorisation 
of psychosis (see page 82) and which I anticipate in my study (see page 202).  
 
I wish to position my thesis specifically in relation to Foucauldian discourse analysis. Fairclough 
acknowledges Foucault’s contribution to social theory in ascribing “a central role to discourse in 
the development of specifically modern forms of power” (1989:12). Foucault’s work is not 
specifically media oriented but is of particular relevance because of its focus upon psychiatric 
and medical discourse (see Chapter 1). Foucault recognises that science is influential; he refutes 
the claim of medical personnel to authority but accepts that our individual fates are bound up in 
their work (1991:22). Fairclough also cites the medical environment as an on-going site for 
power relations and struggles; he questions power and language in the sphere of medicine as a 
discourse bearing institution: 
 
Why are the facts as they are?  How – in terms of the development of social relationships 
of power – was the existing socio-linguistic order brought in to being? How is it sustained? 
How might it be changed to the advantage of those who are dominated by it? (1989:8) 
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Fairclough sees the duty of the researcher to focus on discourse areas “where participants may be 
placed at social risk during the communication, suffering disadvantage in consequence of the 
inequalities of communication”; he includes medical “encounters” as one of these areas and his 
work is clearly relevant to mental health research (1989: viii).   Fairclough considers that whilst 
“in principle anyone is free to obtain… (medical) qualifications, in practice the people who do 
come mainly from the dominant bloc”.  For the majority the only involvement with medicine “is 
in the capacity of “client” patient, pupil or student, and clients are not really “insiders” in an 
institution” (1989:63). Fairclough suggests that the struggle for dominance in medical discourse 
is characterised by the difficulty of finding “an ideologically neutral” term for a person receiving 
medical care (1989:103). He extends this observation to psychiatric discourse which he considers 
to be prone to euphemism, an index of uneasy power relations (1989:117).   
 
Foucault divides psychiatry from medicine in asserting that “it is only by an artifice of language 
that the same meaning can be attributed to “illnesses of the body” and “illnesses of the mind” 
(1976:10). He rejects the truth-value of psychiatric discourse by stating that “none of the 
concepts of psychopathology…can play an organizing role” in what we understand of madness 
(2007:xi).  Foucault considers that “the very notion of “mental illness” is the expression of an 
attempt doomed from the outset” (1976:76). He argues that psychiatric discourse is influenced by 
both historical and institutional contexts and that institutions such as psychiatry which “appear to 
be both neutral and independent” should be criticised “in such a manner that the political 
violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one 
can fight them (1991:6). By focusing upon the film text, policy documents and audience 
response I hope to expose ideological diversity, identify sites of conflict and struggle and 
question discourses which seem to be common-sensical within the psychiatric domain.  
 
Saukko considers that a Foucauldian approach embraces both aspects of ethnography and post-
structuralism by combining an interest in the subordinate and a focus upon discourse (2003:77). I 
intend to examine the discursive resources drawn on by participants who might be considered 
‘subordinate’ within a wider framework that reflects the prevailing culture. The close links 
between Foucauldian discourse analysis and post-structuralism have been considered in Chapter 
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2; the next section will consider the tensions between them and post-structuralism as a 
methodological approach. 
 
POSTMODERN/POST-STRUCTURALIST APPROACHES 
 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough acknowledge the potential tension that exists between a postmodern 
and a discourse approach; they consider that many postmodernists take an extreme relativist 
position which treats all discourse as equally suspect, including the discourse of critique 
(1999:8). When this is taken into account, it is not difficult to anticipate incompatibilities 
between postmodernism and psychiatry which together with other medical disciplines, is 
inherently modernist. Paul Hodgkin suggests that medicine is one of the last social structures to 
resist what he terms “epidemic uncertainties” (1996:1568): 
 
Health is one of the few remaining social values that garners unambiguous support.  This is 
largely due to our continuing and communal belief that there is one truth “out there” which 
can be known, understood, and controlled by anyone who is rational and competent 
(1996:1568). 
 
Bradley Lewis recognises that psychiatry continues to understand itself as “founded” on the 
‘truth’ (2000:74).  In consequence psychiatrists are able to apply the ‘truth’ about a condition 
across all culture and across all historical eras (2000:74). Lewis considers that psychiatry would 
be greatly improved by adopting a post-structuralist approach:  
 
If psychiatry were practiced within a mind set or world view reflecting a “crisis in 
representation,” it would be much less obsessed with “getting it right.”  Categories and 
theories would be understood not as Universally true, but as useful heuristics, necessarily 
formulated through the constraints of a non-transparent language but nevertheless useful in 
the process of inquiry and intelligibility (2000:77). 
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An alternative to a pluralistic approach is offered by Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) which 
Hodgkin considers to offer certainty “to the multiple, fragmented versions of the “truth” which 
the postmodern world offers” (1996:1568). Sackett et al define EBM as “the conscientious, 
explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of 
individual patients” (1996:11); they describe EBM as “clinically relevant research, often from 
the basic sciences of medicine” which uses a bottom up approach that “integrates the best 
external evidence with individual clinical expertise and patients' choice” (1996:11). Trisha 
Greenhalgh considers a further defining feature to be “the use of figures derived from research 
on populations to inform decisions about individuals” (2006:1). Positive support for EBM is 
acknowledged by Kerridge et al who cite the strongest argument in its favour as allowing “the 
best evaluated methods of health care (and useless or harmful methods) to be identified” 
(1998:1151).  There is not unequivocal support, however. Greehhalgh summarises criticisms of 
EBM as:  
 
The glorification of things that can be measured without regard for the usefulness or 
accuracy of what is measured, the uncritical acceptance of published numerical data, the 
preparation of all-encompassing guidelines by self-appointed ‘experts’ who are out of 
touch with real medicine, the debasement of clinical freedom through the imposition of 
rigid and dogmatic clinical protocols and the over-reliance on simplistic inappropriate and 
often incorrect economic analyses (2006:xiii)   
 
She counters that these are what the “EBM movement is fighting against, rather than what it 
represents” but acknowledges “that when applied in a vacuum…EB decision making is a 
reductionist process with a real potential for harm” (2006:xiii). Kerridge et al also consider that 
EBM “invites a simplistic approach to the role of evidence in medicine” and that it is never 
entirely free of value judgments. They do not accept EBM’s claim “to reject the power of expert 
opinion,” arguing that “patients have little influence over the priorities of research” and are not, 
therefore, equal stakeholders (1998:1151).  
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The compatibility of psychiatry and EBM is questioned by Patrick Bracken and Philip Thomas 
who emphasise that psychiatry’s “own modernist achievements are themselves contested” 
(2001:724). Lewis considers the existence of the anti-psychiatry protest movement to be 
evidence that psychiatry should readdress its core knowledge structures (2000:72). Alison 
Faulkner and Phil Thomas argue that EBM is an inappropriate approach in psychiatry as it is 
“incapable of handling the ethical and moral aspects of ‘gathering evidence’... In addition it is 
incapable of responding to different interpretations of emotional distress and psychosis and the 
values and interests that underpin these” (2002:1). Greenhalgh acknowledges the philosophical 
tension that exists between a clinician managing to be both ‘EB’, (systematically informing their 
decision by research evidence) and ‘narrative based’, (embodying all the richness of their 
accumulated clinical anecdotes) (2006:6); the strong narrative tradition of psychiatry appears to 
distance it from a modernist agenda. Lewis identifies psychiatry as the closest medical speciality 
to the arts and humanities and the “least consistent with overly scientific methods” (2000:72). 
Bracken and Thomas consider that “mental health work has never been comfortable with a 
modernist agenda” (2001:727); they attribute this to psychiatry’s “strong tradition of conceptual 
debate” and argue that this gives psychiatry an advantage “over other medical disciplines when it 
comes to the postmodern challenge” (2001:727).  
Bracken and Thomas propose ‘postpsychiatry’ as a postmodern way forward which re-evaluates 
psychiatry’s existing modernist stance. ‘Postpsychiatry’ is not concerned with new theories but 
focuses on perspectives which may previously have been denied – particularly those of service 
users. It is not an anti-psychiatry movement; instead it attempts to move beyond the conflict 
between psychiatry and antipsychiatry, disputing the assumption of both factions that there is a 
correct way to understand madness (2001:724). In employing a research approach that avoids 
strong dialectics and prioritises the views of service users my study is sympathetic to 
‘postpsychiatry.’ Lewis envisages a postmodern model that prioritises clinical activities in the 
wisdom of practice and the concerns of the patient over the ‘objective truth’ of medical research. 
His postmodern psychiatry is distinctly Foucauldian, questioning “the identity of psychiatrists, 
the experience of mental illness, the dilemmas of clinical uncertainty, the effect of power 
differentials…the role of cultural context…and the place of psychiatry within larger social and 
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political trends” (2000:81). Lewis identifies one of the advantages of adopting a postmodern 
approach in psychiatry as a move away from neuroscience and the quantitative social science 
methodologies to a qualitative approach that establishes psychiatry in the field of cultural studies 
(2000:73). Nicholas Mays and Catherine Pope emphasise that conventional measures are 
inappropriate for qualitative research in the medical field as they “cannot and should not be 
judged by…measures of validity...generalisability and reliability” (2006:84). They reject the 
stance that there is “a single, unequivocal social reality that is entirely independent of the 
researcher and of the research process” (2006:84) but also consider that an extreme, relativist, 
post-structuralist approach becomes “anti-realist” (2006:85). Their own interpretation of ‘truth’ 
is “the best informed…and most sophisticated construction on which there is consensus” 
(2006:84). Pope and Mays describe their research approach as “a subtle realist position that holds 
that there is ultimately an underlying social reality that research studies attempt in different ways 
to describe” (2006: 143). Chouliaraki and Fairclough adopt a similar stance:  
 
We accept that scientific claims to privileged knowledge have in some cases worked in 
terroristic ways…but we do not accept that the solution is to give up the very possibility of 
truth claims…such arguments typically confuse the issue by ignoring…the crucial 
difference between ‘truth’ as a matter of privileged access vouchsafed to some …elite…’in 
the know’ and truth as arrived at though reasoned enquiry in the public sphere of open 
participant debate (1999:33). 
 
My view concurs with that of Chouliaraki and Fairclough and also Lewis who argues that 
postmodernism does not necessarily exclude modernism but incorporates it as one of many 
strands (2000:80). Lewis characterises a modernist approach as foregrounding certainty and a 
postmodern approach as foregrounding humility, regarding the two as compatible (2000:80). J. 
Muir Grey similarly argues for medicine that is “modern- sceptical evidence based” but also 
“self critical” and open (1999:1553). Hodgkin concludes, however, that medicine will not be able 
to hold out against the pull of post-structuralism and the “pluralistic, fragmented webs of power 
and knowledge that our accelerating technoculture is creating” (1996:1569). 
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The previous sections of the chapter have sought to emphasise the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of discourse and postmodern approaches in the field of psychiatry.  The next 
section will consider how they have influenced my research methods before foregrounding the 
specific demands of working with those who have experienced psychosis. 
 
THE USE OF INTERVIEWING 
 
Before outlining the interview as a chosen research method I wish to justify my decision not to 
use alternative methodologies. I have discounted conversation analysis because of time 
constraints and because the principle of unmotivated looking does not conform to my desire to 
elicit specific information (McCabe 2006:26).  In addition it is resistant to “linking properties of 
talk” with the “relations of power, ideologies [and] cultural values” which underpin my work 
(Fairclough 1995:23). The principle of conversation is never far away, however. Kvale defines 
the research interview as “a professional conversation” which is “based on the conversations of 
daily life” (1996:5) and Barker and Brooks, in their work on film audiences, point out that: 
  
The success or failure of our interviews…turned on the extent to which we enabled people 
to feel that they weren’t being interviewed at all – they were having a conversation about 
the film that was very like what they liked to have anyway (1998:23). 
 
I have given careful consideration to, but ultimately decided against, carrying out group 
interviews, focus groups or discussion groups as an alternative to or supplement for individual 
interviews.  Kitzinger argues that “group work is invaluable in enabling people to articulate 
experiences in ways which break away from the clichés of dominant cultural constructions” and 
that this “may be particularly important when working with groups “who share stigmatized or 
‘taboo’ experiences (e.g.…mental illness)” (1994:112).  Whilst this is persuasive my decision 
not to use group work is based on my concern that voices might be silenced in situations where 
“participants have on-going social relations which may be compromised by public disclosure” 
94	  
	  
(Michell 1999:36). Kitzinger argues that “knowing what is and what is not expressed in a group 
context may be as important as knowing what is expressed in a confidential, one to one 
interview” (1994:112).  I agree with this but also concur with her view that “focus groups do not 
easily tap into individual biographies or the minutia of decision making during intimate moments 
(1994:116).  It is individual response and what is there, rather than what is not there, that I wish 
to explore in this piece of research. In addition Lynn Michell argues that some participants 
“resist, or social structures…mitigate against” group situations (1999:45). This possibility must 
be weighed against the potential advantage offered by a group dynamic of eliciting “something 
less fixed, definite and coherent that lies beneath attitudes” (Myers and Macnaghten 1999:174). 
Bronwen Davies argues that focus groups can be liberating, offering empowerment to 
“individuals who might otherwise find difficulty in asserting a view that seems to conflict with 
the assumptions of the interviewer” (2005:108). In piloting my research with two informal 
discussion groups from bipolar support groups in South Wales, however, I did not find this to be 
the case. If I do hold assumptions I do not consider that these were apparent.  In addition, I found 
that certain participants were silent and that discussion led to a focus upon key ideas to the 
possible exclusion of others. Whilst appreciating the importance of shared experience it 
crystallised my thoughts that I am not so much concerned with the snowballing or synergistic 
aspects of focus groups (Clough and Nutbrown 2002:79) as the wish to focus upon individual 
narratives and response (Flick 2007: 85).  
 
The most important aspect of my research is to explore the “imagined communities” of those 
who have experienced psychosis in order to see how they construct themselves as individuals 
and how they position themselves in relation to texts that feature psychosis (Staiger 2005:8). My 
research might be considered to be an example of ethnography according to Deacon et al’s 
definition of ethnography as analysis which no longer relies on extended observation but retains 
associations with community based culture (2007:252). Saukko emphasises the tension between 
an ethnomethodological approach that prioritises a lived reality and a post-structuralist approach 
that emphasises the partial and, to a certain extent, political nature of this perspective (2003:15). 
Saukko considers that these two approaches share common ground, however: she uses the term 
“dialogic validity” for an ethnomethodological approach which is “concerned with truthfulness” 
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and allows research participants a voice (2003:19) and considers this, together with a post-
structuralist approach, to be concerned with challenging authoritarian discourse and to be 
essentially democratic in nature (Saukko 2003:21). It is in this spirit that I am approaching my 
study.  
 
After consideration I have nominated the interview as the best method of determining the 
response of those who have experienced psychosis to film representation. Blaxter, Hughes and 
Tight cite the interview as the methodology that promotes maximum discussion (1996:154). 
Rubin and Rubin argue that “qualitative interviewing is appropriate…to unravel complicated 
relationships and slowly evolving events” (such as the experience of psychosis) (1995:51) and 
Kvale suggests that “the qualitative research interview attempts to…unfold the meaning of 
people’s experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations” (1996:1); in 
view of the scientific discourse surrounding psychosis this seems particularly appropriate. The 
interviews that I have carried out have been face-to-face and semi-structured; their purpose has 
been “to obtain descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the 
meaning of the described phenomenon” (Kvale 1996:5).  
 
The nature of the semi-structured interview raises issues about interviewer control and I 
acknowledge its constructed nature.  Clough and Nutbrown argue that “the researcher’s 
voice…should be- as much present as that of the research participants” (2002: 68) and Kvale that 
“the qualitative research interview is literally an inter view an inter change of views between two 
persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest” (1996:2). For this reason I have designed a 
pre-interview questionnaire which enables participants to record “thoughts, feelings, personal 
perceptions and biases regarding the proposed topics” (Murray 2003:233); my hope is that this 
will give respondents the confidence to consider that they have something relevant to say before 
interview (see Appendix p335). McCracken emphasises that “it is important that the investigator 
allow the respondent to tell his or her own story in his or her own terms” (1988:22). Rubin and 
Rubin stress that it is important not to interrupt interviewees when giving a vivid, narrative 
account, (even though its relevance may not be immediately apparent), as this may be valuable 
data (1995: 80). McCracken does, however, consider that the interviewer must “impose order 
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and structure” (1988:22). Deacon et al argue that whilst naturalistic interviews may appear to be 
“everyday conversations” they also “guide informants to topics and…discourage wandering” 
(2007:292). I have developed an interview guide, as recommended by Deacon et al, to focus the 
nature of the face-to-face, semi-structured interviews (2007:67) and have used this as a guide to 
formulate the questions I will ask at interview (see Appendix p341).  I have been influenced by 
Oppenheim, who argues against the use of fixed questions preferring “a list of general topics or 
areas around which the interview should be conducted” (1992:70) and Kvale who advocates “an 
outline of topics to be covered with suggested questions” (1996:129). McCracken points out that 
using a questionnaire does not nullify the “open-ended” nature of the qualitative interview as 
there is opportunity to elicit an exploratory, unstructured response within each broad area 
(1988:22).  The “guiding session” I have produced for the interviews covers key points but also 
encourages participants to initiate their own agendas (Murray 2003). I have adopted 
Oppenheim’s principle of adding to initial conceptualisations, in time, as the interviews 
progressed (1992:70).  
 
I have used informal questioning in order to encourage “interactive dialogue that conforms to the 
normal conventions of conversation” (Deacon et al 2007:65) and because less structured 
questions are more suitable when there are issues with gauging comprehensibility, (something 
which could potentially present in a study of psychosis) (Deacon et al 2007:69). The order of 
questions replicates natural conversation; questions are initially descriptive, to establish “what is 
going on” before becoming more complex and explanatory to explore “why it is going on” 
(White 2009:49). Asmundson et al advocate the use of simple research questions that are limited 
in number, clear and unambiguous with service users (2002). I do not consider this advice to be 
any more applicable to service users than the general population.  I have used “laddered” 
questions, however, to introduce the substance of my research, simply at first, before increasing 
complexity. Bob Price advocates the use of questions that address action before focusing on 
knowledge and finally belief as an effective technique for putting interviewees at ease 
(2002:277). The wording of questions is not standardised as I wish to use the interviewee’s own 
vocabulary wherever possible (Britten 2006:14). Rubin and Rubin argue that “asking everyone 
the same questions makes little sense in qualitative interviewing, where the goal is to find out 
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what happened and why, in rich and individualistic terms” (1995:11). I have used open 
questions, despite the increased demands they place on respondents, because they elicit a more 
personal response which reflects upon behaviour, beliefs and attitude (Deacon et al 2006:75). I 
have also attempted to encourage vivid answers by asking for first hand descriptions of events 
and follow up questions if I feel a topic is worthy of further exploration (Rubin and Rubin 
1995:76). I have piloted my interview in order to maximise its efficacy; it is comprised of nine 
questions. Questions one and two are designed to break the ice and give confidence; the first asks 
about favourite films and the second about films that are disliked. Question three asks about the 
experience of psychosis and can only be introduced once a relationship with an interviewee has 
been established. The interview is designed to become focused more specifically on film as it 
progresses. Respondents are asked about genre and whether this inflects the nature of 
representation and also to give their subjective opinions on which representations they feel 
capture the experience of psychosis well and which do not. They are also asked to consider 
whether they feel that they have learnt anything about psychosis from a film text. Whilst I have 
designed my study to focus on film as a specific media form I have extended this question 
(question eight) to include ‘any other media text’.  This is because I do not wish to discourage 
participants from talking about media texts which may hold significance for them.  I am also 
aware that any information gleaned may be useful for future study. I have concluded the 
interview by appealing to the life experience of the participants in asking them if they have any 
advice to offer a filmmaker who is considering a film which features psychosis. 
  
RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
My approach to sampling in respect of interviewees shares common features with the sampling 
of film texts; I have generated purposive, non-probability samples in order to identify case 
studies which are information rich and can be studied in depth (Gray 2009:180). I have also 
employed maximum variation sampling, as I did with film texts, in order to identify variations as 
well as patterns across the sample (Gray 2009: 181).	  	  McCracken argues that when interviewing 
“it is the categories and assumptions, not those who hold them, that matter” (1988:17). To this 
end I have interviewed sufficient subjects to explore how those who have experienced psychosis 
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respond to its filmic representation but not so many that it is impossible to “make penetrating 
interpretations of the interviews” (Kvale 1996:101/102). By the end of the study 24 respondents 
who have direct experience of psychosis took part.  This relatively small sample enabled me to 
extract “rich, thick data” in respect of how those who have experienced psychosis interact with 
the film texts that represent it (Gray 2009:182). I have aimed at an	  “intensive insight” from my 
interviews; I have not attempted to elicit an average view but to develop an in depth 
understanding. It could be argued that because the group of those who have experienced 
psychosis present naturally as a research prospect I have used a ‘strong’ version of convenience 
sampling (Deacon et al 2007:56) but the selection of respondents is not governed by strict 
sampling rules and is not an intentionally “biased sample” (Greenhalgh 2006:169). My 
interviewees have been generated “informally and organically” and should  be considered 
illustrative rather than generally representative (Deacon et al 2007: 45/46). 	  
 
The criterion for inclusion in my study is that participants have experienced psychosis; this limits 
the planned focus of the study (Flick 2007:44) and relies upon participant knowledge (Rubin and 
Rubin 1995:66). Participants have been identified because they facilitate an exploration of the 
“particular behaviour or characteristic” which underpins my research (Gray 2009:180). In this 
respect I have employed a purposive sampling approach in identifying participants against this 
specific trait (Gray 2009:152) and consider that this non-probability approach allows access to a 
group “whose activities are normally ‘hidden’ from public view” (Bloch 2004:176).	  Clough and 
Nutbrown point out that “interest in a subject only starts to become research when a curiosity is 
systematically informed by perspectives outside of the researcher’s normal vision” (2002: 45); 
this is the case for me in respect of psychosis. Participant knowledge of film was not requisite; 
lack of knowledge was as revealing as extensive knowledge. It was important, however, that 
respondents were “willing to talk” (Rubin (1995:66) and that they were not previously known to 
me in order to maintain objectivity (McCracken 1988:37).  
 
It is important to foreground the specific considerations which arise from conducting a study 
with individuals who have experienced psychosis. Historical discussion has focused on whether 
psychiatric patients should participate in research on the grounds of vulnerability. Linda Moore 
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and Margaret Miller emphasise the negative implications of participating in research as ranging 
from inconvenience to physical, psychological, social, economic and legal risk (1999:1036). 
They define someone who is vulnerable as “an individual who is diagnosed with an illness and 
due to that illness lacks the ability to maintain autonomy, personal independence and self-
determination” (1999:1034/5); Brian Keogh and Louise Daly point out that “people with mental 
or emotional health problems” frequently fall into this category (2009:27). They are potentially 
vulnerable because, at times, they may be “completely or partly unable to make autonomous 
decisions regarding their participation” and may not be capable, at certain times, of giving 
informed consent (Koivisto et al 2001:328).  Koivisto et al recognise that patients who have 
experienced psychosis may enter in to a study when they are unwell only to regret doing so when 
their mental health improves; they caution against judging research participants to be more 
capable than they, in fact, are (2001:329). Koivisto et al debate whether service users should be 
replaced by participants who have no apparent vulnerability, recognising that their protection 
needs to be balanced with foregrounding their views as stakeholders.  They conclude that 
vulnerability should not preclude participation as “autonomous decision making is a basic human 
right” (2001:337).  They also caution that objections raised by close contacts and advocates of 
mental health service users limit participation in research, at times (2001:332). 
 
The ‘efficacy’ and reliability of research that draws on the views of service users has also been 
questioned. Davies considers that “the view that psychiatric patients are incapable of expressing 
a rational opinion has been widely held until recent years” (2005:106). Koivisto et al question 
this; they note that even in studies where 50% of the participants are considered to have impaired 
abilities to make judgements the other 50% who are acutely unwell are capable of participation 
(2001:329). Whilst they consider it to be gross prejudice to assume exclusion they do link 
reduced capacity with active symptoms and lack of insight with schizophrenia. They state that 
“according to some studies as many as half of the patients who are acutely hospitalized for 
schizophrenia may have substantially impaired decision making abilities, including problems 
with understanding, appreciation and reasoning” (2001:329). This raises the issue of whether 
research participants should only participate if they do not display symptoms of psychosis. A 
further consideration is whether psychotic symptoms should preclude inclusion for all studies.  
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Koivisto et al argue that it is not best practice to exclude potentially the most complex 
participants as this leads to bias (2001:329). As a researcher who does not have the specialised 
resources or training to deal with the ethical and practical implications of including particularly 
vulnerable participants in my study, however, I have ensured that participation is voluntary and 
that participants were able to cope with the demands of an interview. I am aware that whilst 
psychosis is a common factor each participant’s presentation differs, including at the time of 
interview. Horsfall et al emphasise that “the length of time the person has experienced clinical 
symptoms, the types of treatment experienced, the range of services and support utilized and the 
overall level of behavioral, emotional and social disability associated with the mental illness” are 
all relevant to the research situation (2007:S13).  
 
Whilst interviewing is recommended as an appropriate way of carrying out qualitative research 
with vulnerable populations, (Murray 2003:233, Keogh and Daly 2009:30), I am aware that my 
research incorporates a double vulnerability factor; in addition to the stress of the interview 
itself, participants were required to reflect upon their own experience of psychosis.  This is a 
potential cause of distress (Murray 2003:235) and an example of a sensitive topic which some 
respondents may find embarrassing and be reluctant to address (Oppenheim1992:140). Important 
ethical considerations had to be met, therefore, before research could proceed; I would argue that 
this was easier to implement for one-to-one interviews than groups. Horsfall et al consider that 
the most crucial aspect of ethical research is respect for human beings; an ethical approach also 
ensures that the burden of research is minimal and the benefits from the research are distributed 
fairly (2007:S10). Asmundsen et al argue that informed consent is crucial.  Their six point 
guideline suggests that: the welfare of the patient is tantamount; the patient must be adequately 
informed; they must be made aware of risk; they must retain the right to refuse to participate in 
addition to being able to withdraw and they must be able to request anonymity (2002:66). Flick 
advises the use of a contract that includes the possibility of withdrawing consent (2007:72).  
These points are addressed in the information sheet included in the Appendix, p337. 
 
Keogh and Daly argue that ethical guidelines have become more conservative over time 
(2009:28); this leads to service users being excluded from research, a situation which might be 
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avoided by pre-planning. Davies recommends that service users are approached well in advance 
of a study and given ample time to decide whether, or not, they wish to participate (2005:108). 
Horsfall et al suggest that extra time is allowed in the interview itself in order to make 
interviewees feel safe and comfortable and that strategies are put in place for addressing strong 
reactions or distress (2007:S13). I have ensured that interviews were conducted in familiar 
surroundings at times of the day which accommodated routines (Moore and Miller 1999:1039). 
All twenty four interviews were carried out at locations convenient to respondents; these 
included their own homes and familiar settings such as the locations used for support groups. I 
ensured that interviewees had access to supportive contacts, where appropriate.  Louise Morgan 
argues that emotional and practical support is vital for service users who participate in research 
(2006:3). She strongly advises uninitiated researchers to undertake relevant training before a 
project is underway; this includes making contact with someone who has experience of working 
with service users. Whilst I had not previously undertaken any research with service users I was 
in regular contact with both those who have experienced mental health difficulties and the 
professionals who work with them. I consider this to have been valuable experience for dealing 
with possible complications such as those documented by Koivisto et al who describe physical 
restriction, in the form of medication-induced rigidity, as a barrier to research participation 
(2001:336) and Davies who describes how a participant refused to be tape recorded because her 
initial psychosis was concerned with surveillance (2005:109). I also gave the conclusion of the 
interview careful consideration; Koivisto et al suggest that interviews are rounded off with a 
“comfortable” topic such as future plans or home life (2001:336). I have concluded the 
interviews by asking respondents if they have any questions or whether there is anything I have 
missed (Rubin and Rubin 1995:137) and by acknowledging the help of their participation 
(Oppenheim 1992:75).  Horsfall et al advise that the end point should always be apparent; 
participants should be given ample opportunity to reflect upon their experience and any findings 
from the research should be disseminated in an accessible format amongst them (2007:S18). I do 
not want my results to be confined to the pages of a thesis but hope to utilise them so that they 
become significant for the individuals involved and further research.  After submission I will 
tailor an accessible report targeted specifically at my respondents (Keen and Todres 2007:1). 
Both Horsfall et al (2007:S8) and Davies (2005:109) point out that service user drop out is high; 
I conducted one self-standing interview with each participant in the hope that this would mitigate 
102	  
	  
against dropout. I also introduced a generous time frame in order to extend the recruitment 
period and allow extra time for rescheduling interviews.   
 
My participants were generated informally from Four Winds, (an open access resource centre in 
Cardiff for anyone experiencing mental health difficulties), bipolar self-help groups across South 
Wales and the mental health charity Mind. I did not recruit via the NHS for two reasons: the first 
is that the necessary protocols were not possible within my time frame but, more importantly, I 
also wished to move away from a medical model when interviewing in order to explore the 
nature of psychosis from a wider perspective. In order to achieve this I made approaches to a 
wide variety of non-NHS mental health organisations across South Wales that could potentially 
put me in touch with willing participants.  Only a small proportion responded and there was also 
great variance in the amount of interviews I secured with each organisation. I carried out one 
interview with Mind for example, whilst Four Winds, a user led initiative in Cardiff, was 
ultimately the source of eight interviews.	  	  
 
By locating my research outside a medical environment I hoped to emphasise the voluntary 
nature of participation.  My decision to recruit largely through self-help groups is influenced by 
the movement towards user led research in medicine that prioritises the combined wisdom of a 
practice community over science. Davies documents notable resistance in the service user 
movement to involving mental health professionals in research because they “are by definition 
socially dominant in relation to service users and their professional knowledge and assumptions 
will inevitably shape the research” (2005:107). Koivisto et al point out that patients rarely refuse 
to take part in research because of feelings of obligation towards medical personnel (2001:333). 
Peter Beresford sees the principle of user led research to be “making change, for the individual, 
the group and in society” (2006:226); he argues that it challenges the medical model assumption 
that the researcher should be distanced from the subject under examination. Beresford describes 
three stages of service user involvement: being ignored, being surveyed and finally being 
involved (2006: 223). He sees user control as “one end of a continuum that starts with no service 
user involvement and is most fully developed” in a user- controlled model” (2006: 226). 
Justifications for user led research are varied: Entwistle et al argue that there is a moral 
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imperative for user involvement as the public are the “owners” of publicly funded research 
policy (1998:463). Ian Chalmers cites experience, common sense and justice as reasons for 
adopting a user led model (1995:1318). Davies argues that mental health practitioners “have a 
duty to acknowledge patients’ expertise in living with the disadvantage of experiencing mental 
ill health” (2005:106). Faulkner and Thomas also consider that “research should be based in the 
subjective, lived experience of emotional distress” as a focus on the “self-defined frameworks” 
constructed by service users to understand their experiences is crucial in avoiding professional 
concepts of illness. They argue that “there is political resistance to seeing psychiatric patients as 
experts and to their involvement as partners in helping to set research agendas” (2002:1). 
Conversely Entwistle et al emphasise that user-led research is not without limitations; they argue 
that service users are not the only stakeholders with legitimate views and advocate the 
incorporation of lay perspectives from carers, whose interests can often conflict with those of 
service users.  They also point out that health professionals may be excluded from research as 
frequently as user groups (1998:466).  
 
My success in securing eight interviews with Four Winds was the result of building up a 
relationship with the group over a period of a year. Four Winds is a user-led organisation for 
people experiencing mental health difficulties.  I sent introductory posters advertising my 
research to all potential centres and initially secured an interview with a film enthusiast at Four 
Winds. From this initial point of contact I arranged further interviews. To a certain extent, 
therefore, interviews were not pre-planned but evolved as the fieldwork began and were secured, 
to some degree, through snowball sampling.  Alice Bloch recommends snowball sampling in 
instances where “there is no list of the population available” or “the population is hidden” 
(2004:177); this was certainly the case in respect of psychosis. Whilst snowball sampling was a 
feature at Four Winds and both the Abergavenny and Carmarthen branches of the Bipolar Wales 
Network, this was not generally the case and can, perhaps, be explained by David Gray’s 
argument that in some situations specific personalities act as a “knowledge source” who then go 
on to suggest other suitable interviewees (2009:153). Whilst noting Bloch’s observations that 
snowball sampling is unlikely to extend to isolated members of a group, tending, instead to target 
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people with similar interests (2004:177), I feel that this has been mitigated against, to a certain 
extent, by using multiple starting points for interviews. 
 
Notably many of the interviews I arranged did not take place as planned; the nature of mental 
illness means that even the best laid plans are subject to change and certain interviewees either 
did not attend for interview or did not feel well enough to be interviewed at the appointed time.  
What my association with Four Winds did allow me to do, however, was to build up a 
relationship of trust with regular users of the centre whilst avoiding any form of coercion and I 
found that after several weeks, (or even months in certain instances), centre users agreed to 
participate after initial reluctance. To a certain extent, therefore, I relied on convenience 
sampling by interviewing centre users who were “accessible and available” (Girden 2001:66).  I 
accept Girden’s reservation that whilst convenience sampling can produce useful information the 
results may be unlikely to generalise but I consider that the more leisurely and sustained nature 
of my contact with Four Winds meant that I was able to access respondents who were, by nature, 
more reticent of participation; it is possible that after seeing me on a regular basis, attendees at 
Four Winds felt that my legitimacy as a researcher was assured. Securing interviews with more 
reserved members of the group also helped to guard against the tendency in purposive sampling 
to select those individuals who seem “most likely to provide information-rich or fruitful data” to 
the possible exclusion of more reluctant potential interviewees (Girden 2001:29). This was 
particularly pleasing because it allowed me to interview two centre users who had experience of 
psychosis in depression, “turning up the volume on the depressed or inaudible voice” and adding 
a valuable dimension to my research (Clough and Nutbrown 2002:71).  Respondents came from 
a pleasing variety of backgrounds in respect of variables such as age, level of education, gender, 
class, and occupation (Oppenheim 1992:68); I was not, however, able to incorporate a wide 
range of ethnicity in to my study. Ultimately, however, I consider that recruitment has 
contributed to a wide range of perspectives and points of view” (Rubin and Rubin 1995:66). The 
intentional creation of “a contrast in the respondent pool” has also enabled me, as interviewer, to 
“manufacture distance” from my interviewees (McCracken 1988:37).  
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I am positioned by marriage, occupation and familial experience in relation to psychosis; 
inevitably therefore I am pre-disposed to find certain discourses more significant than others. In 
the same way my own values inflect my attitudes concerning the validity of discourse in film. To 
this end I have attempted to be open to new ideas and meanings and receptive to any information 
given to me throughout my research including during the final stage which involved the	  
transcription	  of interviewee data (Clough and Nutbrown 2002:18). I recorded interviews using a 
digital dictaphone in order to establish “beyond doubt whatever was said by whom and with 
what expression” (Deacon et al 2007:301). I was the sole transcriber as I knew the data better 
than anyone else (Greenhalgh 2006:169). I transcribed the material verbatim and carefully 
(McCracken 1988:48) using the conventions of broad transcription, for example, the words and 
by whom they were spoken, “medium and long pauses, laughter and uncertain hearings or 
indecipherable words” (Du Bois et al 1993:46).   I adopted conventions of basic transcription 
such as hyphens for truncations; pseudonyms; X for unclear; brackets to show where speech 
overlapped; three dots to show a long pause; a zero in brackets for latching and ‘@’ for laughter 
(Du Bois et al 1993:46-67 see Appendix p351). I was aware that “transcribing involves 
translating from an oral language, with its own set of rules to a written language with another set 
of rules” and that “transcripts are not copies or representations of some original reality” but 
“interpretative constructions that are useful tools for given purposes” (Kvale 1996:158). I was 
also aware that my role alternated “between being a “narrative finder” – looking for narratives 
contained in the interviews, and a “narrative creator – moulding the many different happenings 
into coherent stories” (Kvale 1996:201). I created a ‘Key Element’ sheet for each interviewee 
using standard MS office packages to establish the most salient elements of the transcription. 
The sheets included a section relating specifically to the experience of psychosis. Close attention 
was also paid to any texts which were cited during interview in relation to psychosis. I ensured 
that I viewed any material mentioned, including TV texts such as The Prisoner, in order to 
establish their significance.  The Key Element sheets contained a section detailing any significant 
statements or themes that emerged during the interviews; I relied upon close reading to map out 
areas of significant discourse. I paid close attention to areas of concurrence or regularity with 
other interviewees in order to build up a picture of emerging discourse.  A further section noted 
departures and contradictions. Finally, once key elements for all twenty four interviews had been 
tracked I created an additional series of documents in Microsoft Office that fulfilled the function 
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of clarifying the governing statements and departures and also introduced a quantitative aspect to 
the research – for example by establishing that fourteen respondents expressed negativity 
towards psychiatric personnel and only one felt that psychosis was ‘normal’.  
 
James Scheurich points out that “data analysis…is not the development of an accurate 
representation of the data” but “a creative interaction between the conscious/unconscious 
researcher and the decontextualized data which is assumed to represent reality or, at least, reality 
as interpreted by the interviewee” (1997:63). In doing so he highlights the tension which has 
featured throughout this chapter between the post-structuralist desire to “support the proliferation 
of many ways of seeing and the dominance of none” (1977: 46) and the practical implications of 
designing a research study.  
 
Chapter 4 is the first of three substantive chapters which look at distinct discursive formations 
and make up the main body of my thesis. Chapter 4 examines discourse in the naming of clinical 
psychosis. 
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CHAPTER 4:  THE NAMING OF CLINICAL PSYCHOSIS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider discourses that contribute to the naming of clinical 
psychosis. It focuses on understanding the historical and social factors that have had a bearing on 
the definition of psychosis and the more general concept of mental disorder.  It will consider the 
content of psychiatric discourse and how discourses are produced, circulated and received in 
contemporary society.  
 
My research lends itself to an examination of issues of power; I intend to adopt a Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach which pays specific attention to power in discourse. Wodak 
defines CDA as “fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent 
structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in 
language” and argues that the concepts of power, history, and ideology, all of which will be 
covered in the chapter, are indispensable aspects of discourse (2001:10).  
 
My work has a textual focus; this chapter will pay attention to the language used in texts that 
define psychosis. I intend to use the introductions to the World Health Organisation’s publication 
ICD10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: Clinical Descriptions and 
Diagnostic Guidelines (1992) and the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1994) as textual bases because both of these attempt to 
define psychiatric disorder. Bill Fulford and Norman Sartorius argue that ICD-8, which appeared 
in 1967, was “the first predominantly symptom-based modern classification of mental disorders” 
(2009:30) and Joel Paris that “ICD has been eclipsed around the globe by the more detailed and 
systematic American system – DSM” (2013:9). I will pay close attention to the language that is 
used in constructing discourses of mental disorder and will consider what Fairclough calls the 
“systematic links” between texts and “socio-cultural practices” (1995:16). I will also examine the 
Welsh Assembly Government document The Mental Health (Wales) Measure (2010) which is 
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directly applicable to my research population. As well as defining psychiatric disorder it 
considers the pragmatics of policy implementation. The document is useful in relating textual 
discourse to social context and provides a focus for discourses that circulate around what Nikolas 
Rose delineates as “legalism versus welfarism, punishment versus treatment” and “the austerity 
of the rule of law versus the expansive obligations of care” (2002:3) The chapter will attempt to 
show, via an examination of these three texts, how psychiatric discourse is fluid and yet able to 
define and position social subjects.  
 
My approach is broadly Foucauldian; I draw upon many of the organising principles of 
Foucault’s work. An emphasis on the centrality of language, an examination of power and the 
relationship between discourse and truth are all key. The chapter will consider epistemes in the 
development of psychiatry in order to examine current discourse; both the history and the status 
of the current episteme will be questioned. A Foucauldian approach is particularly applicable to 
an examination of DSM IV and ICD 10 because of its focus on science as a powerful and 
contestable discourse. This chapter will draw upon Foucauldian principles of archaeology and 
ordering (2002) to examine the governing discourses of mental health and scientific theory. 
Foucault’s work on medicine and the positioning of psychiatry in the medical field will also be 
considered. Crucially Foucault questioned the epistemological basis of psychiatry (1991:51) and 
scrutinised its professional ideology  (2007- see page 22). Foucault considered psychiatric 
practice to be worthy of attention because of inherent issues of social regulation (1991:51) and 
argued that it was important to oppose what he considered to be the “political violence” of which 
it was capable (1991:36). Foucault’s work on normalisation is particularly applicable to the 
analysis of DSM IV and ICD 10, both of which consider the interface between disorder and 
normality.  
 
The chapter will also be influenced by the work of Fairclough who, like Foucault, is concerned 
with how discourses are re-contextualised and operationalised and how hegemonic status is 
achieved. The link between social analysis and the critical study of discourse is central to 
Fairclough’s work (Deacon et al 2007:157). Fairclough talks of “the move to cultural 
governance” (2000:157).  He believes that discourse is becoming increasingly important in 
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managing culture and for gaining acceptance for particular representations of the social world.  
He also acknowledges that social change is “complex, contradictory and bewildering” and sees a 
moral and political imperative in analysing this change (2007:9). Fairclough’s work differs from 
that of Foucault in that he disputes what he calls the ‘turn to discourse’ which sees social life as 
nothing but discourse (2000:158).  Fairclough argues that discourse is made up of three complex 
elements: “social practice, discoursal practice (text production, distribution and consumption) 
and text” (1995:74).  For Fairclough discourse analysis is only complete if all three elements 
(and their interrelations) are considered; his hypothesis is that “significant connections exist 
between features of texts, ways in which texts are put together and interpreted and the nature of 
the social practice” (1995:74).  Fairclough’s approach therefore incorporates macro elements of 
social practice as well as micro elements of syntax analysis (Garrett & Bell 1998:11). This 
chapter focuses upon how DSM IV, ICD10 and The Mental Health (Wales) Measure (2010) 
function as texts. An examination of their construction and distribution in addition to discourses 
contained within them facilitates wider social analysis. I will continue to refer to Fairclough’s 
theoretical framework in Chapter 5 where I focus specifically upon discoursal practice in relation 
to the film text and Chapter 6 where I examine texts generated by those who have experienced 
psychosis.  
 
In this chapter I will illustrate that the ontological status of science, medicine and psychiatry 
have all been historically contested; this remains the case in a contemporary setting. I will argue 
that whilst a Foucauldian questioning of psychiatry as science is valuable, a binary approach that 
views medical science as valid and psychiatry as pseudoscience is simplistic. In addition I will 
argue that whilst constructivist approaches to psychiatry are important, social realist and social 
causationist theories should not be dismissed. I will foreground the contestatory nature of 
psychopathology and will show that whilst this is influenced by power, the heterogeneity of 
psychosis also makes classification difficult.  I will argue that whilst power in the field of 
psychiatry is problematic and a hierarchy of discourse does exist not all attacks on psychiatric 
authority are valid. I will conclude by arguing that the field of psychiatry is characterised by 
discourses of resistance. The shape of the chapter is influenced by the hierarchy of discourse that 
is apparent in the three texts I have chosen to study.  It will begin by outlining the precise 
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relationship between DSM IV and ICD 10 and will then move on to examine the social 
positioning of relevant medical and scientific discourses.  
 
THE SOCIAL POSITIONING OF MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE 
 
ICD 10 and DSM IV are both manuals which set out to define psychiatric illness; the relationship 
between them is interesting. Paris considers that ICD-10 “differs from DSM-IV only in detail”. 
He points out that ICD-11 is planned to appear in 2015 and will be more or less compatible with 
DSM-5 (2013:9).  Paris argues that “given the general public’s interest in psychiatry, each 
revision, including DSM-5, is important news” (2013:18). The publication of the two diagnostic 
systems has historically been a collaborative venture.  This continues to be the case today as 
Steven Hyman is both the Chair of WHO’s International Advisory Group for the revision of 
ICD-10 and a member of the DSM-5 task force (Reed 2010:459).  The introductions to both 
manuals stress their collaborative nature.  At the same time, tensions exist between them. The 
introduction to DSM IV acknowledges dissatisfaction with inconsistencies and also lack of 
specificity in ICD criteria (1994: xviii).  This has led to a situation whereby America has been 
slower than other countries to implement ICD; indeed, it has adapted ICD to become ICD CM, 
(the CM stands for “clinical modification”). Many DSM-IV disorders have the numerical ICD-9 
codes next to them but these are clinically modified USA versions (1994: xviii). Clearly power 
play exists in the naming of psychiatric disorder. Paula Caplan emphasises the importance of 
paying attention to DSM because it is “the most powerful mental health enterprise in the world” 
(1995: xvi) and because “DSM is the key volume about mental illness that all trainees must learn 
from cover to cover” (1995: xviii). These perceptions are interesting in view of the requirement 
placed, by international treaty, on all WHO member countries, including the U.S., to collect and 
report health statistics to the WHO using the ICD as a framework (Reed 2010:457).  Geoffrey 
Reed’s emphasis upon “including the U.S.” implies, perhaps, resistance to a co-existing 
classificatory system. It is clear from the outset, therefore, that there is contestation about 
validity and issues of hierarchy in the definition of psychopathology. DSM IV considers that “the 
concept of mental disorder like many other concepts in medicine and science, lacks a consistent 
operational definition that covers all situations” (1994: xx). This argument begins with 
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psychiatry then broadens out to include medicine and finally science.  Inverting the order, a 
questioning of the ontological status of science and its subdivisions of medicine and psychiatry 
has provided a site for fiercely competing discourses over time. Complexity exists in the range of 
discourses that relate to science within the psychiatric field; certain discourses question the status 
of science itself and others accept the validity of science but question its applicability to 
psychiatry. Both will be considered.  
 
Foucault’s work has undeniably been influential in relation to an examination of scientific 
discourse and is highly applicable to my own study. In The Order of Things he considers that 
“discourse in general, and scientific discourse in particular, is so complex a reality that we not 
only can, but should, approach it at different levels and with different methods” (2002:iv).  
Foucault links the concept of ‘Truth’ to scientific discourse and the institutions (including 
psychiatry) that produce it. He questions the scientific mandate of discovering new truths and is 
concerned to detach ‘Truth’ from ideology in order to see how it operates in society. Foucault 
does not believe that ‘Truth’ is a disinterested concept, nor that knowledge is independent of 
power.  In Foucault’s view possession of scientific knowledge is used to legitimise power 
(1994:84). Foucault’s term for scientists who occupy key positions is “the specific intellectual” 
(2000: Xiv). He sees scientists as extremely influential – not because they have specific claims to 
authority but because of their potential influence on the individual. Foucault expresses suspicion 
of medicine; he questions its status as science and is wary of its claim to be for the care of the 
individual (1994:150). His questioning of the validity of science and medicine, however, is not 
as prominent as his questioning of psychiatry, which he subjects to particular scrutiny as a 
medical specialty. Foucault suggests that “medicine certainly has a much more solid scientific 
armature than psychiatry, but it too is profoundly enmeshed in social structures” (1994:12). 
Crucially, however, he does concede that there is some scientific validity in psychiatry and is not 
wholly dismissive of it (1994: xviii).  This stands in opposition to his earlier writing, particularly 
Madness and Civilisation (2007), which is more critical of psychiatry as a discipline; it also 
stands in opposition to anti-psychiatry discourses that denounce the profession. Foucault’s 
questioning of scientific influence and his later revisions of early arguments to embrace a wider 
variety of discourse are important influences in relation to my thesis.   
112	  
	  
 
Writing before Foucault, Karl Popper’s work is notable for its questioning of scientific 
positivism. Relating Popper’s work specifically to the field of psychiatry, Rachel Cooper 
explains that Popper wished to propose demarcation lines between physics, which he admired 
and called science, and psychoanalysis, which he did not admire and called pseudoscience. 
Popper believed that science differed from pseudoscience in that true, scientific theories can be 
falsified whilst pseudoscientific theories are endlessly explicable (2009:14). Thomas Szasz (a 
prominent member of the anti-psychiatry movement and, perhaps, the most recognized figure for 
questioning the scientific status of psychiatry) draws upon the work of Popper.  Like Popper he 
makes a distinction between what he considers to be ‘science’ and what he considers to be 
‘pseudoscience’. In his dedication to The Myth of Mental Illness he quotes Popper: “science must 
begin with myths and the criticism of myths” (Popper 1957:177). Clearly Szasz considers that 
many myths proliferate in the field of psychiatry.  He allies the field of psychiatry with 
“religious” cosmology, considering both to have functioned as “obscurantist teachers misleading 
the student” (1981:273). Like Popper, who admired physics, Szasz shows admiration for the 
‘true’ scientist:  
 
The true scientist differs from the ordinary person in the depth, breadth, precision, and 
power of the account he accepts as the correct explanation for his observation, and in his 
willingness to revise it in the light of new evidence (2004:106). 
 
Szasz draws points of comparison between psychiatry and more ‘traditional’ forms of science.  
In his article ‘Mental Illness: Psychiatry’s Phlogiston’ Szasz considers that chemistry was only 
able to move on as a science when it accepted that phlogiston did not exist. Radically, in order 
for psychiatry to develop as a science Szasz considers that it is essential to recognise “the non-
existence of mental illness” (2004:105).  He adopts an extreme approach in his questioning of the 
medical integrity of psychiatry. He uses the language of semiotics to distinguish between true 
science and psychiatry: “The distinction between fact and facsimile – often apprehended as the 
distinction between object and sign, or between physics and psychology – remains the core 
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problem of contemporary psychiatric discussion” (1981:25). Szasz considers that psychiatry 
stands in a ‘meta relation’ to closely allied disciplines such as neurology, which are firmly 
grounded in a medical field.  He distinguishes between “‘really’ sick, that is neurologically sick 
patients”, and those without neurological impairment whom he considers to be “impersonating 
genuine roles” (1981:234.) He implies that the psychiatric world is one of obfuscation without 
true referents: “psychiatry…is expressly concerned with signs qua signs – not merely with signs 
as things pointing to objects more real and interesting than they themselves” (1981:64).   
 
Szasz’s division between psychiatry and medicine continues to be embodied in current discourse 
and is evidenced by Laura Robinson’s article entitled ‘Are Psychiatrists Real Doctors?’ 
(1995:62-64). Ofer Zur and Nola Nordmarken consider that there are distinct differences 
between medical and psychiatric diagnosis – the latter being firmly grounded in symptoms, the 
former in pathology (2008:15).   They distinguish between mental illness as something a person 
does and ‘real’ disease as something a person has (2008:15). Division is reinforced by James 
Davies who argues that “psychiatry has yet to identify any clear biological causes for most of the 
disorders in the DSM” (2013:11) and Paris who asserts that “no biological markers or tests exist 
for any diagnosis in psychiatry.  For this reason, any claim that DSM-5 is more scientific than its 
predecessors is little but hype” (2013:Xi). Notably the authors of DSM IV acknowledge that 
whilst “medical conditions are diagnosed on various levels of abstraction: structural 
pathology...symptom presentation…deviance from a physiological norm…and etiology”, mental 
disorders are diagnosed via a series of concepts: “distress, dyscontrol, disadvantage, disability, 
inflexibility, irrationality, syndromal pattern, etiology and statistical evidence” (1994: xxi). It is 
arguable whether distinctions between psychiatry and other medical disciplines are reasonable 
grounds to critique the former. Bracken et al emphasise that whilst psychiatry will “never have a 
biomedical science that is similar to hepatology or respiratory medicine” this is not because 
psychiatrists are bad doctors, but because the issues they confront “are of a different nature” 
(2012:432). R. H. Cawley argues that “psychiatry is more than a science”; as a discipline it is 
underpinned by both biomedical and psychosocial science (1993:154). The binary of medical 
science as valid and psychiatry as pseudoscience seems both invalid and simplistic. The authors 
of DSM IV highlight this artificial dichotomy by referring to the “reductionist anachronism of 
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mind/body dualism” (1994:xxi). It is contestable whether illnesses of the body are subjected to 
the same scrutiny as illnesses of the mind. Paris argues that “in medicine, diagnoses are not 
always cleanly defined or related to a specific etiology” (2013:xiii) and Nikolas Rose notes that 
many diseases were recognised before their biological mechanisms were established (1986:195). 
These arguments suggest that the integrity of psychiatry is questioned more frequently than that 
of medicine.  
 
Whilst Szasz’s work interests me in problematising the factual status of mental illness, by 
imposing rigid boundaries on what constitutes true science and what constitutes pseudo-science 
his constructivist approach assumes that it is reality that is socially constructed rather than 
“theories of reality” (Pilgrim and Rogers 2005:16). I would argue that he dismisses, too readily, 
a social realist stance that views aspects of mental illness as an existing reality and a social 
causationist stance that views mental illness as caused by social forces (Pilgrim and Rogers 
2005:16). Cooper considers that parties such as Szasz, who stand in opposition to psychiatry, 
employ the label of ‘pseudo science’ as a “battle cry”. She points out that whilst the binary 
distinction between science and pseudo science is still very important in certain disciplines such 
as medicine, other disciplines, such as philosophy, have abandoned the quest to demarcate the 
two (2009:20). Celia Kitzinger, commenting specifically upon the psychological field, considers 
that the distinction between ‘science’ and ‘pseudoscience’ is artificial. She refers to the shifting 
notion of what constitutes science and points out that “each person’s ‘science’ is someone else’s 
‘pseudoscience’” and the label of ‘pseudoscience’ is used arbitrarily, reflecting personal bias 
(1990:66). Kitzinger sees the appropriation of the term ‘pseudo science’ as problematic because 
its use has the effect of legitimising the claims of  “positivist empirical ‘true’ science” which 
may be equally flawed (1990:69). This last point seems particularly important when considering 
psychiatry in the context of the wider field of medicine, where a questioning of scientific validity 
may not be applied uniformly.  
 
Sharon Traweek subjects scientific discourse to scrutiny by arguing that received views of 
science are framed as “reverential stories”. Such stories include exploration of saints' (genius' or 
scientists’) lives, the miracles (discoveries) enacted by them and their places of work, holy sites 
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(or laboratories) and can usually be found in television documentaries, basic textbooks, and 
official histories of science (1996:131). Bradley Lewis expresses concern about the restrictions 
imposed by a dominant scientific ethos and cites this sanctioning of scientific power as 
problematic. Lewis discusses the division between a scientific approach which he considers to be 
accepted as “atheoretical” versus a social science/cultural studies approach which he considers to 
have become “theoretical beyond redemption” in line with “the intellectual community at large” 
(2009:11). Lewis considers that adopting a cultural studies approach would be of great benefit in 
psychiatry:  
 
Theory provides the humanities with powerful tools and opportunities for breaking away 
from common-sense modernist disciplinary practices, and theory provides the humanities 
with a nuanced understanding of the role of language and power in the shaping of 
knowledge (2009:16). 
 
Lewis is not opposed to science per se but is keen to question whether received ‘scientific’ 
knowledge is best understood as atheoretical (2009:6). He perceives resistance in the scientific 
field towards other forms of scholarship and refers to “science warriors” who “vehemently 
attack” other intellectual approaches including “poststructuralism, postmodernism, cultural 
studies, science studies, and even humanities theory itself” (2009:18).  Whilst acknowledging the 
importance of the modernist dimensions of “empirical diagnosis and rational therapeutics” in 
psychiatry, Lewis recommends a wider approach that embraces many disciplines including “the 
philosophy of science, science studies, (and) feminist and cultural studies of science” (2009:19). 
Lewis considers that “by adamantly denying the theory laden and culturally contextual 
dimensions of psychiatric knowledge, scientific psychiatry denies being situated in a culture” 
(2009:10). Traweek, however, recognises the impact made upon science by alternative 
approaches:  
 
What can the empiricists, nominalists, postmodernists, feminist epistemologists… 
discourse analysts, ethnomethodologists, postcolonialists, constructivists, and so forth 
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among us possibly have in common?   Collectively…that whole generation of research can 
definitely be said to have dislodged the notion of singularity about science (1996:137). 
 
Rob Whitley sees merit in embracing approaches in psychiatry that come from differing 
disciplinary and philosophical traditions.  He is positive about evidence-based medicine (EBM), 
which is essentially modernist and positivist.  He defines it as knowledge that “can be 
incrementally discerned through rational application of progressively refined scientific 
techniques” (2007:1588). Whitley suggests that EBM came about because there was concern that 
patients were receiving incorrect treatment, “treatment that was grounded in tradition, out-dated 
training, or practitioner caprice rather than scientific evidence” (2007:1588). At the same time 
Whitley argues that EBM should be complemented by a cultural competence approach which is 
patient centred and concerned with the development of culturally appropriate care. He argues 
that cultural competence is rooted in the social sciences (anthropology and sociology); it is 
concerned with acknowledging difference and resists a process of standardisation. A cultural 
competence approach ensures that EBM does not become impersonal and concerned solely with 
technology; equally an EBM approach avoids an unrealistic and “anarchic reinvention of 
treatment for every individual patient” (2007:1589). Whitley emphasises his belief that EBM and 
cultural competence approaches work well to temper each other and suggests that they might be 
considered as part of a broader shift towards patient-centred care. The Mental Health (Wales) 
Measure 2010 reflects Whitley’s optimism that psychiatry is becoming more patient-centred; it 
states that its aim is “to improve patient experience and outcomes” (2011: 5).  Placing the 
experience of the patient before the health outcome may acknowledge, perhaps, that 
contemporary psychiatry is re-assessing its priorities and seeking to reconcile disparate 
paradigms. 
 
It is notable, however, that the positioning of science and the role of EBM in psychiatry remain 
under scrutiny. Patrick Bracken and Phil Thomas argue that the abiding concern of medicine lies 
with “‘clinical effectiveness’ and ‘evidence-based practice’: the idea that science should guide 
clinical practice” (2005:13). They consider EBM to be problematic “because psychiatry is 
premised on certain assumptions about the nature of the self and the world…values are built into 
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its diagnostic categories” (2005:3). Alison Faulkner and Phil Thomas question the assumption 
that EBM is always rational and measurable (2002:1). This Foucauldian questioning of science 
as an enduring, dominant discourse in psychiatry is valuable. Paula Caplan argues that “citizens 
of Western culture have become so dependent on technology and awestruck by the scientific and 
medical enterprises that many believe the technology-science medicine (TSM) complex can 
provide a solution for every problem” (2004:17). Rose refers to the way that we have become 
“neurochemical selves” and sees danger in “thinking all explanations of mental pathology must 
‘pass through’ the brain and its neurochemistry- neurones, synapses, membranes, receptors, ion 
channels, neurotransmitters, enzymes” (2003:57). This is reinforced by Bracken and Thomas 
who claim that psychiatric reductionism assumes that “human behaviours (such as our worries, 
regrets, fears, beliefs, hopes, loves and doubts) can be fully explained in terms of ‘non-
meaningful’ entities such as genes, neurotransmitters and ultimately atoms and molecules” 
(2005:14). They acknowledge that “this world has an obvious biological dimension” but argue 
that the realm of ‘mental illness’ lies beyond “the biological world of cells and circulation, 
hormones and nerve pathways” to inhabit  “the realm of thoughts and feelings…reasons and 
relationships” (2005:167). For Bracken and Thomas the assumption “that our psychological 
reality can be rendered accurately in a ‘static’ way and that this is best done through the technical 
language of psychopathology needs interrogation” (2005:123). They argue that: 
 
Many service users…react against a psychiatry that is based on this type of 
phenomenology, a modernist psychiatry involved in a search for knowledge about ‘the 
other’.  For in this form of psychiatry, the patient is always ‘the other’, is always ‘outside’ 
always, inferior (2005:123).  
 
For Bracken et al “the promise of therapeutic gains from the brain sciences always seems to be 
for the future” (2012:430); this may reflect the complexity of brain research or, alternatively, 
support Rose’s explanation of neurochemical dominance, which is that it ensures profit for 
pharmaceutical companies by linking ‘disorder’ with a chemical cure thereby ensuring high 
drugs sales (2003:26). This argument is supported by Davies’ illustration that GlaxoSmithKline’s 
antidepressant, Wellburin was marketed as a smoking cessation pill “under the heading ‘Zyban: 
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Helping Smokers Quit Neurochemically’” (2013: 80).  Davies cites the reduction of stigma as a 
further reason for the prominence of biological explanations of emotional troubles, arguing that 
“the biological myth helps sufferers because it indicates to others that they are not responsible 
for their predicament” (2013:221).  Bracken et al dispute this, however, asserting that “there is 
ample evidence that anti-stigma campaigns based on biogenetic models of serious mental illness 
have been counterproductive” (2012:430). 
 
In addition to challenging the epistemological basis of certain neurochemical claims it is also 
important to question why the plurality of alternative approaches that exist in the psychiatric 
field do not achieve greater prominence. Hilary Allen argues that a unified and unifying theory 
of psychiatry is impossible because it is characterised by so many differing theoretical and 
practical approaches and also because it seeks to treat such a wide range of different conditions 
(1986:107). The issue is, perhaps, that approaches which do not have such a high ‘technical 
profile’ are undervalued. Bracken et al argue that a “growing body of empirical evidence points 
to the primary importance of the non-technical aspects of mental healthcare1.” They believe that 
this must be acknowledged if psychiatry is to be genuinely evidence based (2012:431) and coin 
the term ‘postpsychiatry’ which is characterised by the aphorism “‘ethics before technology’” 
(2005: 19). Bracken and Thomas argue that “science alone… is incapable of tackling (the) issues 
such as racism, disadvantage, poverty, lack of educational attainment, discrimination and social 
exclusion” which present frequently in a psychiatric setting (2005:49).  
 
In summary, whilst arguments that discredit the ontological status of all mental illness are not 
convincing, constructivist approaches that subject science and psychiatry to scrutiny are 
important. The chapter will now change focus from science in the field of psychiatry to the 
classification of psychiatric disorder. What constitutes disease and the way in which this is 
framed in language are closely linked concepts.  Both are contested sites for discourse in the 
diagnostic manuals DSM IV and ICD 10 and will be considered next. The next section of the 
chapter argues that the naming of psychiatric disorder is influenced by power play: this leads to 
critique which, in the case of anti-psychiatry discourse, can be polarised and limited.   
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THE VALIDITY OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER 
 
Szasz asks the question:  
 
What is disease? What are the ostensible and actual tasks of the physician? What is mental 
illness?  Who defines what constitutes illness, diagnosis, treatment? Who controls the 
vocabulary of medicine and psychiatry, and the powers of physician-psychiatrist and 
citizen-patient?  Has a person the right to call himself sick?  Has a physician the right to 
call a person mentally sick? (1981:10) 
 
Historically, Richard Bentall considers that there are two approaches to the definition of disease.  
He equates the first of these with the work of Sydenham who, in the eighteenth century, 
suggested that disease was concerned with the “identification of clusters of symptoms that occur 
together” and the second with the work of Virchow who identified “a pathological process that is 
causally implicated in a disturbance of body or behaviour” (1992:95).  Szasz also attributes 
Virchow with developing a model of disease by firmly establishing the link between disease and 
cellular pathology (1979:9). This biological model stands in opposition to the more complex 
appraisal of disease offered by Hanna Pickard: 
  
Our concepts of illness, disease, well-being, and health – whether mental or physical – lie 
at the interface of science and common sense, of fact and value, as well as exhibiting a 
large degree of cultural and historical development and variation (2009:87). 
 
Pickard distinguishes between the concept of disease as “evolutionary dysfunction” and illness as 
the “more subjective, experiential properties of poor health” (2009:88).  
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As manuals that set out to classify psychiatric disorder both DSM IV and ICD 10 must 
discursively manage this complexity.  The authors of DSM IV admit that it is impossible to 
confer precise boundaries on the concept of “mental disorder” and that many of the terms used in 
the definition of disorder (such as ‘deviant’) are ultimately contestable. (1994: xx). Nevertheless 
the purpose of DSM IV, according to its authors, is to teach psychopathology via the definition of 
mental disorder.  The document is designed for clinicians and is driven by clinical practice, 
although its applicability to different orientations (including “biological, psychodynamic, 
cognitive, behavioral, interpersonal and family systems”) is also emphasized (1994: xiv). The 
authors of ICD 10 explain that the guidelines are there to “provide strong support to the work of 
the many who are concerned with caring for the mentally ill and their families worldwide”; once 
again the intended audience for the publication is the clinician (1992:x).  Great stress is laid upon 
the “extensive empirical foundation” of DSM IV (1994: xiv). The authors take a modernist 
approach; plurality of opinion is not acceptable. DSM IV aims for simplified clarity and the end 
of debate:  “when a review of literature revealed a lack of evidence (or conflicting evidence) for 
the resolution of an issue, we often made use of two additional resources – data re-analyses and 
field trials to help in making final decisions” (1994:xix) 
 
The process of categorisation that determines what constitutes mental disorder is contested by a 
post-structuralist approach.  Foucault objected to the ordering function of hospital and clinic and 
linked the medical desire for categorisation to fear of disorder and disease (2003:49). He 
considered measuring an individual against a corpus of knowledge to be an attack on liberty 
(2003:83). Foucault also emphasised the contestable role of language in labelling disorder, 
drawing attention to the inherent power of language to conceal and influence (2000:92).  Lewis, 
adopting a postmodernist stance, considers that in order “to be intelligible words and 
representations divide the world through relational divisions.  The most basic example in 
psychiatric diagnostic categories is “mental health” versus “mental illness””.  He goes on to 
emphasise the arbitrary and inaccurate nature of such divisions, arguing that “they always 
necessarily constrain further meaning making” and that divisions “are rarely if ever neutral” 
(2009:70). Both ICD10 and DSM IV recognise that discourse is conveyed through language and 
wrestle with terminology in order to define what constitutes psychiatric illness or disorder; it 
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could be argued that both publications employ discursive gestures to imply openness when the 
opposite is actually the case. Notably ICD10 prefers the term ‘disorder’ to illness or disease. 
Under a section entitled ‘Problems of Terminology” it explains:  
 
The term “disorder” is used throughout the classification so as to avoid even greater 
problems inherent in the use of terms such as “disease” and “illness”.  “Disorder” is not an 
exact term, but it is used here to imply the existence of a clinically recognizable set of 
symptoms or behaviour associated in most cases with distress and with interference with 
personal functions.  Social deviance or conflict alone, without personal dysfunction, should 
not be included in mental disorder as defined here (1992:5). 
 
DSM IV is similarly uneasy about language; the introduction to the publication also devotes a 
section to discussing the difficulty of applying terminology. The focus is less upon the term 
“disorder” than the concept “mental”.  The authors express reservations about the term “mental 
disorder” but concede that it “persists in the title of DSM-IV because we have not found an 
appropriate substitute” (1994: xxi). The DSM IV definition is effectively an expansion of the 
definition of disorder in ICD10.  A disorder according to the authors of DSM IV is: 
 
Conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern 
that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present areas of functioning or with 
a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of 
freedom…it must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioural, psychological 
or biological dysfunction in the individual (1994: xxi).  
 
There is a similar emphasis upon impairment of the individual being key and social deviance not 
necessarily being symptomatic of disorder. Inevitably, despite acknowledging the difficulties 
inherent in naming disorder, both manuals must, by definition, classify psychiatric disorder. The 
most radical response to this is to deny that a disorder exists.  The anti-psychiatry critique 
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asserted that mental disorder either did not exist or that it did not exist as an entity that could 
usefully be treated within a medical field (Miller & Rose 1986:2).  Perhaps the most famous 
example of the denial of mental illness stems from Richard Laing’s work on schizophrenia which 
argued that the schizophrenic experience might be viewed, using a different criteria set, to appear 
rational. Laing was responsible for publishing Foucault’s Madness and Civilization in Britain, 
(Parker et al 1995:23).  He shared Foucault’s oppositional stance to psychiatry and adopted the 
philosophical position that the world should be interpreted and experienced from multiple 
viewpoints (Miller 1986:24). Laing considered that it was the task of existential phenomenology 
to determine “the nature of a person’s experience of his world and himself” (1959:15).  He 
emphasised that there may be positive aspects to psychosis; “I am aware…that the cracked mind 
of the schizophrenic may let in light which does not enter the intact minds of many sane people 
whose minds are closed” (1959:27).  Laing was not wholly positive about the schizophrenic 
mind, however. He shared common ground with Szasz in suggesting that schizophrenia 
embodies play-acting: 
 
A great deal of schizophrenia is simply nonsense, red-herring speech, prolonged 
filibustering to throw dangerous people off the scent, to create boredom and futility in 
others.  The schizophrenic is often making a fool of himself and the doctor.  He is playing 
at being mad to avoid at all cost the possibility of being held responsible for a single 
coherent idea, or intention (1959:179). 
 
Szasz’s use of language in relation to the concept of schizophrenia is equally provocative. He 
expresses the opinion that schizophrenia is a construct and rejects the ontological status of 
mental illness considering it to be a moral, not a medical, problem and a metaphorical disease 
(1981:11). Szasz argues that schizophrenia is positioned by psychiatry as “its sacred symbol – 
the largest grab bag of all the misbehaviours which psychiatrists, coerced by society or 
convinced by their own zeal, are now ready to diagnose, prognose, and therapize” (1979:18). He 
makes the link between psychiatric illness, malingering and hysteria more forcibly than Laing, 
suggesting that schizophrenia “is also like many other conditions or situations, such as being 
childish, aimless, useless, and homeless, or being angry, obstreperous, conceited and selfish” 
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(1979: 74).  Notably, despite sharing common ground in questioning the existence of mental 
illness, the notion of an alliance between Laing and Szasz was resisted, particularly by Szasz, 
who repudiated what he felt was a left wing stance in both Foucault and Laing (Parker et al 
1995:27).  His own right wing position, which emphasises the need for the individual to take 
responsibility, has inevitably drawn opposition from many mental health workers and patient 
groups as well as those working in the fields of genetic and cultural studies who see this as no 
simple task. Andrew Slaby disputes Szasz’s views, arguing that psychiatric illness is responsible 
for distorting “thought, mood, and judgment, limiting informed choice and leading to outcomes 
that would not occur in the absence of a potentially treatable illness” (2001:114). Slaby argues 
that those experiencing mental health difficulties do not have the control over their behaviour 
implied by Szasz. I would argue that the sensational nature of anti-psychiatry discourse is 
unhelpful; it serves the function of provoking a response and is important in questioning the 
scientific basis of psychiatry but is essentially limited by its refusal to entertain a range of 
discourses. Ultimately Szasz’s perspective is governed by the discourse of science and does not 
countenance the epistemological validity of alternative theories or explanations of mental illness.  
 
Even when the extremity of the anti-psychiatrists is disregarded, however, it is apparent that the 
issue of what constitutes mental disorder, how this is understood and the best response to it, 
continues to underpin major discourses in psychiatry. This is reflected in ICD 10, which 
considers the classification of psychotic disorder to be particularly difficult and refers to the 
expansion of the section on schizophrenia as evidence of its increasingly perceived complexity 
(1992:4). The status of schizophrenia continues to be subject to a great deal of scrutiny.  Peter 
Miller refers to “its weak diagnostic category, uncertain aetiology and dustbin like character” 
(1986:23).  The British Psychological Society’s response to the development of DSM-5 
comments specifically on schizophrenia’s classification and questions its status as an illness. The 
society point out that it is possible for two people to be suffering from the “condition” but to 
exhibit no symptoms in common (2011:6). Similarly Pickard states, “it is now widely accepted 
within schizophrenia research that there is strong evidence for questioning whether 
schizophrenia is a scientifically valid category thus understood” (2009: 89). An important 
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addendum to her sentence, however, is “thus understood”; she suggests that future research may 
find a correlate. 
 
The heterogeneity of schizophrenia and the recognition that it is a disorder that is influenced by 
social, psychological and biological factors illustrate the complexity of psychiatric diagnosis and 
resistance to the imprecise nature of classification (Poland 2004:151). A further site for 
conflicting discourse that relates directly to classification concerns the pathologisation of 
normality.  This does not so much critique psychiatry on the grounds that medical aspects are 
made too prominent as suggest that medicalisation is used as control; it will be considered in the 
next chapter section which will explore factors influencing definitions of normality and 
abnormality and argue that diagnosis remains problematic.   
 
THE PATHOLOGISATION OF NORMALITY 
 
Parker et al consider that binaries such as insane/sane and healthy/unhealthy have been 
supplanted in the contemporary psychiatric field by a focus on normal/abnormal (1995:1). 
Historically, Rose points out that the concept of normality that considers degrees of deviation 
from a norm only emerged in the nineteenth century and is, therefore, relatively recent (2007:5). 
He emphasises that there has never been a psychological knowledge of normality to precede 
concerns with abnormality; it was perceived pathology that led to concerns that centred on the 
normal (1990:106). Both DSM IV and ICD 10 have grown comprehensively in size over time; 
Davies documents the increase in DSM from 130 pages in 1952 to 886 pages today (2013:9). 
ICD 10 uses alphanumerical codes to accommodate the burgeoning nature of its classificatory 
system (1992). Davies provides three hypotheses for this: the first is that increasing pressure in 
contemporary life has led to stress and “an upsurge in poor mental health” (2013: 39); the second 
is that psychiatrists have got better at recognising psychiatric disease and the third: “that 
psychiatry, by progressively lowering the bar for what counts as mental disorder, has recast 
many natural responses to the problems of living as mental disorders requiring psychiatric 
treatment” (2013:40).  
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Davies’ second category is concerned with diagnosis. There is support for the concept of 
diagnosis and the diagnostic manual. Bracken and Thomas emphasise that “diagnosis has always 
been the job of the doctor.  Thus, assessment and diagnosis lie at the heart of psychiatric theory 
and practice” (2005:106). Paris considers DSM to be “a rough-and-ready classification that 
brings some degree of order to chaos” (2013: Xiii) and argues that “even when knowledge of 
disease is limited, diagnosis performs a number of important functions” (2013:4).  Paris lists 
these as: providing categories specific enough to influence treatment; aiding prognosis; 
improving communication between physicians; enabling researchers to conduct experiments and 
develop theoretical models of disease and, finally, “offering something important to patients: a 
validation that they are indeed sick” (2013:5). The concept of diagnosis remains problematic, 
however; Paris argues that whilst DSM has made diagnosis more reliable, “reliability is not 
validity” (2013:X).  
 
It is Davies’ hypothesis of psychiatry’s power to pathologise normality, however, which evokes 
most response. Davies highlights the historical nature of the debate in his interviews with former 
chairs of DSM.  He interviews Robert Spitzer, Chair of DSM-III, who concedes: 
 
What happened is that we made estimates of prevalence of mental disorders totally 
descriptively, without considering that many of these conditions might be normal reactions 
which are not really disorders.  And that’s the problem.  Because we were not looking at 
the context in which those conditions developed (2013: 44).  
 
An interview with Allen Frances, (Chair of DSM-IV), reveals that Frances considers that there is 
“existing diagnosis inflation” which will only be made worse by DSM-5.  In Frances’ view this 
will lead to “excessive medication and treatment” and “a misallocation of resources away from 
the more severely ill” in favour of those “who don’t need a diagnosis at all and will receive 
unnecessary and harmful treatment” (2013: 54).  Frances believes that DSM-5 “will dramatically 
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expand the realm of psychiatry and narrow the realm of normality – resulting in the conversion 
of millions more patients, millions more people, from currently being without mental disorders 
to be [ing] psychiatrically sick” (2013: 52). The well documented in-fighting between power 
interests in the construction of DSM means, perhaps, that strong reactions are to be expected 
(Decker 2010).  A more measured response to DSM-5’s potential to pathologise normality is 
offered by Paris who concedes that the main risk is over diagnosis with concomitant 
overtreatment (2013:38). He considers that “many categories in the manual skirt on the edge of 
normality” and argues that DSM-5 will promote the ‘medicalization of life’ in the name of 
science (2013: 39).  At the same time Paris points out that it is not driven solely by the medical 
profession; it is “influenced by patient advocacy” and the “lobby group” and also “by the media, 
which have the power to affect everyone’s opinion – even experts” (2013:19). He also argues 
that “psychiatry is only doing what the rest of medicine has been doing for some time – 
overdiagnosing patients who are not ill but who have risk factors for illness and treating people 
who may not need treatment” (2013: 53). Ultimately Paris gives psychiatry the benefit of the 
doubt in attributing the expansion of DSM-5 to the medical fear of “missing something” rather 
than anything more problematic (2013: Xiv). 
 
The work of Caplan perceives danger in an inexorable move towards classifying minor 
conditions as mental disorders when they are effectively only manifestations of normality 
(1995:32). Like Foucault, who made the point that disorder was construed in “the univocally 
negative language of mental illness” (McNay 1994:2) Caplan argues that “disorder” is a 
construct.  She cites the replacement of the word “disease” by “disorder” in DSM IV as a 
contributory factor to the medicalisation of normality (1995:69). Both Foucault and Caplan 
consider that psychiatric terminology has the power to pathologise and that medicine is imbued 
with the power to regulate and normalise the individual. Foucault perceived that there is a danger 
of equating normality with reasonable behaviour and suggests that the criterion of normality is 
used as a dividing practice to qualify or disqualify people as fit and proper members of society 
(1994:12); he developed the concept of transgression via his link between discipline and 
reasonable behaviour (1994:94). The work of Foucault and Caplan, however, says something 
slightly different in relation to normality. Foucault clearly considers that society perceives 
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difference from the norm as a threat that must be neutralised (1994:94) whereas Caplan argues 
that the medicalisation of normality has meant that manifestations of psychiatric illness have 
now become the norm (1995); this means that the criterion of normality is no longer effective in 
acting as a dividing practice.  
 
Caplan emphasises that the definition of normality is subjective: “using a construct always 
involves making choices.  We choose one definition in preference to another, and we choose to 
exclude certain items from our definition and to include others” (1995:35). She argues that all 
definitions are similarly flawed because they are contingent upon historical epistemes and 
cultural values (1995:51). This relies upon Foucault’s concept of  “genealogy” which is not 
concerned with strict historical accuracy so much as documenting surface detail in order to 
interrogate present discourse (1991:7). In taking a genealogical approach Foucault subjects 
“abstract principles and universal laws” to scrutiny and focuses upon the “local (i.e. irregular and 
discontinuous) operation of the actual power relations at work in structuring social forms in the 
modern world” (Parker et al 1990:4).  A genealogical approach that uses historical material in 
order to question the present is revealing; highlighting the moment at which a particular 
discourse came to be seen as true is also key in determining societal attitudes. Notably, for 
example, the term “drapetomanic” was included in early psychiatric literature; this refers to the 
‘psychiatric disorder’ suffered by a slave who runs away (Caplan1995: 144). More recently the 
removal of homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder from DSM III exemplifies discourse which 
appears naturalised at one historical moment but changes over time (Caplan 1995:180). Parker at 
al argue that amendments to diagnostic categories act as reflections of changing morality in 
society (1995:8) and Davies that “it was politics and not science” that removed homosexuality 
from the list of disorders (2013:15).  
 
Caplan concludes her work on normality by wondering “whether not only many psychiatrists but 
also many mental health professionals of all kinds think there is such a thing as a normal healthy 
person” (1995:57). This would certainly seem to be the conclusion drawn by others.  The British 
Psychological Society begins its response to the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-5 
development with the following statement: 
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The Society is concerned that clients and the general public are negatively affected by the 
continued and continuous medicalisation of their natural and normal responses to their 
experiences; responses which undoubtedly have distressing consequences which demand 
helping responses but which do not reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation 
(2011:2). 
 
The Society asks for a revision of the way that mental distress is conceptualised; it wants 
recognition of the “overwhelming evidence” that it is on a spectrum with ‘normal’ experience. It 
expresses particular concern with ‘psychosis’ arguing that its evolution in DSM-5  “looks like an 
opportunity to stigmatize eccentric people, and to lower the threshold for achieving a diagnosis 
of psychosis” (2011:9).  
 
Discourses centring on the nature of ‘normality’ arouse strong feeling and have influenced 
arguments for both the removal and the inclusion of ‘disorders’ in classificatory manuals. A 
typical example is Peter Breggin’s concern with the inclusion of ADHD (Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder) in DSM IV; Breggin argues that ADHD is a construct and a 
pathologisation of a normal spectrum of behaviour (2004:112). A different (but nevertheless 
equally scathing) attack on what is perceived to be the over-medicalisation of normality has led 
to Bentall’s article ‘A Proposal to Classify Happiness as a Psychiatric Disorder’ (1992).  Here 
Bentall is not recommending the exclusion of a ‘diagnosis’ in DSM but proposing the inclusion 
of happiness under the heading “Major Affective Disorder, pleasant type” (1992:94). In 
conclusion he states:  
 
I have argued that happiness meets all reasonable criteria for a psychiatric disorder.  It is 
statistically abnormal, consists of a discrete cluster of symptoms, there is at least some 
evidence that it reflects the abnormal functioning of the central nervous system, and it is 
associated with various cognitive abnormalities – in particular a lack of contact with 
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reality…This would place it on Axis 1 of the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual  (1992:97). 
 
Bentall’s criticism continues when he says that his proposal is “in the interests of scientific 
precision and in the hope of reducing any possible diagnostic ambiguities” (1992:97).  The 
satirical tone of Bentall’s article testifies to both strength of feeling and contention over what 
constitutes ‘disorder’. There are other examples of proposals for exclusion (Caplan, Pre- 
menstrual Dysphoric Disorder 1995:8) and inclusion (Caplan, “Delusional Dominating 
Disorder”, 2004:2); these examples are important in questioning the controversial nature of the 
classification of mental disorder. It is notable, for example, that Pre-menstrual Dysphoric 
Disorder has been moved from the appendix of DSM-IV to the main body of the DSM-5 manual, 
despite opposition (Paris 2013: 119). At the same time certain attacks are notable for their 
limitations.  Breggin’s opposition to what he sees as the indiscriminate prescription of powerful 
medication such as Ritalin seems valid. He argues that in “diagnosing the child with ADHD 
blame for the conflict is placed on the child”, who becomes the source of the problem. Whilst I 
would not dispute that this can happen, I am less convinced by Breggin’s argument that “both the 
classroom and the family are exempt from criticism or from the need to improve” (2004:112). 
Breggin’s polarisation of power seems reductionist and simplistic; he interprets the link between 
power/knowledge and discipline as a punishing or coercive force but ignores the broader 
Foucauldian concept of discipline as potentially productive.  
 
In conclusion, the heterogeneity of mental illness and the recognition that it is influenced by 
many factors mean that both diagnosis and classification are problematic.  Whilst discourses 
disseminated from diagnostic manuals such as DSM-5 and ICD-10 retain power and dominance, 
there is counter discourse about what constitutes pathology and a questioning of diagnosis as a 
dividing practice. The chapter will now move on to consider, in more detail, how power works in 
the field of psychiatry. It will demonstrate that psychiatry is characterised by a hierarchy of 
discourse which is dominated by the professional voice and challenges to this are important.  
Foucault asks the question, “How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power 
relations?” thereby exposing the ability of power to determine identity (1994: 318). He considers 
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that to understand the nature of discourses, “what necessity binds them, and why these and not 
others,” the most important question to ask is “who is speaking?” (1972:50).  The ‘who’ of 
psychiatry provides the focus for the next section of the chapter which will then proceed to 
examine how power circulates, is justified and challenged.  
 
POWER PLAY IN THE FIELD OF PSYCHIATRY 
 
If the function of classificatory manuals is to name psychopathology it seems very important to 
establish whose voice is represented in them. The first statement in the introduction to DSM-IV is 
“DSM is a team effort”. Emphasis is repeatedly placed on the inclusivity of the project; the 
acknowledgements make reference to the 1,000 people who have been consulted in the process 
of DSM IV’s development (1994: xiii).  As well as an emphasis upon the number of collaborators 
the introduction makes reference to the potential cross-cultural nature of the audience (1994: xv).  
A similar concern with evidencing inclusivity is seen in ICD 10 where stress is laid upon the 
“collaboration, in the true sense of the word, between very many individuals and agencies in 
numerous countries” (1992: X). These statements seem defensive, and not wholly convincing, in 
the light of frequent criticism about the exclusivity of the diagnostic manuals. Paris, for example, 
points out that DSM-5 “was not presented to experts entirely outside the DSM-5 process for 
independent assessment.”  He concludes that “because peer review is a basic principle in science, 
DSM-5 risks being less scientific than its predecessors” (2013:26). Discourse surrounding 
interpretations of ‘inclusivity’ and ‘collaboration’ and the function of both introductions in 
providing a “natural and eternal justification” for the selection of contributors is redolent of the 
distorting presence of myth which Barthes describes as “neither a lie nor a confession” but  “an 
inflexion” (1982:129). There is also evidence of ‘inoculation’ being employed as a political tool. 
Barthes defines this as “a mystifying device which consists in inoculating the public with a touch 
of evil” in order to ward off insight in to fundamental problems and to establish an atmosphere of 
“permanently immune Moral Good” (1993:84). It is evident in the DSM admission that work 
group members “were chosen to reflect the breadth of available evidence and opinion and not 
just the views of the specific members” (1994: xx).  By confirming that work group members 
must abandon their own views and act as “consensus scholars” we are exposed to the accidental 
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evil of lost individuality but protected against the more generalised subversion of a diagnostic 
manual that does not reflect a broad consensus. Barthes points out that in order to “restore or 
develop” an “established value”, in this instance the validity of the diagnostic manuals DSM and 
ICD, it is important to expose “the injustices’ and “vexations to which it gives rise…then at the 
last moment, save it in spite of itself or rather by the heavy curse of its blemishes” (2012:99); in 
this sense the “established value” of a representative diagnostic manual is left intact and myth is 
able to conceal its underlying presence. 
 
Caplan’s work pays close attention to the ‘who’ of DSM IV. She stresses the political nature of 
DSM calling it, “an entirely political document…the result of intensive campaigning, lengthy 
negotiating, infighting and power plays” (1995: ix). She emphasises power play at a micro level, 
referring to the “small clique” who wield power because they are the architects of DSM. Caplan 
considers this clique to be “a few dozen people – mostly male, mostly white, mostly wealthy, 
mostly American” (1995:31). Caplan’s limited appraisal of those who are given a voice in DSM 
is unconvincing; nevertheless it seems important to scrutinise the influences upon the designation 
of psychiatric disorder that appear in key publications, particularly in view of Paris’ assertion 
that “sometimes it takes only one powerful voice to determine what gets in, or stays in, the DSM 
manual”. Paris refers to “the influential Stanford psychiatrist David Spiegel, who has promoted 
dissociative disorders for decades”. He argues that once Spiegel was appointed as part of the task 
force for DSM-5 there was no possibility of excluding dissociative disorders – “those who 
recommended elimination…were ignored.” (2013:176).  
 
Foucault uses the term the “rarefaction of speakers” whereby “none may enter into a discourse 
on a specific subject unless he has satisfied certain conditions or if he is not, from the outset, 
qualified to do so” (1972:225).  Lewis considers that this rarefaction takes place in psychiatry 
“through a careful selection process and through the ritual apprenticeships of training, 
examination, licensing and board certification” (2009:56). He also uses the Foucauldian term 
“social appropriation” to refer to the “relatively privileged status of initiates into and members of 
psychiatry’s fellowship of discourse” (2009:56).  Lewis expands upon Caplan’s concept of the 
‘who’ of psychiatric discourse to include the institution. He considers that “just as speakers are 
132	  
	  
central to a discourse, then institutions …and the rules, rituals, and hierarchical relations that 
structure them – are also central to a discourse.  Institutional sites like universities, conferences, 
grand rounds, hospitals, offices, laboratories, and lecture halls all scaffold and solidify a 
discourse” (2009:43). Academic power is subject to particular scrutiny. Paris argues that “high 
ranking academics” live in a rarefied world that is removed from clinical reality but, 
nevertheless, exert major influence on documents such as DSM-5 (2013:20). Bracken and 
Thomas also consider that “academic departments of psychiatry are…the main source of 
‘opinion leaders’ in the field” and “often act as unofficial guidelines for the profession” 
(2005:180); this is of particular concern when they deem academics to be “less prepared to doubt 
and to question their assumptions than their clinical colleagues” (2005:3).    
 
Foucault points out that the influence of institutions goes beyond the physical buildings they 
occupy to include published texts that consolidate “a diffuse yet constraining fellowship of 
discourse” (1972:266). He considers that those who are accepted in to a discourse become 
members of a closed community who must work according to specific rules and points out that 
being a member requires “doctrinal adherence” to discourse which “involves both the speaker 
and the spoken” (1972:266). Foucault explains that “the speaker must conform to doctrine, and at 
the same time the doctrine forms through a prior adherence to its requirements.  Thus ‘doctrine’ 
effects a dual subjection, that of speaking subject to discourse and that of discourse to the group” 
(1972: 226).  This, in Foucauldian terms, is “the will to truth” which has the power to impose an 
exclusionary force on discourse by delineating “a certain position, a certain viewpoint and a 
certain function” (1972:218).  Foucault refers to “the carceral network of power knowledge” 
which is administered by figures of authority and imposes the authority of the norm; he suggests 
that the network is underpinned with “rules of formation” (1994:94). Lewis argues that “in 
contrast to Foucault’s rules of formation, his rules of exclusion mark the semiotic boundaries of a 
discourse.  Not anything can become an object, concept or strategy.  Strict boundaries apply” 
(2009:41).  Applying Foucault’s theory it is notable that whilst Bentall’s 1992 proposal to 
include ‘Happiness’ as a disorder in a psychiatric manual may conform with many rules of 
formation, (for example the use of scientific language), it would ultimately be sanctioned by 
rules of exclusion as it does not subject itself to the discourse of the group and is effectively a 
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satirical attack upon it.  It is possible to extrapolate from this single example to consider voices 
that are both accepted and rejected in psychiatric discourse and, indeed, in the wider field of 
medicine.     
Foucault focuses specifically on the positioning of “specialists” and “patients” in psychiatry, 
asserting that the nature of psychosis or ‘madness’ makes for inequality.  He considers those 
deemed to be “in folly” or “mad” to be cut off from legitimate discourse and contends that their 
“words are null and void, without truth or significance,” ultimately “worthless as evidence” 
(1972:216). Lewis argues that:  
Foucault’s boundary between reason and folly is (at one and the same time) the most 
obvious, most subtle, and most pernicious boundary set in psychiatric discourse…The 
boundary is obvious because the distinction is the very justification for psychiatry’s 
existence. The whole point of psychiatry is to differentiate reason from folly (2009:50).   
He goes on to suggest that the position of “reason” is firmly occupied by the psychiatric clinician 
whilst the patient is relegated to the position of “folly”.  In Lewis’ view the boundary has the 
potential to exclude the “mad” from the discourses that circulate about them: “this creates the 
incredible phenomenon that the patients’ perspective is not included in psychiatric 
discourse…The result is that whole worlds of possible contributions to psychiatric discourse are 
excluded” (2009:50). Whilst I would argue that Lewis overstates the case for the exclusion of the 
voice of the psychiatric patient I do concur with the viewpoint of Whitley (1972) and Harper 
(1995) that a hierarchy of discourse exists and that “there is a danger that professional 
knowledge wields far more power than any “folk” knowledge or expertise expressed by an 
individual receiving treatment in the field of psychiatry” (Whitley 1972:1589). Harper suggests 
that whilst a social constructionist position would acknowledge a plurality of voices the reality is 
likely to be that those of the professionals are more powerful than others (1995:354). This is why 
any challenge is so important. Bracken and Thomas delineate the aims of Mad Pride, an 
organisation led by users who counter discrimination and demand to be “heard in their own 
words”. Drawing upon Foucault’s description of the “stammered, imperfect words…in which the 
exchange between madness and reason was made” (2007:xii), Bracken and Thomas argue that 
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“organizations such as Mad Pride…are demanding a return to dialogue; a move away from 
monologue.  As we enter the 21st century, their words are far from stammered, but articulate and 
powerful” (2005:99).  
 
It is possible, also, that legislation such as The Mental Health Measure (2010) is attempting to 
respond to perceived inequality. One of the intended effects of the measure is to expand 
independent advocacy for anybody who is receiving inpatient treatment or is subject to a section 
of the mental health act; emphasis is placed upon the role of Independent Mental Health 
Advocates (2011:3). At present The Mental Health Act 1983 enables patients who are on long-
term sections to have an advocate – the new act enables patients on the shorter-term emergency 
sections of the Act to “receive independent help and support from an advocate if they wish to” 
(2011:5). In addition the Measure also ensures that anyone who has previously used secondary 
services is able to liaise directly with secondary services rather than being re-referred through 
their GP; self-referral seems to be a symbolic advance in the doctor- patient dynamic (2011:12).   
It could be argued that both of these measures should, in principle, allow service users greater 
ownership of their illness and provide them with support to articulate their views through an 
advocate who acts as an intermediary between doctor and patient. A counter argument might be, 
however, that agency is reduced, still further, by replacing the voice of the service user with a 
stand-in. This is a small illustration of how arguments and counter arguments coexist concerning 
the appropriation of power in the field of psychiatry. The next section of the chapter will argue 
that the recognition of medical dominance does not necessarily render it wholly invalid. I will 
suggest reasons for its existence before outlining aspects of resistance to it. 
 
A (PARTIAL) DEFENCE OF MEDICAL POWER 
 
Whilst the power wielded by the medical professional must be scrutinised, it is also important to 
consider that attacks upon it may be imbalanced. Deborah Lupton argues that:  
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One major difficulty with the orthodox medicalization critique is its rather black and white 
portrayal of Western medicine as largely detracting from rather than improving people’s 
health status, of doctors as intent on increasing their power over their patients rather than 
seeking to help them, and of patients as largely helpless, passive and disempowered, their 
agency crushed beneath the might of the medical profession (1997:97) 
 
Thomas Osborne recognises an anti-medical model that is underpinned by “a kind of 
sentimentalism…often amounting to a form of nostalgia with regard to medicine”. This model 
allies medicine with “‘medicalization’, ‘professionalization’ or scientization” whilst viewing an 
anti-medical model as “humanist, caring, individualizing, preventative, progressive, person-
centred, phenomenological” and “ideographic” (1995:29).  
 
As well as recognising an operation of binaries medicine must also be contextualised within a 
wider social framework. Psychiatry operates within the law: The Mental Health (Wales) Measure 
2010 provides evidence of its positioning within a larger governmental system. Foucault points 
out, via his concept of ‘governmentality’ that “states of domination” (such as those in the 
psychiatric field) “are not the primary source for holding power or exploiting asymmetries, on 
the contrary they are the effects of technologies of government” which regulate, systematise and 
stabilise power relationships leading to potential states of domination (1988:12). Pilgrim and 
Rogers cite law as only one of five governing principles in mental health alongside the lay view, 
psychiatry, psychoanalysis and psychology (2005:1). A plurality of stakeholder interest is also 
recognised in Harper’s acknowledgement that the voices of “professionals of various disciplines; 
users of services; users’ relatives; care staff [and] neighbours” invite consideration (1995:354).  
 
A Foucauldian appraisal of medical power goes beyond simple binaries. Referring specifically to 
psychiatry, Parker et al consider that “the reason why the medical model has such power…is that 
people trust medicine” and are “willing actively to assist the medical control of the mentally ill” 
(1995:10). Rose suggests that medicine is a dominant discourse because it works (1986:195); he 
draws on Foucault in suggesting that some ‘truths’ do not necessarily lose their validity because 
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they are authoritative and argues that not all attacks on medical authority are valid. Foucault’s 
work is valuable in pointing out that ‘Truth’ is not “outside power” or “the reward of free spirits” 
and, also, in cautioning against the attempt to replace one set of truths with another that is 
equally unstable (1991:72).  
 
Miller links psychiatric power, real or perceived, with the prevalence of demands placed upon it 
(1986:39).  He asks, in common with critics of psychiatry, “how, where and through what 
processes do madness, depression and simple unhappiness become constituted as problems 
amenable to psychiatric treatment?” but argues that the answer to this is more complex than an 
assumption of medical dominance (1986:39). Miller suggests that pressure may be exerted upon 
psychiatry to act as a social panacea:  
 
Rather than extending the remit of psychiatry to the manifold problems of social and 
personal life, should we not ask of psychiatry that it takes as its rationale the problem of 
cure rather than the project of normalization? (1986:10).  
 
Miller emphasises the ever-growing complexity of the remit of psychiatry by suggesting that an 
evolving psychiatric model is not of someone suffering a major psychosis but  “the mildly 
distressed individual in the family and in the community”  (1986:14). This is evidenced in the 
Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010 which states, “only a very small minority of people with 
mental health problems need to be treated compulsorily.  The great majority of people with 
mental health problems never need to be treated compulsorily and voluntarily seek treatment” 
(2011:1). Rose also notes the personal volition that links the individual with psychiatry: 
 
In the majority of cases…treatment is not imposed coercively upon unwilling subjects but 
sought out by those who have come to identify their own distress in psychiatric terms, 
believe that psychiatric expertise will help them and are thankful for the attention they 
receive (1986:83).   
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Barnes et al also challenge the perception of the passive psychiatric service user in their assertion 
that “the problem isn’t that people whisk you into hospital and label you, but that you have to 
keep banging at the GP’s door before anybody will really believe that you’ve got a serious 
problem and that you need to be in hospital” (1999:36).  The Mental Health (Wales) Measure 
2010 acknowledges the breadth of its remit and a spectrum of disorder when it says that it is 
“aimed at individuals of all ages who are experiencing mild to moderate, or stable but severe and 
enduring, mental health problems” (2011:4). Notably the first intended effect of the Mental 
Health (Wales) Measure 2010 is the expansion of provision of local primary mental health 
support services; it is hoped that the new measures will be of use to “user groups, carers, 
networks, managers, clinicians and human resources staff”, implying that its focus is community 
based psychiatry for people with milder conditions (2011:2/3). The desire for greater support at a 
local, primary level suggests, perhaps, that resources at a secondary level are presently stretched 
and may also reflect a growing prevalence of psychiatric ‘disorder’ in society. There is an 
acknowledgement that GPs do not always have sufficient specialised knowledge to deal with 
mental health issues.  This can be interpreted as both a corrective to medical omniscience and 
also a reinforcement of the expert knowledge of the mental health professional.   
 
What is apparent from an examination of The Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010 is that its 
central recommendations do not reflect concern about the inappropriate wielding of psychiatric 
power (a discourse which dominates film and Chapter 5). Compulsory admission, for example, is 
clearly perceived to be unusual in the realm of mental health law (2011:5). Similarly there is 
hardly any reference to psychopharmacology. The only possible reference to restraint is 
ambiguous: The Measure talks of providing GPs and other primary care workers with support “to 
enable them to safely manage and care for people with mental health problems”; it is unclear 
whether the safety of medical personnel or the service user is referenced here (2011:4).  
 
A further argument in defence of the assumed dominance of medical psychiatric power is that 
related aspects of the speciality may exert power. Rose argues that:  
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All the sciences which have the prefix ‘psyc’ or ‘psycho’ have their roots in a transformed 
relationship between social power and the human body, in which regulatory systems 
sought to codify, calculate, supervise and maximize the levels of functioning of individuals 
(1996:74).  
 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that other disciplines, such as psychology, are 
controlling mechanisms and should be subject to scrutiny. Rose highlights psychology’s 
centrality as a powerful social force: 
 
Psychology “provides the languages to establish translatability between politicians, 
lawyers, managers, bureaucrats, professionals, businessmen and each of us…And its 
expertise, grounded…in a claim to truth, allows for an indirect relationship to be 
established between the ambitions of governmental programs for mental health, law and 
order, industrial efficiency, marital harmony, childhood adjustment…and the hopes, wishes 
and anxieties of individuals and families.  Convinced that we should construe our lives in 
psychological terms of adjustment fulfilment, good relationships, self-actualisation and so 
forth we have tied ourselves ‘voluntarily’ to the knowledge that experts have of these 
matters, and to their promises to assist us in the personal quest for happiness that we 
‘freely’ undertake (1990:112).  
 
It could be argued that these discourses move beyond the psychiatric institution making them 
more culturally powerful. In emphasising the words ‘voluntarily’ and ‘freely’ Rose draws upon 
Foucault in seeing the function of psychology as not necessarily crushing subjectivity but, 
nevertheless, exerting influence over the individual. The dedication to Rose’s 1989 Governing 
the Soul is a Foucauldian comment upon the soul: 
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It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect.  On the 
contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body 
by the functioning of a power…on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, 
children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and 
supervised for the rest of their lives (Foucault 1979:29).  
 
Foucault’s work on governmentality established the notion of a continuum which “extends from 
political government right through to forms of self-regulation” and emphasised the paradox 
between regulation and the individual ownership of responsibility (Lemke 2000:3). It was a 
revision of his work on ‘docile bodies’ which he felt placed too much emphasis on processes of 
discipline. Siegfried Jäger and Florentine Maier consider that whilst Foucault contests the notion 
of an autonomous subject this does not mean that he “is against the subject” (2009:38). They 
argue that Foucault attributes the individual with the power to be active and “fully involved 
when it comes to realizing power relations in practice.  The individual thinks, plans, constructs, 
interacts and fabricates” but “also faces the problem of having to prevail to assert himself, to find 
his place in society” (2009:38). Rose considers the complex interface between issues of personal 
fulfilment and mental health. He argues that it is psychology which provides the “vital relays 
between contemporary government and the ethical technologies by which modern individuals 
come to govern their own lives” (1990:115). This is also the view of Bracken and Thomas who 
consider that “psychiatric power is now operating to produce an enhanced notion of 
subjectivity…through the production of new discourses of the self” (2005:94).  
 
It is notable that The Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010 offers short-term interventions at a 
primary level which include “counselling, a range of psychological interventions including 
cognitive behavioural therapy, solution focussed therapy, stress management, anger management 
and education” (2011:3). As these interventions are only guaranteed if they are deemed to be 
appropriate it could be argued that there is concern that demand may outstrip supply; a delicate 
balancing act clearly exists between social and personal intervention in managing the self. Rose 
states that  
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Citizens now have ‘attitudes’ to all manner of things, take decisions about their lives in 
terms of such attitudes, discuss them with others, justify them, have them measured and 
changed.  And citizens have opinions, we have learned to ‘become opinionated” (2007:15).  
 
His emphasis upon the active citizen clearly complicates the assumption of medical dominance. 
Bracken and Thomas link the perception of the active citizen with consumerism. Although 
individuals are not cited as ‘healthcare consumers’ in literature such as The Mental Health Wales 
Measure 2010 Bracken and Thomas argue that the very concept “implies that we may think of 
ourselves as consumers of health care” and “that we have choices to make as far as our health is 
concerned”.  They perceive a shift in health care values, which has led to an emphasis upon “the 
importance of consultation with and the involvement of patients in service development and 
planning, the processes of delivery of individual care programmes, and research” (2005:30).  
 
This section of the chapter has sought to show that not all aspects of medical authority are 
invalid and that its power may be due, in part, to its social popularity. Psychiatric treatment is 
sought and not necessarily imposed; not all aspects of psychiatry are authoritative and not all 
attacks upon it are justified. The voluntary nature of treatment for psychiatric conditions extends 
beyond the psychiatric institution to play a powerful cultural position in society. Any discussion 
of the circulation of power must also entertain notions of resistance to domination; Foucault’s 
work on agency argues that “the relationship between power and freedom’s refusal to submit 
cannot…be separated” (1983:221). It sees resistance as an intrinsic part of power; nobody 
actually ‘owns’ power and it does not necessarily achieve what it sets out to. Foucault aims to 
show that “power comes from below” in a “local, low-level, ‘capillary circuit’” (1994: xxiv).  
The final section of the chapter will consider resistance in the field of psychiatry.  
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RESISTANCE TO POWER 
 
Rose points out that, “with regard to power over discourse, different individuals and groups have 
different chances of influence.  However, none of them can simply defy dominant discourse, and 
none of them alone has full control over discourse” (2007:15).  I would argue that the field of 
psychiatry is characterised by discourses of resistance. It is notable that resistance can be offered 
by “speaking subjects” themselves. There is resistance, for example, to the new version of DSM 
from previous key players in the development of the manual (Davies 2013, Decker 2010).   The 
Internet has made the infighting amongst previous editors of DSM and current editors highly 
visible and suggests that the idea of a monolithic power base may be a construct. Hannah Decker 
refers to the “open drama” to which the public have been party and describes a “war” between 
two former editors of DSM IV and the leaders of the American Psychiatric Association’s present 
task force who are responsible for the current version of DSM (2010). Resistance extends to 
other members of the profession such as James Davies, a psychological therapist, who poses the 
question; “Why, when a committee of psychiatrists agree that a collection of behaviours and 
feelings point to the existence of a mental disorder, should the rest of us accept they’ve got it 
right?” (2013: 24).  
 
Further resistance to medical dominance is offered by subjects who might be considered, 
historically, as “non-speaking subjects” in the field of disability and mental health research 
which has traditionally been dominated by clinical and medicalised voices (Beresford 2005:65). 
The work of the Hearing Voices Network, for example, has challenged the ownership and 
medicalisation of ‘auditory hallucinations’. A prominent aspect of this particular resistance is to 
repudiate the medical term and replace it with the simpler term ‘voice hearing’. Bracken and 
Thomas argue that “most research in psychiatry defines effectiveness in terms of symptom 
resolution, but many service users reject notions of illness, or that their experiences are to be 
accounted for as symptoms” (2005: 48); this is one such instance. Parker et al point out that:   
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Whether it is seen as a variety of tinnitus or telepathy, voice hearing confuses any medical 
system which tries to categorize symptoms.  The spotlight is then turned around, as with 
the queer movement, on to those who are unable to tolerate the variety and ambiguity of 
identity that results.  It has been argued, in this deconstructive spirit that clinicians caught 
up in this way of thinking may be suffering from ‘Professional Thought Disorder’ 
(1995:126).   
 
More generally, resistance is embodied by the user-led movement which Bracken and Thomas 
consider has “no equivalent in general medicine” (2005:51). They express “a profound respect” 
for the agendas emerging from user-led initiatives, considering that this is “where the future lies” 
in terms of putting an end to Foucault’s “monologue of reason about madness” (Foucault 2007: 
xii). They are optimistic that real dialogue is beginning to take place “between those who 
experience episodes of madness and dislocation and the society in which they live” (2005:2). 
Bracken et al, however, feel that true collaboration can only take place once psychiatry moves 
“beyond the primacy of the technical paradigm” (2012: 431).  
 
Diana Rose traces the slow progress that user-led research has made over time (2005).  Rose is a 
social scientist and is also a mental health service user.  She works for SURE (the Service User 
Research Enterprise) at the Institute of Psychiatry in London; the aim of SURE is to research 
from the perspective of the user of mental health services. Bracken and Thomas attribute Rose 
with the development of UFM (User Focused Monitoring), which they consider to be important 
in promoting a service user perspective. As illustration, a professional approach to medication 
emphasises compliance, whilst UFM groups “approach medication in terms of choice, dignity, 
respect and information about side effects” (2005:61).  This divergence highlights the need for 
multiple voices and discourses in the psychiatric field. Rose explains that the user movement has 
grown exponentially from fifteen groups in the 1980s to over seven hundred today (2005:2). She 
makes the point that mental health service users were ahead of all other patient groups in wishing 
to have more of a voice in research into their own condition; she links this to particular concern 
with a medical model which has the power to take away liberty when no crime has been 
committed (2005:2).  Rose cites the perception of injustice in the psychiatric field and a desire to 
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challenge this as reasons for undertaking user-led research. A specific aim is to “elucidate the 
experience of mental distress and of receiving treatments and services as understood and 
experienced by service users” (2005:3).  Rose considers the patient experience to be under-
explored and cites this as a cause for concern: 
 
We cannot uncritically accept the idea of the neutral observer in relation to the production 
of knowledge.  We have a battle on our hands – we need to emphasise the importance of 
expertise by experience and not have this undermined by more mainstream ways of 
producing knowledge (2005:11). 
 
Rose argues that the path of user controlled research has not been straightforward, describing 
opposition from the mainstream research community who have historically considered it to be 
“biased, anecdotal and over-involved” (2005:3). She makes a specific distinction between user 
involvement in research and user controlled research which can be traced back to the 1990s in 
the UK and has links with the user/survivor movement as well as the wider field of disability 
research (2005:3). Rose attests to opposition to having user-led research published in peer-
reviewed literature until very recently.  She cites research on electroconvulsive therapy as an 
emblematic illustration of how tension still exists between “senior scientists and 
methodologists”, describing how scientists have branded patients who objected to ECT as “a 
vocal and angry minority who represented no one but themselves” (2005:5). On-going tensions 
clearly continue about the status of “true scientific research”.  Rose mentions the importance of 
systematic reviews and randomised controlled trials (RCTs); she is apologetic in tone about the 
potential validity of qualitative research and perceives testimonies from service users as being 
less sound than RCTs, something which Lewis contests (2005:4).  In spite of on-going areas of 
conflict, however, Rose is optimistic about the progression of user led research.  She makes the 
point that the UK Institute of Psychiatry, which she considers to be a conservative institution, has 
recognised the importance of user-led research and provided funding.  She is also positive about 
work carried out by service users being championed by NICE (The National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence, an advisory body to the Government) an indication, perhaps, that the discourses of 
service users and clinicians are not as disparate as they were (2005:7). 
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In conclusion it is apparent that whilst it seems inaccurate to suggest that there is no diversity in 
the discourse that contributes to the naming of psychiatric disorder a deconstructive approach is 
essential in order to examine and contest dominant discourse. Whilst there are signs of an ever-
increasing plurality of discourse there is still a long way to go before a true democracy of 
existing discourse is achieved. The next chapter will move the focus from an analysis of 
discourse practice in respect of policy documents which determine the naming of clinical 
psychosis and their influence on social practice to consider, specifically, the film text and how it 
is constructed, distributed and consumed.  A focus upon representation, the film industry as an 
institution and socio cultural attitudes to film conforms with Fairclough’s model of critical 
discourse analysis which describes “overlapping dimensions of text, discourse practice and 
sociocultural practice” (Smith & Bell 2007: 86). Chapter 5 will build on work done in this 
chapter to determine the relationship between discourse in the naming of clinical psychosis and 
notable discourse in film. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE REPRESENTATION OF PSYCHOSIS IN FILM  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will consider the discourses centring on psychosis that are present in film. I 
continue to adopt a Critical Discourse Analysis approach to consider the dynamic nature of 
discourse and its relation to socio-cultural change. Jäger and Maier consider that Critical 
Discourse Analysis “reveals the contradictions within and between discourses, the limits of what 
can be said and done, and the means by which discourse makes particular statements seem 
rational and beyond all doubt, even though they are only valid at a certain time and place” 
(2009:36). A discourse analysis approach argues that the media is instrumental in constructing its 
own versions of reality but that these apparent realities are discursively shaped and always open 
to contestation (Macdonald 2003:16). 
 
I have chosen to base my discourse analysis on film texts which date from the inception of film 
to the present day. Films analysed range from major releases such as A Beautiful Mind (2001) to 
Mieke Bal’s A Long History of Madness (2011) which has not been on general release. Peter 
Remington argues that amongst representations of psychosis in film those “directly treating of 
madness have historically been the exception rather than the rule” (2011: 144). He documents a 
dramatic increase in films that feature depictions of mental illness in the last twenty or so years 
(2011:151); it is not possible to cover the whole field in this thesis. I have not confined my 
selection to English language films, although texts principally refer to the USA; this reflects 
American cultural influence in the field of popular entertainment. I include a broad range of 
genres and have considered representations that provide a variety of discourses. My focus is on 
psychosis; to this end I include films that depict drug-induced psychosis and also ‘psychosis’ 
which does not have any apparent causation. In addition to examining films that seek to further 
an understanding of mental illness I also wish to establish why psychosis is used to provoke 
spectator fear; this is the case in slasher films from Asylum Erotica (1971) to Psychosis (2010) 
which make no attempt to understand the mental condition of the ‘psychotic’ protagonist. 
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“Aesthetic judgments of text – which are ‘good’, which are ‘bad’ which are ‘masterpieces’ and 
which are ‘failures’” are not relevant to these concerns (McKee 2003:25).  
 
I continue to draw upon the work of Foucault and Fairclough in this chapter. Both see the media 
text as the site of a power struggle (1995:94) and as part of a range, including the medical texts 
and policy documents in Chapter 4 and the interview transcripts in Chapter 6, which might 
exercise influence (1995:209). Fairclough emphasises the importance of the social agent in 
determining textual discourse. He considers that complexity results when there is a discrepancy 
between the agent’s ideological interpretation of the world and the world itself (1989:170). 
Fairclough emphasises that social agents: 
 
Have their own ‘causal powers’ which are not reducible to the causal powers of social 
structures and practices…Social agents texture texts, they set up relations between 
elements of texts.  There are structural constraints on this process…But this still leaves 
social agents with a great deal of freedom (2003:22).   
 
The social agent links with Foucault’s “speaking subject” whereby “living persons” take up 
subject positions that have already been negotiated and are recognised as ways of 
comprehending the world (Matheson 2005:61). This has been explored in the naming of clinical 
psychosis (see Chapter 4) and will now be applied directly to film.  
 
Discoursal practices (production, distribution and consumption, with an emphasis on 
distribution) are also considered key by Fairclough and are well recognised aspects of vertical 
integration in the film industry (2000:158). The macro aspect of film discourse in managing 
culture and legitimising specific representations of psychosis will also be considered.  
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Adopting a broadly Foucauldian approach this chapter is concerned with how discourse has 
operated at specific times and according to social shifts since the inception of film. Foucault 
considers that discourses should be approached from both the point of view of their “tactical 
productivity” (what they achieve in terms of power and knowledge) as well as their “strategical 
integration” (what circumstances and rules give rise to their use in particular circumstances) 
(Macdonald 2003:18). Foucauldian discourse theory aims to “analyse the constitution of the 
subject in its historical and social context from a diachronic…and synchronic …perspective” 
(Jäger & Maier 2009:38).  In examining discourse that surrounds psychosis I focus upon how 
individuals who have experienced it have been positioned in film over time; the act of definition 
seems crucial to the social and cultural identity of this vulnerable group.  
 
In this chapter I will argue that because film texts are key sites for cultural representation and the 
negotiation of identity, the presentation of the psychotic individual must be scrutinised. I will 
argue that because texts are appropriated by the public and the powerful in order to define social 
roles, the potential limitation of these roles may influence perceptions concerning mental health. 
The chapter will demonstrate that the film text is heterogeneous and inflected by a range of 
diverse factors including control over distribution and changing audience profile. It will address 
the challenge posed in reconciling ‘realism’ based on the experience of psychosis with film as an 
entertainment form and will conclude that psychosis can, at times, provide escapism and wish 
fulfillment. In it I will argue that whilst film conventions influence representation, film is 
sometimes able to capture the complexity of psychosis. I will illustrate that psychosis provides 
both opportunities and challenges to the filmmaker and its presentation is inflected by various 
factors including era, genre and intertextuality. I will demonstrate that film stresses positive 
aspects of psychosis, at times, but negative representations which ‘other’ psychotic protagonists 
and emphasise links between psychosis, violence and problematic sexuality predominate.  In a 
comparative analysis with clinical discourse in Chapter 4 I will identify prominent film discourse 
as focusing on the role of the carer and the curative properties of love.  I will establish that a 
common shared discourse is the division between pathology and normality and will demonstrate 
that whilst film discourse seldom questions scientific or medical authority it is critical of 
psychiatry as an instrument of repression. I will argue that film rarely explores social attitudes 
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towards mental illness and fails to recognise autonomy amongst those who experience psychosis. 
The undeniable differences in the hierarchical arrangements of discourse reflect the competing 
interests between the stakeholders in the naming of clinical psychosis and filmmaking.  
 
THE FILM TEXT  
 
John Ellis highlights the heterogeneity of film by observing that “general statements are made 
about ‘cinema’ as though ‘cinema’ were a mass of virtually undifferentiated material”. He 
contests this and emphasizes that whilst the “common sense notion of a film” corresponds to 
American entertainment cinema the film text is much more complex than this (1992:23).  Janet 
Harbord also emphasizes this complexity in a consideration of the interface between film and the 
individual consumer: 
 
Our access to film is situated, I have argued, in networks of time…and space… which 
connect us to particular discursive practices of film culture and diverse histories of cultural 
value…each film culture purports an aesthetic exclusive to its own domain (art gallery, 
arthouse cinema, multiplex, home view)….systems of production and distribution collude 
to create mutually exclusive aesthetic cultures (2002: 117). 
 
The film texts which provide the focus for this chapter must, therefore, be considered as products 
which have been inflected by a range of diverse factors in an industry that is notable for its 
heterogeneity. Fairclough recognises mass media institutions in contemporary society as 
complex structures which contain multiple forms of discourse in multiple situations. He feels 
they are particularly worthy of consideration because “the nature of the power relations enacted” 
within them “is often not clear” and may be concealed (1989:91). He does not doubt the 
ideological function of such institutions but considers that this can vary as institutions “provide 
alternative sets of discoursal and ideological norms” (1995:40). Whilst emphasizing plurality he 
considers that this varies according to time and place and is influenced by the balance of power 
which exists amongst those who are responsible for the institution’s formation. He considers that 
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complexity is compounded in mass media institutions such as the film industry because 
“participants…are separated in place and time” (1989:49). Fairclough’s work echoes Foucault’s 
‘rarefaction of speakers’ (1972:225) in suggesting “each institution has its own set of speech 
events, its own differentiated settings and scenes, its cast of participants, and its own norms for 
their combination” (1995:38). Fairclough considers the members of an institution such as the 
film industry to be participants in a cast who choose to play parts in order to achieve goals which 
are ultimately recognised by the various members of that institution; certain discourses will be 
ingrained and new discourses may be considered with suspicion. Membership includes members 
of the audience as well as producers. Fairclough sees the institution as “simultaneously 
facilitating and constraining” social action by providing “a frame for action” which also acts as a 
constraint (1995:38). He uses the term MR (members’ resources) to refer to the knowledge 
utilised to interpret texts as well as to produce them (1989:24); this is closely allied to Roger 
Fowler’s preferred term “discursive competence”, which refers to the relationship between a text 
and the common knowledge shared by an audience in what is permissible and what is prohibited 
according to its conventions (1991:44).  Fairclough considers that the knowledge shared by 
members of an institution is social in origin and is the result of the struggle for dominance in 
discourse; it is socially transmitted but unevenly distributed.  When applied to the film industry it 
is clear to see that both the nature of discourse and control over distribution are key. Branston 
considers control of distribution to be vital as specific discourses can be circulated over and over 
again, sometimes long after the historical moment and situation when they came in to being 
(2000:160). She also considers that costs and mass marketing in contemporary cinema demand 
broad categorizations which are simple to understand and can be distributed en masse; this 
simplification leads to repetition, a restricted range of discourses in specific sectors and the 
possibility that alternative discourses are not available for popular audiences (2000:161).  
 
It cannot be assumed, however, that the film audience is without agency.  McKee argues that 
audiences influence the content of textual production and that  “media producers deliberately try 
to produce texts that will fit in with the sense-making practices of audiences – they don’t just 
produce whatever they would like to see, or push particular ideological lines that they believe” 
(2003:48).  Fairclough considers that the very nature of mass media means that there is “no way 
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that producers can even know who is in the audience, let alone adapt to its diverse sections” 
(1989:49). Arguably, however, there have been attempts, over many decades, to do so.  Susan 
Ohmer documents the Audience Research Institute’s (ARI) quest to define the audience as early 
as 1944 via the use of preview screenings with carefully selected audiences. The aim was not to 
“reflect the interests of the average filmgoer” so much as to “‘select a replica in miniature of the 
movie masses”. Via the use of a ‘Televoting Machine” featuring a luminous dial that could be 
turned to positions marked “very dull, dull, neutral, like, like very much” the ARI claimed to be 
able to monitor individual response by the second. The response was used to action edits of film 
sequences, which did not receive favourable responses and also to highlight areas of confusion 
(2006:221). Such historical research reveals that the film industry has invested in getting to know 
its audience and has also acted upon audience response. Even when factoring in technological 
advance such as hardware applications using keypads to monitor audience response and software 
applications for mobile ‘phones which serve the same purpose, however, the concomitant 
increase in the diversity of film tends to support Fairclough’s assertion that it is impossible to 
‘know’ the audience and adapt the text to their tastes and needs. 
 
In addition to a recognition of political and economic influence it is important to consider how 
the “formal workings and pleasures of films” affect discourse (Branston 2000:176). Ellis justifies 
film purely on aesthetic grounds, considering the cinematic image “the perfection of 
photography” (1992:38).  Branston refers to the “complex ‘refractions’ of the aesthetics of films” 
(2000:141) and considers formal systems such as “the look of the camera, lighting, editing, 
framing and production” to be key in meaning making (2000:136). Dyer argues that the “non-
representational” signs of cinema including “colour, texture, movement, rhythm, melody, 
camerawork” all provide audience pleasure (2002: 20). Beyond these formal properties Branston 
argues that cinema draws upon conventions such as narrative structuring and language-use 
(2000:136); these become part of what she terms the ‘textiness’ of film and provide an 
alternative source of pleasure (2000:166). Ira Torresi argues that whilst filmic representation 
might not necessarily be negative or false it offers limited correspondence with real life; filmic 
convention is prioritised to become a dominant discourse in its own right and an influence upon 
meaning making (2007:532). Whether complexity is sacrificed in favour of the ‘textiness’ of film 
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and how this ‘textiness’ operates in films that feature discourses of psychosis are crucial issues in 
relation to my own work.  Writing specifically in relation to psychiatric discourse Glen and Krin 
Gabbard argue that complexity is sacrificed to filmic convention: 
 
Most film theorists agree that movies succeed more often when they put aside pretension 
and turn to material that is suited to a popular medium like the cinema.  This is not to say 
that films cannot be serious or significant, but rather they suffer when the complexity of 
the material lies outside the range of what cinema can effectively dramatize (1999:101). 
 
I would contest the Gabbards’ assertion that there are limits to what can be effectively 
dramatised in film. My own conclusion is that films can capture degrees of complexity 
surrounding discourses of psychosis. Independent film A Woman Under the Influence (1974), for 
example, portrays both the chronic, stultifying nature of mental illness and its potential for drama 
and conflict.  Equally a mainstream film like Mr Jones (1993) captures some of the complexity 
of psychosis; it is notable that a critical review by Roger Ebert considers the film to be successful 
in this respect but to be limited by an ineffectual romantic subplot. Ebert considers that “in a less 
ambitious movie, we might accept the romance as part of the whole commercial formula” 
(1993:online). Films portraying psychosis may succeed or fail for a variety of reasons; the 
treatment of psychosis is only one aspect.  
 
Branston argues that the film industry’s desire to maximise box office receipts by responding to 
the audience’s expectation for “thrills, laughter, tears and cheers” leads to simplification 
(2000:131). Harbord considers that this is historical and that “early film draws heavily on 
popular attractions as well as narrative-based arts, on the fairground and its physical and 
sensational form of pleasure, the corporal shock of sensory confusion” (2002: 23). Branston 
notes that the music hall influenced early film to produce a display of “attractions” which were 
designed to “shock, thrill or incite curiosity” (2000:23). Similarly theatre lent cinema a 
melodramatic quality which led to the simplification of representation and related discourses.  
Cinema’s readily understandable conventions sacrificed complexity in favour of what Branston 
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calls “everyday understanding and action” (2000:161). Both Harbord (2002:25) and Branston 
(2000:23) consider that the early desire for spectacle has not been diminished, over time, so 
much as displaced (see also Gunning (2006)).  Both identify spectacle in narrative films, the 
avant-garde and in specific genre forms. Harbord points out that the shock effects of early 
cinema may now manifest as special effects, which are superficial and essentially conservative in 
nature (2002:32).  Alan Lovell and Gianluca Sergi consider cinema to be “as much a sensual 
experience as it is an intellectual one” (2009: 30). They question the negative connotations that 
attach to spectacle, however, arguing that “many of cinema’s triumphs” including Battleship 
Potemkin “have been achieved through the creation of spectacle” (2009: 74).   
 
A specific area of interest in relation to my work must be, therefore, whether ‘spectacle’ presents 
in films that feature discourses surrounding psychosis and, if so, whether this ‘spectacle’ leads to 
simplification. It is possible to argue that neither simplification nor spectacle seems compatible 
with psychosis as subject matter. John Hill argues that it is the “twin expectations of narrative 
and ‘realism’ which are, perhaps, the most fundamental in defining our sense of what constitutes 
a ‘good’ film and establishing the terms on which films are to be understood” (1986: 54); 
prioritising ‘realism’ in films that feature psychosis may pose potential problems for the 
filmmaker. 
 
Dyer’s work is valuable in analysing the complex relationship between the entertainment film 
and its presentation of ‘reality’. Dyer defines entertainment as “a type of performance produced 
for profit, performed before a generalized audience (‘the public’), by a trained paid group who 
do nothing else but produce performances which have the sole (conscious) aim of providing 
pleasure” (2002:19). He sees two of the central tenets of entertainment as “escape” and “wish 
fulfillment” and groups these together under the heading of “utopianism” (2002:20). Jackie 
Stacey argues that “by focusing on utopian sensibility Dyer highlights…the emotional 
dimensions” of cinema – an area that has hitherto been under-explored in comparison with visual 
pleasure” (2002:429). Dyer formulates a category titled “Social Tension, Inadequacy/Absence”; 
this recognises negative aspects of the ‘real’ world which are ‘solved’ by the ‘utopian solutions’ 
provided by the film text (2002:26).  The list includes “Scarcity, Exhaustion, Dreariness, 
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Manipulation and Fragmentation”; it can be read as a checklist for those experiencing mental 
health difficulties.  Dyer considers “Scarcity” to be “actual poverty in society” or “unequal 
distribution of wealth” and “Fragmentation” to mean “job mobility, re-housing and development 
and high rise flats.”  A fracture clearly exists in reconciling ‘realism’ and narrative based on the 
experience of psychosis with film as an entertainment form.  The “utopian solutions” that   Dyer 
provides to address ‘reality’ are: to replace scarcity with abundance thereby eliminating poverty; 
substitute exhaustion with energy; replace the dreariness of daily life with excitement and drama; 
substitute transparency and honesty for manipulation and provide a sense of community to 
compensate for the fragmentation in society.  These solutions initially appear to be incompatible 
with an exposition of psychosis yet a more detailed analysis of texts that feature discourses on 
psychosis confirms that they are evidenced consistently in film. Ellis testifies to what can be 
achieved in reconciling ‘realism’ and entertainment:  
 
In many senses entertainment cinema has been concerned more with spectacle than with 
reality.  Or rather it has been concerned to play between the two, to make the real 
spectacular and the spectacular plausible…Cinema fictions present extraordinary events, 
ones that we know to be impossible, or at least highly unlikely.  It then performs a fantastic 
trick upon these unlikely things: it succeeds in making them credible (1992:51) 
 
Ellis’ commentary upon the real and the spectacular is particularly applicable to the experience 
of psychosis as it argues that it is possible to use a serious social problem as the basis for 
entertainment and also to capture the fantastical aspects of psychosis and make them work on 
screen. Referring, once again, to Dyer’s work it can be demonstrated that aspects of psychosis do 
not have to provide the narrative problems, which are solved by film entertainment, but can also 
provide the representational solutions. Mania, for example, is characterised by “energy” and 
“abundance” which can be used to counter “scarcity”; this is evidenced in Mr Jones (1993) 
where the eponymous character, who is hospitalized for mania, instructs the psychiatrist in how 
to enhance her unfulfilling life. Genre films such as Twelve Monkeys (1995) allow for action 
sequences and special effects.  Star performances such as that of Jim Carrey in Me, Myself and 
Irene (2000) are notable for their energy.  Crazy People (1990) introduces a narrative that centres 
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on the duplicity of the advertising world and refers directly to Dyer’s category of “manipulation” 
which requires a “utopian solution.”  Dudley Moore, (an advertising executive), is sent to an 
asylum by his employer for questioning the corrupt nature of his work; whilst there he learns the 
value of community, transparency and honesty. The nature of relationships in romances such as 
Crazy People (1990) and David and Lisa (1998) testifies to the “experiencing of emotion 
directly, fully, unambiguously, authentically” thereby replacing manipulation with transparency 
in a different sense (Dyer 2002:23).  It is also notable that Dyer’s “non-representational 
categories” are used in films that feature psychosis to provide visual, narrative pleasure. In Dead 
Ringers (1988), for example, the scene in which psychotic twin Beverly, played by Jeremy Irons, 
performs gynaecological surgery wearing a red hijab embodies Dyer’s claim that the non-
representational provides “spectacle as materialism and metaphysics” which is notably “tactile, 
sensuous (and) physically exhilarating”; at the same time it contradicts Dyer’s association of the 
non-representational with “fairyland” and “magic “ (2002:28). The power of the scene derives, 
perhaps, from the juxtaposition of what John Harkness refers to as “high tech” environments, 
which are “logical monuments to clarity and order” and the shock engendered by the “disease 
and madness” which manifest in these settings (1983:24). Pete Boss refers to the power 
unleashed by the coupling of medicine and more traditional horror tropes in Cronenberg’s work: 
“Despite the immaculate order to the hospital, its brilliance and asepticism, the banishing of the 
signifiers of death and decay, it remains a sanctuary of contemporary terror” (1986:20). 
Cronenberg juxtaposes “normally unharmonious elements…the result is a combination of 
dissimilar elements and the discovery of unforeseen resemblances in things apparently unlike”.  
This leads to “the violent revelation of dissimilarity or difference in what seems similar." (Grant 
1997:17). 
 
Dyer also considers that “utopian solutions” are relevant to filmic resolution; it is important to 
apply this to films that feature psychosis. At the simplest level Robin Wood considers the “happy 
ending” to be an “‘emergency exit’ (Sirk’s phrase) for the spectator, a pretense that the problems 
the film has raised are solved” (1992:476). Hill argues that the expectation of narrative resolution 
“tends to encourage the adoption of socially conservative endings”. He points out “there is a 
presumption, built into the very structure of conventional narrative, that problems can be 
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overcome, can indeed be resolved” (1986:55). Ellis refers to “tightly organized narration” which 
ensures that “a particular problem or disruption” is resolved at the end of a film; this indicates 
that when psychosis features as problem or disruption there is a tendency to provide an 
explanation and a resolution for it (1992:24). Explanations can be straightforward, for example 
in Requiem for a Dream (2000) where psychosis is drug induced. Hill emphasises that social 
problem films do not truly “deal with social problems in their social aspects at all (as problems 
of the social structure) so much as problems of the individual” (1986:56).  This is the case in 
Requiem for a Dream (2000) where there is no substantial social analysis; by locating problems 
in the individual “there is no necessity for reconstruction of the social order” (1986:56). Films 
made during the “psychoanalytic hiatus” in the mid- twentieth century employed guilt complexes 
as a theory of causation (Shorter 1997:145); Scottie in Vertigo (1958) is diagnosed with “acute 
melancholia together with a guilt complex” and John Ballantyne has buried his guilt at being the 
inadvertent cause of his brother’s death in Spellbound (1945). Once the guilt complex is 
addressed the individual can be cured. Post-traumatic stress disorder also offers a neat 
explanation for psychosis and is used repeatedly, for example in Wild at Heart (1990) and Nurse 
Betty (2000). Family dynamics are often responsible for deteriorating mental health in 
entertainment films. An overbearing upbringing results in both Casey’s problems in Mad Love 
(1995) and Janice’s in Family Life (1971). Sibling incest is the root cause of both Lilith and 
Anne’s difficulties (Lilith 1964, Asylum Erotica 1971) and Chief Bromden’s  and Ray’s fathers 
were alcoholic (One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest 1975, Some Voices 2000). Very occasionally a 
family psychiatric history is mentioned – for example Cody Jarret’s father was committed to an 
asylum in White Heat (1949).   It is the mother’s influence, however, that most notably 
precipitates mental illness in popular cinema’s terms. Relationships with the mother may be cold 
(The Snake Pit 1948) or uncomfortably intense (Psycho 1960, Spider 2002). Michael Fleming & 
Roger Manvell point out that the “mother as tyrannical bitch” is a catalyst for madness and is 
consistent with classic psychoanalytic trends which emphasise the “castrating phallic mother 
who makes the child feel inadequate” (1985:35). This representation is evidenced repeatedly, for 
example in Ordinary People, (1980) and Black Swan (2010).   
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At first sight Me, Myself and Irene (2000) appears unusual in shifting responsibility for Jim 
Carrey’s breakdown from the individual to an uncaring society.  Upon further examination, 
however, his battles are against specific individuals within his community.  This effectively 
draws the focus away from political and social dimensions and suggests that “if the causes of 
problems are located in the individual then prima facie there is no necessity for a reconstruction 
of the social order” (Hill 1986:56). Occasionally a film does not attempt to offer an explanation 
for mental illness.  Richard Gere as Mr Jones (Mr Jones 1993) constructs an elaborate 
explanation of his own psychosis. This self-deception acts as private resolution but the wider 
narrative is that his illness exists independently of any causation. This is unusual as the classic 
realist text typically avoids the real as contradictory (Hill 1986:61). Gabbard and Gabbard refer 
to myths which “serve the ancient function of allowing us to live with the contradictory to keep 
our illusions at the same time that we acknowledge our limitations” (1999:15).  These myths 
provide solutions for problems by obfuscating them or rendering them unreal. The myth of ‘the 
cure’ is a notable example: Peter Byrne refers to the potential offered by ‘the cure’ as dramatic 
catharsis in melodrama (2001:27). Cure appears to be complete for certain protagonists who 
experience psychosis (Charley in Me Myself and Irene (2000), Eve in Three Faces of Eve 
(1957)). Even when a complete ‘cure’ is resisted film tends to imply that some ‘resolution’ of 
mental illness has been achieved and the future looks brighter, for example Virginia in The Snake 
Pit (1948) and Bob in What About Bob? (1991).  Occasionally films that feature psychosis avoid 
myth and resist offering a solution to the ‘problem’ of mental illness; this is the case in Some 
Voices (2000) and My Sister’s Keeper (2002).  
 
In addition to a consideration of film ‘pleasures’ and formal properties, both genre and the 
historical positioning of a text impact upon discourses of psychosis.  This contextual focus will 
provide the basis for the next section of the chapter where I argue that the perpetuation of myth 
surrounding psychosis is not dependent upon era and consider the representation of psychosis to 
be intertextual. I attribute the presence of psychosis in a range of genre films to its potential to 
disrupt social order and recognise the function of genre as restoring this.  
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CONTEXTS: HISTORY AND GENRE 
 
Teun van Dijk considers that “no serious ideological analysis is possible without at least some 
knowledge of…historical, political or social” contexts (1998:62). Discourse is not ahistorical and 
an emphasis upon contemporary film incorporates a historical dimension. It is important to 
examine how discourse draws upon existing power/knowledge networks and to establish whether 
it attempts to create new ones; this can only be done by considering context. Madness is a 
cultural construct; its history has been determined by issues of control, knowledge and power, 
some of which have been represented on screen. It lends itself well to a Foucauldian analysis 
which concerns itself with historical change, the historical contingency of power and the inter-
connected emergence and development of discourse. Carabine poses key questions in relation to 
historical discourse: “How potent was it?  Was it resisted?  To what extent was it put into 
practice?” (2001:301). Wodak & Meyer draw upon the work of Foucault in attempting to elicit 
what can be considered to be valid knowledge, at a certain place and time (2009:46). Like 
Foucault they are concerned with how knowledge arose, how it was passed on to others and how 
influential it is in shaping the individual and society (2009:34). They consider that “each topic 
has a genesis, a historical a priori” and stress that every discourse has both a diachronic and a 
synchronic dimension (2009:34). Ultimately, therefore, film texts prove to be what Fairclough 
terms “sensitive barometers of social processes, movement and diversity” (1995:209).   
 
In their work on the representation of psychiatry in cinema Gabbard and Gabbard consider that 
there are marked shifts in discourse according to when a film has been made (1999:xxii). What 
About Bob? (1991) is an interesting example from the 1990s that features a prominent discourse 
based on market forces and psychiatry.  The film considers the ‘reasonable’ demands that an 
affluent client can make upon their psychiatrist in return for payment - a discourse that has 
topical geographical and historical relevance. Gabbard and Gabbard argue that “American films 
made earlier than the 1960s seldom venture outside received cultural myths” (1999:5) and that 
the earlier a film is made the less challenging it is in its exposition of psychiatric discourse 
(1999:xxv).  From my own study of films that feature psychosis, whilst I accept that the era in 
which a film is made can affect its content I do not accept the Gabbards’ argument that the 
earlier a film is made the less likely it is to challenge cultural myth. Contemporary films can be 
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deeply conventional and, as the use of the word “seldom” in the Gabbard and Gabbard quotation 
implies, pre 1960 films do challenge cultural myths, at times. It is important to factor in Hill’s 
argument that “films which were accepted as ‘realistic’ by one generation often appear ‘false’ or 
‘dated’ to the next” (1985:48).  An examination of texts from a well-known era that has formed a 
part of lived experience is different to a consideration of discourse which has not been directly 
experienced. Thomas Schatz argues that “there is little question but that our historical 
perspective, compounded by our cultural and academic biases, renders our 
viewing...substantially different for us than it was for an” [earlier audience] (1981:266). This is 
not to say that texts which feature previous eras are devoid of interest. A Beautiful Mind, which 
was made in 1994 but takes place in the 1940s, for example, details the insulin therapy 
administered to John Nash before anti-psychotics became available. Of perhaps more interest, 
however, is what is revealed about historical discourse by films which were made in an earlier 
era. Spellbound (1945) opens with a dedication to psychoanalysis and might be considered as an 
advert for the discipline when its popularity was at its height. The extended Salvador Dali dream 
sequence reflects the tolerance of cultural attitudes towards psychoanalysis at the time of 
production. Spellbound (1945) is typical of Gabbard and Gabbard’s ‘Golden Age’ when almost 
all discourse centring on psychiatry was positive. It is interesting that Gabbard and Gabbard 
consider this, the 1940s and 1950s, to be the “age of earnest realism and reconciliation”; they 
clearly perceive positive representation to be synonymous with accuracy and feel that it is 
important that cinema and psychiatry are ‘reconciled’ (1999:112). The ‘Golden Age’ was 
supplanted, however, by discourse which was characterised by its antipathy towards psychiatry 
and was “undoubtedly related to the cultural revolutions of the 1960s” when “a more satiric, 
socially critical vision was appropriate” (Gabbard and Gabbard 1999:114).  The new order is 
evidenced in Shock Corridor (1963), which is critical of psychoanalysis and contains the 
exhortation, “Why don’t you get off this psychoanalytical binge?” Shorter argues that the 
influence of the anti-psychiatry movement, which developed in the 1960s and “fostered hostility 
towards authority, medical and otherwise” is evidenced throughout the film (1997:273). Perhaps 
the most notable revelation of changing societal attitude comes in the film Suddenly Last 
Summer (1959). The film opens in a centre for psychosurgery where lobotomy is performed 
routinely. Montgomery Clift, a surgeon, admits that lobotomy is experimental and warns the aunt 
of a potential recipient, “the operation is only for the unapproachable, the hopeless…There’s 
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great risk in this operation…It will be years before we know whether it’s ok…The patient will be 
limited.” He, nevertheless, believes passionately in the merits of lobotomy.  The tension driving 
the narrative is not its brutal nature but lack of funding to perform it. The film was made a 
decade after the peak year for lobotomies in the USA (1949) when 5,074 procedures were carried 
out and acts as a strong illustration of the changing historical validity of knowledge (Shorter 
1997:228).  
 
The unequal treatment of aspects of psychiatric history is notable. Porter argues that the 
evolution of psychiatry has been influenced by the “twin goals” of “gaining a scientific grasp of 
mental illness and healing the mentally ill” (2002:183). He considers issues surrounding 
incarceration and decarceration; the questioning of psychoanalysis; the beneficence of the 
psychiatric profession; the justification of techniques such as clitoridectomy, lobotomy and 
electroconvulsive therapy and the role played by psychiatry in the socio-sexual control of ethnic 
minorities to be important markers in psychiatric history (2002:5). Whilst certain historical 
aspects appeal to film makers, others, for example the last listed, have yet to feature on screen. 
Gabbard and Gabbard similarly recognise “impressive advances in the neurosciences and an 
extraordinary expansion of psychopharmacologic agents” in the 1980s and 1990s but concede 
that they are “almost completely absent from the screen” (1999:143). The reason they offer is 
that aspects of psychiatry are prioritised because they support the “mechanical needs” of a film, 
for example, in terms of genre convention (1999:xxii) 
 
It cannot be assumed that the aim of certain films is to achieve historical accuracy; One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975) contains a plethora of psychiatric treatments from different eras, 
all of which are employed at the same time. Byrne points out that film must sometimes be read 
as metaphor rather than a literal statement (2003:432). Aspects of madness transcend historical 
context to influence screen representation. Fuery argues that the representation of psychosis is 
“transpositional”, drawing “freely upon discourses of madness that have taken place throughout 
history” (2004:31). He considers that film is able to plunder a wide range of cultural and 
historical discourse because of its breadth as an art form. Fuery defines four distinct 
“motivations” from literature of the eighteenth century onwards that feature strongly in cinematic 
160	  
	  
representations of madness as “family histories, the influences of reading, a religious force and 
sexual acts” (2004:80). Wahl also notes the ahistorical nature of representation; he argues that 
contemporary representations of psychosis have an atavistic tendency to revert to centuries’ old 
referents.  Wahl cites early representations linking  ‘melancholia’ with dark colours and madness 
with dishevelment as artistic conventions that continue to exert influence (1995:116). He regards 
such recycling, along with the repetition of narrative plot lines as “lazy” and partially responsible 
for homogeneity of psychiatric representation (1995:112).  
 
Films notably rely upon intertextual referents. Fairclough argues that the text should be 
considered as part of a chain (2002: 184) and Byrne that “film begets film” (2009:287); this is 
apparent in films such as Wild at Heart (1990) where Lula’s psychosis frequently evokes The 
Wizard of Oz (1939), both visually and linguistically.  As well as referencing apparently 
unrelated films, texts that feature psychosis also contain references to films which have 
previously explored related subject matter.  The psychiatrist Loomis in Halloween (1978) shares 
his name with his predecessor in Psycho (1960) and The Dream Team (1989) is enriched by its 
comparison with One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975). Both films feature a non-conformist 
protagonist who encourages inmates in an asylum to break free and Christopher Doyle reworks 
his performance as an inpatient, albeit in comedic mode. The light-hearted nature of the second 
film can, perhaps, only be fully appreciated in the light of its more serious forerunner. 
 
Historical film production trends also influence discourse. Stacey argues that, “historically it has 
been the female spectator who has been of most interest to the cinema” (2002:424). Women 
made up the highest proportion of the Hollywood audience in the 1930s and 1940s; the studios 
consequently went to great lengths to make films that appealed to them producing films that 
featured female rather than male stars, dramas that were serious in tone, musicals and love 
stories, well-developed characterization and narratives that were essentially ‘human’ in nature 
(Stacey 2002:424). The preferences of the female audience would explain Gabbard and 
Gabbard’s belief that “Hollywood turned its attention to the social problem film in the 1940s and 
1950s; discourses surrounding mental illness were part of this along with issues such as 
alcoholism, racism and homosexuality” (1999:25).  
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The influence of genre upon film content is a further consideration. Rick Altman emphasises the 
contribution made to genre by the discursive formation of the film industry, arguing that genre 
terminology is industry driven. Altman argues that genre is “defined by the industry” before it is 
“recognized by the mass audience” (2002:16); it acts as an interface between audience members 
and the film industry within the wider context of culture. He sees genre as a “blueprint” or 
formula that “precedes, programmes and patterns industry production”; a “structure” or “formal 
framework on which individual films are founded”; a “label” or “category central to the 
decisions and communications of distributors and exhibitors” and a “contract” or “the viewing 
position required by each genre film of its audience” (2002:14). Altman recognises that the 
audience are influential in the negotiation of genre; he advises an approach to genre that 
acknowledges the multiplicity of users, takes in to account different readings, assesses the 
relationship between users and addresses the effect of multiple users on the production and 
categorization of film (2002:214).   
 
The precise nature of genre is endlessly contested (see Jancovich 2002:469, Hollows 1995:29).  
At the same time Pam Cook and Mieke Bernink suggest that the text can: 
 
Never entirely evade…‘the law of genre’ for the simple reason that all utterances, 
whenever they are actually encountered, are always encountered in a context of one kind or 
another and are therefore always confronted with expectations, with systems of 
comprehension and in all probability with labels and names (1999:147). 
 
This concurs with Jacques Derrida’s view that “every text participates in one or several genres, 
there is no genreless text” (1981:61). Cook and Bernink conclude that genres “pervade the 
cinema, films, and the viewing of films as a whole” and that all films, like all linguistic 
utterances, ‘participate’ in genres of one kind or another and usually in several at once 
(1999:147). It is important, therefore, to pay attention to the way in which psychosis is 
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negotiated generically as the system of conventions governing a genre can inflect presentation. 
Schatz argues that: 
 
A genre’s iconography reflects the value system that defines its particular cultural 
community and informs the objects, events, and character types composing it. Each genre’s 
implicit system of values and beliefs – its ideology or worldview – determines its cast of 
characters, its problems (dramatic conflicts) and the solutions to those problems (1981:24).  
 
Schatz considers that “simply stated, a genre film…involves familiar, essentially one-
dimensional characters acting out a predictable story pattern within a familiar setting” (1981:6); 
this belies the complexity of genre, however. Schatz argues that genres are “social problem 
solving operations” which serve the function of confronting ideological conflict (1981:24). He 
sees generic conflict and resolution as two opposing forces which are underpinned by dialectical 
value systems, the outcome of which is that genre films “do seem to foreground ideological 
contradictions rather than do away with them, do seem to organize a world of depth and 
ambiguity” (1981:263). Schatz considers that “all film genres treat some form of threat- violent 
or otherwise – to the social order” (1981:26) and a genre’s popularity is attributable to “the 
sustained significance of the “problem” that it repeatedly addresses” (1981:34). Psychosis clearly 
offers the potential to disrupt the social order and its presentation and treatment are sites for 
multiple discourse.  It is not surprising, therefore, that psychosis appears in a wide range of genre 
films. In relation to generic resolution, Altman cautions against likening genre to myth (2002:20) 
and is questioning of a reductive ideological approach that sees “the same situations and 
structures as luring audiences into accepting deceptive non-solutions, while all the time serving 
governmental or industry purposes” (2002:27).  At the same time he does not view genre solely 
as a semantic and syntactical choice and does not wholly dismiss its ideological function. He 
contests Bordwell’s view that Hollywood cinema is “excessively obvious” (1988:2), preferring, 
instead, to see it as “deceptively obvious” (2002:135). Altman argues that the starting point for 
genre films is to reflect a cultural norm (2002:155); at the same time they offer an opportunity 
for “counter cultural pleasure” by contradicting the norm (2002:156).  One way of enacting this 
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contradiction is via excess in genres such as romance and horror, both of which feature psychosis 
(Altman 2002:158).  
 
In this section of the chapter I have argued that film texts reflect the era in which they are made 
but simple assumptions about the relationship between psychosis and myth cannot be related to 
era. Representations of madness are transpositional and film is subject to intertextual influence 
and productions trends. Genre conventions can inflect the presentation of psychosis which can 
provide material for conflict in genre forms.  The influence of genre on the representation of 
psychosis will be further evidenced in the next section, which will consider discourse that 
dominates film but not the naming of clinical psychosis. This section will then progress to 
address commonalities and absences in comparison to Chapter 4.  In it I will argue that psychosis 
allows for experimentation with film form and that film highlights positive attributes of 
psychosis such as artistic ability. I will identify additional dominant film discourses as 
foregrounding the role of the carer and the ability of love to “conquer all”.  I will argue that film 
links violence and problematised sexuality with psychosis.  I will also identify the on-screen 
portrayal of the psychotic female as an important corrective to the male gaze as unproblematic. 
The section will be subdivided in view of its length.  
 
DOMINANT DISCOURSE IN FILM 
 
Positive aspects of psychosis 
There is an emphasis in film upon the positive attributes of psychosis; this does not feature 
amongst discourses identified in the naming of clinical psychosis. This can be viewed in two 
ways: as exploiting the creative possibilities offered by madness and as emphasizing the 
advantages conferred by psychosis. Cynthia Erb refers to the “modernist tradition of overvaluing 
madness known as schizophilia” (2006:45). Erb attributes the term to French sociologist Rene 
Lourau and considers it a pole to stigmatization that reflects cultural ambivalence towards the 
‘insane’ (2006:54). Erb argues that the over-representation of schizophilia acknowledges the 
fascination of madness or mental illness in art and culture. She considers the “cinema of 
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schizophilia” to be typified by films such as Silence of the Lambs (1991) (2006:61), whose 
protagonist, Hannibal Lecter is described by Martin Rubin as “a Nietzschean anthropophagus, 
psychiatrist and psychopath as well as a talented amateur painter, virtual telepathist, Mabuse like 
manipulator and Houdini-class escape artist” (1999:58). An awed response to madness is also 
reflected in discourses that draw upon the timeless and epic nature of madness. Shock Corridor 
(1963) opens with a quotation from Euripides: “Whom God wishes to destroy he first makes 
mad”; The Sign of the Killer (2001) presents psychosis in a similarly grandiose way.  The set 
incorporates discus throwers and winged angels and is bathed in light; the scale of the 
presentation suggests the monumental nature of madness. The ‘unknowable’ nature of mental 
illness is also used, at times, as a platform for experimentation with film form. Byrne argues that 
psychosis, along with the effects of drug misuse, is “highly filmic” (2009: 193). Unusual 
techniques are employed to represent the disordered mind and capture the nature of auditory and 
visual hallucinations.  This is seen in films where the narrative focus is the subject of mental 
illness (Some Voices 2000) but also in films such as Julien Donkey Boy (1999) where the subject 
of mental illness acts as a justification for unsettling and unconventional film form.  
 
Psychosis is also a useful device for adding filmic complication in terms of appearance versus 
reality. A frequently used device is to see through the eyes of the person experiencing psychosis 
(Rosemary’s Baby 1968, Images, 1972, A Beautiful Mind 2001, Spider 2002). The result is 
uncertainty and enigma coding – we are disorientated in time and place and unable to trust our 
experiences, (a simulation of psychosis itself). When challenged about the reality of his 
imaginary controller, Styvesen, Romulus in The Sign of The Killer (2001) insists, “Styveson is 
much truer than reality – he invented reality”. Appearance and reality also form important 
aspects of characterization in films that feature psychosis. Norman Bates appears anodyne in 
Psycho (1960); Romulus’ disheveled appearance in The Sign of the Killer (2001) belies his 
musical genius.  James in Twelve Monkeys (1995) takes on many aspects of the stereotypical 
psychiatric patient: he appears to lack motor movement and is shown to be under the influence of 
heavy sedatives; he drools and his facial expressions are uncontrolled. He is also the familiar, 
beleaguered science fiction hero whom nobody believes or understands. He is made to appear 
alien and vulnerable but his mission is to save the world.  
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A recognizable, and partially schizophilic, discourse in films that feature psychosis is the 
connection between ‘madness’ and enhanced ability of some sort. Roy Porter recognises a 
perceived link between ‘madness’ and ‘authentic’ art:  
 
 True art – as opposed to the good taste favoured by the bourgeoisie – sprang from the 
morbid and pathological: sickness and suffering fired and liberated the spirit, perhaps with 
the aid of hashish, opium, and absinthe and works of genius were hammered out of the 
anvil of pain (2002:81). 
 
Often the benefits conferred by psychosis on screen are artistic in nature. Casey in Mad Love 
(1995) and Joon in Benny and Joon (1993) are both artists; Mr Jones (Mr Jones (1993)) and 
Romulus (Sign of the Killer (2001)) are both musicians. Biopics are a reminder that ‘genius’ and 
mental illness are compatible.  Shine (1996) is based on the life of concert pianist David 
Helfgott; An Angel at My Table (1990) is an autobiographical account of the life of author Janet 
Frame and A Beautiful Mind (2001) focuses on John Nash’s mathematical ability. Film 
prioritises artistic ability as a narrative structure; Carolyn Anderson and John Lupo emphasise 
the romantic tendencies of the biopic: 
 
The lament of the tortured artist is a biopic trope with particular appeal to filmmakers who 
are, or fancy themselves, artists…contemporary biopics about artists on the fringe are the 
iconoclasts’ song to themselves (2002:97). 
 
Sometimes the nature of the advantage conferred by psychosis is less specific.  In Lilith (1964) 
Stephen says that he can feel “colours” in madness and we are told that the inmates of the asylum 
have “extraordinary minds – they have seen too much with too fine an instrument.” This notion 
of heightened sensitivity also appears in Mr Jones (1993) where Richard Gere is able to identify 
obscure accents with great accuracy. A familiar narrative is that investing in someone who 
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experiences psychosis is difficult but worthwhile. Casey in Mad Love (1995) takes Ben out of his 
conventional environment; she is demanding but she is beautiful and exciting. Ray’s 
schizophrenia in Some Voices (2000) makes him “different – funny and dynamic”.  
 
Violence and Psychosis 
Discourses that link violence and psychosis are prominent in film but notably absent in the 
clinical naming of psychosis (Chapter 4). Byrne argues that “if it bleeds it leads: violence, injury 
and death often ensure prominence of a story in both news and film” (2009:287).  He also 
considers that “film makers have focused not just on the 10% of people with psychosis who may 
become violent during their illness but on the tiny proportion who kill” (2009:293). The 
explanation for the conflation of film and violence may link to the earlier section of this chapter, 
which considers film as entertainment. John Corner outlines the cultural paradox that forms of 
behavior which are considered wrong underpin “a wide range of popular culture” (1998:104). He 
argues “that violence (like stereotyping) is hard to dispense with, is possibly even essential to 
narratives.  It provides action, intensifies characterization, serves to make vivid the resolution of 
certain plots, and is a chance to display special FX in films” (Branston 2000:167). Corner 
believes it is necessary to “come to terms with the widespread enjoyment of depicted violence” 
in order to understand the paradox (1998:104). Violence occurs in escalating degrees in films 
that feature psychosis; it can manifest in self-harm, (A Beautiful Mind, (2001), Benny and Joon, 
(1993), Lilith (1964) and Mad Love (1995)). Comedies, which might not be immediately 
associated with violence, are notable for reinforcing the link between it and mental illness.  In 
What About Bob? (1991) Bob presents as neurotic and agoraphobic.  It is incongruous, therefore, 
that Dr Marvin tells his family, “Don’t you understand this guy is crazy, he could be a mass 
murderer?” In The Dream Team (1989) a cheerful patient tells a member of the public “I’m an 
escaped mental patient with a history of violence” and in Me, Myself and Irene (2000) Charley’s 
sons are told, “Your dad’s sick mentally – he’s a danger to be around.”  Sometimes violence is 
implied; protagonists are used to inject menace in to a narrative. James in Twelve Monkeys 
(1995) is powerful and needs restraint; Ray in Some Voices (2000) has a forensic history and is 
linked with arson.  Julien in Julien Donkey Boy (1999) possesses a gun and is implicated in the 
death of a child. Sometimes the violence is diegetically actual; Dr Bowen in Mr Jones (1993) is 
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almost strangled by a patient.  In more extreme instances mental illness is linked with murder 
(Spider 2002). Sometimes this can be multiple murder, as in The Cabinet of Dr Caligari (1920), 
Psycho (1960), Repulsion (1965) and Shutter Island (2010).  
 
Sexuality and psychosis 
 
Psychosis and the discourses that surround it problematise traditional screen representations of 
sexuality.  Occasionally films rely upon a medical model to explain how psychosis affects 
sexuality; A Beautiful Mind (2001), for example, acknowledges that psychiatric drugs lead to 
reduced libido.  Mr Jones (1993) is unusual in documenting an increased libido in mania as there 
is a filmic tendency to treat psychosis and sexuality as incompatible. McMurphy in One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975) and Billy in The Dream Team (1988) are both sexually 
motivated; notably, however, it is contestable whether they are mentally ill. I would argue that an 
air of chasteness or innocence is sometimes constructed around the psychotic protagonist. Joon’s 
sexual relationship (Benny and Joon 1993) is depicted as childlike and clumsy. Ray is sexually 
active (Some Voices 2000) but there is a similar sense of wonderment and awkwardness about 
the sex scenes which is romanticised and possibly linked with issues of consent or what Ross 
refers to as “the infantilization of disabled people” (1997:660). Lack of emphasis upon sex in 
films that feature psychosis may only be a reflection of a general trend in mainstream Hollywood 
romantic comedy, however. Whilst Tamar Jeffers McDonald concedes that “at the heart of every 
romantic comedy is the implication of sex, and settled, secure, within a relationship sex at that” 
(2007:13) she also points out that “the current form of romantic comedy…greatly de-emphasises 
sexuality” (2007:97).  Jeffers McDonald argues that current romcoms “have to work hard to find 
ways to explain why sex is not happening for its main couple” and that “rapturous sex 
is…portrayed as something immature, something not a lot like love, which…is based more on 
shared conversation, disappointments and compromises than heady physical pleasure” (2007:97). 
Whilst recognising this general trend I would argue that awareness of psychiatric pathology and 
consequent vulnerability makes “rapturous sex” particularly inappropriate for protagonists who 
experience psychosis.  Instead sexuality is used to complicate the narrative – for example in 
doctor/patient liaisons.  Despite Byrne’s assertion that “in the real world, where psychiatrists 
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rarely sleep with their patients, men violate trust two to three times more often than women” 
(2009: 287), female psychiatrists form relationships with patients throughout film history 
(Spellbound (1945), Mr Jones (1993), Twelve Monkeys (1995)); occasionally a female health 
professional becomes romantically involved with a female (Asylum Erotica 1971, Persona 
1966). In rare instances a male psychiatrist falls in love with a female patient (Suddenly Last 
Summer (1959). I have yet to note a male professional forming a romantic bond with a male 
patient.  Filmic discourse also associates psychosis with sexual ‘deviance’. Shock Corridor 
(1963) depicts sexuality in a gratuitous and varied way. Incest (feigned) is synonymous with 
insanity in a film which also exploits aspects of fetishism.  Central protagonist Johnny Barrett, 
played by Peter Breck, is tortured by intrusive thoughts of his girlfriend’s profession as a 
stripper; his ultimate descent into madness is punishment for her ‘deviance’. Incest and insanity 
are also linked in Spider (2002) where, as a young boy, Dennis, played by Ralph Fiennes, 
experiences delusions that his mother is a prostitute.  In Psycho (1960) Norman is dominated by 
thoughts of his mother; he is voyeuristic and his ‘madness’ is linked with sexual inexperience or 
dysfunction.  
 
It is notable that the female is central in narratives that feature sexuality and psychosis even 
when the central protagonist is male.  Linda Williams points out that in both Psycho (1960) and 
Dressed to Kill (1980) “although the body of the attacker might appear to be male, it is really the 
woman in this man who kills” (1992:571). The female is linked with promiscuity and 
‘nymphomania’ is a ‘medical’ diagnosis (Asylum Erotica 1971, Lilith 1964).  Lilith is 
disinhibited and behaves inappropriately with a minor and in Suddenly Last Summer (1959) 
Catherine is accused of erotomania; male members of staff are nervous of going on the female 
ward because of the aggressive, sexual presence of women.  A warder is banned from the female 
ward in Shock Corridor (1963) for the same reason. At the other end of the spectrum the female 
is presented as frigid. Virginia in The Snake Pit (1948), (her name is not coincidental), cannot 
form relationships with men because of traumatic events in early life. The repulsion Carole feels 
(Repulsion 1965) is towards men and, by extension, sex.  Her sister’s affair with a married man 
influences her appraisal of men as predators. Three Faces of Eve (1957) juxtaposes presentations 
of both the frigid and sexually available central protagonist.  Eve White is a shy housewife 
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referred to by her psychiatrist as “that dreary little woman from across the river.”  Eve Black, the 
second aspect of Eve’s disassociative identity disorder, is promiscuous; she makes sexual 
advances to both her husband and her psychiatrist.  It is interesting that Eve Black is Eve’s 
maiden name and that both psychiatrist and husband find her sexuality equally inappropriate. 
Certain films feature very beautiful women who exhibit both mental and physical fragility and do 
not invite but, nevertheless, receive a sexual response.  A predatory interest that is not 
reciprocated is seen repeatedly (Repulsion 1965, Red Desert 1964, Mad Love 1995) introducing 
discourse about responsibility and consent.   
 
I would argue that psychosis adds complication to the ‘to be looked at position’ made famous by 
Laura Mulvey in Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema (1989).  Mulvey argues that: 
 
Traditionally the woman displayed has functioned on two levels: as erotic object for the 
characters within the screen story, and as erotic object for the spectator within the 
auditorium, with a shifting tension between the looks on either side of the screen 
(2000:40). 
 
In Repulsion (1965) the greater knowledge of the audience means that they do not appraise 
Carole in the same way as the on-screen male; unrestricted narration about her mental state 
increases tension and challenges convention. Ellis points out that:  
 
Obsessively in classical narrative films it is women who cannot be fitted in, who represent 
a problem or a threat to the male self-definitions and masculine positions. So women are 
eliminated from the story entirely...threatened and brutally assaulted…punished for 
embodying a sexuality that is as puzzling and threatening to the males as it is desired...or 
are tamed into a secondary role, a safe role by the  ‘happy end’ (1992:67). 
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The conventional vulnerability of the female protagonist is also noted by Andrew Tudor, who 
refers to the “terrorizing” narrative in the horror film where “young, isolated women are preyed 
upon by marauding psychotics” (1989:58).  There is an obvious reversal in Repulsion (1965) 
where Carol becomes the “marauding psychotic” but also a complication because she remains 
the object of the gaze. Stacey considers that visual pleasure results from the combination of “two 
contradictory processes: the first involves objectification of the image and the second 
identification with it.” Traditionally the spectator identifies with the main male protagonist, 
thereby indirectly possessing the central female who appears as sexual object (2000:451).  This 
does not occur in Repulsion (1965) as the viewer is all too aware of the on screen male’s error of 
judgement. Ellis considers that cinematic identification is comprised of two essential 
components:  
 
First there is that of dreaming and phantasy that involve the multiple and contradictory 
tendencies within the construction of the individual.  Second there is the experience of 
narcissistic identification with the image of a human figure perceived as other (1992:42). 
 
It is difficult to identify cinematically with the psychotic protagonist, perhaps, because spectators 
do not wish to recognize their own psyche in the screen portrayal. Ellis argues that “any act of 
looking in the cinema is constituted in the tension between voyeurism and fetishism” and that 
“fetishistic looking implies the direct acknowledgment and participation of the object viewed” 
(1992:47).  This position is more extreme and more problematic when the central protagonist’s 
physical perfection invites but is compromised by her murderous actions. Colin, played by John 
Fraser in Repulsion (1965) is attracted to central protagonist Catherine Deneuve; just as he 
experiences difficulty in reading her response, the viewer struggles to determine whether his look 
is acknowledged or returned. This situation is replicated in what Rhona Berenstein refers to as 
“hypnosis films”, a sub-genre of horror movies in which the male protagonist’s “ability to see 
what is happening” is often ineffectual (1996: 98). Berenstein considers the hypnotized heroine 
to be “a transformative figure, a woman who looks as if on the brink of death but who surges 
with a hidden life inside” (1996:107). The importance of hypnosis films, according to 
Berenstein, is that they ask the following questions:  
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Who looks at whom, in what way, and for how long?  Is the look returned?  What power 
does the character looking have within the diegesis?  And what power does the character 
being looked at have? (1996:100) 
 
Berenstein’s hypnotised female is an extreme example of a female body, categorised by Ellis as 
“dangerous in its mystery” (1992:47); the psychotic female approximates this and notably 
modifies the fetishistic gaze.  Mulvey argues that fetishistic scopophilia “builds up the physical 
beauty of the object, transforming it into something satisfying in itself” (2000:42) whilst Ellis 
suggests that the fetishistic gaze is “captivated by what it sees, does not wish to inquire further, 
to see more, to find out” (1992:47).  This is rendered problematic in films which feature 
psychotic females where the murderous actions of the female both complicate their beauty and 
demand further enquiry.  
 
The on-screen portrayal of psychotic females such as Carol in Repulsion (1965) offers an 
important challenge to any acceptance of the male gaze as unproblematic. Despite its huge 
influence Mulvey’s initial concept has been criticised as an “ahistorical, totalizing construction” 
(Humm 1997:17); this has led to revisions and addendums, including the work of Elizabeth 
Cowie who introduces “multiple cross gender identifications” (Humm 1997:25) and bell hooks 
who argues that race is suppressed by Mulvey’s narrow, psychoanalytic framework (Humm: 
1997:34). The result is a wider interpretation of what Jane Gaines calls “the right to look” (2000: 
346). As well as challenging the male pleasures foregrounded by Mulvey (1989), viewing the 
psychotic female protagonist might also offer what Berenstein calls “identification in 
opposition”. Here pleasure is generated when the viewer is given the opportunity to escape from 
their “everyday social, racial, sexual and economic roles” (1996:47). Viewing the discomfort of 
an on-screen male whose gaze does not carry with it the conventional “power of action 
and…possession” capable of annihilating the threat posed by women makes this possible 
(Kaplan 2000:121). In this instance cinematic entertainment renders male and female desire 
equally problematic.  Masculine desire can no longer be “assumed to be a set of positive 
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definitions: action towards a goal, activity in the world, aggressiveness, heterosexual desire”; 
female desire does not lead to a situation where “individual women end up mad precisely 
because they cannot find a place in the world of fiction” (Ellis 1992:48). Instead the psychotic 
female is empowered as a violent agent, thereby perpetuating psychiatric stigma (Byrne 2009: 
296).  
 
The Role of the Carer 
A further dominant film discourse, which is acknowledged in a clinical context in the naming of 
clinical psychosis (Chapter 4) and relatively ignored by those who have experienced psychosis 
(see Chapter 6), is the role of the carer. There is no particular pattern to the identity of the carer 
and generally film is sympathetic towards the role. In A Beautiful Mind (2001) we are made 
aware of the financial and emotional stress which mental illness can confer on a spouse. 
Similarly A Woman Under the Influence (1974) explores the difficulties faced by a husband and 
father attempting the dual roles of a job and caring for his children after his wife is admitted to 
hospital. In Julien Donkey Boy (1999) the whole family respond to Julien’s needs without any 
apparent intervention from psychiatric services; the stresses are immediately apparent when the 
father admits that he, “just can’t take it any longer.” In The Sign of the Killer (2001) it is a 
daughter who must take on responsibility for a father with schizophrenia as his ex-wife will no 
longer fulfill this role. A sense of poignancy and loss are apparent when the daughter gets a 
fleeting insight into their previous roles: “just for a second, just for a fucking second it was like I 
was actually talking to my father.”  
 
Film discourse can also act as a criticism of over-protection on the part of the family member. In 
Some Voices (2000) Ray is found naked, in the street, re-arranging bin bags.  His brother seems 
justified in telling him that he must stand over him “morning noon and night”. At the same time 
the narrative tells us that Pete finds it very hard to stop being the carer; his role impacts on his 
personal relationships and may have contributed to the breakdown of his marriage. The same 
narrative is enacted in Benny and Joon (1993) where Benny limits Joon’s independence through 
over-protection. An extreme version is seen in Love Actually (2003) where Sarah “gives up on 
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love” in order to constantly administer to a brother with mental illness. These films suggest that 
responsibility should be devolved, at times, to professional and social services.  
  
Demedicalisation: Love Conquers All 
The final example of a dominant filmic discourse, which is wholly absent from those identified 
in Chapter 4 is the cinematic staple of “love conquers all”.  Frank Krutnik considers that the 
‘power of love’ is such a strong motif that it is often more important than a central character and 
can play the part of the antagonist (2002a:138). Referring to romantic comedy Krutnik argues 
that:  
 
Conceptualisations of love may constantly be in flux…but the genre routinely celebrates it 
as an immutable, almost mystical force that guides two individuals who are ‘made for each 
other’ into one another’s arms.  Love is shown triumphing over all manner of obstructions, 
over all kinds of differences in social status, cultural background and personality 
(2002a:138). 
 
Similarly Kathrina Glitre sees romantic love as “constructed as entirely ‘natural’, a force that 
knows no bounds and that cannot be resisted” (2006:106). Glitre argues, however, that romance 
must be understood as a fictional mode which “often draws attention to the gap between reality 
and fiction by embracing artifice” (2006:16). Gabbard and Gabbard consider that “romantic 
liaison films contribute to the demedicalisation of psychiatry by suggesting that disturbed people 
need only love and that if psychiatrists really care they can save their patients by supplying that 
love” (1999:20). Certainly love is shown to have a healing function in films featuring psychosis, 
for example in Spellbound (1945) where John Ballantyne is completely rehabilitated as a result 
of Constance’s love and support (she is aptly named). Joon’s psychosis is not cured by meeting 
Sam (Benny and Joon 1993) but she is certainly comforted and calmed by his presence. The 
bond between husband and wife in A Woman Under the Influence (1974) would also support the 
theory of love ultimately conquering all. Schatz argues that the conclusion of the romance film 
leads to a sense of loss because complexity has been masked “through romantic coupling” and 
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sacrificed in pursuit of the happy ending (1981:33). Romantic love, therefore, reflects ideology; 
it foregrounds the contradictions that exist between screen presentations and the real world and 
attempts to provide ready solutions. Jeffers McDonald suggests that the utopian ending “reveals 
its anxiety over the possibility of lasting love in…society” (2007:92) and Schatz sees the 
popularity of the romantic comedy genre as related to its function of offering up a problem and 
employing cycles of conflict to achieve resolution (1981:34). It is notable, however, that love 
does not always prove capable of providing solutions in films that feature psychosis.  In The 
Snake Pit (1948) Virginia cannot contemplate love until her psychiatric problems are resolved. 
Love complicates rather than resolves Mr Jones’ problems (Mr Jones 1993) and in Sign of the 
Killer (2001) and Requiem for a Dream (2000) love proves to be inadequate in the face of 
psychosis. Notably love in films that feature psychosis need not always be romantic love. In 
Some Voices (2000) Ray’s romance is unsuccessful; his girlfriend is unable to cope with the 
severity of his illness. Sibling love proves to be stronger; the film ends with the two brothers 
reconciled after an intense physical and emotional struggle which affirms their commitment to 
each other. Love, in this instance, has conquered all.  
 
In addition to noting dominant discourse in films that feature psychosis it is also important to 
consider shared areas of clinical and filmic discourse.  The next section of the chapter will also 
be subdivided because of its length. In it I will argue that common areas of discourse between 
film and the naming of clinical psychosis are the foregrounding of medical authority and a focus 
on the division between pathology and normality.  I will argue that film problematises the latter 
by presenting ‘psychotic’ protagonists without explanation in order to provide narrative 
‘shortcuts’ and also ‘others’ and sensationalises both psychotic protagonists and minor 
characters. I identify a further example of shared discourse as the recognition of psychiatric 
power. Aspects of Foucauldian surveillance and authoritarianism circulate in representations of 
the asylum, psychiatric treatments and the psychiatrist; these are occasionally mediated by 
positive representation and are challenged by a strong vein of anti-authoritarian discourse.   
 
 
	  
175	  
	  
DISCOURSES THAT FEATURE IN FILM AND IN THE CLINICAL NAMING OF 
PSYCHOSIS. 
  
The Influence of Medical Discourse 
 
The influence of medical authority on films that feature psychosis can be emphatic; The Three 
Faces of Eve (1957) begins with the authoritative voice of Alistair Cook instructing the audience 
that Eve’s story is true and was presented to The American Psychiatric Association in 1953. 
Fleming and Manvell see this as “an attempt to make the film a quasi documentary of a clinical 
case study” (1985:66). More generally medical terminology exerts power and diagnosis is 
largely unquestioned in films representing psychosis; its relevance and importance, however, can 
vary widely. In The Dream Team (1989), for example, the sole manifestation of a character’s 
‘split’ personality is his false conviction that he is a doctor whereas in The Sign of the Killer 
(2001) the central protagonist’s schizophrenia is coded much more thoroughly through his belief 
that he is receiving messages via the television, his conviction that a landmark tower emits 
destructive rays and is controlled by his nemesis and his daughter’s opinion that he is 
“completely delusional”. The ownership and validity of medical terminology is occasionally 
contested, for example in David and Lisa (1998) where the central protagonist and in-patient, 
David, studies medical literature and ‘adopts’ another resident as his focus of study.  He employs 
medical vocabulary and informs his psychiatrist, “She has dissociative reactions.  I hope you 
don’t think she has schizophrenia.”  The psychiatrist, conversely, is keen to stress that he takes 
“particular pains not to use psychiatric terms.”  This role reversal highlights the power play 
associated with medical terminology. Diagnosis is not always treated with reverence. In Me, 
Myself & Irene (2000) medical hubris is mimicked; the viewer is warned,  “this DVD may cause 
you to develop advanced delusional schizophrenia with narcissistic rage,” the medical label 
given to central character(s) Charley/Hank.  
 
A shared discourse between the naming of clinical psychosis and film is a questioning of the 
division between pathology and normality – after all, as Palliacci tells the audience in Shock 
Corridor (1963), “when we are asleep no one can tell a sane man from an insane man.” This also 
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proves difficult in waking life: Mr Deeds Goes to Town (1936) concludes with a judge 
pronouncing that Mr Deeds (who is being tried for insanity) “is not only sane, he is the sanest 
man who ever walked in to a court room.”  One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975) notably 
questions the nature of madness; it takes a Foucauldian stance in representing madness as a 
construct. Daniel Vitkus draws on Foucault in his belief that the protagonists “fight against the 
merciless language of non-madness” (1994:84). In Ken Kesey’s novel Chief Bromden believes 
that he is being controlled by a “combine” (a term which serves the duel purpose of referring to a 
huge piece of machinery but also wider social control).  This strong referential code for 
psychosis is not developed in the film where narrative emphasis is placed firmly upon the social 
construction of madness. Vitkus points out that the consultant psychiatrist, Dr Spivey’s:  
 
Liberal rhetoric which claims all the authority of science, medicine, technology and 
empirical truth is obviously false, while the Chief’s delusions about the Combine are in 
fact a more valid, though figurative description of reality (1994:72). 
 
The film also invites discussion about whether McMurphy’s actions can be interpreted as 
‘madness’.  In Ken Kesey’s novel McMurphy attacks and rapes Nurse Ratched; the rape is 
omitted in the film although McMurphy does subject her to a brutal attack.  Vitkus sees this 
violent act as a “representation of genuine madness” (1994: 85) thereby suggesting that 
McMurphy’s psychopathy constitutes true ‘madness’ rather than psychosis itself.  
 
Gabbard and Gabbard suggest that the interchangeability of “disturbed” and “normal” people 
constitutes a recognisable discourse in psychiatric film (1999:69).  The problematic identity of 
the “real” ‘madman’ occurs as early as The Cabinet of Dr Caligari (1920). Richard Murphy 
considers that the “psychological and representational structure in Caligari is characterized by a 
mode of ambiguity, a tendency toward the creation of doubles, double meaning and duplicity” 
(1991:48). The use of the ‘unreliable’ narrator problematises the character of Dr Caligari and the 
incarceration of Francis at the end of the film means that it is impossible to determine who is 
delusional and who is not. Often the status of doctor and patient are reversed. This device is used 
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in Spellbound (1945) where Dr Murchison (a psychiatrist) is revealed as the murderer and is 
notable in comedies such as The Dream Team (1989) and What About Bob? (1991). Andrew 
Stott views reversal as a particular feature of comedy, which relies “upon a culturally defined 
sense of compatible orders, such as the displacement of people or discourses, to produce 
ambiguity and the feeling that normality has been momentarily decentred for pleasurable ends” 
(2005: 10). He suggests that: 
   
The inversion of the good with the bad, the wise and the foolish, and the mad with the 
sane, lies at the heart of the ‘eccentric’ vision of comedy where thoughts and experiences 
can coexist alongside ironic reflection on those same thoughts (2005:51).   
 
Reversal accounts for light-hearted interludes in films such as One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest 
(1975) where the patients impersonate psychiatrists whilst fishing but can also act as a more 
serious critique of medical authority. Dr Bowen’s impulsivity and disastrous personal life in Mr 
Jones (1993) question the doctor/patient divide; Nurse Ratched’s rigidity in One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest (1975) prompts concern about her suitability to pronounce upon the mental state 
of others and Vincent, a carer in Lilith (1964), is ultimately shown to be more unpredictable than 
Lilith herself.  
 
Reversal is not confined solely to medical personnel; in The Dream Team (1989) asylum inmates 
are juxtaposed with the congregation of a Baptist church.  The similarity in their respective 
behaviour invites questioning of the dividing line between religion and socially sanctioned 
madness. The representation of the family raises the issue of where eccentricity ends and mental 
illness begins. This is notable in Julien Donkey Boy (1999) where Julien’s family are so 
dysfunctional that their actions can be interpreted as contributing to his mental illness and also in 
A Woman Under the Influence (1974) where Nick does not have a named mental illness but 
seems as vulnerable as Mabel, at times. Nick cannot self-discipline and loses control; he 
physically threatens the GP and relies on his young children for guidance. Notably he questions 
the nature of mental illness and regards Mabel as “delicate, unusual, not crazy.” 
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A spectrum of films, (including popular film), questions distinctions between ‘normality’ and 
‘pathology’ in order, perhaps, to question discourses of authority and to celebrate ‘difference’.  
At the same time there is also an enduring tendency to present ‘psychotic’ protagonists with 
minimal explanation.  Tudor argues that horror movies attempt explanations, however clumsily, 
for madness; they “constantly allude to a loosely interlinked array of themes: family or parent 
derived repression (classically mother/son); perverse sexuality; male upon female voyeurism; a 
link between violent killing and sexual gratification; and…a predator prey relation between male 
psychotics and female victims” (1989:57). The tenuous nature of this motivation and the limited 
nature of representation will be considered next.  
 
Screen Portrayals of the Psychotic Individual 
 
The representation of the individual who is experiencing psychosis in film is crucial in terms of 
concepts of identity. Dyer highlights the importance of scrutinising representation as it has “real 
consequences for real people” (1993:3).  He argues that “how social groups are treated in cultural 
representation is part and parcel of how they are treated in life” and emphasises that “poverty, 
harassment, self-hate and discrimination (in housing, jobs, educational opportunity…) are shored 
up and instituted by representation” (1993:1). This has clear implications for those who 
experience psychosis. Dyer’s focus upon “representation as politics” (1993:127) is shared by 
Hall who argues that discourse theory “has radical implications for a theory of representation as 
individuals must subject themselves to its rules to become “the subjects of its power/knowledge” 
(1997:56). Kathryn Woodward links meaning production and identity; she argues that an 
examination of identity sheds light on social, cultural, economic and political discourse that may 
be dynamic (2007:11). Chouliaraki and Fairclough consider that “the struggle to find identities is 
one of the most pervasive themes of late modernity and one of the sharpest focuses of late 
modern reflexivity”(1999:96). They suggest that there has been an “unsettling of identities in the 
flux of late modernity” which has led to a struggle to negotiate both individual and collective 
identities. Woodward explores the concept of difference in identity:  
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Identity gives us an idea of who we are and of how we relate to others and to the world in 
which we live.  Identity marks the ways in which we are the same as others who share that 
position, and the ways in which we are different from those who do not.  Often identity is 
most clearly defined by difference, that is by what it is not.  Identities may be marked by 
polarization...and by the marking of inclusion or exclusion – insiders and outsiders, ‘us’ 
and ‘them’.  Identities are frequently constructed in terms of oppositions (1997:2). 
 
Woodward does not consider that difference is always construed negatively; she suggests that it 
can be “celebrated as a source of diversity, heterogeneity and hybridity, where the recognition of 
change and difference is seen as enriching” (1997:35). The issue of difference, in its positive and 
negative aspects, is important to a consideration of the representation of those who experience 
psychosis in film. Chouliaraki & Fairclough argue that it is crucial to consider “how to dialogue 
and act with others who are different?”; they consider that true democracy lies in recognising 
difference and finding ways to “dialogue across” it, thereby transcending it (1999:95). Media 
texts can play a vital part in constructing, representing and (de)valuing identity. Fairclough 
argues that a textual focus must establish whether the text is open and accepts “recognition of 
difference”, accentuates “difference and polemic” or attempts to “overcome difference”. It is 
notable that certain film texts featuring psychosis have critiqued the ‘othering’ of those with 
mental health difficulties. This occurs in Bedlam (1946) which is set in and exposes the historical 
practice of paying to see inmates as entertainment in this establishment. Family Life (1971) 
concludes with a Foucauldian critique of the way in which central protagonist Janice is subjected 
to a dehumanising medical gaze as an ‘exhibit’ for medical demonstration purposes.  
 
Despite critique, however, an examination of film texts indicates that ‘othering’ the individual 
that experiences psychosis is the rule rather than the exception. Wahl considers that this takes 
place through visual stereotypes. He cites the casting for One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest 
(1975) as an example: 
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One of the reported start up problems was finding a sufficient number of competent actors 
who looked unusual enough to portray mental patients.  Using actual patients from Oregon 
State Hospital where the movie was filmed, for walk on roles, was considered but such use 
was rejected because the real patients did not look distinct enough to depict mental patients 
on the screen (1995:38). 
Wahl argues that as “there is not even homogeneity of symptoms among those with mental 
illness” and as “there are many different disorders of varying symptoms and degrees of severity” 
difference ought to be reflected and not reduced to crude stereotypes (1995:51). Hall considers 
that the stereotype “reduces, essentializes, naturalizes and fixes ‘difference’”. He argues that 
stereotyping functions to maintain social order; it “facilitates the ‘binding’ or bonding together of 
all of Us who are ‘normal’ into one ‘imagined community’; and it sends into symbolic exile all 
of Them- ‘the Others’ who are in some way different (1997: 258). Dyer takes a broader view. He 
sees stereotypes as “highly charged with the feelings that are attached to them.  They are the 
fortress of our tradition and behind its defences we can continue to feel ourselves safe in the 
position we occupy” (1993:10). Like Homi Bhabha, who acknowledges the insecurity of the 
stereotype in his observation that it must be “anxiously repeated” (1983:62) Dyer questions the 
power of the stereotype, seeing it as “a mask for realities that are disturbingly fluid, impermanent 
and never really known.” (Dyer 1993:87). He moves beyond representation as politics to 
emphasise that stereotypes must also be considered from an aesthetic standpoint and according to 
how they work in fictional forms (1993:10).  
 
It could be argued that psychosis is, by its very nature, ‘other’ and that detailed portrayals of 
psychotic protagonists will inevitably reveal ‘difference’. Wahl points out:  
 
The truth is that those who suffer from mental illnesses are not fundamentally different 
from others.  Again, this is not to deny that people with such illnesses have specific 
symptoms that may be unusual, different, or even bizarre.  When those symptoms are being 
displayed individuals may indeed act and seem “different’ from others without those 
symptoms.  When the illness is severe or prolonged, it may even be difficult to recognize 
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the sufferer as the same person we knew before the illness.  Some also may be taking 
medications that produced tremors, facial contortions, or other odd movements.  But all of 
this is true with almost any illness (1995:46).  
 
Ray in Some Voices (2000) wears old-fashioned clothes; his posture is characterised by a fixed 
stare and his actions are repetitive and clumsy. He is disinhibited and paranoid, at times. Ray is 
preoccupied with patterns and circles and expresses delusional beliefs; “when I’m depressed I 
become invisible…I don’t need clothes, I’m invisible.” To an extent, Ray is ‘othered’ by the 
degree of his illness and his medication as well as the semantic and syntactic choices prioritised 
in the film. The same can be said of Clegg in Spider (2002). The opening sequence shows a train 
emptying of passengers – it is a direct invitation to pick out the central protagonist.  Visually 
Clegg appears different to those around him: his clothing is comprised of multiple layers; he 
mumbles and his gait is hesitant and creeping; he is fixated by objects on the floor. Once again it 
could be argued that Clegg is ‘othered’ by both his illness and formal film elements.  
 
Unusually, some film texts representing psychosis choose not to ‘other’ their protagonists. The 
beginning to The Snake Pit (1948), for example, opens with two women in what appears to be a 
public park; one is distressed.  The film soon reveals that they are within the confines of an 
asylum and are both inmates.  The central protagonist is smartly dressed and well educated.  The 
film ultimately documents the detrimental effects of mental illness by charting Virginia’s weight 
loss and lack of interest in her appearance but the over-riding impression is that ‘otherness’ is 
transitory.  Depictions of those that experience psychosis sometimes avoid the impulse to 
simplify personality in psychosis. Mr Jones (Mr Jones 1993) is generous and energetic; he can 
also be petty and quick to anger. Mabel in A Woman Under the Influence (1974) has frequent 
mood swings; at times she is manic, at others paranoid.  She makes unusual gesticulations which 
are almost autistic in nature. At the same time she is strong; she is the homemaker who must take 
control and reassure her husband.  
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From early in film history, however, there has been a notable tendency to sensationalise 
characters from the psychiatric world. Cesare’s appeal in The Cabinet of Dr Caligari (1920) 
stems from his unworldly appearance, his sadness and his mysterious condition as a 
somnambulist.  Philip Simpson points out that he is also “one of the first multiple murderers in 
cinematic history” (2000:31).  The juxtaposition of psychosis, an unworldly appearance and 
deviance was, therefore, established at an early stage and is still observable in films such as 
Julien Donkey Boy (1999). Not all aspects of Julien’s presentation are deviant, (he enjoys word-
play, for example) but, as a protagonist who experiences psychosis, he is ‘othered’, both 
physically by his metal teeth and by the extremity of his actions: he is implicated in child 
murder; is in an incestuous relationship with his sister; cross-dresses and steals a dead baby from 
a hospital ward.  
 
It is notable, however, that ‘othering’ is not always achieved via physical difference; visual 
‘normality’ can be used to mask extremity and deviance.  The horror genre provides the starkest 
examples of this. Tudor notes the migration of the movie monster to the everyday landscape, 
interpreting this as a film-maker’s attempt to root fear in the “dangers posed by our own 
unpredictable psyches” (1989:47). Altman points out that horror pleasure is contingent upon 
“heightening viewer sensation” (2002: 153); he describes the horror audience’s desire to “seek 
out fear and the unlawful or inhuman” over the “security and the company of our kind and 
culture” (2002: 154).  There is an initial contradiction as ‘normality’ has replaced monstrosity; 
apparent ‘normality’, however, proves effective in subverting security. Barry Grant considers 
that Psycho (1960) was responsible for establishing “the horror of the normal” (1999:28). 
Whether it was Psycho (1960) alone is debatable; Steven Schneider argues that Mark in Peeping 
Tom (1960), from the same year, is “primarily coded as monstrous not because of some physical 
or mental deformity” but conversely because he appears to be “a pretty nice, pretty normal 
looking bloke” (2003:177); Tudor links the “metamorphoses of” these “seemingly sane young 
men into compulsive killers” to issues of sexuality (1989:99).  Simpson argues that apparent 
‘normality’ does not diminish monstrosity.  He suggests that “the serial killer…appears human 
but a “hidden” monstrosity radiates a kind of moral leprosy that taints all who come in contact, 
much like werewolves or vampires infect others with their ‘disease’ (2000:10). Deborah Knight 
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and George McKnight distinguish between the presentation of Norman Bates (Psycho 1960) and 
Michael Myers (Halloween 1978) as serial killers, arguing that the first film is interested in “the 
psychology of psychosis” whilst the second has “little or no psychological depth”(2003:216). 
Tudor similarly considers that Halloween offers “only minimal characterization of the psychotic” 
(1989:200). He observes a distinction between madness and psychosis, viewing madness as 
“fundamentally represented as a form of diffuse unreason” which is “rooted in an excess of the 
passions” and psychosis as a type of unreason that is “concealed beneath a surface of apparent 
normality” (1989: 200).  Tudor also differentiates between “characterized psychosis” and 
“uncharacterized psychosis”.  “Characterized psychosis” proves to “make sense at some level” 
and is often explained by a psychiatrist; “uncharacterized psychosis” is “no longer subject to 
reason, either as understanding or control.  It is now something ‘other’ something strictly 
inexplicable and the once intelligible psychotic has metamorphosed into an irresistible bogey 
man lurking within our own homes and ourselves” (1989:205). An explanation for these 
developments is offered by Wahl who argues that the use of the mentally ill protagonist avoids 
lengthy and detailed explanations of motive via the provision of the rarely questioned ‘rationale’ 
of mental illness (1995:112). Altman points out that in offering counter cultural pleasure horror 
movies “produce pleasure in proportion to the distance that must be traversed in order to restore 
order...to kill the monster…The greater the risk the greater the pleasure of the return to safety” 
(2002:156). By not making sense, “uncharacterized psychosis” appears to offer more risk and, 
therefore, more pleasure to the audience.  
 
Two debates stem from the presentation of “psychotic” but apparently “normal” serial killers 
which are of relevance to those who experience psychosis; the first is concerned with the 
definition of the monster and the second with the distinction between psychosis and 
transgression.  Noel Carroll argues that a true horror monster must exhibit features that go 
beyond the boundaries delineated in psychiatric texts; for Carroll, Norman Bates is not a monster 
because he is “a type of being that science countenances” (1990:38). Knight and McKnight, 
however, counter Carroll’s argument by suggesting that “what marks out a monster isn’t the 
degree to which it offends science, but the degree to which it offends morality” (2003:214). By 
Carroll’s definition someone experiencing psychosis could not be considered a ‘monster’ but by 
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Knight and McNight’s they could.  The second debate concerns the distinction between 
psychosis and transgression; it can be illustrated by attitudes towards the serial killers in the film 
Natural Born Killers (1994).  Screenwriter Dave Veloz states “instead of being sick Mickey and 
Mallory are just plain evil,” (2000:180). Lucille Cairns observes the same distinction, arguing 
that “transgression of ‘natural’ laws differs from pathology in that sickness is involuntary, 
transgression intentional” (2006:52).  The link between violence and psychosis remains 
problematic (Clarke 2004: 16). Fleming and Manvell refer to the “murderous drooling 
psychopath” as the “star” of films including Halloween (1978) and Friday the Thirteenth (1980); 
they point out that “America has easily accepted this image, since it plays on some of the most 
basic aspects of primitive thought, those which equate murder with the mad as a way of 
distancing such an act from the world of the sane” 1985:109.  It is vital to continue to question 
the association as it has potential consequences for those who experience psychosis, their 
families and wider society (Byrne 2000:28). 
 
The representation of the psychotic individual is also notably inflected by the comedy genre. 
Andre Bazin considers that comedy is “in reality the most serious genre in Hollywood” reflecting 
“through the comic mode, the deepest moral and social beliefs of American life” (1982:35). It is, 
therefore, important to pay it close attention. Altman argues that “excess is one of many ways in 
which genres embody counter-cultural expression” (2002:158); excess is notable in comedies 
featuring psychosis such as What About Bob? (1991), The Dream Team (1989) and Me, Myself 
and Irene (2000). These films are also notable for their star status, most notably Bill Murray in 
What About Bob? (1991) and Jim Carrey in Me, Myself and Irene (2000).  Steve Seidman refers 
to ‘comedian comedy’, which establishes a relationship between specific performers and the 
comedy genre (1981). Neale suggests that comedic stars operate as “anomalies and misfits…they 
often portray eccentric or deviant characters, characters given to dreaming, to disguise, to 
regression and to bouts of madness” (2000:62). The link between comedy and ‘madness’ is 
clearly relevant to those who have experienced psychosis.  Stott argues that “comic 
characterization is usually subordinate to the demands of the plot and is therefore more 
effectively realized with stereotypes and one dimensional characters” (2005:41). This explains 
the strong visual codes (including a Hawaiian shirt and a chicken suit) employed in The Dream 
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Team (1989) to differentiate asylum inmates. In such comedies characters might be described as 
exhibiting learning disability rather than psychiatric illness.  Stott provides an explanation: 
 
Many comic characters might be said to play on our fears of being incomplete humans 
through their failures of self-awareness or inability to reflect on the nature of experience.  
Comic characters are traditionally one-dimensional in the sense that they are apparently 
unable to learn and change...comic identity is derived from a sense of atrophied 
consciousness (2005: 41). 
 
The comedy genre serves, at times, to ‘other’ those who experience mental illness; Me, Myself 
and Irene (2000) is a notable example. The premise of the film is that Charley is ‘schizophrenic’ 
and, therefore, ‘two’ people. When psychotic Charley undergoes a Hulk like transformation to 
become Hank, physical comedy and the frequent use of linguistic terminology such as “schizo” 
“nuts” and “maniac” denote his ‘psychosis’. His voice becomes gruff and wheezy; he smokes 
and has sex (these actions are implicitly ‘deviant’). Hank is notably disinhibited; he attempts to 
breastfeed and defecates on suburban lawns. Stott notes that comedy “strategically bypasses 
civility to return us to our body, emphasizing our proximity to the animals, reminding us of our 
corporeality and momentarily shattering the apparently global imperatives of manners and 
beauty” (2005:86). In this way comedy is linked to carnival in its revolt against accepted values 
and its celebration of the body and the senses (Danow 1995:3-4) and is generated when Charley, 
as ‘psychotic’ Hank, violates social taboos in order to provoke laughter.  
 
The treatment of minor characters is also revelatory of attitudes towards psychosis. Murray 
Smith refers to “stick people” or background characters (1995: 124); they are an important aspect 
of Hollywood film but are differentiated from the central character who appears comparatively 
“salient and legible” (1995:125). Smith argues that “minor characters, and even unindividuated 
figures who populate the background, have the same potential for an inner life as the major 
characters” (1995:150) but often, in films that feature psychosis, they remain a shadowy 
background presence (the “chronics” in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975) for example). 
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Characters also tend to act as a foil to the presentation of the main character; Terence in Spider 
(2002) is a comedic survivor of colonial Africa who contrasts with Clegg’s subdued but 
disturbing presence. Smith argues that minor characters both conform with and depart from 
stereotypes and he links this with plausibility:  
 
In some cases and for some audiences, the mark of plausibility will be a high degree of 
conformity with a stereotype; in other cases and for other audiences just the opposite is true 
– the plausible character is the character that ‘goes beyond’ or breaks with familiar types 
(1995:116).   
 
Minor characters in films that feature psychosis tend to conform to stereotypes; they are 
employed to carry out the predictable routines of asylum inmates in films as diverse as The 
Cabinet of Doctor Caligari (1920) and Manic (2001). They do not depart from stereotypical 
roles so much as display extremity within these roles.  
This is probably best exemplified in Shock Corridor (1963) where an imaginative range of 
asylum inmates includes: an opera singer; an H bomb scientist; a man who thinks he is an army 
confederate; a black man who considers himself white and a man who believes he is pregnant.  
All of them are more flamboyant than central protagonist, Johnny Barrett, who appears 
misplaced in comparison.  This is explained by Smith’s argument that supporting characters in 
Hollywood film are required to be “more animated or broadly expressive” than the lead 
(1995:159) but is not always the case; McMurphy explodes on to the set in One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest (1975). Often other inmates are shown to be inferior to the central character.  In 
Shock Corridor (1963) the way in which the other inmates eat revolts Johnny Barrett. 
Catherine’s beauty and French clothes set her apart in Suddenly Last Summer (1959); her 
psychiatrist does not want her to feel that “she is a patient.” The attractive central protagonist 
appears frequently in films that feature psychosis.  This includes men (Mr Jones (1993)) but is 
most notable amongst female protagonists (Lilith (1964), Girl Interrupted (1999)). In general the 
gaze is reserved for attractive people whose ‘mental illness’ proves to be more treatable than 
their less fortunate associates. Supporting characters are important in providing narrative 
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causality (Albert’s childlike need to stop the bus is the catalyst for ensuing drama in The Dream 
Team (1989), for example). They also fulfill the important function of aiding insight in to the 
main character. Smith argues that the way in which major characters behave towards minor 
characters is “an important device of moral orientation” (1995:188).  This is most notable in 
instances where minor characters display vulnerability; McMurphy wins the approbation of the 
audience by championing the cause of less assertive inpatients in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s 
Nest (1975) whilst Lisa alienates it as a result of her cruelty to Daisy in Girl Interrupted (1999).  
 
Another prominent discourse that is present in both the naming of psychosis and the 
representation of psychosis in film is predicated on issues of power. This provides the focus for 
the next section of the chapter. 
 
Power Play 
Remington argues that “mental illness frequently forms a bridge to other social- political issues 
or the power politics of diagnosis, enforced hospitalisation and treatment” (2011:152). The 
asylum acts as a powerful icon of psychiatric power and has featured in film since its inception. 
The distinctive set design of the asylum in The Cabinet of Dr Caligari (1920) makes it attractive 
and opulent; the inpatients are generally young, physically attractive and gentle. Congenial 
representations of the asylum also feature in films from later eras. Shorter provides an 
explanation by pointing out that “for psychiatrists the fig leaf of nerves offered a chance to 
escape the asylum for lucrative private practice with middle-class patients” in purpose built 
clinics and retreats (1997:113). The atmosphere in the asylum in Spellbound (1945) is relaxed; 
the doctors wear dressing gowns whilst the patients stroll in the grounds. The asylum gardens are 
beautifully landscaped in Asylum Erotica (1971) where patients are depicted playing croquet. 
Institutional care offers respite in Benny and Joon (1993) and Some Voices (2000) and is an 
infinitely preferable choice to David than his familial home in David and Lisa (1998). Both Karl 
and Clegg are comforted by a return to the security of the asylum in Sling Blade (1996) and 
Spider (2002) respectively. Generally, however, representations of the asylum are negative and 
emphasise mystique. Occasionally this mystique is resisted, for example in A Woman Under the 
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Influence (1974) where Mabel’s inpatient treatment and ECT are not part of the diegesis. Benny 
and Joon (1993) also demystifies the asylum as one of Benny’s friends works there rendering it 
knowable. The asylum in Shutter Island (2010), however, is both mysterious and formidable; the 
approach to it is made across an inhospitable stretch of water and accompanied by a discordant 
soundtrack. Block ‘C’, a granite construction, is particularly forbidding, housing the most 
dangerous criminally insane. In Psycho (1960) Norman objects to Marion’s attempt to temper the 
asylum with the use of the euphemism “someplace”: 
 
You mean an institution? A madhouse?  People always call a madhouse someplace, don’t 
they?  Put her some place…Have you ever seen the inside of one of those places?  The 
laughter and the tears and the cruel eyes studying you?  
 
Often the asylum is synonymous with repression.  The Snake Pit (1948) gets its name from the 
ancient practice of throwing the insane in to pits full of snakes in the hope that this will cure 
them (Foucault 2007).  A bird’s eye view presents the asylum as overcrowded, and seething like 
a snake pit; it is characterized by noise and petty rules. Erb sees The Snake Pit (1948) as one in a 
series of films which focused on the “postwar phenomenon known as deinstitutionalization”.  
She argues that the representation of the asylum and its inmates was directly influenced by news 
photographs (2006:50) and was a response to concerns about conditions in American state 
mental hospitals (2006:45). The institutionalized and utilitarian nature of the asylum is 
frequently captured by the colour of the paint (green in Some Voices (2000)) or a brick wall 
(Suddenly Last Summer (1959)).  Its lofty, Victorian architecture is utilised as an impressive 
architectural background in Shutter Island (2010) and Twelve Monkeys (1995) where the vaulted 
rooms and lift shafts provide a location for action sequences and the iron bedsteads and shadows 
build up atmosphere.  There are inevitable links between the asylum and prison. In Shock 
Corridor (1963) the eponymous corridor resembles a prison landing; it is a crucial meeting place 
where all social interaction takes place, hierarchy is determined and acts of petty criminality are 
enacted. The asylum embodies aspects of Foucauldian surveillance and authoritarianism. In One 
Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975) Dr Spivey tells McMurphy, “we are going to study you.” 
The opening sequence of the film emphasises doors, locks, harsh lighting, strapping and an ECT 
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suite. In this asylum there are distinct rules about physical space; specific zones are controlled so 
that they are inaccessible to patients.  Vitkus sees the ward as a microcosm of a wider world:  
The routine of ward life…is a grotesque and exaggerated version of everyday life under 
American capitalism.  It is a dehumanizing, tedious and repetitive pattern which is 
scientifically measured and automatically scheduled for maximum precision (1994:71). 
 
The deadening nature of incarceration is evident even in light-hearted comedies such as The 
Dream Team (1989) where a determined “prison break” is in danger of collapse because “it’s 
chicken chow mein tonight.” It becomes a central theme in One Flew Over The Cuckoo’s Nest 
(1975) which subjects interpretations of freedom to a more thorough analysis. The asylum is also 
viewed as a destructive force which has the potential to harm central characters such as 
Catherine in Suddenly Last Summer (1959).  
 
The physical building of the asylum becomes the setting for a range of psychiatric treatments, all 
of which are potentially harmful.  Treatment ranges from art therapy (Crazy People (1990)) to 
hydrotherapy (The Snake Pit (1948)) and tends to reflect the era in which the film was made. The 
straightjacket is a recognizable icon which is used as early as The Cabinet of Dr Caligari (1920).  
Gabbard & Gabbard consider that psychiatry is consistently demedicalised in film in favour of “a 
striking overrepresentation of “the talking cure” and an equally striking underrepresentation of 
treatments such as ECT” (1999:27).  Their explanation is that “simplified talking psychiatry 
offers more drama and consolation than the scientifically technical aspects of the profession” 
(1999:44).  I would argue that whilst the “talking cure” is in evidence, ECT has also been 
represented throughout film history, indeed Andrew McDonald and Garry Walter have traced its 
representation in American film (2001). The portrayal of ECT might simply reflect a distressing 
reality; in An Angel at My Table (1990), for example, we learn that Janet Frame has had two 
hundred treatments over eight years, “each one like the fear of an executioner”.  McDonald and 
Walter conclude, however, that the portrayal of ECT has become “progressively more negative 
and cruel” (2001:264) and Byrne that it “will always get a rough cinematic ride” (2009:219).  
Certainly, along with other treatments, it is frequently employed for its dramatic potential, 
190	  
	  
although this is not the case in A Woman Under the Influence (1974) where ECT takes place off 
screen and aids Mabel’s rehabilitation. The Snake Pit (1948) acknowledges the potential benefit 
of ECT but cannot resist exploiting it, along with other therapies, in order to generate screen 
drama; Virginia is injected in her bed, force fed in an enclosed tub and strapped in to a straight 
jacket. It is difficult to justify these interventions in terms of their curative aspects alone. Erb 
considers that The Snake Pit (1948) is ambiguous as a text: “designed to promulgate a social 
message, the film insistently trades on the same shock effects found in more deliberate cases of 
film exploitation” (2006:50). Psychiatric treatments are often shown to be punitive. Gabbard & 
Gabbard link Samuel Fuller’s Shock Corridor (1963) with the torture chamber (1999:113); 
Johnny Barrett is strapped to a bed in order for ECT to be administered as punishment for his 
involvement in a riot.  This treatment has a lasting effect on his vocal chords and contributes to 
his descent into madness. Lobotomy, an even more extreme procedure than ECT, also appears on 
screen, for example in An Angel at My Table (1990) where we see shuffling patients with 
bandaged heads and learn that Janet Frame’s mother has consented to this treatment on her 
behalf. Its efficacy as therapy is partially acknowledged in Suddenly Last Summer (1959) where 
Dr Cucrowicz deplores the lack of funding which prevents him from carrying out as many 
procedures as he would like. The extremity and invasiveness of lobotomy are simultaneously 
acknowledged, however, by the audience’s concern that it will be administered to the central 
protagonist, Catherine. Lobotomy is also shown as a brutal method of psychiatric control; along 
with ECT it is administered to McMurphy in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975) for a 
series of misdemeanors. Meanwhile Requiem for a Dream (2000) is a film which is notable for 
employing psychiatry’s full armature.  Central character Sara Goldfarb is blue lighted to hospital 
at the end of the film, manacled and wearing an oxygen mask.  An imposing nurse administers a 
needle; she is force fed, offered ECT and finally appears to be lobotomised.  The implied reason 
for this is that diet pills have made her ‘mad’.  There is no apparent logic for the sequence except 
to exploit the dramatic potential of psychiatric treatment. Similarly One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s 
Nest (1975) is a film that contains a huge range of psychiatric therapies including hydrotherapy, 
group therapy, ECT and psychosurgery.  Notably every treatment is punitive and ineffective.  
McMurphy provides alternative (and effective) therapy in the form of fishing, sex, televised 
sport and alcohol, thereby emphasising that nothing psychiatry has to offer can beat ‘life’ itself. 
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Similar discourses about medication as coercion can be traced in a range of relevant films 
including, once again, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975) where soothing, contrapuntal 
music is played whilst powerful medicines are dispensed to unwilling recipients. Protagonists 
frequently resist medication. Pat in Silver Linings Playbook (2012) pretends to swallow 
medication and abandons it completely once out of hospital as it numbs his responses.  John 
Nash (A Beautiful Mind, 2001) prefers to confront his delusions.  Ray in Some Voices (2000) 
administers his medication to the general public on the top of pizzas in order that they should 
also experience its effects. Me, Myself and Irene (2000) is unusual in that it creates a visual sight 
gag based on anti-psychotic medication. Hank does not like taking his medication because it 
gives him “unbelievable cotton mouth”; we see him foaming at the mouth and as if his jaw is 
dislocated as the result of taking antipsychotics.  Those who do take this medication have 
questioned its suitability for standard slapstick where “the protagonist is continually prone to 
attack through…a bodily revolt” (Stott 2005:93, see Chapter 6). Beyond the slapstick, however, 
the preferred reading of the film is that medication is essential for the mental wellbeing of those 
who are ill. This remains the exception rather than the rule; protagonists rarely welcome 
medication, although in both Suddenly Last Summer (1959) and Manic (2001) they submit 
readily to calming injections. 
 
The filmic representation of the psychiatrist inevitably contributes to discourses around power. 
Films act as critiques of the psychiatric ‘expert’, for example in the comedy What About Bob? 
(1991) where Dr Leo Marvin is depicted as a power player who exerts his influence 
unreasonably in an attempt to incarcerate Bob. Marvin craves attention and likes to command. 
He is motivated by money, taking on Bob (a difficult client who demands frequent 
appointments) because he sees a profitable venture. His private life is compromised; he has little 
time for his family but when with them attempts to repress and control them.  Marvin is undone 
by medical hubris and his own sense of superiority. Despite his self-belief his diagnoses are 
questioned, (it is Bob who proves to have superior knowledge both of medicine and of life). 
Marvin is punished for his avarice and ultimately, despite wealth and status, is not a winner. His 
family attributes his isolation to being “so far above us” but the film continually codes him as 
inferior.  
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Not all representations of the psychiatrist are negative. Gabbard & Gabbard consider that it is 
“the ability of cultural myths to tolerate diametrically opposed images” which “accounts for 
parallel traditions of good and bad psychiatrists” (1999:34). Hitchcock is largely sympathetic 
towards his psychiatrists. Dr Fred Richman in Psycho (1960) is Latinate and exotic; at the film’s 
denouement the audience are informed, “if anyone gets any answers it will be the psychiatrist.” 
Spellbound (1945) is notable for its variety of psychiatric types. Alex Brulov is the stereotypical 
Viennese psychiatrist, complete with white, pointed beard and round glasses. His protégé, Dr 
Constance Petersen, shows promise but is compromised by her femininity; a male colleague is 
convinced that “the poor girl is withering away with science.” She falls in love with a patient and 
exhibits a strongly maternal side. Dr Murchison is the evil psychiatrist who is guilty of murder. 
Gabbard and Gabbard argue that varied representation results because “the portrayal of the 
psychiatrist is best understood in terms of the…needs of the films in which they appear, 
particularly within the conventions of genre” (1999:xxii). Further variance is depicted in Shock 
Corridor (1963) where the evil Dr Fong masterminds the comparatively naïve and 
impressionable Dr Christo. Dr Spivey in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975) is world 
weary and wholly irresponsible in his delegation of power. Dr Weitzman, a young, bearded 
psychiatrist in The Dream Team (1989) is also irresponsible but his idealism is refreshing when 
compared to the cynicism of his disapproving male elders. Idealism is usually reserved for the 
female psychiatrist. In Twelve Monkeys (1995) Dr Kathryn Reilly displays an interesting blend of 
strength and weakness. She takes an oppositional stance to her ‘traditional’ male colleagues who 
hope to curb her ‘fanciful’ approach to psychiatry. She expresses disapproval of restraint and 
medication and acts as a mouthpiece for anti-science discourse by refusing to divorce medicine 
from the unexplained. Like Dr Libbie Bowen in Mr Jones (1993) she is a vulnerable and 
attractive female psychiatrist who lacks judgement and is impulsive. She exhibits traditionally 
female nursing skills and is a foil for Bruce Willis’s masculinity. Both women conform to the 
figure of the “lonely heroine” which features in wider representations of the female in science 
and is described by Kitzinger, Haran et al (2008); they are employed to question traditional male 
power bases in the psychiatric domain. Whilst gender is largely shown to inflect representation 
the inclusion of a black female psychiatrist in Benny and Joon (1993) is a notable exception as 
neither her sex nor race are treated as a significant aspect of the narrative.  
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The abuse of power is not restricted solely to the psychiatrist. Care workers are portrayed as 
manipulative and uncaring in Lilith (1964) and Spider (2002) and The Snake Pit (1948) includes 
an unsympathetic psychiatric nurse.  Perhaps the most famous example of a coercive psychiatric 
practitioner, however, is Nurse Ratched in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975). It is 
possible to interpret Nurse Ratched as a dedicated psychiatric nurse; she is committed and 
hardworking and appears to interact well with her medical colleagues. Notably Dr Spivey shows 
approbation for Nurse Ratched’s ward; this does not extend to the in-patients who are frightened 
of and loathe Nurse Ratched in equal measure.  It is tempting to interpret her as intentionally 
evil; Vitkus refers to her “ability to infantilize and humiliate the men” (1994:65), but it is equally 
possible to see her as the product of a larger system, particularly when her former army career is 
considered.  The film can be read on two levels – as the depiction of a flawed individual or as a 
broader criticism of social hierarchy that invests people like Nurse Ratched with authority.  
 
Inevitably discourses that centre upon power invite a counter reaction and there is a strong vein 
of anti-authoritarian discourse in these films.  This is embodied in protagonists such as Billy 
Caulfield in The Dream Team (1989) and McMurphy in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest 
(1975). Fleming and Manvell refer to McMurphy’s “instinctual life” which “threatens the 
controllers of society, of which the psychiatric institution is portrayed as being in the service”; 
they view this representation of the psychiatric institution as a prison for “rebels, dissidents and 
all those who threaten the status quo” (1985:54). Gabbard & Gabbard consider the mental 
institution film to be a subgenre of the prison movie; both “engage American myths of freedom, 
easily lending themselves to plots in which innocent people must face drastic curtailment of their 
liberties” (1999:26). Freedom and its curtailment by both society and family members are 
dominant narratives in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975). McMurphy takes upon himself 
the task of restoring personal freedoms but his actions lead to a questioning of how far 
boundaries can be extended. McMurphy introduces gambling, alcohol and prostitutes to the 
psychiatric ward and acts in the role of pimp.  He breaks glass and attempts murder.  His own 
freedom is radically curtailed. The film questions whether or not McMurphy needs governance 
and, if so, who should administer this. Vitkus considers that “McMurphy’s response to the 
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system, his ”natural” rebellion to an unnatural mechanical system is a kind of violent, instinctive 
reaction to that authority – not a real, viable form of protest or a strategy to create change” 
(1994:83).  He remains, however, a “compelling pastoral giant” who shows his fellow inmates 
that mental illness is a form of power (Faggan 2005:xiv). Me, Myself and Irene (2001) is unusual 
in casting society, rather than psychiatry, as the coercive force. Here, once again, mental illness 
brings liberation as it is only through ‘madness’ that Charley can transcend the restraints placed 
upon him by society.  
 
In this section of the chapter I have argued that common areas of discourse between popular film 
and the naming of clinical psychosis include the recognition of medical authority and psychiatric 
power and a focus upon the division between pathology and normality. The final section of the 
chapter will consider the discourses that are notably absent in film when compared with the 
naming of clinical psychosis. These include a questioning of scientific validity, notions of self-
governance and the ontological status of mental illness.   
 
DISCOURSES THAT ARE NOT PROMINENT IN FILMS FEATURING PSYCHOSIS. 
 
Discourses concerning scientific validity are absent in films that feature psychosis, suggesting 
that scientific discourse is accepted as authoritative.  Occasionally medicine, as a discipline, is 
questioned.  This occurs in Patch Adams (1998) where medical hubris is criticised by the 
juxtaposition of ‘unorthodox’ Patch and the Medical Dean who tells the new student cohort that 
“the idea of medicine is to train the humanity out of you and make you something better – we’re 
going to make doctors out of you.”  It is disputable, of course, whether the film acts as a true 
critique of medical science as Patch, a medical doctor himself, is venerated for his wisdom. 
Whilst psychiatry is criticised in films that feature psychosis, therefore, it is notable that the 
wider field of medical science is not.  
 
Film does little to explore social attitudes towards mental illness, preferring to prioritise the 
problems of the individual (Hill 1986:55). Occasional reference is made to the uncaring nature of 
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society, for example, in Requiem for a Dream (2000) where mental illness is seen as a corollary 
to societal corruption.  In The Sign of the Killer (2001) Romulus is goaded by members of the 
public to ‘give us a tirade’ and A Woman Under the Influence (1974) illustrates society’s limited 
understanding of mental illness via the brutal language that Nick is forced to use to convey his 
situation to his colleagues – “Mabel is in a nut house, she has got a screw loose.” Negativity is 
generally tempered, however, by the inclusion of sympathetic characters; the possibility of social 
prejudice is, therefore, acknowledged but countered.  Films only occasionally address political 
issues, although the “transfer of the vocabulary of commodities and markets” to the psychiatric 
world does occur over the decades (Fairclough 2007:199). A consultant considers the service to 
be underfunded in Mr Jones (1993) and Ray is only able to see a community psychiatric nurse 
every two weeks because of cutbacks (Some Voices 2000).  Accommodation is clearly 
inadequate in both the asylum (The Snake Pit 1948) and in the community (Spider 2002).  
 
Discourses predicated upon service-users’ autonomy and self-help are regrettably absent from 
films that feature psychosis.  A Beautiful Mind (1991) is an unusual film in emphasising the 
central protagonist’s ability to control his own illness. It is, perhaps, this attribution of agency 
which has led to approbation from service users (see Chapter 6). The Sign of the Killer (2001) 
similarly shows Romulus, (a musician who hears voices) as controlling his own destiny.  He 
chooses to live tangentially to the rest of society in a ‘cave’ he has constructed in parkland 
bordering the city.  Whilst he is dignified in the unorthodox way in which he takes charge of his 
own life the film also expresses regret that he is not able to participate more fully in wider 
society. Filmic discourse tends to emphasise unsuccessful attempts to achieve agency as a 
service user.  Mr Jones’ attempts to self-govern end in hospitalisation (Mr Jones 1993). It is lack 
of self-governance that leads to the descent into chaos of the central protagonists in Requiem for 
a Dream (2000).  Bob, in What About Bob? (1991), is an extreme representation of someone who 
is unable to achieve independence; he is selfish, narcissistic and reliant upon psychiatric services 
at all times. Shock Corridor (1963) positively warns against psychiatric self-governance by the 
solemn pronouncement “a man cannot tamper with his mind”; the consequences of doing so are 
terrifying. This is important in relation to the Foucauldian concept of governmentality which 
focuses upon the interface “between the technologies of domination of others and those of the 
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self” (Martin 1988:19). Foucault considers that the free and autonomous individual of classic 
liberalism has been replaced by the neo-liberalist modification of  “the enterprising and 
competitive entrepreneur” (Olssen et al 2004:136).  This state-created shift results in 
“manipulatable man”…who is…continually encouraged to be “perpetually responsive” (Olssen 
et al 2004:137).  
 
The absence of these discourses in film indicates a restricted screen vision which reconstructs 
reality in specific ways and legitimates certain modes of storytelling to the exclusion of others 
(Schubert 2007:266).  It confirms that films featuring psychosis prefer to focus upon the 
individual rather than tackle more abstract themes such as scientific validity or social attitudes 
towards mental illness. It is unfortunate that this focus fails to recognise the many strategies 
employed by those who experience psychosis to improve their own lives, preferring, instead to 
prioritise the role of the ‘carer’ and open up possibilities for complex on-screen relationships.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Key conclusions from the chapter recognise that whilst film discourse does share common 
ground with discourse in the naming of clinical psychosis (Chapter 4) there are undeniable 
differences in prioritisation and emphasis which reflect the competing interests of stakeholders in 
these contexts. A further conclusion is that the heterogeneity of film is noteworthy and that the 
recognition of any pattern or social shift in the portrayal of psychosis in film must also 
acknowledge the existence of exceptions. Film can provide philosophical interpretations of 
madness such as the Shakespearean exploration of psychosis as ecstasy, innocence and rapture in 
Lilith (1964) (Foucault 1976:67).  It can also feature detailed expositions of what it is like to 
suffer from mental illness, for example schizophrenia in Some Voices (2000) and bipolar disorder 
in Mr Jones (1993). At the same time this may not be the primary focus; Julien Donkey Boy 
(1999) states on its cover that it is “one of the most affecting portraits of schizophrenia ever 
captured on film” but is notable for its formal properties rather than its exploration of mental 
illness. Films can be misleading; Shock Corridor (1963) warns that mental illness is contagious. 
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Few films acknowledge the chronic nature of psychosis; this is due, perhaps, to popular narrative 
structures of “resolution” whereby “every one of the questions raised in the course of the story is 
answered by the time the narrative is complete” (Byrne 2001:28). Notable exceptions are Mr 
Jones (1993) which refers to repeat hospital admissions over twenty years and My Sister’s 
Keeper (2002) which charts the cycle of deterioration and improvement of its protagonist’s 
mental state from her teens through to middle age.  
 
Film discourse prioritises an exposition of the power of psychosis over an exploration of its 
ontological status in order to maximise on-screen drama.  The experience of psychosis is shown 
to be profound and is often depicted as very distressing.  Occasionally the depiction is 
understated – for example in A Woman Under the Influence (1974) where Cassevetes prefers to 
concentrate on Mabel’s initially escalating symptoms and gradual improvement rather than her 
illness at its height.  More often, however, psychosis is depicted as terrifying.  This is notable in 
David and Lisa (1998) which opens with a shot of a teenager in torment, crying and sweating 
profusely; nothing can be done to alleviate his suffering. Joon (Benny and Joon 1993) 
experiences debilitating auditory hallucinations on the bus and in Repulsion (1965) Carole is 
tortured by her visions. Perhaps the most florid depiction of the descent into psychosis is 
portrayed in Shock Corridor (1963) via an apocalyptic scene, complete with thunder and 
lightning, which takes place on a flooded and electrified set. Occasionally a film refutes the 
notion that psychosis is distressing –Mr Jones embraces the experience as part of who he is (Mr 
Jones 1993) but this portrayal is unusual amongst popular cinema’s narratives. Occasionally a 
film acknowledges the complexity of mental illness; A Woman Under the Influence (1974) 
suggests that if you experience mental illness you can be many things – loving, artistic, generous, 
but you may also be fragile and very vulnerable. Pete as the sibling of a brother with 
schizophrenia in Some Voices (2000) sums up psychosis: “It’s a fucking mystery and it’s 
complicated and it’s ugly and it’s scary”; this possibly mirrors the difficulty faced by the film 
maker in presenting it on screen. 
 
The material discussed in this chapter and Chapter 4 will now be contextualised in relation to the 
hierarchy of discourse that emerges from the cohort of interviewees who have experienced 
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psychosis.  Chapter 6 will therefore examine a new hierarchy of discourse from a distinct cohort 
of stakeholders: service users. 
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DISCOURSES WHICH ARE NOTABLE AMONGST THOSE WHO HAVE 
EXPERIENCED PSYCHOSIS 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Wahl considers that “in particular those whose lives are most affected by mental illnesses – those 
who have experienced psychiatric illnesses and the ministrations of the mental health system – 
are the least likely to be consulted” by the producers of media texts (2004:65).  This chapter is an 
attempt to redress the balance by considering the views of those who have experienced psychosis 
in relation to film texts that portray the experience of psychosis. The most salient aspects of 
discourse from the interviews with those who have experienced psychosis will be compared with 
discourse in both the chapter on the naming of clinical psychosis (Chapter 4) and film discourse 
(Chapter 5). The chapter will begin with an exploration of dominant discourse before moving on 
to consider both commonalities and discourse which is comparatively under-represented amongst 
those who have experienced psychosis.  Fairclough’s definition of discourse as “a complex of 
three elements: social practice, discoursal practice (text production, distribution and 
consumption) and text” continues as a thread which runs throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6 (1995: 
74).  The primary focus in this chapter is textual material resulting from interviews with those 
who have experienced psychosis which has been generated in response to film texts. Fairclough 
argues that “texts are social spaces in which two fundamental social processes simultaneously 
occur: cognition and representation of the world and social interaction” (1995 6).  He considers 
that individuals use texts in order to resolve dilemmas surrounding their own identities (1995:7).  
It is this interpretative aspect of sociocultural practice which shapes the current chapter.  
 
The interviews with those who have experienced psychosis concluded by showing two film 
clips; the first was from David Cronenberg’s Spider (2002) and the second from Mike Figgis’ Mr 
Jones (1993).  The clips were chosen as representative of material from less and more 
mainstream cinema, respectively, and also as representative of two different experiences of 
psychosis; Spider is withdrawn whilst Mr Jones appears to be experiencing an episode of mania. 
Responses to the clips were analysed as part of a study which considered the wider 
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representation of psychosis in film; their inclusion enabled comparative work looking at clusters 
of meaning and also atypical readings. Livingstone argues that the negotiation of meaning 
brought about by the interaction between audience and text is “a struggle, a site of negotiation 
between two semi-powerful sources”; she considers that “each side has different powerful 
strategies, each has different points of weakness, and each has different interests” (1998:26). 
Livingstone guards against seeing either the text or the audience as dominant in determining 
meaning.  She argues that, in addition to establishing how people make sense of the text, it is 
also important to determine whether texts influence or restrict interpretation (1998:26).  Both of 
these concerns were addressed during the series of interviews, not only in respect of the clips but 
also when discussing texts introduced by the interviewees. Livingstone emphasises the 
circularity of cognition and the media text (1998:30). The distinction between the interpretation 
of film through socio-cognitive knowledge and the potential influence that the film text has had 
upon this knowledge has been observed in my analysis of the interviews. Both the potential of 
the film text to offer a template for understanding psychosis and the experience of psychosis in 
influencing textual interpretation have been considered. The clips were not only useful in 
evoking specific comment but also in acting as a stimulus for areas of discussion that were felt to 
be key by respondents. They prompted wide-ranging discussion, some of which cannot be 
addressed within my restricted word count.  The personal beliefs, preferences and contradictions 
that have emerged from viewing the clips are characteristic of the interviews as a whole. This 
diversity will be reflected in the following chapter.  
 
The first half of the chapter will illustrate that the exploration of psychosis amongst respondents 
is more personal than it is in Chapter 4 and more nuanced than it is in Chapter 5. It will 
demonstrate that interviewee discourse is not concerned with the philosophical nature of 
madness and does not subject the epistemological basis of science and psychiatry to extensive 
scrutiny.  Any discussion around the nature of madness focuses on the interface between 
‘madness’ and ‘normality’ which also features in Chapters 4 and 5. Respondents offer thorough 
explanations of how psychosis manifests. There is consensus about what characterises psychosis 
but there is also variation; psychosis is described as contradictory, lacking continuity and 
evading definition and respondents argue that this makes psychosis difficult to capture on screen. 
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Both positive and negative aspects of psychosis are referenced, although positive factors are not 
celebrated to the extent that they are in film. The consequences of psychosis are described as far-
reaching and occasionally devastating; the aftermath is cited as having a profound effect upon 
employment and relationships but is rarely felt to be as sensational as it appears on screen.  
 
In this section of the chapter I will continue to demonstrate differing hierarchies of discourse 
according to stakeholder positioning. Interviewee discourse reveals, for example, that whilst self-
management and support from fellow sufferers are key to those who experience psychosis they 
are absent discourses in Chapters 4 and 5. Conversely discourses that have dominated in earlier 
chapters, such as the power wielded by pharmaceutical companies in Chapter 4, do not feature in 
interviewee discourse. In addition broad areas of shared discourse, such as issues of power, 
reveal different emphases. The focus upon the power of the psychiatrist is not as emphatic as it is 
in film, for example, whereas the family are identified as power brokers. In this chapter I will 
also argue that discourse amongst interviewees is characterised by both reiterations of dominant 
discourse and marked resistance to it.  This is shown in several areas such as diagnosis, 
medication, and attitudes towards inpatient care.  Whilst coercive aspects of all three are 
acknowledged, benefits are also discussed at length, indicating that discourse is polarised.  
 
Notably certain discourses dominated the interviews.  A consideration of dominant service user 
discourse amongst my respondents and a comparison with dominant discourse in Chapters 4 and 
5 will provide a focus for the first section of the chapter which foregrounds psychosis as holding 
great significance for those who have experienced it. Psychosis will be presented as eluding easy 
definition and lacking continuity; the problems posed for the filmmaker in attempting to capture 
it will be discussed. Shared characteristics of psychosis, in addition to individual presentations, 
will be explored.  Psychosis will be considered in terms of both its positive and negative aspects.   
 
The second half of the chapter will specifically address the interface between the interviewees 
and the film text. Fleming and Manvell stress that “the depiction of madness can be understood 
in the last analysis only by the viewer” (1985:21); this is particularly relevant if the viewer has 
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experienced psychosis. My twenty-four semi-structured interviews were carried out at multiple 
sites across South Wales between January 2011 and September 2012. Respondents were 
recruited principally from the mental health organisations Four Winds, bipolar self help groups 
and the charity Mind. The interviewees include eleven females and thirteen males whose ages 
extend from early twenties to seventies.  There is contrast in terms of education and employment. 
Positions held (or previously held) range widely from farmer to poet to forensic scientist (see 
Appendix p349). The experience of mental illness has clearly affected employment; all 
respondents had worked at certain stages of their life, although less than half were employed at 
the time of interview.  There is evidence of career change, early retirement and part time work. 
Four respondents are currently engaged in education, three at a post-graduate level, and there 
was notable evidence of autodidactism. The interviews necessitated specific considerations for 
working with ‘vulnerable adults’ (see page 100) and produced twenty-four interview transcripts 
ranging between one hour and four minutes and one hour and forty nine minutes in length (see 
accompanying flash drive in appendix). Anonymity has been preserved throughout the study; 
references to all respondents in this chapter is via the use of pseudonyms. As noted in Chapter 3, 
whilst observing standard convention when transcribing interviews, I have punctuated quotations 
taken from them in order to aid fluency in this chapter.  
 
DOMINANT DISCOURSES AMONGST THOSE WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED 
PSYCHOSIS. 
 
The series of interviews was notable for its sustained focus upon the nature of psychosis.   There 
was a sense that “lived experience”, when it relates specifically to psychosis, has the power to 
eclipse other life events (Hills 2002:30). The experience of psychosis appears to have a marked 
effect upon language and subsequent life events; it is an extreme form of what Staiger refers to 
as the “environmental experiences” that impact upon our “identities or cognitive schemata” 
(2005:166).  Roger Silverstone refers to “private texts” which play their part in the “cultural 
stratification of everyday life” and points out that the intrinsic relationships that exist between 
these and “public” media texts are an important focus for study (1998:242). Similarly 
Livingstone considers it to be important to “examine the social knowledge of the reader”, and “to 
conceive of readers in relation to texts and texts in relation to readers” in order to pose questions 
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such as how individuals relate their knowledge of the world to media texts; “how the 
interpretations they make of programmes fit or challenge their prior experiences” and what role 
their knowledge plays in “directing divergence in interpretations” (1998:173). 
 
The experience of psychosis was referenced repeatedly. Out of the series of interviews no one 
suggested that it was not significant; indeed its overwhelming nature was emphasised.  Ralph 
considered psychosis to be cataclysmic and life changing; he likened emergence from his first 
episode to a feeling of rebirth and a failure to recognise the world.2 The exploration of psychosis 
was more nuanced and detailed amongst respondents than it is in filmic representation; emphasis 
centred on personal experience rather than the objective goal of definition which dominates 
Chapter 4. There was some consensus about what characterised psychosis; this was because of 
mutual experience but there was also a sense in which “personal and specific opinions derive 
from socially shared opinions or attitudes” in addition to “personal experiences and evaluations” 
(Van Dijk 1998:26). Psychosis was broadly recognised as precipitating physical sensations that 
can have an effect aurally, visually and kinaesthetically.  These presented in multiple ways, for 
example ‘time–shifting’ and lack of sleep. A profound effect on thought processes was also 
noted; Glen said that psychosis was “like knowing all the secrets of the universe”.3 Ceri 
described thinking more globally or “all around the box”4 and Ali said that in psychosis she felt a 
sense of connection between herself and “everyone on the planet”.5  
 
A notable area of consensus was the recognition that psychosis has both negative and positive 
aspects; this is only occasionally acknowledged in film, (see Mr Jones 1993).  The psychotic 
experience, in terms of affect, is not central to the naming of psychosis. Seventeen respondents 
mentioned negative aspects of psychosis.6 It was widely referenced as an isolating experience 
which led to poor self-care, irritability, intolerance and despair; five respondents mentioned 
suicide attempts or self-harm when psychotic7 and Glen said he would rather lose a limb than go 
through a serious depressive episode again.8 Derek described his first episode:  
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The first instance that I had of psychosis was ^very ^very frightening…um..it was…I …I 
knew there was something wrong with me but I couldn’t figure out what it was.  It was a 
completely new experience for me… I had this sort of Armageddon experience …that it 
was the end of the world…that God was coming to judge..the living and the dead and it 
was um..it was very graphic in detail.  It was as real as the room is around me..and..um..at 
some point ..I.I.I actually wet myself.  I think that that was probably through 
fear..um..ah..yeah..it was very frightening..just to be lost in another reality…because it was 
reality for me (Interview with Derek 2011:4). 
 
It is illustrative of the paradoxical nature of psychosis that sixteen interviewees also 
foregrounded its pleasurable aspects.9 Both Owen and Meic described psychosis as conferring 
the feeling of being ‘the special one’10 and Carrie said that she felt a certain sense of privilege 
that her mind has gone where, for others, it rarely goes: 
 
The upside is of it I feel I’ve experienced something that some people will never..and I 
think you’ve experienced and taken the mind to a point on its own… With the chemical 
imbalance or whatever you call it without taking any hallucinogenic drugs…um so in that 
way I think it’s quite amazing myself (Interview with Carrie 2011:6). 
 
Respondents identified a link between psychosis and enhanced ability.11 This is recognised by 
Rogers and Pilgrim who argue that mental health problems often equate with “creative artists, 
novelists, poets and musical composers” (2005:31). Interviewees described it in more modest 
terms, however, such as improved computer skills, and avoided the approximation to genius 
which features in screen portrayals (see Chapter 5). Psychosis was also linked to great affability 
and an ability to be persuasive and credible. Four respondents referred to the confidence and self-
assurance that accompany psychosis12 and Derek explained how it had assisted him at interview:  
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I’ve gone for jobs which I’ve been very convincing in the role @ yeah because..you know 
you believe yourself, it’s like being an actor par excellence.  It’s almost like you’re the 
method actor but you’ve forgot that you are acting at all ..er.. yeah.  During one of my 
episodes which was raised, you know elevated mood…I went for a job now, ^very ^very 
good job, company car and it wasn’t until someone actually got in touch with the company 
and said, well, he’s not quite well at the moment.  Well the job was mine if you want with 
it because erm, you’re very enthusiastic, you’re very convincing ..you’re erm…it’s that 
sort of panache ..er..charm you’re…erm.  It is, it is very engaging ..you can..er really take 
people in…you’re quite manipulative as well. (Interview with Derek 2011:18-19).  
 
Despite well-recognised features of common experience a notable characteristic of psychosis 
was that it eluded definition. Nine respondents considered that psychosis is complex because it 
presents in so many different ways.13 There was evidence of contradictory experiences of 
psychosis amongst interviewees. Tabitha and Rod experience psychosis that is rapid cycle and 
short in duration whilst Tina and Tom spoke of mania that is barely detectable but sustained over 
lengthy periods, extending to years.14 Meic felt that there is no continuity in his own presentation 
of psychosis; each episode is new and different.15 Capturing the experience of psychosis is 
complicated by further factors; Ceri pointed out that social landscape impacts upon the nature of 
psychosis. By way of illustration she suggested that in the Cold War psychosis presented as 
paranoia about Russian spies whilst contemporary psychosis is characterised by influences from 
science fiction.16 Cultural shift is also recognised by Byrne who states, “my medical textbooks 
predicted manic patients with delusions of divinity, but I have seen more young people with 
psychosis who reference The Truman Show (1998) and The Matrix (1999) than higher powers” 
(2009:186). It is a manifestation of the “historical impress” on textual discourse recognised by 
Fairclough (1995:10) and is embodied in both the coining of the term ‘the Matrix Defence’, 
whereby a defendant argues that their actions were prompted by the film The Matrix (1999) and 
the documentary which is based on this phenomenon (The Matrix Defence 2003). Notably two 
respondents said that despite having long histories of experiencing psychosis they did not feel 
qualified to comment upon it as they had no insight in to their delusional episodes.17 This 
indicates that even those supposedly most qualified to define psychosis do not always feel 
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confident in doing so. Applying boundaries to psychosis was also perceived to be difficult; Rhys 
said that it was almost impossible to determine where euphoria ended and psychosis began.18  
Rod felt that being low and high (two areas of psychosis that might be considered distinct) 
presented “a significant amount of similarities”; he described “high high periods whilst severely 
depressed”.19 Whilst film is capable of reflecting the complexity of psychosis (see Chapter 5) 
this is rarely the case, reflecting, perhaps, Byrne’s view that “film-makers learnt what they know 
about mental illness and its treatments at the cinema, not from books or in the clinic” (2009:287). 
 
The second dominant discourse to emerge from the interviews concerns the consequences of 
psychosis. This section of the chapter will illustrate that just as the nature of psychosis itself is 
perceived to be overwhelming, the corollary of the experience is described as profound. The 
emphasis placed upon the implications of experiencing psychosis by the interviewees sets in 
relief the relative lack of stress placed on this in the naming of clinical psychosis (Chapter 4) 
which is much more concerned with diagnosis.  It also raises questions about why it is a notably 
absent discourse in film linking, perhaps, to the “high degree of closure” which characterises the 
classic narrative (Byrne 2001:28). In this section of the chapter I will argue that interviewee 
response challenges the view that psychosis is uniform and permanent.  It has the power to make 
the individual feel isolated and “othered”. In rare circumstances, psychosis can precipitate the 
sorts of violent acts that dominate screen presentations (see Chapter 5) but the consequences of 
psychosis tend to be far less sensational, impacting upon employment and relationships. Both 
filmic discourse and interviewee discourse acknowledge varying rates of success in personal 
relationships that feature psychosis, although there is a notable bias towards unproblematic 
romance in film. Psychosis can confer benefits, for example enhanced ability, although this is not 
celebrated to the same extent as it is in Chapter 5. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF PSYCHOSIS 
 
Once again, the individual experience of the legacy of psychosis elicited a range of responses. 
Respondents were keen to point out that psychosis is both a fluctuating and temporary condition 
which need not be viewed as all consuming; recovery is possible and illness is debilitating for 
circumscribed periods of time. Rod pointed out that each individual displays only a limited range 
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of psychotic features20 and Mari that people lose only part of themselves in psychosis21. Carrie 
said that even at the height of her psychoses she was able to function completely normally in 
terms of day-to-day tasks.22 These responses challenge the perception of psychosis as uniform 
and permanent and introduce a level of nuance which is not recognised in the film text where 
narrative clarity is prioritized over realism (Henderson 1996:31). Responses concerning recovery 
were also at odds with film narrative. Notably nobody interviewed considered themselves to be 
permanently ‘cured’ and two respondents stated specifically that cure was not a reality.23 The 
possibility of further episodes of psychosis was ever present; Delyth referred to the chronic 
nature of psychosis as “a life sentence”.24 Lesley Henderson notes that media story arcs 
frequently contradict “the reality of mental ill health where people may recover and then become 
ill again” (1996:22); the cohort acknowledged media prioritisation of the unrealistic cure.  
 
The magnitude of the aftermath of mental illness was apparent. Psychosis was perceived to have 
the power to make the individual feel “othered”; Owen considered that psychosis “begins by 
thinking that you are not like other people”.25 There was general resistance to the perception that 
psychosis leads to the sort of physical “othering” that is present in film, although Ralph 
considered that it was visibly perceivable as “dis –ease…a dis-connectedness…an unsureness” 
(Interview with Ralph 07.04.11:23). The issue of ‘Othering’ as a consequence of experiencing 
psychosis was framed more forcibly in terms of the discrimination and stigma recognised by 
Rogers and Pilgrim, (2005:32).  Only Gwen said that she felt that the vast majority of people did 
not attach stigma to mental illness;26 a more general response was that a psychiatric history has 
the power to stigmatise. Nine respondents said that, despite this, they were sufficiently 
unconcerned about prejudice to remain open about their illness;27 others were guarded, whilst 
three said that they were not open at all.28  Tabitha felt that personal experience had taught her to 
avoid being candid about her dual diagnosis of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia as this affects 
the responses of others towards her:  
 
They walk away from you or pretend they haven’t seen you and things…and that’s 
horrible.  The more people know you got it…they tell everybody else and then they just 
look at you…which before they’d come up to you and say, “oh how are you how are you 
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doing?” and pretend not to see you in the street.  When I’m down the river with the dog 
everybody talks and says, “Oh look at him he’s getting old or he’s a lovely dog”…they talk 
to you..you know everybody talks to you…but if you didn’t have that dog and if they knew 
about your illness they wouldn’t talk to you (Interview with Tabitha 26.05.11:7).  
 
Derek pointed out that, for some, the consequences of psychosis are devastating; in a minute 
percentage of instances, psychosis can precipitate individuals to commit acts that guarantee a life 
of misery.29 This is consistent with Byrne’s assertion that 10% of those with psychosis may 
become violent during their illness and, of those, a “tiny” proportion may kill (2009:293) and is 
over-represented in films that feature psychosis (see p182).  Interviewees placed greater 
emphasis on economic disadvantage and unemployment as consequences of psychosis. 
Psychosis was cited as career ending by two respondents,30 thus confirming Rogers and Pilgrim’s 
view that those who experience psychosis “suffer the ecological consequences of this 
vulnerability” by living in poor localities and encountering “labour market disadvantage” 
(2005:41). Screen treatment of the consequences of psychosis is uneven: the dramatic potential 
generated by the sometimes-unpredictable acts of those who experience it tends to be exploited 
in film whilst the more mundane economic hardship that accompanies it is not. Henderson sees 
this as the inevitable consequence of a desire for high audience ratings.  She considers that a 
commercial imperative “can override any social responsibility to represent more balanced or 
accurate representations of mental ill health and can undermine the possibilities for images 
which convey more challenging messages about the subject” (1996:18).  This does not explain 
why art house representations such as Julien Donkey Boy (1999) suggest links between psychosis 
and unpredictable acts; it can only be assumed that the temptation to generate drama exceeds 
commercial imperatives.  
 
The effect of the experience of psychosis on relationships was mentioned frequently. This is a 
narrative that does not feature in the naming of clinical psychosis but takes precedence on screen 
where a film staple is “love conquers all (see p167). Dewi acknowledged the love of his partner, 
who also experiences psychosis, as key in improving his mental state: 
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We saw each other at our worst to begin with so we recognised each other, we recognised 
each other’s symptoms, so if if one of us is changing at all then we know how to approach 
it.  We learn by sort of approaching it and for me that’s just great, it’s the most beautiful 
thing for me ‘cos I am very much in love really so it’s great (Interview with Dewi 
2011:19).  
 
Five respondents cited the support of a partner as essential31 but there was a spectrum of opinion 
concerning the curative properties of love (see p167). Mari characterised her relationship with 
someone who has experienced psychosis as follows:  
 
Very very hard…^Very ^Very hard…It’s the hardest thing and I don’t think anyone should 
even walk the first step unless they are strong…unless they’re able to be aware of what 
unconditional love means.  Because there is no way that you are not going to get hurt…and 
there is no way that you are going to win and until you have accepted the fact that there is 
no winning, you really oughtn’t to start the paths, but you do because that’s the way the 
path starts, you can’t start it any other way.  No it’s very hard…and I fully understand why 
families separate..from people who’ve had one or two psychotic episodes…fully…in fact I 
think some families ought to…I think it’s right that they do.  Because it’s only the very 
strong that can stay with them and be of any long-term value (Interview with Mari 
2011:10-11).  
 
Both film discourse and interviewee discourse document the impact of psychotic illness upon a 
range of people including partners, parents, children, extended family and friends.32 Whilst both 
acknowledge variable rates of success in personal relationships there is a notable bias towards 
unproblematic and redemptive romance in film.  
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The final dominant discourse to emerge from the interviews with those who have experienced 
psychosis was an emphasis upon self-management.  It is particularly regrettable that this is an 
absent discourse in film where ‘salvation’ is more frequently offered by a third party, in the form 
of medical authority, romance or occasionally both. Self-management might be considered to do 
away with the dramatic conflict occasioned by relationships in films that feature psychosis. The 
implications of minimising self-management, autonomy and expertise, however, are clearly 
important for the individual who has experienced psychosis and will be considered in the next 
section of the chapter. This section acknowledges further under-developed filmic discourses as 
the knowledge that accrues from a family history of mental illness and the help and support 
provided by other sufferers.   
 
AGENCY AND SELF-MANAGEMENT IN PSYCHOSIS 
	  
Byrne argues that “there are no mental health films, just mental illness ones” (2009:287); he 
considers that individuals with mental illness present in fiction films as victims unless they are 
empowered as “violent agents” (2009:296). Both points argue against screen representations of 
autonomy for psychotic protagonists. Despite being under-represented on screen self-
management was clearly felt to be both possible and vitally important amongst those who have 
experienced psychosis.  Respondents referred to their own expertise in managing their 
symptoms; six expressed the belief that their symptoms had become more manageable over time 
because of growing insight into their own conditions.33 A further six said that they worked hard 
to minimise their symptoms so that others did not know that they were suffering; in this way they 
were able to keep their experience private and exert more control.34  As well as expertise in their 
own illness a number of respondents had built up a wealth of knowledge about wider mental 
health issues.  This was due, in part, to experiences which pre-dated their own diagnosis. Family 
history, for example, was mentioned by seven of the respondents as a key genetic component in 
mental illness and also as a form of exposure to mental illness.35  This is referenced in both 
Chapters 4 and 5 but does not dominate to the extent that it does amongst those who have 
experienced its effects at close hand.  Terry was concerned about the hereditary nature of mental 
illness:  
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My father had gone through a period of being very er..withdrawn into himself and quiet. 
He was always a quiet man, a lovely man, a lovely father but he went in to this …not 
communicating and, er, this is always the fear in the back of my mind that I’m going the 
same way you know…when I am really ill but I try to get myself out of it by saying, “ Well 
I’ve got it worse than my father really”.  Just ‘cos we were all a family functioning around 
him and my dad’s time, this was back in 1965, ’66.. erm, we didn’t realise how ill he was 
or perhaps we didn’t want to realise. He became worse and worse…and I ..and I found him 
when I came downstairs for to get ready to go to work and he’d taken all of his tablets and 
I found him. Perhaps that, subconsciously, has had a tremendous effect on me and I often 
think that when I’m.. I’m gonna be er I’m going that way and also the fact that it’s worse 
for me because I am alone like, you know, apart from the dog (Interview with Terry 
2011:19). 
 
In film the hereditary nature of psychosis is underexplored compared to narratives that attribute it 
to trauma (Benny and Joon 1993) or coercive family relationships (Family Life 1971). Film 
discourse also under-represents the help and support provided by fellow sufferers in psychosis, 
although this does feature occasionally in films such as David and Lisa (1998). Interviewees 
clearly valued support from others who had experience of and empathy with the condition (see 
Interview with Dewi 2011:8). Drawing on Foucault’s work on individuation John Fiske 
considers that the “identity that really matters is the one produced by bottom up, localizing 
power” (1993:68). Fiske distinguishes between “individuality” and “individuation.” He sees 
individuality as “the product of a person’s history, of family ties and continuities, of relationships 
with friends or community groups, or choices in leisure time activities” and individuation as a 
“power process which separates an individual from others for the purposes of documentation, 
evaluation and control.” He believes that “individuation identifies the individual but cannot 
produce identity; indeed it is threatened by identity, so works to evacuate it from the 
individuality it identifies” (1993:67). The interviewees’ preferred approach to the experience of 
psychosis and the management of it is individual; it can be interpreted as resistance to 
individuation and an assertion of self-knowledge relating to identity that assures greater agency 
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and control (Fiske 1993:16). It is important to recognise autonomy and self-knowledge amongst 
those who experience psychosis and to scrutinise its absence in wider discourse. 
 
The next section of the chapter will move on from a consideration of dominant discourses 
amongst those who have experienced psychosis to consider significant discourse sites in 
common with Chapters 4 and 5. These sites have been sub-divided in to the following categories: 
normality, diagnosis, power, medication and the asylum, and are characterised by contestation 
and contradiction. In this section of the chapter I will argue that the analysis of respondent 
discourse surrounding psychosis reveals a focus on practicality rather than philosophy. I will 
demonstrate that discussion about the ontological status of psychosis shares a focus with 
Chapters 4 and 5 on the interface between ‘madness’ and ‘normality’ and that whilst the 
epistemological basis of science is not questioned there is some questioning of psychiatry as a 
scientific discipline. This section of the chapter will be subdivided because of its length. 
 
SHARED DISCOURSES IN RELATION TO CLINICAL AND FILMIC SITES.  
 
An Exploration of Normality 
 
Rogers and Pilgrim refer to madness as “an ordinary social judgment awaiting medical 
codification” (2005:29); Chapter 4 scrutinises this codification. Film rarely attempts an 
exploration of the ontological status of madness, preferring, instead, to focus upon its 
consequences. Notably there was no desire to explore the nature of ‘madness’ amongst the 
interviewees but there was an acceptance of ‘madness’ as an experienced reality. This may be 
explained by Foucault’s assertion that the essence of mental illness is that it “resists all 
understanding” (1976:45).  There was a sense that the practical concerns of ‘madness’ were more 
relevant than a philosophical discussion of its nature. Any discussion that did occur about what 
constitutes ‘madness’ moved closer to the focus in Chapters 4 and 5 that considered the interface 
between ‘madness’ and ‘normality’. Matt was the only respondent who took the view that mental 
illness is “not normal”.36 As somebody with a long history of mental illness he equated 
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difference with abnormality, embodying Foucault’s belief that “the patient recognizes his 
anomaly and it gives him, at least, the sense of an irreducible difference separating him from the 
world and the consciousness of others” (1976:46).   There was some discussion which supported 
Simon Cross’s assertion that “the categories of sickness, madness and badness are in constant 
flux because they are evaluative, socially constructed categories with imprecise boundaries” 
(2010:94). Ralph described an evolving sense of what constitutes normality:  
 
Erm, certainly my first experience kind of made me think, oh my god, you know, I’m 
different, strange, weird and all the things that jump to mind,..whereas my experiences then 
working with other people said, actually, no, you’re just pretty ordinary…erm you just 
have something which is different  (Interview with Ralph 2011:10-11). 
 
Seth argued that ‘madness’ is a social construct and a label that is applied when an individual 
fails to achieve societal targets;37 he stressed that there has been an increase in ‘madness’ under 
capitalism.38 The arbitrary nature of ‘madness’ was illustrated by a questioning of the psychic 
world as socially sanctioned ‘madness’.39  Charlotte emphasised that upbringing and class are 
equally influential and arbitrary as wider social influence in determining what is ‘normal’ and 
what is ‘abnormal’.40 The prevalence of mental illness was stressed as a major argument in 
favour of its ‘normality’. Mari pointed out that mental illness must be ‘normal’ as it is part of 
reality and part of being human.41 There was argument for and against the hypothesis that the 
incidence of mental illness was increasing; a further argument was that even though the 
incidence of mental illness might not have increased, the manifestations of it were becoming 
more recognised and, therefore, more normalised.  Terry felt that seeing a psychiatrist had 
become more acceptable over time.  He explained that at the time of his father’s suicide:  
 
The working class were not normally going to see psychiatrists and even your 
doctor…you’d have to be pretty ill to call your doctor out in those days, like, you know, 
‘cos the doctor was looked on like God, you know, to someone he wouldn’t waste his time 
with ordinary minded illnesses (Interview with Terry 2011:19). 
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A frequently voiced view (by seven respondents) was that psychosis is brought about by a 
chemical imbalance in the brain; this provided a rational and physical explanation for irrational 
behaviour which lessened the mystique of mental illness and established it, more firmly, within a 
spectrum of normality.42 It is a corollary, perhaps, of Rose’s argument that a dominant medical 
model seeks to place emphasis upon our “neurochemical selves” (2003) and supports Cross’s 
recognition of the faith engendered by “new technology for studying the brain…the development 
of molecular genetics…the human genome project …breakthroughs in pharmaceutical research” 
and “new drug treatments” (2010:152). 
 
It was notable that there was almost no questioning of science, as a discipline, (this mirrors 
filmic discourse but not anti-psychiatry where science is subjected to scrutiny). Whether or not 
this is an indication that the validity of science is so readily accepted that it is not a subject for 
discussion is difficult to establish.  Ralph expressed faith in science by defining psychosis as 
unscientific or “illogical thought”.43 There was little discussion of psychiatry in terms of its 
scientific status but what discussion did take place was characterised by differences in opinion 
concerning its validity. Three respondents with bipolar disorder welcomed (and clearly had faith 
in) psychiatric research in the fields of genetics and neuropsychology as a way forward.44  At the 
same time there was a strong but limited response from interviewees who were sceptical of the 
advances made by science in respect of mental illness. Tabitha felt that “almost nothing” is 
known45 and Seth referenced his doubts in relation to the development of lithium:  
 
A lot of scientific discoveries are accidental when you’re doing something else…you’re 
looking at something else, it’s the bi-product of another investigation so…they still don’t 
know how it [lithium] works, got no idea, there’s no idea.  They just know that it works in 
certain people in certain doses and that it can kill you very easily as well. Well the whole 
thing, well mental illness is still like, you know, relatively speaking stone age…not middle 
ages it’s stone age.  Nobody knows much about brain activity or brain (Interview with Seth 
2011:18-19). 
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The presence of a wide range of discourse surrounding ‘normality’, some of which reinforced 
dominant medical discourse and some of which revealed resistance to it, is evidence that 
discourse “works in discontinuous and often contradictory ways (Hook 2001:24) and that 
“discursive practices…cross and juxtapose each other” as if mutually unaware (Hook 2001:25). 
Derek Hook argues that such contradictions are “the seams to be pulled, the joints and 
weaknesses to be relentlessly stressed” in order to increase “combative power” (2001:26). A 
similar manifestation was evident in discourse surrounding diagnosis.  This revealed resistance 
to its reductionist nature and concern about the language used to frame it and will be considered 
next.  
The Issue of Diagnosis 
 
The issue of diagnosis is a dominating discourse in the naming of clinical psychosis; in film it is 
explored largely in relation to discourses surrounding the division between normality and 
pathology and aspects of authoritarianism.  Diagnosis is central to the definition of what 
constitutes psychosis and is linked with power; Caplan considers the “major systems responsible 
for bias in diagnostic practices” to be unassailable because of “their power, prestige and access to 
immense sums of money” (2004: 20).  Whilst there was no evidence of interviewees citing 
diagnostic coercion there was resistance to the reductionist nature of diagnosis. Meic, for 
example, argued that diagnosis is problematic because there is no such thing as a standard 
illness, (he does not fit the typical pattern of schizophrenia because he has never heard voices).46  
Glen felt that misdiagnosis was common and certainly applied to him personally.47 At the same 
time there was also a broad acceptance (and even a welcoming) of medical authority in terms of 
defining disorder.  Respondents iterated that diagnosis was not necessarily a bad thing and could 
act as a relief for both the patient and their family.  Owen described his own diagnosis:  
 
I was first diagnosed, it was you know it was quite a erm inspirational psychiatrist really 
who explained to me 
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SUE: This was when you were a teenager?  
 
OWEN: Christ no it was when I was 33 @@...My father was bipolar my best friend’s 
father was a psychiatrist and I was mental and nobody did anything about it…@@ no no 
no no no so many wasted years…No diagnosis until yeah no diagnosis ‘til 33..whole 
different life..I honestly, honestly, honestly don’t know and it’s… I can’t change it, as I 
say, but it…it could have been a whole different life, but there you go (Interview with 
Owen 2011:42).  
 
Esme similarly felt that diagnosis came far too late, suggesting that the reason for this was that 
psychiatrists exercised caution in an attempt to avoid labels.48 When resistance was shown in 
respect of diagnosis it was frequently concerned with the capacity of diagnosis to confer a label. 
Gwen had fought hard with her psychiatrist to challenge her initial diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia because she felt that it was “death on legs to any future you might have.”  She 
points out: 
 
If I’m going to go for a job in the future and I say that I’m a paranoid schizophrenic there’s 
a…brick wall.  If I go for a job in the future and say I’m bipolar they say “ooh like Stephen 
Fry?” (Interview with Gwen 2011:15) 
 
Ruth also admitted to telling people that she had “mental health difficulties” or even 
“depression” rather than mention the word “schizophrenia.”49  
 
The wider issue of problematic psychiatric terminology beyond diagnosis features as a major 
discourse in Chapter 4; this was not a central discourse amongst respondents but the issue of 
language use was raised. Ralph argued that caution should be exercised in the use of language 
(he welcomed the term “mental health” to replace “mental illness”) and felt that the judicious use 
of language could actually have a positive effect in normalising the experience of mental illness:  
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So more and more people are trying to use terms that are more acceptable… so from 
madness to mental illness to mental health it’s all kind of trying to er make that message 
that this is ownable, this is something which is possible to experience without it being, 
separating you from the vast majority of humanity, which I think is kind of how people are 
left feeling. (Interview with Ralph 2011:10). 
 
Seth considered that the register of medical language acted as a barrier between psychiatric 
personnel and those experiencing the disorder50 and Gwen that there was a general ignorance 
about mental health terminology.  She referred specifically to the frequent confusion between the 
terms “psychotic” and “psychopathic” and argued that this might affect both social attitude and 
film representation.51 This concern is borne out by Wahl who avers that “the majority of books, 
films, and television programs...mix psychotic and psychopathic in their portrayals as well as in 
their advertising” (1995:19).  This popular cultural blurring makes it apparent that entertainment 
precedes understanding. Glen considered that specific conditions are mislabelled and that it 
would make far more sense to call ‘bipolar’ ‘schizophrenia’ because the former is characterised 
by two extremes of personality when the latter is not.52  There was some evidence of the desire to 
re-appropriate language which Cross refers to as “transcoding” (2010:31).  As someone who has 
been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, for example, Seth took exception to the replacement of the 
term ‘manic depression’ by ‘bipolar disorder’: 
 
I don’t think bipolar is descriptive of anything, it doesn’t describe anything to do with an 
illness. You get two poles, one there and one there, what does that mean? Manic 
depression is quite a violent kind of description, it’s far more descriptive than bipolar is.  
Manic depression isn’t that or that, it’s a lot of things involved at any one time.  When 
you’re manic you may well be depressed ..you’re so depressed you go manic…so there’s 
the stress.  So it’s it’s not that or that and all this, it’s all much more complicated I think 
than it’s described.  Bipolar, it simplifies it ...and I don’t think it does it any services ….it 
doesn’t do anything for me (Interview with Seth 2011:10). 
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His response reflects a perceived lack of control of his own lived experience. A further discourse 
that was characterised by competing strands of discourse and counter discourse was the issue of 
power and how it presents in relation to the psychiatric profession; this will be considered next. 
This section of the chapter will illustrate a shift to the identification of power play in everyday 
settings, illustrating Foucault’s argument that power “is everywhere” and “comes from 
everywhere” (1998:63) Whilst the psychiatric profession are criticised for exerting power they 
are also treated with approbation. The discursive struggle for power extends to the family unit.  
Power and the Psychiatric Profession 
A dominant discourse examined in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 is the power wielded by the 
psychiatric profession.  Due to inevitable involvement with psychiatric services this was also 
a discourse that was present in the series of interviews with those who have experienced 
psychosis. Comments on power play were concerned with the everyday actions of psychiatric 
personnel rather than the epistemological validity of psychiatry as a discipline in Chapter 4, 
marking a distinct shift to lived experience and the pragmatics of involvement with 
psychiatric services. A substantial number of respondents (fourteen) expressed negative or 
critical comments about the psychiatric personnel whom they had encountered during the 
course of their illnesses.53 Esme felt that NHS nurses, “did not give a toss” (2011:18) and Ceri 
that the actions of psychiatric personnel were more questionable on inpatient units where they 
could act with relative impunity compared to in the community where they were more easily 
observable.54 The professional/patient divide was considered to be un-necessary, at times, 
particularly in view of four respondents confirming the film staples of the institutionalised 
psychiatric worker and the inversion of psychiatrist and patient.55 Respondents spoke of 
“them and us” situations on inpatient wards and two cited the physical barrier of the nurses’ 
station as divisive.56  Glen considered the case review to be the most coercive and distressing 
aspect of psychiatry.57 In this situation a patient must face a whole panel of psychiatric 
personnel - a “them and us” situation that he felt should be avoided.  
 
Once again, however, discourse was characterised by strong binaries which are reflected in the 
film representations of Drs Evil and Wonderful (Gabbard and Gabbard 1999).  Glen felt it was 
inevitable that those who experience mental illness should show resentment towards psychiatric 
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personnel as this is a reaction prompted by denial and directed at the curtailment of liberty rather 
than the psychiatric profession per se.58 Rogers and Pilgrim make a closely related point: 
 
It is very difficult to interpret the meaning of mental health service users reporting poor 
quality of life.  Is it that the underlying reasons for the latter (poverty, restricted social 
networks, stigma, poor education and employment) are so profound and pervasive that 
disappointment with services reflects an incorrigible state of poor self-esteem and 
alienation about everything in the patient’s world?  Under these circumstances service 
users may be suffering a deep-seated impoverishment and disempowerment created by 
their social conditions, but they attribute the state to service inadequacies (2001:196). 
 
In addition to criticism, approbation was shown for medical and psychiatric services; Owen 
praised his GP59 and Seth considered himself to be lucky in terms of the level of expertise shown 
by his psychiatrists.60 Five respondents said that their psychiatrist had appealed to them as 
experts.61  This may exemplify what Fairclough sees as “the problematisation of traditional 
models of professional practice”, the hallmarks of which are: “more democracy in relations 
between professionals and clients”, greater individual autonomy and marketisation that enhances 
consumer choice (1995:211). Fairclough suggests that “structures and relations have become 
more unstable and practices more diverse and open to negotiation… such that there are many 
hybridizations of traditional” discourse (1995:211). Ceri’s belief that she wields far more power 
as a service user than in her professional mental health role also supports Fairclough’s 
assertion.62 
 
Respondents indicated that issues of power were not limited to psychiatric services.  A notable 
discourse was feeling disadvantaged as someone who experiences mental health issues within the 
family unit. Three respondents referred to being disconcerted and disempowered by an absence 
of memories which meant their families had more knowledge of the manifestations of their 
illness than they did.63 This is an important discourse in delineating that the discursive struggle 
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for who ‘owns’ personal experience is not limited to the professional domain but also exists 
within families.  
 
A discussion of power in the field of psychiatry leads, inevitably, to a consideration of 
medication and attitudes towards it amongst those who have experience it directly.  It is a further 
example of a field that is characterised by reiterations of dominant discourse and marked 
resistance to this.  In contrast to the tendency in screen representations to present medication 
largely as an aspect of coercion, those who have experienced psychosis considered it in more 
measured terms, arguing that it is essential, at times.  
 
Medication  
	  
Medication (largely its misuse) is seen as a key aspect of power play in popular filmic discourse. 
Jonathan Metzl highlights the potentially coercive aspects of medication:  
 
Prescribed, ingested, signified and metabolized, psychotropic medications allow 
psychiatrists to regulate and normalize their subject from within, long after the 
interpersonal interaction between doctor and patient has ended (2004:30). 
 
Fourteen respondents commented specifically on their medication regimes as being a 
significant part of their lives.64 The notion of medication being ‘tweaked’ or ‘refined’ was 
prevalent and an indication that it is a dynamic and chronic reality. In contrast to the tendency 
in screen representations to present medication in dramatic and negative ways those who have 
experienced psychosis gave a more considered response which acknowledged both 
advantages and disadvantages. There was occasional outright condemnation of medication 
and also of psychiatric practice.  Mari considered that the “chemical cosh” or “bomb 
injection” was used as a manifestation of power;65 Similarly Delyth felt that, in her case, ECT 
was used punitively.66 Only Rhys voiced a central argument present in Chapter 4 that 
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mediation is over-prescribed as a direct result of the dominance of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  He referred to “being shocked by the way the system really is just about 
pharmaceuticals” and felt that talking therapies were side lined as a result (Interview with 
Rhys 2011:31). Respondents perceived the side effects of strong medication to be worse than 
the manifestations of the illness itself, at times. Seth’s comments reflect both positives and 
negatives in respect of powerful medication:  
 
The chemical cosh…I’ve had Largactyl which wasn’t very nice…erm I’ve had Haloperidol 
which was an obscene drug, I think, to give me ‘cos erm they just gave it when I was in.. 
hospital.   I came in, I was examined, physically examined, put down.   I said, “Can I have 
something for this ‘cos you know I’m psychotic or I’m so active I need something to calm 
me down?”  They give me Haloperidol, alright, at first I’d been mildly stoned and then I 
started having reaction in my legs like there was gravel going through my veins so I told 
them, begged them, for something else.  Give me procyclidine and that had a very bad 
effect on me, as well.   I could only walk backwards, I couldn’t walk forwards at all.   I 
couldn’t physically walk forwards at all.   I walked out of that hospital next day, backwards 
in to an ambulance to take me back to Cardiff (Interview with Seth 2011:33).  
 
Seth’s request for medication, despite the side-effects, indicates that, at times, it is deemed 
essential by those who experience psychosis; this is not reflected in film (see Chapter 5). Even 
the most extreme forms of treatment, (such as ECT), were spoken of with approbation by 
respondents who had experienced their benefits.  Both Glen and Derek recounted experiences of 
being sedated by ‘the chemical cosh’ and said that they welcomed this as they were clearly at 
risk of doing themselves harm in psychosis.67 The polarised views which characterised attitudes 
towards conventional medicine also extended to alternative therapies; Mindfulness and Shiatsu 
were felt to confer great benefit by two respondents.68  David Armstrong sees this as evidence of 
a challenge to established medical power bases and considers that “the recent growth of 
alternative medicines such as acupuncture, herbalism, homeopathy and osteopathy shows that the 
hegemony of human anatomy is under challenge” (1995:23).  Ceri, however, took an 
oppositional stance to alternative therapy (including hypnotherapy) arguing that it was utilised by 
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the unscrupulous to offer unrealistic hopes of cure to people who were vulnerable and 
desperate.69 
 
Whilst being confident of the relevance of medication to a cohort of interviewees who had 
experienced psychosis I was unsure of how many would have had direct experience of 
inpatient treatment or ‘the asylum’, as it is designated in film (see p187).  It was interesting to 
note that the contest and contradiction that characterises discourse surrounding diagnosis, 
power relations and medication was also evident in relation to the asylum. Discussion 
encompassed historical perspectives and extended to consider community initiatives.  
 
The Asylum 
The power and mythical fear embodied by the physical edifice of the asylum are not just 
recognisable motifs in film but can be perceived in wider society; Terry spoke of the “element 
of fear” which attaches to the asylum as a result of it being an unknown world (2011:15). 
Attitudes towards inpatient care were, once again, divided. Both Gwen and Ruth, (both of 
whom have experienced inpatient treatment), dreaded “incarceration”. 70  Gwen perceived 
having her liberty curtailed to be extremely distressing; lack of privacy and the difficulty 
posed by living in close proximity to others with mental health difficulties were also cited as 
negative inpatient experiences.71 At the same time inpatient care was clearly perceived to 
offer sanctuary and comfort by three respondents.72  Matt cited repeated instances of wishing 
to be re-admitted to an inpatient ward because he felt safe there73 and Carrie cited the 
experience of being an inpatient, having an insight in to a relatively unknown world and 
meeting some extraordinary people as a privilege.74 
 
Pat Carlen considers that “the asylum and the community are alike at least in the sense that both 
ideas have been objects at times imaginarily invested with extravagant virtues and powers” 
(1986:275). Approbation for and mistrust of community initiatives were evidenced throughout 
the interviews. Whilst a small number of respondents expressed a preference for being treated in 
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the community Esme felt that ‘care in the community’ was a money saving ploy which did not 
actually occur.75  Ceri, on the other hand, said that the distinction between the control exerted by 
inpatient care and that in the community was not as distinct as many people imagined.  She 
considered that there were now many more community orders than were initially anticipated 
because of fear of litigation and an escalating risk culture.76 This concurs with Rose’s assertion 
that public debate has moved from “care in the community to scare in the community” and 
indicates that discursive power relations circulate beyond the physical confines of the asylum 
(2002:182). Rose suggests that the health of the individual is not central to policy in the 
community; instead care in the community is “a managerial attempt to regulate levels of 
deviance.  It is actuarial in that it is concerned with the overall levels of undesirable events in a 
population at large” (2002:9).  To this extent it approximates a penology traditionally occupied 
by incarceration in the asylum. Ceri’s reflection on the community order as “a real chemical cosh 
in the community”77 is an illustration of the conflation between two systems that have 
traditionally been viewed as polar opposites.  
 
This section of the chapter has addressed areas of shared discourse with Chapters 4 and 5; these 
include normality, diagnosis, power, medication and the asylum.  Discourse generated by 
interviewees is characterised by discontinuity, indicating, perhaps, that the concepts under 
discussion are characterised by resistance and struggle (Hook 2001:23) The chapter will now 
change focus to consider the interaction between the interviewees and the text. The purpose of 
my research is to examine the relationship between the representations of psychosis present in 
film and the worldviews of those who have experienced it. I wish to test Fairclough’s argument 
that social control and domination are increasingly exercised but, notably, also resisted, through 
the text (1995:209) and also the findings of Philo et al’s 1996 study which concludes that 
respondents with direct knowledge of mental health issues still accept dominant media messages 
about mental illness. I will argue that there is a circular relationship between interviewees and 
the film text and that film is interpreted through but also affects “sociocognitive knowledge and 
processes” (Livingstone 1998:30); texts provide a point of reference when processing mental 
illness whilst the lived reality of experiencing psychosis influences response to filmic 
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representation.  I accept S. Elizabeth Bird’s argument that “a complete understanding of the 
media role in social life is forever elusive” (1992:111). 
 
Interviewees commented on the media in general and film as a specific aspect of the media. I 
will consider the former before narrowing to focus on the film text. In this section I will argue 
that whilst positive aspects of media texts were acknowledged, negative qualities were 
referenced more frequently, focusing heavily upon the media link between psychosis and 
violence.  Responses to the text will be considered using Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital 
which acts as a theoretical framework and is relevant to an analysis of interviewee response; 
individual readings are inflected by ‘habitus’ and characterised by the simultaneous observation 
of rules in multiple ‘fields’. The intensely personal nature of interaction with the text will be 
illustrated and will reveal a range of investment in film texts. The final section of the chapter will 
argue that the relevance of films which feature psychosis to those who have experienced it 
cannot be assumed. It will illustrate that respondents rarely cite films that contain representations 
of psychosis as evocative of their own psychotic experiences; conversely aspects of films that 
may not appear to have anything denotatively to do with psychosis can mirror the experience.  
The chapter concludes by arguing that the experience of psychosis and the effect of this upon 
textual decoding may offer a unique, or unusual, case study of the interaction between audience 
and text. 
 
CONTEXTUALISING THE WAY IN WHICH RESPONDENTS USE THE MEDIA: THE 
WORK OF PIERRE BOURDIEU. 
 
Bourdieu believes that culture is enacted by everyone and likens culture to an economy in which 
individuals are able to invest and accumulate capital (Robbins 2000: x). The economic and social 
aspects of Bourdieu’s concept of ‘symbolic capital’ are relevant to this study as they are affected 
by the nature of mental illness (Rogers and Pilgrim 2001:196). In addition the cultural strand of 
‘symbolic capital’ is key to an examination of how respondents react to the film text.  Michael 
Grenfell defines cultural capital as referring to “education, qualifications, marks of distinction – 
accent, clothing, behaviour – and actual objects – books, art etc” (2004:28). Baldwin et al argue 
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that the most innovative aspect of Bourdieu’s work is “to coin the concept of cultural capital” 
and use it “in tandem with the more familiar idea of economic capital” (1999:355). Bourdieu 
views cultural capital as an aspect of power which can be drawn upon in the same way as 
economic capital; he emphasises that it is possible for certain groups to be “high in economic 
capital” but “low in cultural capital” (Baldwin et al 1999:355). Fiske, building on the work of 
Bourdieu, also observes parallels between economic and cultural systems and argues that both 
have the propensity to distribute resources unequally leading to privilege and under-privilege 
(1992:36).  Bourdieu’s central concept of ‘distinction’ (1984) is concerned with the way in 
which particular social groups define their identity, make known their values and “seek to 
maintain boundaries between themselves and other groups” (Baldwin et al 1999:111).  This 
concept is interesting when related to a cohort that is defined by mental illness as it is possible to 
see that such group identity might be welcomed but might equally be rejected.  Members may 
derive comfort from the group and seek to maintain boundaries from those who do not 
experience mental illness; at the same time they may resist membership of this culturally 
devolved group.  Derek Robbins points out:  
 
To a very large extent we do not choose our identity.  We receive the cultural identity 
which has been handed down to us from previous generations…We adhere to groups, 
whether clubs or political or religious organizations, and we adopt the identifying images 
of social groups, whether in hair style or clothing, so as to confirm our social identity 
(1991:174).  
 
Robbins’ analysis provides only a partial fit for those who experience psychosis. The principle of 
lack of choice is particularly relevant but the experience of psychosis creates a social grouping 
that transcends the cultural identity conferred from previous generations and does not invite 
allegiance in terms of subcultural style. This group fulfills Baldwin et al’s assertion that “those 
living at the extremes of society…are perhaps very different in their ways of life from the broad 
mass in the middle” (1999:112) but, in this instance, it is not inherited culture which legitimises 
and naturalises inequality so much as mental illness (Baldwin et al 1999:111).   
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Bourdieu’s work is valuable in highlighting the cultural significance of consumption and placing 
emphasis upon “the learned, unquestioned taken-for granted aspect of cultural behavior” 
(Baldwin et al 1999: 110). An analysis of the cultural behaviour of respondents may reveal 
commonalities conferred by the experience of psychosis but also differences resulting from 
cultural imprinting that both pre- and post- dates it. Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ 
are central to his work on cultural economy. According to Bourdieu individuals are not 
completely free but neither are they “the puppets of social laws” (Lane 2000:25). Their 
experiences impose cultural boundaries and form their ‘habitus’, “a structure of dispositions 
which reflects the opportunities available to individuals at any given moment” (Lane 2000:25). It 
is possible to view psychosis as a disposition which affects the habitus, albeit in an unusually 
acute manner. Harbord sees the ‘habitus’ as:  
 
The sedimented effect of our individual histories, created through the systems of family 
and education, legitimated and consolidated by systems reward…and the assumption of 
social position within a hierarchy (2002: 15). 
  
A wider interpretation of Bourdieu’s class based concept of ‘habitus’ incorporates consideration 
of “the way in which different social groups classify the world and view it” (Baldwin et al 1999: 
356). Fiske considers that a habitus is “both a mental disposition and a ‘geographical’ disposition 
in the social space” (1992:45).  It is possible that psychosis affects both mental attitude and 
‘geographical’ location. In addition to attempting to determine whether this habitus of 
experienced psychosis shapes spheres such as social action, perception and taste in relation to 
film it is also important to take in to account influences that are independent of psychosis and 
might be considered to be allied to Harbord’s interpretation of habitus.  Applying the concept of 
the habitus to marginalised groups Fiske emphasises that individuals who are subordinate by 
virtue of factors such as gender, age or class are likely to have developed a ‘habitus’ 
characterized by a proletarian culture which is notable for its lack of economic or cultural capital 
(1992:36). Whilst the experience of mental illness indicates marginalisation it does not indicate a 
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“proletarian culture”, although the two may occur together. Bourdieu explains that our social 
positions are modified by our cultural tastes because the cultural system in which we are situated 
attributes more value to certain tastes than to others (Robbins 2000:32). In Distinction he argues 
that “taste classifies and it classifies the classifier” (1994:6). Fiske emphasises the implications 
for subordinate groups:  
 
The cultural system works like the economic system to distribute its resources unequally 
and thus to distinguish between the privileged and the deprived.  This cultural system 
promotes and privileges certain cultural tastes and competences…official culture, like 
money, distinguishes between those who possess it, and those who do not (1992: 30). 
 
Bourdieu’s key concept of the ‘field’ is equally appropriate to a consideration of those who have 
experienced psychosis. The term is considered by Bourdieu himself: 
 
What do I mean by “field”?  As I use the term a field is a separate social universe having 
its own laws of functioning independent of those of politics and the economy (1993:162-
163). 
 
Bourdieu developed the concept of the ‘field’ to denote “the formal context in which every kind 
of capital must acquire its particular value” (Robbins 2000:37). He argues that individuals 
identify themselves by their positioning in particular fields; in the case of the interviewees these 
are widely disparate and might include, in addition to the experience of psychosis, varied 
employment and varying film knowledge. Referring specifically to the use of interviews with 
those who have experienced mental illness Holland et al point out that “it is not illness itself but 
the interrelations of various fields of practice that determine the possibilities of self-expression” 
(1998: 206). Individuals, therefore, observe rules in multiple fields at the same time and adopt 
strategic positions between and within fields (Robbins 2000:xv).   The ‘habitus’ or “inherited 
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social condition” is, ultimately, modified by “an accumulation of taking positions in other fields” 
(Robbins 2000: 87).  
 
Bourdieu focuses on the relationship between the production and consumption of cultural 
products in fields that are socially constructed (Robbins 2000:18); this can be readily applied to 
film within a wider media framework. He considers that cultural fields are produced by human 
agents and are artificial constructs that are used for “position taking” (Robbins 2000:30). The 
acts of production and their reception might be considered to be “a strategy employed by distinct 
groups in order to sustain their distinction” (Robbins 2000:56). Bourdieu rejects the notion that 
all cultural fields have equal status; he discounts the ability of popular texts to act as a 
democratising force, declaring that there is no popular art (Lane 2000:161). Bourdieu views 
popular texts as largely functional and the antithesis of a genuinely autonomous product (Lane 
2000:49). Whilst Jeremy Lane considers that Bourdieu is right to question the liberating nature 
of popular cultural forms he does take issue with Bourdieu’s contention that marginal groups are 
incapable of invention. Sandvoss also considers that Bourdieu displays a “too narrow and 
deterministic understanding of class as a structure of entrapment”; in addition he questions 
Bourdieu’s assumption that objects of consumption have fixed meanings, arguing that this leads 
Bourdieu to “underestimate the individual freedom that consumers and audiences exercise 
through consumption choices” (2005:36). These arguments have direct relevance to an 
examination of the responses of those who have experienced psychosis.  It is notable that 
interviewees reference a wide range of material including popular media forms but also esoteric 
material.  It is also notable that their responses are characterised by invention and individuality. 
Hartley proposes Fiske’s introduction of the term “popular cultural capital” (1987) as a necessary 
modification of Bourdieu’s work.  “Popular cultural capital” stands in opposition to dominant 
values and derives its power from enjoyment in being different; it is an amalgam of meaning and 
pleasure that can be appropriated by those in subordinate positions (2002:45). Whilst accepting 
Kevin Glynn’s argument that this approach advances “the interests of disempowered social 
formations” such as those who experience psychosis (2000:144) I consider Fiske’s work to be 
limited by its propensity to celebrate subculture and accept Sandvoss’s criticism that it lacks 
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“Bourdieu’s detailed attention to the interplay of society, culture and economy” and is, therefore, 
a limited extension to his theory (2005:14). 
 
In the next section of the chapter I will illustrate the variation in economic wealth and education 
amongst the interviewee cohort and demonstrate that participation in many different social fields 
has the potential to affect attitudes towards representation. This section will describe some 
approbation for popular cultural texts but demonstrate that “academic” texts were felt to be more 
efficient in conveying information about mental illness. It will also show that responses to the 
wider media ran broadly in line with those to the film text specifically. Whilst interviewees 
acknowledged positive aspects of existing representation, negative aspects were referenced more 
frequently and the link between violence and mental illness was considered particularly 
problematic. Unsurprisingly in a voluntary study based on film, the majority of respondents 
expressed enthusiasm for film as a media form. This section will illustrate that investment in film 
does vary and that the nature of the interaction with the text can be a matter of personal viewing 
strategy.  
 
AN APPLICATION OF BOURDIEU’S THEORY TO THE INTERVIEW COHORT 
 
Considering my interview cohort in relation to the class model employed in The Great British 
Class Survey (GBCS), defined by Savage et al as observing “a trend in ‘cultural class analysis’” 
(2013:3), enables me to comment in greater detail on media reception. This model offers the 
advantages of being recent and influenced “by the deployment of Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptual 
armoury” (Savage et al 2013:2).  It observes three distinct forms of capital, previously identified 
as economic, cultural and social, all of which convey “certain advantages” (Savage et al 2013:5). 
Recognition that individuals may possess different “stocks” of all three enables a more complex 
analysis of social class. This is particularly important in relation to my interview cohort which is 
defined by employment inequality and concomitant economic disadvantage in respect of 
household income, savings and property.  
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Feminist critique has previously argued that “a focus on occupations as the sole measure of class 
occludes the more complex ways that class operates symbolically and culturally” (Savage et al 
2013:4).  The same principle applies to those who have experienced mental illness.  Using the 
occupationally based Nuffield measure to assess class amongst the cohort, for example, would 
ignore the inflexions of social and cultural factors upon class; more relevant variables might be 
the occupation of the main wage earner when the respondent was a child (Savage et al 2013:8) or 
the social capital measure of whether respondents know people in thirty seven different 
occupations (Savage et al 2013:6).  
 
Amongst the twenty four respondents there was variation in economic wealth and education, 
factors which might be expected to affect taste and the consumption of cultural products. 
Unsurprisingly, in a study with a media focus, the relationship between the interviewee and the 
media text was mentioned frequently. Interviewees acknowledged positive aspects of existing 
media representation. Delyth, Dewi and Carrie, for example, said that they sought out media 
material about mental illness because of its relevance to their own lives.78  This fits with 
Fairclough’s argument that in situations of doubt or insecurity people turn to texts as a means of 
resolving dilemmas surrounding their own identity (1995:7). Rhys felt that his understanding of 
his own condition had come from an eclectic range of sources and it would be unrealistic to think 
that the media did not provide some of these.79  His comments support Staiger’s view that “our 
identities or cognitive schemata or psychological profiles are constructed in part from various 
environmental experiences that do include film and television” (2005:166). Rod was able to cite 
an actual example of a media text being revelatory in terms of his own illness:  
 
It was the programme that Stephen Fry made…erm…four or five years ago, a diary of a 
manic depressive. It was through watching that I realized I was manic, I was bipolar..and, 
and my wife and I were watching it and we looked at each other and she said, “that’s you” 
so I went to my GP.  I’d been treated for depression but not for bipolar so I went to my GP 
then and said, “I think I’m bipolar”...so referral to a psychiatrist and within 10 minutes my 
dose of lithium @.  That’s been it ..it was revelatory…he was describing some of  his 
symptoms..er you know highs and lows and it just rang a bell you know.  The only thing 
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that I didn’t agree with was when he said that he was glad to be bipolar because that was 
where he got his creativity from.  I can relate to that but personally I think I would rather 
not have bipolar (2011:6-7).  
 
There was consensus that ‘serious’ media texts such as public service material, documentary and 
“academic” texts, which focused specifically upon mental health issues were the best way to 
impart information about psychiatric disorder.80  Derek felt that information about psychosis 
should be imparted via instructional videos81 and Ceri sought out documentaries such as Horizon 
for information.82 Notably both Ceri and Derek are extensively educated and have worked as 
mental health professionals, an important part of their ‘habitus’ which may have influenced their 
preference for factual texts. Their response might be explained by Bourdieu’s argument that lack 
of interest in popular culture texts is inspired by a “bourgeois habitus” which automatically 
prompts resistance (Lane 2000:49). Rod, another mental health professional and graduate, 
however, felt positive about the democratising effect of celebrity culture reflecting, perhaps, 
Savage et al’s argument that “elite culture has become more liberal and tolerant as the middle 
and upper classes have become more ‘omnivorous’, keen to partake of both highbrow and 
popular cultural forms (2013:8).  A limited number of respondents welcomed the exploration of 
mental illness and celebrity culture in mainstream magazines such as Hello; both Tabitha and 
Rod viewed celebrity confession as an important way to address stigmatisation.83  A larger 
proportion of respondents, however, felt that the link between bipolar and celebrity was 
unhelpful and led to misunderstanding.84 Fiske considers that a hallmark of the proletarian 
habitus is that it “refuses to distance the text and artist from the audience as it refuses to distance 
it from everyday life” (1992:40). This viewpoint provides a possible explanation for the way in 
which the boundaries between celebrity and the everyday were eroded in some responses. A 
further explanation is provided by Harbord who considers that “the aristocratic cultural taste is 
predicated on a refusal of culture as life, as ordinary, whilst the working class preference is 
forged in opposition, the refusal of the aristocratic denial of culture as ordinary” (2002:17). 
There was evidence of simultaneous approbation for celebrity endorsement of mental illness and 
acuity when appraising how celebrity works which supports Harbord’s view that taste is 
characterised by class-based position taking. Rod, for example, discriminated between the 
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individual ‘stories’ of celebrities who experienced mental health issues, accepting some and 
rejecting others.85 
 
Negative aspects of media texts were referenced more frequently than positive.  Rod said that he 
approached factual material on mental illness with caution, as it could be extremely distressing to 
watch it in the company of his family.86  This fits with Philo’s 1996 study, which concludes that 
“service users… show sensitivity in how the media represents them when in the presence of 
others (for example their children)” (1996:106). It was notable that reference to negative media 
portrayals amongst respondents focused almost exclusively upon the link between violence and 
mental illness (1995: 2004).87  Fourteen respondents cited this, which is not surprising in view of 
its wide recognition, (see Wahl 1995, Philo 1996, Byrne 2001, 2009, Pilgrim and Rogers, 2005, 
Morris 2006). Gwen, who worked as a journalist for twenty years, pointed out that despite being 
made continually aware of an association between mental illness and violence in media texts she 
could not remember editing a story about a mentally ill murderer during her career.88  
 
Turning the focus from media texts in general to the film text specifically it is perhaps not 
surprising in a study that considers the representation of psychosis in film that a large majority of 
respondents (nineteen) expressed some enthusiasm for film as a media form.89 In the case of 
interviewees such as Tom, Flash, Charlotte, Owen, Dewi and Ali this enthusiasm was 
pronounced. Personal engagement with the film text is embodied by Tina’s response:   
 
I’m afraid I’m a bit of a romantic.  As a child er having had an insular upbringing and not 
being able to go out because of er being of Italian origin, they brought me up to stay at 
home and not go out, not to go out teenage years.  So I always used to bury myself in 
film..erm black and whites… the Fred Astaire, the musicals, the romance.  And I used to 
get lost in that because I had nothing else..you know and that used to become my reality 
the film..and erm my first episode [of psychosis] when I was 17..erm the television the 
films I became the films during my psychosis (Interview with Tina 2011:1).  
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Ali’s response also reiterated the importance that film can play in the negotiation of personal 
identity:  
 
If you can relate to something it sort of becomes like a precious part of your cultural 
interest doesn’t it?  I don’t know if that’s the right way of putting it but you know like if 
you like a film because you can… because it speaks to you it becomes like important 
(Interview with Ali 2011:26).  
 
 A wholly positive approach was not universal, however. Matt considered film to be largely 
offensive90 and four interviewees said that they watched very few films and, therefore, knew 
nothing about film.91 Harbord considers Bourdieu specifically in relation to film choice:   
 
Choices about film, our putative tastes, are derived from our position within what Bourdieu 
images spatially as a field, a matrix of relations structured by class, ethnic and national 
differences.  We bring to film and what brings us to film, is our own individual histories, 
which are none the less social histories produced through institutions of the family, 
education and work.  Our tastes for film, located within our broader positioning of 
dispositions more generally lead us to the social comfort and ease of certain texts and 
locations and the rejection of others (2002:2). 
 
Martin Barker and Kate Brooks point out that the ‘field’ of film requires that audiences “have to 
be trained how to respond and to participate; audiences have to learn the ‘rules’ (of efficacy, of 
success, of aesthetics)” (1998:226). The respondents in the study had been exposed to or had 
sought out various levels of training; Dewi, for example, studied film as an academic discipline 
and Owen ran the film club at university. Barker and Brooks, however, provide a definition of 
‘training’ that goes beyond this level of formality; they consider that Hollywood, particularly, 
has “trained its viewers into distinct modes of response” (1998:226). Comments concerning 
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Hollywood were distinctive; Tom referenced the aesthetic qualities and technology of the early 
Star Wars films:  
 
I can remember quite vividly one of the first films I saw was Star Wars…and obviously 
you know all of that’s quite ground breaking with all of the re-issues.  You watch all 
Industrial Light and Magic and then you can see, then, the effort that was put in and 
everything.  Even today it looks great, you know the originals still look really good 
(Interview with Tom 2011:2).  
 
Tom’s response is evidence perhaps, of what Savage et al refer to as “emerging cultural capital” 
(2013:9); his knowledge of film does not fit with conventional Bourdieusian interpretations of 
highbrow culture, demonstrating, instead, alternative cultural acquisition. Seth, however, said 
that he valued the work of Ken Loach more highly than anything that came out of Hollywood 
because he considered him to prioritise the story and not to prioritise “the treat.”92  His response 
to Hollywood embodies a more traditional interpretation of Bourdieusian cultural capital, born 
perhaps, of his cinematic acculturation. Tom’s celebratory response is countered by Seth’s 
criticism; both provide evidence that attitudes towards Hollywood are not consistent or the result 
of formal training. Adding a further dimension to the work of Bourdieu, Barker and Brooks coin 
the term ‘investment’ in relation to film which they feel is closely related to and supplements 
Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’. They consider that the “orientation” of the individual to the film 
text is dependent upon both ‘habitus’ and ‘investment’. They question how important a film is to 
an individual and what they hope to achieve through participation. Dahlgren adds to the concept 
of ‘investment’ by suggesting that it refers to the degree to which people “care about their 
participation or involvement in a leisure activity” (1998:308) (my italics).  Dahlgren concludes 
that intensity of involvement is an important factor in making sense of media texts. Investment 
amongst the respondents to my study ranged from Mari telling me that she “did not watch a lot 
of film…and did not go to the cinema”93 to Tom who admitted that he:  
 
235	  
	  
Can get very drawn in to a film, you know.  When I’m in the cinema, your popcorn and 
your drink, do the adverts and the trailers then deadly silence through the film.  I’m so 
irritated if anyone even creaks a chair during the film ‘cos I just like to get absorbed in it 
you know (Interview with Tom 2001:1) 
 
Tom’s response incorporates key aspects of Livingstone’s checklist for the analysis of media 
reception; she considers the variety of media texts consumed, the level of attention paid to media 
forms and whether the consumption of texts is social or individual to be significant (1998:19). 
For Tom concentration and the social act of viewing are important; he also states that without 
being “snobbish about it” he hunts out an eclectic range of films (Interview with Tom 2001:1). 
His use of the word “snobbish” emphasises, once again, his recognition of film as an aspect of 
emerging cultural capital.  
 
Interviewees were asked to reflect specifically upon the way in which psychosis is represented in 
film. The more focused nature of this discussion will be considered in the next section of the 
chapter where the circular relationship between the interviewee and the film text is illustrated. In 
this section I will illustrate that respondents expressed a desire for a wider exploration of issues 
surrounding mental illness and placed emphasis upon the importance of responsible filmmaking. 
The dominant reaction to the way that psychosis is represented in film was critical.  There was 
debate about whether film successfully conveys the experience of psychosis and recognition of 
the conflict between commercial representation and film as an art form. The figure of the director 
was felt to be particularly influential in the portrayal of psychosis.  
 
REFLECTIONS ON THE PORTRAYAL OF PSYCHOSIS IN FILM 
 
Whilst the work of Fiske, Barker and Brooks is useful in extending Bourdieu’s arguments, the 
central tenets of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ remain key when considering interviewee responses. The 
respondents in my study participate in many different social fields, all of which have the 
potential to affect their attitudes towards filmic representation. This can be illustrated by Meic 
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whose experience as an aluminium fitter meant that he focused much more on the ‘inaccuracies’ 
of Mr Jones’ portrayal as a roofer than his mental health in response to the opening sequence of 
Mr Jones (1993). The most obvious influence in terms of frequent reference was the mutually 
inhabited field of experienced psychosis, (this links with the notable emphasis given to the 
experience of psychosis documented in the first section of this chapter). Robbins points out, 
“behaviour in relation to the internal rules of one field always occurs alongside behaviour in 
other fields which is external to that field” (2000:87); the relevance of fields varied according to 
the respondent.  There was some evidence that respondents considered the worlds of film and 
mental health to be mutually exclusive. Eight respondents, for example, said that they had not 
learnt anything about mental health from a film.94  This was a more emphatic response than was 
produced in relation to whether anything had been learnt from more general media forms, 
linking, possibly, with the previously expressed view that factual texts were more ‘educational’ 
than fictional or popular texts.  At the same time there was evidence that films were a point of 
reference when processing mental illness.  Matt said that when he learnt that he had 
schizophrenia his only frames of reference came from film:  
 
I watched, you know, I watched, I saw The Shining, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. 
You know, I’ve seen a few films, you know and all that, and I thought when they said 
schizophrenia, I thought that’s what I was like.  I thought that’s what I was going to be 
like.  I thought I was going to be absolutely uncontrollable and I was scared (Interview 
with Matt 2011:25).  
 
Matt’s response testifies to the influence exerted upon him by the film text. Employing 
Livingstone’s circularity of cognition model (1998:30) the lived experience of psychosis also 
influenced Matt’s attitude towards film; he felt that films that deal with mental illness have a 
duty to offer hope to those who experience it.95  
 
There was recognition amongst interviewees that conflict exists between the representation of 
mental illness and film as an art form. Ali was the only respondent to suggest that the essential 
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purpose of film is to create and to challenge;96 Ali had completed an art degree and embarked on 
a masters in an art-related field, therefore it is logical to view her response as directly related to 
her habitus. Flash saw morality in film and the representation of psychosis as incompatible;97 this 
tension is explored in the field of Disability Studies. Ross argues that “artistic license and the 
creative imperative are meagre proxies for informed comment and the experiential evidence 
provided by those who live the life every day” (2003:135). Enns and Smit, on the other hand, 
feel that a dominant focus on disability has detracted from the idea of film as art (2001:xi). This 
is reinforced by Hoeksema and Smit who argue that “students of disability and film need to be 
concerned with portrayals of disability, not solely because of their inadequacies but because they 
are emotional, relational and artistic offerings as well (1995:42).  Barker similarly recognises the 
importance of what he calls “filmicness” when seeking meaning from a film text (2000:192). He 
coins the term ‘pro-filmic approach’ to explain a process whereby films are appraised according 
to their ability to “generate possible (sensuous, emotional, aesthetic, cognitive, social) roles for 
audiences to occupy”. The acknowledgement of these qualities means that “the imaginative 
universe” of the film world and its interaction with the audience’s lives are considered 
specifically in relation to audience pleasure (2000:193).  
 
There was some debate about whether film was a useful media form to convey the experience of 
psychosis. Whilst Derek, Esme and Flash98 said that they felt that film was not a suitable medium 
to convey psychosis Ali felt that the creative possibilities of film were endless99 and both 
Charlotte and Owen said that psychosis provides great material for a filmmaker.100 These 
divergent views may once again result from habitus; Esme and Ali share common features of 
habitus as mother and daughter but Esme had not undertaken Alis’s extensive art education. A 
further explanation is offered by the detailed description of psychosis provided earlier in this 
chapter. Five respondents said that capturing the variety and complexity of psychosis posed 
problems for the filmmaker;101 the spectrum of psychosis is reflected in the descriptions of Derek 
and Terry. Derek believed that some of his own experiences were so apocalyptic that a) they 
would be too expensive to present on screen and b) an audience would struggle to accept their 
plausibility as psychotic episodes102; his response illustrates the scale and intensity of psychosis. 
Terry, on the other hand, felt that his own psychotic depression was not suitable for film 
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treatment because it is characterised by withdrawal and would offer little audience interest or 
pleasure.103  
 
The dominant reaction to the way that psychosis was represented in film was critical; criticisms 
ranged broadly and were predicated, in part, on the identification of ‘absent’ narratives. Great 
emphasis was placed upon the importance of responsible film making which showed mental 
illness fairly, accurately and in context.104  There were frequent recommendations that those who 
had experienced psychosis should be consulted in the making of films about psychosis.105 
Henderson recognises this expressed lack of consultation, citing it as leading to imbalanced 
representation (1995:64). Further exploration of the issues surrounding mental illness was felt to 
be necessary by respondents who felt that certain narratives did not make it to the screen.  These 
included: the aetiology of mental illness;106 narratives on acute wards;107 challenges to the 
medical profession;108 the contribution to society made by people with mental health 
difficulties109 and the impact of mental illness on children.110 Narratives which show agency 
amongst those who experience mental illness were also notably absent,111 mirroring Philo et al’s 
observation that “positive images of people coping with their illnesses seem to be very few” 
(1995:75).   The “missing” narratives illustrate a desire to supplement, address and challenge 
existing representations with material which mirrors lived experience.   
 
 Representation was considered to be formulaic, incorporating stereotypes such as the “needy” or 
institutionalized protagonist or the clichéd representation of the strong, coercive female nurse.112 
A less frequent but notable response was that screen portrayals of psychosis tend to be “quaint” 
and effectively sanitise the true nature of mental illness by avoiding its unpleasant aspects.113  
Film’s propensity for ‘schizophilia’ was also recognised (Erb 2006: 32). Both Owen and Seth 
were sceptical of this celebration of ‘genius’ arguing that it is patronising.114 Seth and Ali felt 
that there was an index between films about psychosis and “art-house pretension”. 115 By far the 
most emphatic response towards representation which was perceived to be ‘unfair’ or ‘biased’, 
however, was concerned with the sensationalised presentation of psychosis.116 Seth argued that 
the “anarchy” and flamboyance of “uncontrolled madness” is irresistible to film makers.117 This 
propensity is also recognised by Wahl who considers that “interacting with the attraction of the 
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philosophical/existential challenge presented by madness is the public’s appetite for arousal and 
excitement, its desire to be frightened and titillated” (1995: 111). Rod considered that the former 
exploitation of physical ‘difference’ to establish a “freak show mentality” in film had been 
transferred to mental health.118 Martin Norden identifies a “paradoxical repulsion-attraction” 
which is exerted by those with a disability and functions as a dramatic device (2001:Xi).  Norden 
argues that this also establishes the persistent “association of disability with malevolence” 
(2001:2) which has been noted in Chapter 5 (p182) and also more generally in media texts. The 
result is a dramatic portrayal which creates “an inaccurate and unbalanced view among the 
general public” (Morris 2006:10).  
 
Respondents were analytical in providing explanations for the way in which psychosis is 
presented in film. Three respondents linked sensational portrayals with film’s primary function 
of making money,119 confirming Byrne’s view that “film is art but it is also a ruthless 
commercial enterprise, driven by populism and low cunning: ‘follow the money’ is the first rule 
of movie psychiatry” (2009:286). Esme attributed sensational films to the demands of audiences 
to be shocked, frightened or entertained120 and concurred with Wahl that the screen staple of the 
psychotic villain is a lazy way of avoiding the need to establish motivation121 (1995:112). The 
centrality of the director and their personal motivation were perceived to influence the portrayal 
of psychosis. Mari said that she felt it was extremely unlikely that a director would not have a 
personal agenda.122 This agenda was interpreted by Matt as the human trait of needing to feel 
superior:  
 
And they can go ha ha! You’re a mental patient, I’m alright, so makes them feel good 
about themselves.  So I haven’t got a mental illness, I’m superior.  Makes them feel good 
about themselves rather than thinking about the mental patient who goes and sees that film 
and thinks Oh my god I feel more depressed than before I went to see it (Interview with 
Matt 2011:31). 
 
Seth, however took a diametric approach:  
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I think that some directors are genuinely concerned. They might have a relative who’s 
experienced mental health problems and they want to further the cause of people with 
mental health problems…you know it’s a genuine desire to further the cause of mental 
illness (Interview with Seth 2011:11).  
 
Directorial fear of and curiosity about psychosis were felt to be catalysts for its treatment in 
film.123 Mari said that filmmakers had a stark choice; they could use film as an opportunity for 
growth or they could take the route of superficial entertainment.124  She felt that there was a 
danger that filmmakers could use their power irresponsibly for personal catharsis.125 Her 
response provides evidence that respondents defined discourse in terms of the personal struggle 
or choices of the director. Although there was little focus upon specific, named directors, this 
emphasis can be seen as part of an auteurist tradition that accepts the centrality and free will of 
the artist and provides evidence for Rose’s assertion that “the free, rational, conscious, choosing, 
autonomous self is a creation of western capitalist democracies”(1989 Xii). John Blewitt’s 
argument that “auteurism dominates the aesthetic consciousness of the educated middle classes” 
(1993:368) may also provide an explanation when Mari’s response is regarded as the reflection 
of an extensive education and a preference for elite culture (Savage et al 2103:8). There was no 
voiced recognition of the director as ‘discursive subject’, positioned by the wider field of history 
or influenced by language.  Similarly challenges to the centrality of individual agency by 
external factors such as ideology and technology were not recognised (Cook 1999:300-301).  
 
In addition to commenting upon the way in which psychosis is represented in film, interviewees 
discussed what experiencing psychosis means to the viewing experience. The final section of the 
chapter will illustrate that the relevance of films which feature psychosis to those who have 
experienced it cannot be assumed. In this section I will argue that the experience of psychosis is 
a key factor in the reception of film; it can make interaction with the text more difficult and may 
affect film taste. Interviewees employ media texts to “see what they want to see” (Nightingale 
2003:30).  They rarely cite films that contain representations of psychosis as evocative of their 
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own psychotic experiences but do identify aspects of films that do not appear to have anything to 
do with it denotatively as resonances. The chapter concludes by arguing that the experience of 
psychosis and the effect of this upon textual decoding may offer a unique case study of the 
interaction between audience and text. 
  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHOSIS AND FILM VIEWING 
 
A key research finding was that the relevance of films which feature psychosis to those who have 
experienced psychosis could not be assumed. Both Ralph and Gwen pointed out that a thematic 
focus on mental health issues does not necessarily have a bearing on whether, or not, they wish 
to see a film;126 relevance is also governed by factors such as genre, cast and nationality. Seth 
explained that he would avoid any Hollywood portrayals of mental illness such as Shine (1996) 
because “they are just trashy to me.”127 Gwen explained that she did not see A Beautiful Mind 
(2001) simply because it did not hold sufficient attraction as “a good night out” 128 and Rod said 
that he prioritised “artistic merit” over subject matter.129 Meic actively avoids films that feature 
psychosis as he needs light relief from the condition and not exposure to filmic explorations of 
it130; he felt that the target audience of films such as A Beautiful Mind (2001) could only be those 
who had not actually experienced psychosis. Gwen explained that film is relevant to her 
experience of psychosis but she prefers to seek out resonances in films that are not directly about 
mental illness as they represent psychosis in a positive, non-judgemental way and are 
consequently more enjoyable than films which set out to explore the issue.131 This embodies 
Nightingale’s view that people use media texts to see what they want: “they often use the 
information provided by the media…to elaborate old experiences” (2003:30).  
 
A further notable finding from the interviews was that the experience of psychosis is a key factor 
in the reception of film. Respondents commented frequently on how psychosis affects their 
viewing habits.  Ceri said that watching films when actively psychotic means that her senses are 
more heightened and she is more focused;132 Gwen said that certain films (her favourites) are 
particularly enjoyable during a psychotic episode.133  There was a general feeling, however, that 
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psychosis made interaction with the film text more difficult. Psychosis was noted to impact upon 
concentration,134 the ability to relax sufficiently to watch an entire film135 and tolerance of 
technology; Charlotte, for example, explained that she now avoids visuals, preferring, instead, to 
listen to the soundtrack of a film.136  Ali expressed a sense of loss that she is no longer able to 
deal with films that she considers to be complex, (she cited Inception (2010) with its multiple 
levels of reality as an example).137  Gwen said that post psychosis she is troubled by lack of 
resolution in films:   
 
I like er storylines that I can understand and stories that are resolved at the end of the 
film..and especially since I’ve been ill I don’t watch films which are psychologically 
worrying..‘cos they have a deep effect on me and I I didn’t like them even before I was ill 
but now I try not to watch them.  I don’t like films that just provoke a psychological unease 
without giving you any pointers on how to to act or manage that unease…but I don’t mind 
films where people die.  I I I mean I I can I can handle events in films where people die or 
commit suicide as long as the the situation is resolved in a communal way, so long as a 
person isn’t left isolated at the end of the day (Interview with Gwen 2011:1-2).   
 
Shocking subject matter did not affect Gwen but lack of narrative closure left her feeling that 
something was “hanging over her” and films where someone was left in isolation disturbed her 
deeply.138 Six respondents said that they avoided sensitive or provocative film material for fear 
that it would exacerbate their illness;139 Ceri said that she found black and white films 
particularly “painful” to watch when she was ill.140  There was a significant adverse reaction to 
horror films amongst those interviewed; twelve respondents said that they did not like horror 
films because they found them deeply unsettling.141 It is possible, therefore, that the experience 
of psychosis affects the relationship with specific genres of film. Responses, as always, were 
characterised by departures and inflections. Delyth was the only respondent who stated that she 
actively enjoyed watching horror films;142 Dewi was unusual in seeking out material that he 
found disturbing. He emphasised that he disliked horror, but not because of the effect it had upon 
him.  He actively enjoyed science fiction because it mirrors his “dark episodes.”143  Dewi 
responded to intensity in film and portrayals of surveillance, in particular, as these link with his 
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own feelings of paranoia.144 Livingstone emphasises the importance of “social cognition” as a 
component of audience studies. This approach considers “the processes by which people make 
sense of their world, processes involving both the construction and use (or reconstruction) of 
social knowledge” (1998:27); there was a clear sense in which Dewi uses the film text in order to 
understand his world.  
 
Another key finding was that respondents rarely cited films that contain representations of 
psychosis as evocative of their own psychotic experiences. There were two instances, however, 
when The Shining (1980) was mentioned in relation to personal experience. Ralph identified with 
the actor Jack Nicholson as an embodiment of a psychotic individual145 and Tom described how 
he watched the film prior to a psychotic episode and remembers, distinctly, feeling as if he were 
“shining” or communicating through psychic abilities or extra sensory communication during his 
psychosis.146  Whilst specific films that deal with psychosis were not referenced widely there 
was marked evidence that film, more generally, has played a role in the psychotic experience.  
Tina, for example, said that becoming a film character has been a marked feature of her 
psychosis;147 she has previously used a variety of texts as a means to escape reality and enter a 
screen world. Two respondents said that their psychotic episodes had taken the form of a film; 
Glen likened a psychotic episode to a scene from Men in Black (1997)148 and Carrie described 
one episode as a Bond movie with a huge cast of personnel including the army and a 
corresponding body count.149 
 
A further key finding from the interviews was that aspects of films that may not appear to have 
anything to do with psychosis can mirror the experience; Ceri felt that a very small part of a film 
that does not denotatively feature psychosis might be sufficient to resonate with someone who 
has experienced it.150 Gwen described psychosis as:  
 
A bit like what I’ve seen in a Star Trek film where erm your body goes out of itself when 
you have like a shaded shadow of yourself running around like a white shadow running 
around which is you outside of your body. (Interview with Gwen 2011:6).  
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Meic felt that associating psychosis with films that did not specifically reference it was not 
surprising; he emphasised that the issue is not so much about how film makers represent 
psychosis as how people with psychosis identify themselves in film: 
 
It’s it’s the opposite side of the coin from the portrayal of of madness is when people see 
themselves in a film.  Rather than a film portraying clearly mentally ill people, mentally ill 
people can see themselves in films that might not be about them erm Die Hard II 
(Interview with Meic 2011:14).   
 
An important issue in examining the reception of texts that feature psychosis is whether readings 
are based on the inherent semiotics of the text itself (Sandvoss 2005: 108).  Barthes’ 
consideration of denotation and connotation explores the difference between denotated or 
‘stable’ meaning in relation to connotated meaning which is dependent upon context and is both 
ideologically and culturally inflected.  Denotation is associated with textual closure and 
singularity; connotation, on the other hand, enables the opening of the text to multiple meanings 
(Barthes 1995:90-93). In view of this potential multiplicity Sandvoss suggests that “the key 
question is one of degree: of just how many and how easily different readings can be constructed 
from a given text” (2005:125). For Sandvoss there is no such thing as a “monosemic text”; he 
cautions that, consequently, the open nature of the text is rarely challenged (2005:124). Sandvoss 
considers that the issue of multiple meanings is particularly applicable to the discipline of fan 
studies as “the more that approaches to fandom emphasise the element of the reader’s self in the 
construction of meaning, the greater the degree of polysemy they imply” (2005:126). Sandvoss 
suggests that the self-reflexive use of the fan text means that, at times, texts might be considered 
to carry no inherent meaning; they become polysemic to such an extent that they are 
‘neutrosemic’.  He defines this as “the semiotic condition in which a text allows for so many 
divergent readings that, intersubjectively, it does not have any meaning at all” (2005:126).  
Ultimately, however, Sandvoss concludes that whilst the concept of neutrosemy is useful in 
examining cultural change no text can be “read in any and every way” (2005:126); for Sandvoss 
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the more pertinent debate is why certain texts lose objective meaning and become sites for 
creating self-reflexive meaning. Fiske, whilst emphasizing the dominance of the audience, also 
questions the plausibility of the endlessly interpretable text. He asserts that audience members 
are able to make of texts what they will subject to two constraints; the text itself and social 
influence (Abercrombie & Longhurst 1998:22).  Fiske describes a situation where interpretation 
is constrained:  
 
When an artist produces a message for a defined audience using shared codes – when, that 
is, s/he produces a narrowcast message – s/he can expect that the range of meanings 
negotiated by audience members will be very limited (1990:78). 
 
Even when a text appears to be polysemic Stuart Hall is also resistant to the notion of 
unconstrained signifiers generating endless meaning:  
 
Of course there will always be private, individual, variant readings.  But ‘selective 
perception’ is almost never as selective, random or privatized as the concept suggests.  The 
patterns exhibit, across individual variants, significant clusterings (2003:60).  
 
There was evidence of patterns or clusters in the responses generated by the interviewees. Three 
respondents, for example, said that comic book films with hyperbolic and often flawed heroes 
came close to psychosis.151 The link with the text was repeated sufficiently to imply that there 
may be a commonality of experience which influences textual interpretation.  Similarly action 
heroes,152 and major iconic screen characters153 were felt to be evocative of psychosis. Films that 
involved temporal shifts were also cited to evoke the experience of psychosis by more than one 
respondent: both Groundhog Day (1993)154 and Fifty First Dates (2004) were mentioned by two 
respondents155.  Films which centre on a confusion with reality and paranoia such as The Truman 
Show (1998) were also cited by a significant cluster of respondents as being evocative of 
psychosis.156  
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There was also evidence, however, that respondents appropriated texts in relation to their own 
personal experience of psychosis, leading to an individual response and an embodiment of 
Nightingale’s assertion that “variability of interpretation is the constant law of mass 
communications” (1996:35). This runs counter to Philo’s argument that “audiences within a 
culture do not typically create a new meaning with each “reading” or encounter with an encoded 
message (2008:537).  Ceri said that films which feature non-animate things becoming animated 
immediately reference her own psychosis.157 Ali cited horror films such as Candyman (1992) or I 
Know What You Did Last Summer (1997) because her psychosis feels like a “bogeyman waiting 
to pounce”.158 Gwen described consistent reference to Star Trek and Star Wars because she feels 
as if she is in dialogue with “the force.”159  
 
Fiske considers the “difference of ‘reading’ that derives from different experience” to be “what 
Eco (1965) refers to as aberrant decoding” (1990:78). He suggests that members “of a different 
culture” produce aberrant readings, which are essentially a mismatch of intended meaning 
between what is encoded and what is decoded.  Hartley also considers that those from “different 
cultures” produce aberrant readings.  He moves towards a qualification of “different culture” by 
suggesting that aberrant decodings are unexpected except in instances where decoders do not 
know the language or are from “future generations” or “belief systems” (2002:1). Fiske also 
refers to “numerous subcultures” whose codes may differ substantially from those encoding 
media texts. Both Fiske and Hartley emphasise that, according to Eco, aberrant decodings 
predominate in the reception of contemporary media texts. The implication of this is that there 
must be a difference between an aberrant reading and a complete misunderstanding.  Hall 
concedes that “total misunderstandings” of the text might occasionally occur (1980:135-6). I 
would classify Gwen’s interpretation of Spider as “a warm individual” as a misunderstanding 
(Interview with Gwen 2011:25).  I would similarly consider Flash’s evaluation of One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975) as “surreal and psychotic in its portrayal of mental illness” and “a 
deterrent to drug induced psychosis” as further evidence of misunderstanding (Interview with 
Flash 2011:7). Hall’s concession is felt to be underdeveloped by Hills who argues that a more 
forcible acknowledgement that total misunderstandings exist “would open the door to the 
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possibility that readers’ codes might be entirely unrelated to the codes used in encoding, 
challenging the very logic of Hall’s model, in which decodings must be related to encodings” 
(2005:87).  
 
The question remains, however, of whether the responses of those who have experienced 
psychosis can be considered to be “misunderstandings” or “aberrant” readings.  There seems to 
be something more complex going on here, at times, than the slip between encoded and decoded 
meaning illustrated above. There is a definite sense in which interviewees use film texts for 
reasons of identity, for example, treating them as a resource which can be utilised to fashion a 
sense of self (Abercrombie & Longhurst 1998: 24). In applying the Narcissus myth to the media 
text Marshall McLuhan considers that “men at once become fascinated by any extension of 
themselves in any material other than themselves” (1994: 41). It is possible to apply the 
principles of narcissism to aspects of fandom and to my cohort of interviewees. Abercrombie and 
Longhurst make the link between utilising a text in order to fashion identity and counter 
perceived social powerlessness (1998:24). Fiske’s work is also concerned with subordinate 
groups who show resistance to incorporation in to the media text and choose to subvert it 
(1998:15). The activity of those who have experienced psychosis does not indicate that the 
preferred meaning of the text is subverted or resisted so much as suggest that it is appropriated 
for a personal reading.  What does seem apparent is that there is an element of “textual 
poaching” going on which is foregrounded in the work of de Certeau (1984) and Jenkins (1992).  
The analogy with poaching emphasises that readers, “like the poachers of old…operate from a 
position of cultural marginality and social weakness”(1992:26).  The value of the analogy 
between the way in which those who have experienced psychosis use the text and the work of 
both de Certeau and Jenkins is that theirs is “a theory of appropriation, not of “misreading” 
(Jenkins 1992:33).  The further applicability of de Certeau’s work is made evident by Jenkins’ 
comparison between the model of textual interpretation provided by Hall and that provided by de 
Certeau. Hall’s model “tends to imply that each reader has a stable position from which to make 
sense of a text rather than having access to multiple sets of discursive competencies by virtue of 
a more complex and contradictory place within the social formation ”(1992:33).  The changing 
nature of the experience of psychosis, which has been documented by those taking part in the 
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study, tends to suggest that if texts are appropriated because they are evocative of psychosis then 
this is not done from a stable position.  
 
Work in the field of fan studies provides useful similarities to the way in which those who have 
experienced psychosis utilise the text but a direct comparison also reveals notable differences. 
Jenkins’ view that fans “appropriate popular texts and reread them in a fashion that serves 
different interests” certainly applies to my cohort of interviewees (1998:23); Gwen’s relationship 
with Star Trek implies this. Similarly de Certeau’s key observation that readers are not simply 
“poachers” but are also “nomads” who move continually between texts in order to make meaning 
is also relevant (Jenkins 1992:36); Meic, for example, cites evocations of his psychosis in films 
as diverse as Sticky Wickets (1990), Die Hard (1988), Darkman (1990) and Airplane (1980).160 
His specificity underlines the principle of readers being ultimately isolated from each other 
through their desire to serve only their own particular interests; Jenkins considers this to 
characterise fandom (1992:45). Hills considers fandom to be a site for intense pleasure and also 
for play (2002:65, 93); Abercrombie and Longhurst also reference the ludic nature of audience 
interpretation, considering it to be characterised by unpredictability rather than resistance and a 
tendency to replace the ordered structure of the text with disorder (1998:31). This playfulness 
can be seen in Tina’s enjoyment of losing herself in “unreality.”161 
 
Whilst a sense of play is discernible, a notable difference between the way in which fans and 
those who have experienced psychosis utilise the text, however, is that for the latter the pleasure 
principle is not always guaranteed. Jenkins characterises “textual poaching” as “an impertinent 
raid…that takes…only those things that are useful or pleasurable to the reader” (1998:24). It is 
possible to argue that Ali’s link between the experience of psychosis and the ‘bogeyman’ in 
Candyman (1992) conforms with Jenkins’ description of taking material that is useful because it 
helps her to make sense of psychosis but she did not overtly state this.162 Notably the element of 
pleasure derived by the fan seems more prominent than that of my interviewees who cite both 
pleasant and unpleasant resonances of psychosis in film texts. In addition, fan readings seem 
more systematic and targeted. Jenkins suggests that fan responses often come about because texts 
“fail to satisfy” (1992:23).  Whilst those who have experienced psychosis do critique absent 
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narratives there is no firm evidence that this perceived inadequacy prompts their individual 
readings of texts. Additionally, Jenkins foregrounds an initial link between the text and the fan 
by stating that “there is already some degree of compatibility between the ideological 
construction of the text and the ideological commitments of the fans” (1992:33). The connection 
between the interviewee who has experienced psychosis and the text seems far more ephemeral 
and arbitrary than this. Meic, for example, explains a perceived link with Casino Royale (2006).  
 
MEIC: Right um Casino Royale the first woman he gets close to in that film very Spanish 
looking lady have you seen the film?  
 
SUE: Yeah  
 
MEIC: Lovely long, dark, black hair...she dies tortured.  You don’t see it thank god but 
you see her body washed up on the beach and then Vesper who kills herself.  But in my 
twisted mind, months before I was sectioned, I thought is that about me? Could that be 
Denise and the love of my life Lauren? I have gone.. this is film.. something from the ether 
telling me you know don’t worry about those women any more they’re safe.  Yeah I really 
thought there was a link there (Interview with Mike 2011:19).  
 
Despite Jenkins’ emphasis upon the isolated nature of fandom there also seems to be an element 
of community in fan behaviour which is rooted in responses to the text but is also promoted by 
additional fan activity (1992:45).  Abercrombie & Longhurst cite Fiske (1992) as arguing that 
fans are productive in three aspects, “semiotically, enunciatively and textually” (1998: 147). As 
far as I am aware from the interviews carried out only the first of these aspects is applicable to 
those who have experienced psychosis; an exploration of whether any responses to the text are 
sustained beyond an initial private moment of recognition would provide a fascinating further 
study.  
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In conclusion, therefore, what does characterise the response of the person that has experienced 
psychosis to the text?  Meic’s comments on Casino Royale reinforce Miller and Philo’s argument 
that even when providing a reading which appears to be aberrant “varied audience groups have a 
very clear understanding of what is the intended message and can reproduce it very accurately” 
(2001:1).  Meic was clearly responding to Casino Royale on two levels – the first as a film text, 
which he knew very well, and the second as a platform to negotiate meaning in his own life.  The 
issue with those who have experienced psychosis, therefore, does not seem to be misreading or 
aberrant readings so much as an apparently arbitrary and unpredictable appropriation of texts 
relating to psychosis which is, nevertheless, rationalised by an internal logic. The experience of 
psychosis and the effect of this upon textual decoding may offer up a unique case study of the 
interaction between audience and text. The closest description I can formulate in response to the 
way in which the text it used is an ‘evocative’ reading that identifies and sets out to explore the 
intensely personal nature of experiencing psychosis.  
 
This chapter has identified dominant discourses in relation to film representation amongst those 
who have experienced psychosis. It demonstrates that the exploration of psychosis amongst 
respondents is thorough and significant and that the many manifestations of psychosis offer a 
challenge to the filmmaker. This chapter illustrates that respondents place great emphasis upon 
autonomy and the support of other sufferers, discourses that are not acknowledged in Chapters 4 
and 5. The present chapter also considers why key discourses that have been identified in 
previous chapters remain under-developed amongst respondents.  It documents the 
commonalities that do exist with Chapters 4 and 5, including an exploration of what constitutes 
normality and manifestations of power, but demonstrates that these discourses are inflected 
according to the positioning of the stakeholder. Discourse amongst respondents is characterised 
by notable resistance to dominant discourse as well as endorsement of it. 
In the next, and concluding chapter I will summarise my main arguments and findings in order to 
critically evaluate them. I will also include an assessment of my strengths and weaknesses and 
the implications that these have for further study. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis I have sought to explore how psychosis is constructed in clinical terms and also 
cinematically.  I have set out to understand if and how those who have experienced psychosis 
respond to its cinematic portrayals. My concluding chapter will begin by summarising the 
content of my thesis, focusing particularly upon my research findings, and will further clarify 
how my research makes a contribution to work in the field of cultural studies from the 
perspectives of film studies, disability studies and audience studies.  I will then detail the 
implications that my data analysis has for further study.  This Conclusion will evaluate both the 
theoretical and methodological frameworks that inform my study and will make 
recommendations for future developments. It will consider alternative approaches that might 
have been taken and will detail limitations of the study. I will conclude with a consideration of 
the strengths and weaknesses of my work.  
 
IN SUMMARY: CONTEXTS, THEORIES AND METHODS 
 
This thesis builds upon the work of others who have examined the representation of mental 
health issues in the wider media, most notably Philo (1996) and Wahl (2003, 2004) and more 
specifically, in film (Fleming and Manville 1985, Gabbard and Gabbard 1999, Byrne 2000, 
2001, 2003, 2009a, 2009b). It also draws upon the work of Johnson who provides a rare example 
of a Foucauldian analysis of a mental health text (2008). This thesis supports an on-going 
process of scrutinising mental health representation; it recognises a range of representation and 
confirms that whilst aspects of it are dynamic and can be positive (Johnson refers to a shift from 
“negative, derogatory…insane “Others”” to “heroes, celebrities and everyday citizens” 
(2008:28/29)) problematic areas remain, prompting Byrne to conclude that “mental health 
stereotypes have not changed over a century of cinema. If anything, the comedy is crueller, and 
the deranged psychokiller even more demonic than earlier prototypes” (2009a:4). This study 
recognises, as a particular cause for concern, the media association between mental health and 
violence which has been referenced repeatedly (Philo 1996, Rogers and Pilgrim 2005, Byrne 
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2009a, Bithell 2010:4). Before discussing the implications of my findings I will summarise the 
theoretical and methodological approaches that have underpinned my conclusions.  
 
Chapters 4 to 6 have provided the main thematic discussion for my thesis. Chapter 4 considered 
the discourses that contribute to the naming of clinical psychosis. It examined historical and 
social influences on the definition of mental disorder, including psychosis and how discourses 
surrounding it are formulated, circulated and received in a contemporary setting. Chapter 4 
established the work of both Foucault and Fairclough as key in relation to discourse, setting these 
up as a thread which also ran throughout Chapters 5 and 6; it used discourse analysis to explore 
the language used in medical texts defining psychosis. This chapter drew upon Foucault to 
scrutinise the ontological nature of science and assess psychiatry’s place within medical science; 
it also identified discourses of resistance to psychiatry. It considered a Foucauldian appraisal of 
science to be productive but deemed a binary division between science and pseudo-science to be 
reductionist. Chapter 4 also foregrounded the contestatory nature of psychopathology and 
showed that its heterogeneity makes classification difficult. It demonstrated that power in the 
psychiatric field is problematic and that not all attacks upon psychiatry are valid.  
 
Chapter 5 considered the discourses surrounding psychosis that are present in film. It 
demonstrated that film cannot be treated as an undifferentiated mass and contested the view that 
film fails to capture the complexity of psychosis (Gabbard & Gabbard 1999). Chapter 5 argued 
that psychosis can be culturally versatile; its representations provide the basis for social realist 
film but also act as a vehicle for escapism. It exposed a reductionist tendency to interpret filmic 
material that deals with psychosis as revealing the psychiatric world as repressive and coercive.  
Instead it demonstrated that film discourse relates more closely to a Foucauldian paradigm that 
illustrates the circulation and contestation of power. Chapter 5 carried out a comparative analysis 
with the available discourses in Chapter 4 and also considered absent clinical discourses in 
popular film. It applied Fairclough’s concept of discoursal practice to the production, 
consumption and distribution of film.  It acknowledged film as an important site for the 
negotiation of identity and established that whilst positive representations do feature on screen, 
representation tends to be negative, problematising violence and sexuality. Chapter 5 illustrated 
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both the challenges and opportunities offered to the filmmaker by psychosis.  It reviewed 
prominent screen discourses, including the role of the carer and the curative properties of love. It 
also established common discourses with Chapter 4, including shared clinical and dominant 
filmic divisions between pathology and normality. Chapter 5 concluded that film prioritises 
specific areas of concern whilst neglecting others (Ellis 1992:15). It does not explore social 
attitudes to mental illness in any depth, preferring to prioritise the problems of the individual. 
Regrettably a focus on self-help and the strategies employed by service users to improve their 
own lives is an absent discourse.  
 
The primary focus in Chapter 6, according to Fairclough’s tri-partite system, was the textual 
analysis of discourse generated by the interviews with those who have experienced psychosis.  
Chapter 6 completed the ongoing process of comparing the most salient aspects of discourse 
from respondents to dominant discourse in Chapters 4 and 5; it confirmed that different 
hierarchies exist amongst stakeholders. Chapter 4, for example, was dominated by contestation 
about the validity of psychopathology and an examination of the circulation of power in the 
psychiatric field. The emphases in Chapter 5 conformed to cinematic “modalities of meaning” 
(Ellis 1992:15), demedicalising psychosis and prioritising discourses centring on schizophilia, 
‘love conquers all’ and the role of the carer; violence and sexuality were also problematised.  
Chapter 6 demonstrated that the exploration of psychosis amongst respondents was more 
personal and nuanced than it was in Chapters 4 or 5. It identified that any discussion of the 
ontological nature of ‘madness’ centred upon its interface with normality and illustrated that 
definitions of madness were open to interpretation. Both positive and negative aspects of 
psychosis were described and interviewee response was characterised by re-iterations of 
dominant discourse but also resistance to it, demonstrating that discourse can be both 
discontinuous and contradictory (Hook 2001:24). Interpretations of the text were also shown to 
be inflected by educational, cultural and social capital (Savage et al 2013:5). I will now discuss 
the implications which can be drawn from the findings in my thesis.  
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KEY FINDINGS: FROM BIOGRAPHICAL EXPERIENCES TO EVOCATIVE 
READINGS 
 
My study develops knowledge in specific areas, making a contribution to both film and cultural 
studies’ traditions. A focus upon the formal properties of film acts as a useful corrective to work 
in disability studies that has considered representation without paying due attention to the media 
text itself (Hoeksema & Smit 2001).  
 
My thesis acknowledges that the major emphasis in work that centres upon media 
representations of psychosis is textual and goes beyond this to produce audience focused work. 
By adopting a cultural studies approach I ensure that my thesis takes account of interviewees’ 
biographical experiences and that emphasis is placed upon interaction with the film text. I 
supplement an existing body of audience studies’ and disability studies work by interviewing a 
cohort that I consider to have previously had a restricted voice in relation to the media text and 
images of psychosis.  
 
By adopting a Foucauldian approach I challenge existing work that views the representation of 
psychosis from the standpoint of its utility within a medical model; Pirkis et al refer to this as 
“cinematherapy” (2006:535) and it is evidenced widely (see Bhugra 2003, Clarke 2004, 
Ritterfeld and Jin 2006, Darbyshire and Baker 2012). My study can, therefore, be seen to offer a 
counter and non-medical perspective. It recognises that work on the representation of psychosis 
which originates in the medical domain tends to acknowledge but leave undeveloped the existing 
body of work in audience studies.  It challenges uncontested statements about media effect such 
as M. Anderson’s assertion that “Psycho is one of the most influential films ever made” 
(2003:303) or Morris’ statement that it is the worst types of representation (the “insensitive” and 
“grossly exaggerated”) which create the greater impact and tend to be more memorable for the 
viewer” (2006:143), illustrating, instead, that influence cannot be predicted or generalised as 
meaning production is “dependent on what people bring to their engagement with the media” 
(Kitzinger 2004:24). My thesis also recognises that work on the representation of mental health, 
from both a medical and a non-medical perspective, has focused narrowly upon potential 
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negative influence on the general public (Philo 1996, Wahl 2003, Bhugra 2003, Byrne 2000, 
2009a, Clarke 2004, Pinfold and Thornicroft 2006). Pirkis et al emphasise that far more attention 
has been paid to potential negative effect than positive and identify a need to consolidate work 
on the “extent, nature and impact” of representations of mental health (2006:524). They also 
argue that whilst research suggests that non-fiction media may perpetuate negative public 
attitudes towards those who experience mental health difficulties, less is known about fiction, 
including film (2006:523-524). Carrying out empirical audience work has prevented me from 
making assumptions about effect and, also, what constitutes positive and negative portrayal. It 
has enabled me to show that audience readings are inflected by individual histories and the 
multiple fields inhabited by respondents (Bourdieu 1993:162-3) and that simple assumptions 
cannot be made about textual responses which are governed by personal freedoms.  
 
As a direct result of analysing the responses of those who have experienced psychosis to the 
representation of psychosis in film I believe that I have established that interaction with the text 
takes place in a way that has not, yet, been adequately described by audience theorists. Meic, (a 
respondent), argued that the issue is not how film-makers represent psychosis but how those who 
have experienced it recognise themselves in film (interview with Meic 2011:14); this concurs 
with Staiger’s argument that “how we think of ourselves as individuals and our imagined 
communities in our media experiences” is central to reception (2005:8). Sandvoss argues that the 
presence of the self in the construction of meaning might lead to ‘neutrosemy’; a condition 
whereby a text invites so many readings it loses intrinsic meaning (2005:126). Like Fiske, 
however, Sandvoss emphasises the essential qualities of the text and concludes that it is not 
endlessly interpretable (Sandvoss 2005:126, Fiske 1990:78).  My study provides evidence that 
“there will always be private, individual and variant readings” (Hall 2003:60) suggesting, 
possibly, that these are not as unusual as Stuart Hall implies (2003:60) whilst at the same time 
qualifying Sandvoss’s concept of neutrosemy.  My findings do not concur with Sandvoss’s 
argument that specific texts have the propensity to lose inherent meaning to become sites for 
self-reflexive meaning, however, as respondents made associations with a wide variety of texts, 
individually as well as collectively (2005:126).  Their interpretations did not provide a perfect fit 
for either Fiske’s definition of aberrant decoding (1990:78) or Hall’s category of “total 
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misunderstandings” (1980: 135-6), but appeared to be the result of fashioning a sense of the self 
(Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998:24). There were parallels between interviewee activity and 
fan behaviour, for example in the realm of ‘textual poaching’ (de Certeau 1982, Jenkins 1992), 
which is defined as a model of “appropriation” and not ‘misreading’ (Jenkins 1998:33). 
Audience response was also illustrative of de Certeau’s key concept of the cultural ‘nomad’ who 
seeks out texts to serve individual interest (Jenkins 1992:45).  This was, at times, ludic in nature 
but pleasure, an important aspect of fan behaviour, (Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998:31, 
Jenkins 1998:24, Hills 2005: xi, Scodari 2007: 52, Gray 2007:84,) was, perhaps, not as 
significant in motivating the textual investment of the individual who has experienced psychosis 
as negotiating meaning in respect of psychosis and identity. The response of interviewees to the 
text also differed from the typical fan reading in that it did not appear to be prompted by a 
perceived inadequacy in the text (Jenkins 1992:23). The connection between interviewee and 
text is also, perhaps, more ephemeral in nature as it appears to be governed by the desire to 
‘capture’ psychosis which itself is essentially dynamic.  As a result of being unable to find a term 
that precisely describes the way in which my respondents interact with the text I have coined the 
term an ‘evocative reading’, which I feel best describes the way in which those who have direct 
knowledge of psychosis use texts in order to make sense of and associatively evoke their own 
experiences. The next section of the chapter will consider the implications of this for further 
research.   
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 
The shifting nature of psychosis prompts Fuery to question: 
 
How does one represent that which cannot by its very nature be represented, that which 
constantly resists translation, interpretation, and stability? The impossibilities of defining 
madness are also part of the impossibilities of representing it (2004:13). 
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The challenges offered by psychosis justify it as the focus of this research; its fecundity means 
that further research could profitably be carried out to build upon my existing findings.  This is 
possible in the field of media reception, particularly as little work exists looking at the reactions 
of those who have experienced psychosis to the text. The implications of ‘evocative’ reading 
may be applicable to all textual interpretation and so could be highly relevant in audience 
studies. Whilst the experience of psychosis remains culturally and discursively specific, there is a 
danger of ‘Othering’ those who experience it by assuming that they, alone, use texts 
‘evocatively’. A democratising aspect of further study might, therefore, be to interview a control 
cohort who have not experienced psychosis but who otherwise match my respondent profile to 
see whether they use film texts in the same way to evoke alternative significant experiences and 
emotions. In terms of my existing interviewee cohort, it would also be fascinating to develop my 
hypothesis that the texts selected to negotiate meaning in relation to psychosis are ephemeral in 
nature.  Further study would establish whether the significance of ‘evocative’ texts fades, over 
time or whether the influence of certain film texts endures; my interviews lacked a longitudinal 
dimension, although this was partly a result of my PhD’s timetable.  More extensive work could 
begin to map patterns between ‘evocative’ texts and establish whether those who have 
experienced psychosis display recognised aspects of fan behavior, for example productivity, in 
relation to the text (Hills 2002:30).  
 
The application of Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital to the interviewee cohort recognises 
that other avenues might be further explored to determine potential cultural influences upon 
media reception. This study acknowledges that factors beyond psychosis may exert an influence 
and even eclipse its significance. Wilde’s analysis of both non-disabled and disabled audience 
response to images of impairment and disability in the media concludes that “viewers do not 
make simple identifications on the basis of impairment or disability status, or indeed, by gender, 
class, ethnicity or sexuality” (2010:42). Wilde’s study is valuable in considering reception from 
multiple angles and also in challenging assumptions surrounding the centrality of disability to 
reception. It provides a platform for future research; for the purpose of this study, however, the 
cultural positioning of psychosis as a form of disability, which is presently under-explored in 
relation to media reception, provided a logical initial focus. 
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Profitable further study might also stem from research findings which confirm the problematic 
nature of representation. The first area centres on the female and psychiatry. Allen argues that 
historically “the female is not the ‘special’ but the normal form of the psychiatric patient” 
(1986:85). She considers that: 
 
It is not difficult to demonstrate that psychiatry is contingently sexist, normative and guilty 
of many abuses against women.  Indeed, given the general conditions of society outside of 
psychiatry it would indeed be curious if one could not find such features inside psychiatry 
as well (1986:95). 
 
Fuery considers that gender difference translates to the screen, arguing that gender roles are a 
vital part of how madness is shown in film (2004:21). Despite the clear significance of gender, 
however, a more specific focus on its meanings, at this stage, would detract from the main aim of 
the study which has been to establish, more generally, how psychosis has been experienced by 
my respondents, and how they react to its presentation in film regardless of gender, and 
specifically in relation to clinical and dominant-filmic discourses of psychosis.  
 
A second problematic area emerges from the combined results of both reception and textual 
analysis. The relationship between genre and patterns of representation is key, most notably in 
the horror genre (see p172). Links between psychosis and horror are well documented (Tudor 
1989, Carroll 1990, Simpson 2000, Schneider and Shaw 2003) and have led to widespread 
concern amongst those who campaign for an end to discrimination against service users (see 
Byrne 2009a). Reception analysis in this study has added to a body of largely textual material 
that considers the link between psychosis and violence to be a problem. Notably a significant 
proportion of those interviewed expressed dislike of horror (see p242). In addition to adverse 
reaction to the psychological effects of horror respondents also condemned the sensational 
presentation of the ‘psychotic’ protagonist and the link between representations of psychosis and 
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violence (see p232).  This suggests that the expressed dislike of horror was also a reaction 
against representation that was perceived to be inaccurate and discriminatory. Deni Elliot argues 
that “it is unethical to present people with disabilities in negative or exploitative ways because it 
is inaccurate and unfair to an oppressed societal group” (1994:78) and that this may result in 
actual harm (1994:74). It is not unreasonable to consider that horror genre representations of 
psychosis may be harming those who have experienced it. Elliot believes that accurate 
representation is a media responsibility and that any presentation that results in harm should be 
justified (1994:74). Further research to address issues of media responsibility and explore an area 
of representation that is potentially discriminatory and problematic is necessary, although my 
discursive evocative approach challenges and complicates the assumption that “accurate” 
denotations of psychosis are easily possible. A challenge nonetheless exists to media personnel 
to show sensitivity to those who have experienced psychosis in order to increase understanding 
of what it means to manage the condition.  
 
A revisiting of my original PhD proposal also prompts recommendations for further work; this 
planned to compare the psychosis oriented textual interpretations/reactions of both those who 
have experienced psychosis and those who have not experienced it directly but have observed it 
in close proximity as a partner, parent, close relative or carer. I streamlined this initial design to 
consider only those with lived experience of psychosis because I wanted to focus upon a 
relatively confined sample in detail.  After carrying out a Foucauldian analysis, however, I feel 
that an extended study which produced discourse generated by someone close to the experience 
of psychosis would be a fascinating addendum in terms of power and stakeholder interest. My 
original design also incorporated the use of focus groups.  As I explained in Chapter 3  I replaced 
these with long interviews in order to elicit individual responses but I continue to feel that focus 
groups would provide further insight in to the experience of psychosis in relation to the film text, 
and would be extremely useful in developing the themes that have emerged from the study so 
far. The use of focus groups would also be a small step in moving towards a user-controlled 
research model. Focus groups would not address the objection of service users to “being 
subjected to the…gaze of researchers” (Barnes 1999:10) or solve the problems of “tokenism’ and 
disempowerment in traditional research” (Turner and Beresford 2005: v) but low key facilitation 
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may help to emphasise “the importance of expertise by experience” which has traditionally been 
“undermined by more mainstream ways of producing knowledge” (Rose Online: no date). Diana 
Rose sees the future for mental health research as one where service users become “activist 
scholars in the way that has been done by other marginalised groups” (Online: no date). Whilst I 
appreciate that service user control is key in ensuring that the power inequalities that have 
characterised traditional research are not perpetuated, I continue to feel that participatory 
research is preferable to an outright silencing of the voices of those who experience psychosis. In 
concluding this chapter, and my PhD overall, I will address the strengths and weaknesses of my 
work.  
 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES: ISSUE OF REPRESENTATIVENESS AND 
REFLEXIVITY  
 
My thesis is a site for both strengths and weaknesses. I note Marian Barnes’ observation that it 
cannot be assumed that user groups are representative, either of society as a whole or “all other 
users” (1999:34).  I have endeavoured to provide as wide a range of variables as possible in 
terms of age, ethnicity, sex, education and clinical diagnosis amongst my interviewee cohort; this 
has been largely achieved apart from ethnicity (see Appendix p350). I concede, however, that 
although I emphasised that enjoyment of film was not a necessary requirement when taking part 
in the study, (a spectrum extending to indifference would have been more balanced and 
preferable), I suspect that the study attracted film enthusiasts and could, therefore, be accused of 
being unrepresentative in this sense.  I also suspect that, despite interviewing individuals with a 
wide range of diagnoses, the nature of chronic depression means that individuals who experience 
this, in particular, were not inclined to take part and hence are under-represented amongst 
respondents.  
 
I have tried to be reflexive and sensitive throughout to the ways in which both my positioning as 
researcher and the research process itself may have exerted influence upon the data collected. 
Clough and Nutbrown point out that:  
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Our identity, as man, woman, academic, mother, father – is (to a greater or lesser extent) a 
driving force in our research foci.  What we do and how we do it is informed by who we 
are, how we think, our morals, our politics, our sexuality, our faith, our lifestyle, our 
childhood, our ‘race’, our values (2002:70). 
 
My positioning in all of these respects, together with my prior assumptions and experience, may 
have influenced the significance I have placed upon certain discourses. I may also have 
identified frames which would not have been prioritised by another researcher, who may have 
pulled out different inferences or deductions. I consider, however, that I have used reflexivity to 
transform “a problem [in]to an opportunity” (Finlay 2002:212). To this end I have used 
introspection about my own positioning in order to aid my insight into how my research is 
constituted. Reflexivity has led to a closer analysis of my relationship with my respondents and 
an acknowledgement of the shifting positions between us (Finlay 2002:224). I have observed 
psychosis closely in both a professional and a familial setting; this has exposed and sensitised me 
to an unusually wide range of discourse in the field of mental health. I have not, however, 
experienced psychosis directly. This inevitably influences aspects of difference and power in 
relation to my interviewee cohort.  My role as a teacher of film has also inflected 
interviewee/interviewer subject positions.  I feel that it has meant that I have accrued a 
knowledge base which has allowed me to pick up on material in interview that I may otherwise 
have missed. It may have been intimidating to interviewees, however, who felt that their views 
were being appraised by a film ‘expert’. More generally my unique ‘cultural capital’ (Grenfell 
2004:28), including my age and regional accent (not Welsh) have all affected the exchanges I 
have had with respondents.  
 
In presenting my results I also recognise my own definition of psychosis to be a construct as “the 
effects of discursive practices is to make it virtually impossible to think outside of them” (Hook 
2001:2). I accept Slade and Priebe’s argument that “there are different concepts of evidence”, all 
of which are disputable as absolute concepts by postmodern epistemology (2006:3). At the same 
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time as I accept the position that “no single framework will ever be able to explain everything”, 
however, (Bracken and Thomas 2006:233) carrying out a Foucauldian discourse analysis has 
prioritised an attempt to understand how historical and social conditions have inflected discourse 
over epistemological relativism (Harper 2006:52). I accept that prioritising the subjective 
experience of those who have experienced psychosis might be interpreted as a phenomenological 
approach which attempts to understand the essential nature of the psychotic experience but 
consider that I have approached this from a Foucauldian perspective which sees the experience 
as constructed from available discursive resources (Harper 2006:53). A Foucauldian 
constructivist approach has been invaluable in problematising the factual status of mental 
‘illness’; ultimately, however, my own stance in respect of psychosis combines a critical realist 
and social constructionist approach, a combination that Rogers and Pilgrim do not consider to be 
necessarily “set in opposition” (2005:16) and which is implied by Shorter’s belief that: 
 
Psychiatry is, to be sure, the ultimate rule maker of acceptable behaviour through its ability 
to specify what counts as “crazy”.  Yet there is such a thing as mental illness.  It has a 
reality independent of conventions of gender and class, and this reality can be mapped 
(1999: viii). 
 
Accessing the wealth of textual material that has potential relevance for a study of the 
representation of psychosis in film has proved to be a challenge. Patrick Fuery points out:  
 
It is not enough to look to those films that show acts of madness…this is because, in part, 
although there are many films that engage in such representations, ultimately such a study 
will lead to a simplifying arrangement of the categorising of types and overt manifestations 
(2004:17). 
 
To this end I have not restricted my study to an examination of texts where psychosis has been 
named but have extended it to texts where psychosis is implied as well as exploring audiences’ 
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evocative readings which go beyond textual denotations or even connotations of psychosis. I 
have gone beyond Fleming and Manvell’s design which is restricted to “certain major feature 
films, which have for the most part enjoyed wide distribution and general acceptance (1985:19) 
to include marginal films (see p145). I have considered films from different eras and from 
different nationalities.  
 
Methodologically speaking by including two film clips for analysis by all respondents (Spider 
2002 and Mr Jones 1993) I concede that I have been somewhat directive; at the same time this 
ensured that the study incorporated a greater measure of continuity and comparative study. I 
have also facilitated an aspect of spectatorial choice in encouraging respondents to nominate 
their own choices of texts that approximate ‘madness’; this mitigates against the possible 
subjectivity of my own selection and works well in combination with the standardising function 
of the film clips.  
 
In terms of strengths, I consider that the use of Foucauldian discourse analysis has helped me to 
engage, in detail, with clinical, filmic, textual and audience discourses.  It has underpinned a 
method that has enabled me to pay attention to discourses related to psychosis that circulate in 
three distinct areas: the naming of clinical psychosis; the film text and amongst those who have 
experienced it. A Foucauldian approach has been wholly appropriate as a means to directly 
compare statements and discourse positions from stakeholders in these domains. It has helped to 
identify the rules of possibility that make certain discourses possible and has also aided the 
identification of limits upon discourse. It has also allowed me to evaluate power relationships 
between discourses and contexts and the implications of this for those who experience psychosis.  
 
I consider that a further strength of my work is that I have concentrated on an area that does not 
receive wide media coverage. Jenny Morris explains that:  
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The experience of ageing, of being ill, of being in pain, of physical and intellectual 
limitations, are all part of the experience of living.  Fear of all these things, however, 
means that there is little cultural representation that creates an understanding of their 
subjective reality”(1992:164). 
 
I have implemented the necessary arrangements to elicit the responses of a vulnerable population 
to film texts This has necessitated a robust consideration of ethical issues (Koivisto et al 2001, 
Davies 2005) but has resulted in access to voices that have historically been silenced in film and 
audience studies (Clough and Nutbrown 2002:45). The requisite considerations of working with 
a cohort who have experienced psychosis are ongoing and will extend to the dissemination of my 
findings. I consider the communication of these to research participants to be essential (see p98). 
I will send an accessible report to Mind and the geographically dispersed bipolar support groups 
but intend to present it in person at Four Winds, the drop in centre in Cardiff where several of my 
interviews took place. I have contended with a high drop- out rate of interviewees and extended 
the interview period as a result of this.  I have been committed in my desire to negotiate access to 
respondents and have shown flexibility in carrying out interviews, for example, I have travelled 
extensively in South Wales in order to explore the narratives of those who have experienced 
psychosis. In doing so I have been privileged to engage in dialogue with respondents who have 
articulated their own interpretations of psychosis.  Carrying out this study has made me aware 
that psychosis is not so much an aspect of illness as an aspect of identity. The struggle to pin 
down its elusive and fascinating nature in words brings me full circle to my opening discussion 
of language, again foregrounding the inadequacy of the terms available to fully do justice to the 
complexity and variability of clinical, filmic and experiential discourses of psychosis.	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ENDNOTES 
	  
1	  Bracken	  (2009)	  distinguishes	  between	  a	  ‘technical’	  paradigm	  which	  views	  
“mental	  health	  problems	  as	  primarily	  technical	  problems	  to	  be	  analyzed,	  
classified,	  sorted,	  and	  treated”	  and	  a	  non-­‐technical	  paradigm	  which	  is	  concerned	  
with	  “values,	  relationships,	  the	  question	  of	  power,	  question	  of	  meaning	  and	  the	  
search	  for	  meaning”. 	  2	  Interview	  with	  (Ralph	  13.	  07.04.11	  p23)	  3	  Interview	  with	  Glen:	  (10.	  06.04.11	  p9)	  	  4	  Interview	  with	  Ceri:	  (12.	  07.04.11	  p17)	  5	  Interview	  with	  Ali	  (3.21.02.11	  p9),	  6	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ruth	  1.	  20.01.11),	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11),	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11),	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11),	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Glen:10.	  06.04.11),	  (Mari	  11.	  06.04.11),	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11),	  (Ralph	  13.	  07.04.11),	  (Dewi	  14.	  26.04.11),	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11),	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11).	  7	  Interviews	  with:	  (Dewi	  14.	  26.04.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11).	  8	  Interview	  with	  Glen:	  (10.	  06.04.11	  p26)	  9	  Interviews	  with:	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11),	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11),	  (Rhys	  4.	  22.02.11),	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Glen:10.	  06.04.11),	  (Mari	  11.	  06.04.11),	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11),	  (Dewi	  14.	  26.04.11),	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11),	  	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11),	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11).	  10	  Interviews	  with:	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11).	  11	  Interviews	  with:	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Glen:10.	  06.04.11).	  12	  Interviews	  with:	  (Glen:10.	  06.04.11),	  (Ralph	  13.	  07.04.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11).	  13	  Interviews	  with:	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Ralph	  13.	  07.04.11),	  (Dewi	  14.	  26.04.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11),	  (Flash	  25:	  08.09.11).	  	  14	  Interviews	  with	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11).	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Tom	  22:	  07.07.11).	  	  15	  	  Interview	  with	  Meic	  (21.	  08.06.11).	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  16	  Interview	  with	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11).	  17	  Interviews	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Flash	  25:	  08.09.11).	  	  18	  Interview	  with	  (Rhys	  4.	  22.02.11).	  19	  Interview	  with	  Rod	  (23.	  29.07.22).	  	  20	  Interview	  with	  Rod	  23.	  29.07.11	  p8	  21	  Interview	  with	  Mari	  11.	  06.04.11	  p32	  22	  Interview	  with	  Carrie	  17.	  19.05.1	  p11.	  23	  Interview	  with:	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11).	  24	  Interview	  with	  Delyth	  (8.	  14.03.11)	  25	  Interview	  with	  Owen	  16.	  (19.05.11	  p10).	  26	  Interview	  with	  Gwen	  (9.	  16.03.11	  p20)	  27	  Interviews	  with	  (Rhys	  4.	  22.02.11),	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11),	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Glen:10.	  06.04.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11).	  28	  Interviews	  with	  (Ruth	  1.	  20.01.11),	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11).	  29	  Interview	  with	  Derek	  (2.	  17.02.11	  p12).	  30	  Interviews	  with	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11)	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11).	  	  31	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ruth	  1.	  20.01.11),	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11),	  	  (Dewi	  14.	  26.04.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Ralph	  13.	  07.04.11),	  	  	  32	  Interviews	  with	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11),	  (Rhys	  4.	  22.02.11),	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11),	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Glen:10.	  06.04.11),	  (Mari	  11.	  06.04.11),	  (Ralph	  13.	  07.04.11),	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  (Tom	  22:	  07.07.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11),	  (Flash	  25:	  08.09.11).	  	  33	  Interviews	  with	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11),	  (Glen:10.	  06.04.11),	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11).	  34	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ruth	  1.	  20.01.11),	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11).	  35	  Interviews	  with:	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11),	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Ralph	  13.	  07.04.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11).	  	  	  36	  Interview	  with	  Matt	  (5.	  28.02.11	  p28),	  37	  Interview	  with	  Seth	  (15.05.05.11	  p11).	  38	  Interview	  with	  Seth	  (15.05.05.11	  p23).	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  39	  Interviews	  with	  (Ralph	  (13	  07.04.)	  and	  (Flash	  25:	  08.09.11).	  	  	  	  40	  Interview	  with	  Charlotte	  (19.	  26.05.11	  p23).	  41	  Interview	  with	  Mari	  (11.	  06.04.11),	  42	  Interviews	  with	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11),	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04.),	  (Seth15.05.05.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11).	  43	  Interview	  with	  Ralph	  (13	  07.04	  p14)	  44	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11).	  	  45	  Interview	  with	  Tabitha:	  (pre-­‐interview	  comment	  20.	  26.05.11).	  46	  Interview	  with	  Meic	  	  (21.	  08.06.11	  p11).	  47	  Interview	  with	  Glen	  (10.	  06.04.11	  p37).	  48	  Interview	  with	  Esme	  (6.	  03.03.11	  p6)	  49	  Interview	  with	  Ruth	  (Ruth	  1.	  20.01.11	  p12)	  50	  Interview	  with	  Seth	  (15.05.05.11	  p17).	  51	  Interview	  with	  Gwen	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11	  p4)	  52	  Interview	  with	  Glen	  (10.	  06.04.11	  p27)	  53	  Interviews	  with:	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11),	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Mari	  11.	  06.04.11),	  	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11),	  	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04),	  (Seth15.05.05.11),	  (Owen16.	  19.05.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11),	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11).	  	  54	  Interview	  with	  Ceri	  (12:	  07.04.11	  p9).	  55	  Interviews	  with:	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  56	  Interviews	  with	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11),	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11).	  	  	  	  	  57	  Interview	  with	  Glen	  (10.	  06.04.11	  p43)	  58	  Interview	  with	  Glen	  (10.	  06.04.11	  p42)	  	  59	  Interview	  with	  Owen	  (16.	  19.05.11	  p17).	  	  60	  Interview	  with	  Seth	  (15.05.05.11	  p17)	  	  61	  Interviews	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11),	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  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11).	  	  	  62	  Interview	  with	  Ceri:(12:	  07.04.11	  p44).	  63	  Interviews	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  (Flash	  25:	  08.09.11).	  	  	  64	  Interviews	  with:	  (Rhys	  4.	  22.02.11),	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11),	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11),	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Glen10.	  06.04.11),	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11),	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04),	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11),	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11).	  	  	  65	  Interview	  with	  Mari	  (11.	  06.04.11	  p25).	  66	  Interview	  with	  Delyth	  (8.	  14.03.11	  p32).	  67	  Interviews	  with:	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11),	  (Glen:10.	  06.04.11).	  	  68	  Interviews	  with	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04),	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11).	  69	  Interview	  with:	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11	  p39).	  	  	  	  70	  Interview	  with	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Ruth	  1.	  20.01.11).	  71	  Interview	  with	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11	  p22)	  72	  Interviews	  with	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  73	  Interview	  with:	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11	  p35).	  	  74	  Interview	  with:	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11	  p28).	  75	  Interview	  with:	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11	  p13).	  	  76	  Interview	  with:	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11	  p45).	  	  77	  Interview	  with:	  (Ceri	  	  (12:	  07.04.11	  p45).	  78	  Interviews	  with:	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11).	  	  	  	  79	  Interview	  with	  (Rhys	  4.	  22.02.11	  p20).	  80	  Interviews	  with:	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11)	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11).	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  81	  Interview	  with:	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11	  p11).	  	  82	  Interview	  with:	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11	  p19).	  83	  Interviews	  with:	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11).	  	  	  84	  Interviews	  with:	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11)	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11).	  	  85	  Interview	  with:	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11	  p4/5).	  86	  Interview	  with:	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11	  p6).	  	  87	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ruth	  1.	  20.01.11),	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11),	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11),	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04),	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11),	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11),	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11).	  	  88	  Interview	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11	  p21).	  89	  Interviews	  with:	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11),	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11),	  (Rhys	  4.	  22.02.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Glen10.	  06.04.11),	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11),	  	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04),	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11),	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11),	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11),	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11),	  	  (Tom	  22:	  07.07.11),	  (Flash	  24:	  08.09.11).	  	  	  	  90	  Interview	  with:	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11	  p7).	  91	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ruth	  1.	  20.01.11),	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Mari	  11.	  06.04.11),	  	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11).	  92	  Interview	  with:	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11	  p15).	  93	  Interview	  with:	  (Mari	  11.	  06.04.11	  p1).	  94	  Interviews	  with:	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Glen10.	  06.04.11),	  	  (Mari	  11.	  06.04.11),	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11),	  (Seth	  15.05.05.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11).	  95	  Interview	  with	  Matt:	  (5.	  28.02.11	  p6).	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  96	  Interview	  with:	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11	  p25).	  	  97	  Interview	  with:	  (Flash	  24:	  08.09.11	  p18).	  98	  Interviews	  with:	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11),	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Flash	  24:	  08.09.11).	  99	  Interview	  with:	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11	  p25).	  100	  Interviews	  with:	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11).	  101	  Interviews	  with:	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11),	  (Terry	  7.	  07.03.11),	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04),	  (Flash	  24:	  08.09.11).	  	  102	  Interview	  with:	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11	  p6).	  103	  Interview	  with	  Terry:	  (7.	  07.03.11	  p20).	  104	  Interview	  with	  Seth	  (1505.05.11).	  105	  Interviews	  with:	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11),	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11),	  (Seth	  1505.05.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11).	  106	  Interview	  with:	  (Flash	  24:	  08.09.11).	  	  107	  Interview	  with:	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11).	  108	  Interview	  with:	  (Mari	  11.	  06.04.11).	  109	  Interview	  with:	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11).	  110	  Interview	  with:	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11).	  111	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11),	  (Glen10.	  06.04.11),	  	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11),	  	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11).	  	  112	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ruth1.	  20.01.11),	  (Matt	  5.	  28.02.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11).	  113	  Interview	  with:	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11).	  114	  Interviews	  with:	  (Seth	  15:05.05.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11).	  115	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11),	  (Seth	  15:05.05.11	  p30).	  	  	  116	  Interviews	  with:	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11).	  117	  Interview	  with:	  (Seth15:05.05.11	  p13).	  	  	  118	  Interview	  with:	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11	  p12).	  	  119	  Interviews	  with:	  (Seth	  15:05.05.11),	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11),	  (Flash	  24:	  08.09.11).	  	  120	  Interview	  with:	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11	  p10).	  121	  Interview	  with:	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11	  p10).	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  122	  Interview	  with:	  (Mari	  11.	  06.04.11	  p4).	  123	  Interview	  with:	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11).	  124	  Interview	  with:	  (Mari	  11.	  06.04.11	  p3).	  125	  Interview	  with:	  (Mari	  11.	  06.04.11	  p4).	  	  126	  Interviews	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.23),	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04).	  127	  Interview	  with:	  (Seth15:05.05.11	  p15).	  128	  Interview	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11	  p23).	  	  129	  Interview	  with:	  (Rod	  23.	  29.07.11	  p11).	  	  130	  Interview	  with:	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11	  p23).	  131	  Interview	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11	  p11).	  132	  Interview	  with:	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11	  p17).	  133	  Interviews	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11	  p12).	  134	  Interviews	  with:	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11).	  135	  Interview	  with:	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11	  p2).	  136	  Interview	  with:	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11	  p7).	  137	  Interview	  with:	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11	  p4).	  138	  Interview	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11	  p2).	  139	  Interviews	  with:	  (	  Ali	  3.21.02.11),	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11).	  	  140	  Interview	  with:	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11	  p15).	  	  	  141	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ruth	  1.	  20.01.11),	  (Derek	  2.	  17.02.11),	  Ali	  (3.21.02.11),	  (Esme	  6.	  03.03.11),	  (Glen10.	  06.04.11),	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04),	  (Dewi	  14.	  26.04.11),	  (Seth	  15:05.05.11),	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11),	  (Tabitha	  20.	  26.05.11),	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11),	  (Flash	  24:	  08.09.11).	  	  	  142	  Interview	  with:	  (Delyth	  8.	  14.03.11	  p5).	  	  143	  Interview	  with:	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11	  p8).	  144	  Interview	  with:	  (Dewi14.	  26.04.11	  p7).	  	  145	  Interview	  with:	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04	  p11).	  146	  Interview	  with:	  (Tom	  22:	  07.07.11	  p12).	  147	  Interview	  with:	  (Tina	  18.	  26.05.11	  p1).	  148	  Interview	  with:	  (Glen10.	  06.04.11	  p11).	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  149	  Interview	  with:	  (Carrie	  17.	  19.05.11	  p10).	  	  	  150	  Interview	  with:	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11	  p15).	  151	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04),	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11	  ),	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11).	  152	  Interviews	  with:	  (Glen10.	  06.04.11),	  (Ralph	  13	  07.04),	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11).	  153	  Interview	  with:	  (Charlotte	  19	  26.05.11	  p26).	  154	  Interviews	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11)	  155	  Interviews	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11),	  (Glen10.	  06.04.11).	  	  156	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11),	  (Dewi	  14.	  26.04.11),	  (Owen	  16.	  19.05.11),	  	  (Flash	  24:	  08.09.11).	  157	  Interview	  with:	  (Ceri	  12:	  07.04.11	  p27).	  158	  Interviews	  with:	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11	  p16).	  159	  Interviews	  with:	  (Gwen	  9.	  16.03.11	  p12).	  160	  Interview	  with:	  (Meic	  21.	  08.06.11).	  	  	  161	  Interview	  with:(Tina	  18.	  26.05.11	  p2).	  	  	  162	  Interview	  with:	  (Ali	  3.21.02.11	  p16).	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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A POSTER AD 
 
Would you be prepared to help? 
      
 
If you have ever experienced psychosis or know someone well 
who has Sue Bisson (a part time PHD student from Cardiff 
University) would love to interview you! 
 
In the interview you will be asked your thoughts about the way 
that psychosis is featured in films.  It does not matter if you do 
not like or know any films – this is also of interest to Sue. If 
you love film that is great too!  At the end of the interview you 
will be shown 2 clips and asked to give your views. 
 
The interview is a chance for you to make your opinions 
known.  It will be taped and will take place at a time and place 
that is convenient for you. 
 
Sue can be contacted by email (sue.bisson@btinternet.com) 
 
Or by ‘phone (07968 047516) 
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It would be great if you could find time to help. 
 Thank you for your interest! 
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APPENDIX B INFORMATION SHEET 
 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESEARCH 
Title of Project: The Representation of Psychosis in film. 
 
Name of Researcher: Susan Bisson  
 
Part 1 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please 
take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you 
wish. Ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
Please take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to look at the way in which psychosis is represented in film in order 
to examine why representations are as they appear in film.  
 
Why have I been asked?   
You have been chosen because you have been identified as someone who has 
experienced psychosis. 
 
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you will 
be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you 
decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not have any sort 
of repercussion. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to take part in the study you will be given a pre-interview questionnaire 
asking you about film.  You will then be asked to take part in an interview that will take 
approximately an hour. During the interview you will be asked about your opinions on 
film.  This interview will be audio taped and will include two film clips. 
 
What sorts of questions will I be asked? 
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Initially you will be asked about film in general and the sorts of films that you like and 
dislike. You will then be asked about your views on the representation of psychosis in 
film. You will be asked your opinion on whether certain types of film treat psychosis in 
different ways and whether some films show psychosis more than others.  You will also 
be asked specifically about what it is like to experience psychosis. Finally you will be 
asked what advice you would give to a filmmaker who wished to include a 
representation of psychosis in his/her film. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
This will be a useful opportunity to make your own first hand views on psychosis and the 
way it is shown in film known to others. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any possible harm 
you might suffer will be addressed.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? Is it possible to remain 
anonymous? 
The answer to both of these questions is ‘yes.’  Ethical and legal practice will be 
followed and all information about you will be handled in confidence. Data will be stored 
securely.  In the event of any publication or presentation resulting from the research 
your name will be changed and you will remain anonymous.  Just to re-iterate, you will 
not be named in any publications resulting from this research.  Once the interviews and 
focus group discussion is over the session will be transcribed and all participants will be 
given fake names.  
 
 
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering participation, 
please read the additional information in Part 2 before making any decision. 
 
 
Part 2 
 
What will happen if I don’t carry on with the study? 
If you withdraw from the study, I will destroy all your identifiable information.  With your 
permission I will use the data you have given up until your withdrawal.  This will be anonymous.  
If you would prefer the data not to be used at all it will be withdrawn completely.  
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What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to Sue Bisson, 
the researcher ,who will do her best to answer your questions. Further contacts at JOMEC 
include Dr Matt Hills, the research supervisor and Dr Andrew Williams the Ethics officer at 
JOMEC. 
	  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information will be made anonymous and stored in compliance with the data 
protection act.  No individual will be able to be identified in any reports or publications 
that result from the study.   
 
	  
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will be presented in the form of a PhD thesis and may be written 
up for publication in journals. If you would like a copy of the summary report this will be 
available to you after the study is completed.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed and approved by the JOMEC ethics committee. 
 
In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during the research and 
this is due to someone’s negligence then you may have grounds for legal action for 
compensation against Cardiff University, but you may have to pay your legal costs.   
 
Contact for Further Information 
If you require any further information about this study, please contact : Susan Bisson, 
JOMEC, Bute Building, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3NB. 
Telephone: 07968 047516.  Email: sue.bisson@btinternet.com 
 
 
 Thank you for considering taking part in this study. 
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APPENDIX C – PRE-INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
PRE-INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE: 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in an interview for my PHD project which 
will look at how psychosis is shown in film.  Thinking about the following 
questions will mean that we can get off to a good start in talking about films 
when we meet up for an interview.  Please do not worry if you cannot think of 
any films which feature psychosis – this does not matter at all as my PhD is 
also about whether, or not, these types of films are popular at all. 
 
1 Roughly how often do you watch a film? 
 
 
 
2 What sorts of films do you like? 
 
 
 
 
3  Are there any sorts of films you particularly dislike? 
 
 
 
 
 
4 If you do watch a film where do you tend to watch it? (for example at the 
cinema or at home) and do you tend to watch alone or with other people? 
 
5 Can you remember watching any films that have featured psychosis.  Please 
list them in the boxes below.  Two columns are included – one for films that 
you have enjoyed and one for films that you have not enjoyed. 
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FILMS YOU HAVE ENJOYED 
 
FILMS THAT YOU HAVE NOT 
ENJOYED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Do you think that your enjoyment of the film had anything at all to do with 
the way in which psychosis is shown in the film? Try and explain your reaction 
to the film.   
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APPENDIX D – INTERVIEW GUIDELINE 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDELINE 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective is to discover what those who have experienced psychosis and 
their close contacts think of representations of psychosis in film. Two 
guidelines exist: one for the cohort that has experienced psychosis and the 
other for the cohort of close contacts.   
Questions that will answer this objective will centre on the following 
areas: 
1: What film consumption is like (i.e. whether, or not, films are a relevant area 
of cultural interest for the two distinct cohorts and how they tend to be 
consumed). 
2: Whether the interviewee can recognise/nominate any films at all that feature 
psychosis and if so what they are. 
3: Whether the interviewee has any opinions on the actual representation and 
if so what these are. 
The main questions in the interview guide will be designed to be in descriptive 
form.  They will not be asked rigidly and may show some variety in order to 
elicit the above.  The questions are designed to be conversational and to 
encourage the interviewees to begin describing their own cultural arenas.  
Hopefully the interviewees will be able to access material about their 
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experiences and understandings in relation to filmic representations of 
psychosis. The focus of my study is on what is going on rather than why it is 
going on.   
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE COHORT THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED 
PSYCHOSIS 
The introductory questions link to the pre-interview questionnaire and 
are designed to put the interviewee at their ease; they will not take up 
much interview time but will merely act as icebreakers.  
1:  Tell me about your favourite films. 
2: Tell me about films that you have particularly disliked and the reasons why. 
3: Could you tell me about what it is like to experience psychosis? 
4: Do you expect certain types of film to look at the subject of psychosis more 
than others?  For example is psychosis featured in romantic comedies more 
than in documentary or art house movies more than mainstream? 
5: Does the way in which psychosis is shown in films differ according to genre? 
(For example if psychosis appears in the horror genre does this tend to be in a 
way that is different from when it is shown in an action movie?) 
6: What sorts of films do a good job of capturing the experience of psychosis? 
7: What sorts of films do a bad job in capturing the experience of psychosis? 
8: Do you think that anything you have personally learnt about psychosis has 
come from film or another media text? 
9: What sorts of advice would you give to a filmmaker who was considering 
making a film that features psychosis? 
 
 
Follow up questions and prompts will be used to elicit as much information as 
possible.  
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE COHORT OF CLOSE CONTACTS WHO HAVE 
WITNESSED PSYCHOSIS 
The introductory questions link to the pre-interview questionnaire and 
are designed to put the interviewee at their ease; they will not take up 
much interview time but will merely act as icebreakers.  
1:  Tell me about your favourite films. 
2: Tell me about films that you have particularly disliked and the reasons why. 
3: Could you tell me about what it is like to be an onlooker when somebody 
close to you experiences psychosis? 
4: Do you expect certain types of film to look at the subject of psychosis more 
than others?  For example is psychosis featured in romantic comedies more 
than in documentary or art house movies more than mainstream? 
5: Does the way in which psychosis is shown in films differ according to genre? 
(For example if psychosis appears in the horror genre does this tend to be in a 
way that is different from when it is shown in an action movie?) 
6: What sorts of films do a good job of capturing the experience of psychosis? 
7: What sorts of films do a bad job in capturing the experience of psychosis? 
8: Do you think that anything you have personally learnt about psychosis has 
come from film or another media text? 
9: What sorts of advice would you give to a filmmaker who was considering 
making a film that features psychosis? 
 
 
Follow up questions and prompts will be used to elicit as much information as 
possible.  
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APPENDIX E- CONSENT FORM 
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APPENDIX F – INTERVIEWEE DESCRIPTORS 
DESCRIPTORS OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
No of 
interview 
NAME GENDER AGE OCCUPATION 
EDUCATION 
SELF 
NOMINATED 
CONDITION 
1 Ruth 
 
Female 20-30 Part time M.A. 
Student 
Schizophrenia 
2 Derek Male 30-40 Working for 
Hafal 
Computers 
Technical 
Middle Class 
Bipolar 
3 Ali Female 
 
30-40 M.A 
Student 
Schizophrenia 
4 Rhys Male 40-50 Degree.   Own 
business 
computers 
Technical 
middle class 
Bipolar 
5 Matt 
 
Male 30-40 Carpenter 
Precariat 
Schizophrenia 
6 Esme Female 50-60 Administrator 
For post office 
(former)  
New affluent 
workers 
Close contact 
(Mother) 
7 Terry Male 60-70 Former 
accountant 
Established 
Middle Class 
Close contact 
Depression 
8 Delyth Female 40-50 Not working 
Precariat 
 
Not specified 
but has 
experienced 
psychosis 
9 Gwen Female 40-50 Former 
journalist  
Established 
Middle Class 
Schizophrenia 
10 Glen Male 40-50 Farmer 
Traditional 
Working Class 
Bipolar 
11 Mari Female 70+ Retired nurse 
Technical 
Middle Class 
Carer 
(Life partner) 
 
12 Ceri Female 60-70 Retired social 
worker 
Established 
Middle Class 
Bipolar 
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13 Ralph Male 50-60 Former art 
teacher 
Technical 
Middle Class 
Bipolar 
14 Dewi Male 20-30 Student  Schizo affective 
disorder 
15 Seth Male 40-50 Former mental 
health worker 
Emergent 
Service 
Sector 
Bipolar 
16 Owen  Male 40-50 Poet 
Technical 
Middle Class 
Bipolar 
17 Carrie Female 30-40 Forensic 
scientist 
Technical 
Middle Class 
Bipolar 
18 Tina Female 50-60 Farm worker 
Traditional 
Working Class 
Bipolar 
 
 
19 
 
Charlotte Female 40-50 Hairdresser 
Emergent 
Service 
Sector 
Bipolar 
 
20 Tabitha Female 
 
 
40-50 
 
 
Former nanny 
Precariat 
 
Schizophrenia/ 
Bipolal 
21 Meic Male 40-50 Aluminium  
Fitter  
Traditional 
Working Class 
Schizophrenia 
22 Tom Male 30-40 Mental Health 
worker 
Emergent 
Service 
Sector 
Bipolar 
23 Rod Male 40-50 Retired social 
services 
Traditional 
Working Class 
 
Bipolar 
24 Flash Male  60-70 Retired guest 
house owner 
Emergent 
Service 
Sector 
 
Schizophrenia 
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APPENDIX G – INTERVIEW LOG 
INTERVIEW INTERVIEWEE PAGES DATE 
1 KATHERINE (RUTH) 25 20.01.11 
2 DAVE (DEREK) 24 17.02.11 
3 ISOBEL (ALI) 39 21.02.11 
4 CHRIS (RHYS) 33 22.02.11 
5 MARK  (MATT) 40 28.02.11 
6 MAUREEN (ESME) 22 03.03.11 
7 TONY  (TERRY) 32 07.03.11 
8 MARGARET (DELYTH) 34 14.03.11 
9 JAYNE (GWEN) 28 16.03.11 
10 GARETH (GLEN) 45 06.04.11 
11 JUDITH (MARI) 35 06.04.11 
12 KATE (CERI) 45 07.04.11 
13 JOHN (RALPH) 30 07.04.11 
14 TRISTRAM (DEWI) 29 26.04.11 
15 DAVE (SETH) 41 05.05.11 
16 ANTHONY (OWEN) 43 19.05.11 
17 DEB (CARRIE) 34 19.05.11 
18 ROSALIA (TINA) 35 26.05.11 
19 JULIA (CHARLOTTE) 51 26.05.11 
20 MARGERET (TABITHA) 35 26.05.11 
21 JONATHAN (MEIC) 32 08.06.11 
22 STEVE (TOM) 25 07.07.11 
23 NIGEL (ROD) 24 29.07.11 
24 JONATHAN (FLASH) 25 08.09.11 
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APPENDIX H – TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS 
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